


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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THE present volume is one of a series of selections from the Punjab Government records which have been published by the Punjab Government. The volumes constituting the series are—

The Delhi Residency and
Agency Records ... 1807-1857, Volume I.

The Ludhiana Agency Records, 1808-1815, Volume II.

The Political Diaries of the
Resident at Lahore and his
Assistants ... 1846-1849, Volumes
III—VI.

The Mutiny Records—Corres-
pondence and Reports ... 1857-1858, Volumes
VII and VIII each
in two Parts.

It had been intended to issue further volumes also, dealing with (a) the records of the Karnal, Ambala and Ludhiana Agencies (including the despatches of Sir D. Ochterlony, Superintendent of Political Affairs and Agent to the Governor-General at Ludhiana, and the diaries of his Assistant, Captain G. Birch), 1816—1840 ; (b) the records of the North-West Frontier Agency, 1840—1845, and (c) those of the Lahore Residency, 1846—1849 ; but it has been found necessary on financial grounds to postpone the publication of these further papers.

The material for the volumes issued has been prepared and put through the Press by Mr. A. Raynor, late Registrar of the Punjab Civil Secretariat.

LAHORE :

December 1915.



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
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
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Photogravure.

Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, July 1908.

COLONEL G. W. HAMILTON.

COMMISSIONER OF MULTAN IN 1857.

MUTINY REPORTS.

CHAPTER V.

REPORTS ON EVENTS IN THE MULTAN DIVISION.

46. *From Major G. W. HAMILTON, Commissioner and Superintendent, Mooltan Division, to R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, Lahore,—No. 42, dated Mooltan, the 24th February 1858.*

As required by your Circular No. 5 of the 16th ultimo, I have the honor to transmit narratives of a portion of the occurrences in this division during the mutinies. The remaining narrative will shortly follow.

Narrative of events in the Multán Division.

NARRATIVE.

THE first intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi was received by Major G. W. Hamilton, Commissioner and Superintendent of the Mooltan Division, at Mooltan, on the evening of the 13th of May 1857, in a note from R. Montgomery, Esquire, C. S., Judicial Commissioner.

Receipt of news of Mutiny.

2. Reference to the Map of India will at once place the reader in possession of the geographical position of Mooltan. As a military post it could not be overestimated. The fort contained munitions of war to the value of 15 lacs of rupees; its maintenance was vitally necessary, not only to keep open the river communication—the only means of obtaining reinforcements from Bombay—but to check the more than

Geographical position of Multán and its importance.

doubtful Mahomedan ally of Bahawalpoor, holding a large tract of country on the left banks of the Indus and Sutlej, ever ready in the event of any further disaster to intrigue with our troops, invade the British territories and by his presence stimulate the people to rebellion and lay siege to the fort. It will thus be seen that its safety was of the deepest importance and extremely critical.

Troops at
Multán.

3. At that time the troops consisted of—

European Company of Artillery,
4th Troop, 3rd Brigade of Horse Artillery (Native),
62nd Regiment, Native Infantry,
69th Regiment, Native Infantry,
1st Irregular Cavalry,

exclusive of the head-quarters of the 3rd Katar Mookhi Police Battalion, 250 strong, and of a troop of mounted police amounting to 100 sabres.

Doubtful
loyalty of
troops.

4. Although no open symptoms of insubordination had been made manifest, there was great reason for suspecting the fidelity of the Native troops.

The cartridge question had certainly been discussed in the regiments of Native Infantry, and it was the current belief in the city and bazars that any attempt made to force the objectionable ammunition on the troops would cause an explosion.

Instances of
growing dis-
affection.

5. Many instances of growing disaffection could be adduced, but one or two will fully exemplify—

1st—A sepoy rushed into the Assistant Commissioner's Kutchery two hours before the arrival of the post conveying the *Calcutta Gazette* announcing the disbanding of the 34th Regiment, Native Infantry, and asked "what is the news." Receiving in reply that the post had not arrived, he left with an incredulous smile, implying knowledge of more than inclined to disclose.

2nd—The sepoys daily surrounded the post office asking unusual and inquisitive questions to the bodily fear and alarm of the whole establishment.

3rd—Family remittances invariably made through Government, but lately through native agency, were re-demanded in cash payment.

4th—The price and purchase of gold mohurs increased hourly, warranting the anxiety to rid themselves of cumbersome silver.¹

6. The intelligence received from Lahore was at once communicated by the Commissioner to Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks, Commanding the Station, and that officer immediately entered into communication with Major Chamberlain and his Brigade Staff. Colonel Hicks was not of opinion that there was any cause to suspect the Native Infantry, but on the representations made to him, particularly by Major Chamberlain, he willingly agreed that it was advisable to take all necessary precautions in case of an outbreak. It was the opinion of Major Chamberlain that the regiment under his command would remain faithful from the fact of his senior Resaldar and the Woordee-Major having reported to him that men of the Native Infantry Corps had been amongst his own, urging them to join the common cause, which they declined to do, and that whilst little confidence could be placed in the loyalty of the Native Infantry, particularly in respect to the 69th, there was every hope that the Native Horse Artillery would adhere to its allegiance.

Opinions of
Commanding
Officers as to
the feelings of
their corps.

Both the Commissioner and Captain Tronson, Captain of Police, were fully confident that the utmost trust could be placed in the Katar Mookhi Police Battalion and in the Mounted Police.

7. The head-quarters of the Battalion being located in the fort, which contained the magazine and heavy ordnance, Colonel Hicks, at the request of the Commissioner, made over

Measures for
defence of the
fort in case of
necessity.

¹ NOTE.—For the benefit of our English readers it is important to state that the middle and lower classes carry their coin round the waist, either in a leathern girdle or a purse of fine cord.

charge of the place to him, who in conjunction with Captains Tronson and Spencer (Commissary of Ordnance) immediately made arrangements for providing for its defence and for rendering it a place of refuge in the event of an outbreak. Although the ramparts had been demolished, it still consisted of an enclosure capable of some slight defence. All the available detachments of the Police Battalion were recalled to head-quarters and a contingent guard of extra police was substituted at the jail for that furnished by the Police Battalion. By these means the garrison was slightly increased, and the outposts of the Mounted Police being recalled, that force was increased by 120 sabres.

Captain Spencer undertook to improve the defences of the fort, and in a short time had several pieces of ordnance mounted in commanding positions. He also organized a battery of two field pieces manned by the Europeans of the magazine establishment assisted by trustworthy natives. In the course of a few days these arrangements had so far advanced that there was every hope the fort would afford an adequate protection to the European establishments and troops in the event of an outbreak. Provisions were also laid in for six months' consumption, and in the meantime Majors Hamilton and Voyle (Deputy Commissioner) had taken every precaution.

At the request of the Commissioner, Lieut. Etheridge, I. N., detained the steamer which was then at the ghaut for a few days, until the arrangements regarding the fort were completed, in case its services should be required. These arrangements had been effected prior to the receipt of the instructions of the Chief and Judicial Commissioners of nearly the same purport. The Editor of the native newspaper published at Mooltan had also been instructed by the Commissioner to submit his paper for inspection prior to its publication, and to this order the Editor gave a ready compliance.

Other precautionary measures.

8. The whole of the native correspondence was stopped and examined. Only one or two letters of importance were discovered, one leading to the execution of the author. Most

of the ferries were closed, and those which remained open were carefully guarded. All fakeers, foreigners and suspected persons were arrested, and every possible measure taken to prevent news from other parts of the country reaching the Native troops. The guards of extra police on the city were strengthened and furnished with arms and ammunition, and frequent patrols were sent between the city and cantonments, Police Cavalry being placed upon the bridges leading therefrom, to convey the first symptoms of an outbreak. The officers in command of the frontier posts of Derah Ghazee Khan and Asnee were informed of the occurrences at Mooltan and requested to hold their available force in readiness. These requisitions were immediately attended to; but, as Colonel Hicks objected to calling in the aid of these troops, they were not moved to Mooltan until the special order of the Punjab Government to that effect was received.

Moving of
troops from
frontier to
Multán.

Captain T. W. Hughes, Commanding the 1st Punjab Cavalry, marched upon his own responsibility immediately upon hearing of the outbreak, feeling that his regiment would in all probability be required either at Mooltan or elsewhere. The services subsequently performed by this gallant officer and his noble regiment are matter of history.

On the 9th June the following frontier troops had reached Mooltan :—

1st Regiment, Punjab Cavalry ;

Wing, 2nd Regiment, Punjab Infantry.

These were placed under the orders of Major Hamilton and located in the "Am Khas" near the fort and about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from cantonments, the object being to keep them perfectly separate from the disaffected regiments.

Intelligence of the despatch of the left wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Sind for Mooltan had been received some days before this, but the time of its arrival was very uncertain. For this addition to the European force suitable arrangements were made in cantonments by converting the gunsheds, native hospitals and other buildings into barracks; two temporary barracks were also commenced.

Arrangements
for housing of
1st Bombay
Fusiliers ex-
pected from
Sindh.

At that time the treasure had been removed into the fort, leaving, however, the guard of Native Infantry at the empty treasury, whilst the magazine guard of Native Infantry in the fort had been relieved by another furnished by the Police Battalion.

Disarming of
Native troops
by Major C.
Chamberlain.

9. The disaffection of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, now no longer admitting of a doubt, and hourly reports being made of an intended outbreak, a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry under the personal command of Captain Hughes was moved on the afternoon of that date into the lines of the 1st Irregular Cavalry to strengthen them, 200 men of that corps being absent at their homes on furlough. About 9 P. M. of the same evening orders were received from the Punjab Government, addressed to the Commissioner and Major Chamberlain, for the immediate disarming of the Native Infantry Regiments and entrusting the execution of the order to the latter officer. The same night arrangements were made for carrying the order into effect, but no communication was made to the residents of cantonments until next morning.

The necessity of disarming the Native Infantry had from the commencement been apparent, and its execution had been delayed only from the want of means to overawe that force. On the arrival of a portion of the Punjab regiments arrangements had been made by the Commissioner, Major Chamberlain, and the officers in command of the Punjab regiments and Police, for the advance of the force from the fort and civil lines on cantonments for the purpose of disarming the disaffected troops or suppressing any outbreak. On the arrival of the order for disarming the troops it only remained to carry into effect the preconcerted plan.

At gun-fire of the 10th June Colonel Hicks was furnished with the orders of the Punjab Government and requested to direct a parade of the whole of the troops in garrison. This was accordingly done, and in accordance with arrangements decided upon the night before, the Punjab Cavalry and Infantry marched down to cantonments by two separate

roads. The Cavalry by the road to the right debouching on the grand parade was to cut off fugitives should the troops about to be disarmed have dispersed before the whole force had assembled, whilst the Infantry moved direct on to the parade from the city and was concealed until it made its appearance from the rear of the Irregular Cavalry lines. The troops arrived at their destinations most opportunely and took up their positions at the proper moment in the order as shewn in the annexed plan.¹ The Horse Artillery masked by a portion of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and supported by the European Company of Artillery, the Punjab Infantry being on their left flank. The 62nd Regiment, Native Infantry, in $\frac{1}{4}$ distance column, originally occupied the ground to the left of the 1st Irregular Cavalry, but were afterwards advanced to the front, the Punjab Cavalry taking their place. At the same time the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, also in $\frac{1}{4}$ distance column, were marched from their own parade to the grand parade and halted in contiguous close columns with the 62nd in front of the masked battery. The whole of these movements were executed without the slightest confusion or hesitation.

Disarming of
Native troops
by Major C.
Chamberlain.

A general order was then read to the two corps of Native Infantry, and they were afterwards addressed in a few words by Major Chamberlain, who informed them that the orders of Government had been received for their disarming and that it was absolutely necessary their arms should be surrendered at once; that if they obeyed the order quietly no harm would befall them, but if the slightest hesitation was shewn he was prepared to enforce the order at all risks. At this moment by a preconcerted signal the 1st Punjab Cavalry by a flank moved to the left, unmasked the Horse Artillery of six field pieces, loaded with grape and port-fires lighted.

The battery was manned by natives, but each piece was supported by 8 European Artillerymen with loaded fusils. It was afterwards found that the guns had been laid by the native troopers directly on the 69th Regiment, Native

¹ Not traceable in the Secretariat records.

Disarming of
Native troops
by Major C.
Chamberlain.

Infantry, thus evincing their sentiments with regard to the men of this corps.

The 62nd Regiment, Native Infantry, piled their arms without delay, some of the men exclaiming that the Government which had given the arms had a right to demand them, but some slight hesitation was observed amongst the men of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry.

The disarmed columns were then moved to the right and left and Cavalry interposed between the piles of arms and each column. The men were then ordered to take off their accoutrements. Their lines and bells of arms were searched and all arms found in them taken away. All the station and regimental guards were relieved by parties of disarmed men and the arms of the guards piled with those of regiments. Strong guards of the 1st Irregular Cavalry were put over the regimental expense magazine store rooms, and by 11 o'clock the whole of the arms had been despatched to the fort and the parade dismissed. The removal of the ammunition occupied until early the following morning.

Thus happily terminated without bloodshed a matter of great moment when the absence of European agency is considered.

The demand for every European and frontier native soldier to reinforce the army before Delhi utterly precluded the possibility of European aid from Lahore, distant 206 miles. The reduction of the steamers on the Indus consequent upon the Persian War left but slight means at the disposal of the Scinde Government for the transport of European troops, which had been urgently called for, the first detachment of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers being at this time not nearer than Sukkur, distant 500 miles.

Disarming of
guard of 69th
Native In-
fantry over
the Treasury.

10. Simultaneously with the disarming of the troops in cantonments a strong guard of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, at the local treasury in the Edgah was disarmed by a party of the Katar Mookhi Battalion and Mounted Police under Captain Tronson, who effected this important measure with the same success.

11. It would not be proper to omit to notice the effect which was produced on the inhabitants of the city by the disarming of the troops of the line. Previous to this operation great alarm had prevailed amongst the citizens : most of them had buried their wealth, and many had left the town or sent away their families ; but no sooner had the troops been disarmed than the principal inhabitants waited on the Commissioner, congratulated him upon the result and expressed their gratification at the removal of their apprehension. In a short time the whole of the people who had left returned to the city.

Effect of the disarming of the Native troops on the inhabitants of the Multán City.

12. The only inhabitants of rank at Mooltan are the descendants of the Mahomedan saints, who are also the guardians of the numerous shrines and places of pilgrimage which abound in the district, and a few remains of the old Pathan nobility. The former have much influence with the community, and it was a fortunate circumstance that at this crisis they, with one exception, stood faithful to the British Government and in general were anxious to evince their loyalty by every means in their power.

Fidelity of Muhammad-ans of rank in Multán.

The most conspicuous amongst these was Makhdum, Shah Mahmood, Kooreshee, within the *enceinte* of the fort. The Pathan Chiefs had rendered eminent service during the last Punjab War, and on the present occasion they also shewed their readiness to come forward in aid of the State, but they had little influence in the country.

Makhdum, Shah Mahmud, Kooreshi.

13. By order of the Punjab Government Gholam Moostapha Khan, Khagwanee, organized a resallah of Irregular Cavalry, with which he afterwards did good service under General Cortlandt.

Ghulam Mustapha Khan, Khagwani.

14. The only classes from whom much danger was to be apprehended were the predatory clans inhabiting the Bar or central tracts of the peninsulas between the rivers. From time immemorial these clans had been addicted to robbery and cattle-lifting, and under former Governments had repeatedly broken out in insurrection. Since the establishment of the British rule their predatory habits had been suppressed,

Danger apprehended from inhabitants of the "Bár."

but it was still to be feared they might take advantage of any disturbance to return to their old occupation. The chiefs of these clans in the Mooltan district were summoned to the Commissioner and detained until all doubt of their honest intentions was removed. They endeavoured to evince their good wishes by furnishing some horses for the Irregular Cavalry raised in the district.

Description of districts of Gugera and Jhang.

15. The other districts comprised in the Mooltan division are Googaira and Jhung. The former is wild, partly agricultural, but more distinguished as a pastoral tract, producing large herds of camels, cattle, sheep, goats and a few horses of a good breed. The inhabitants of the pastoral tracts are chiefly herdsmen, associated in clans under influential chiefs, and are similar in habits and character to the predatory tribes of the Mooltan district.

Disarming of detachment of 49th Native Infantry at Gugera.

16. The station of Googaira is situated near the Ravee, about 130 miles from Mooltan and 75 from Lahore. The station was occupied at the commencement of the outbreak by a company of the 49th Regiment, Native Infantry, under a Native Officer, employed in guarding the treasury, aided by 80 of the "Kuttar Mookhee" Battalion and a portion of a resallah of Mounted Police. Shortly after the intelligence of the outbreak of Meerut and Delhi, Lieutenant Elphinstone, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, acting with very great promptitude and energy, by aid of the Police disarmed the company of Native Infantry without any opposition and replaced them by the same. On the spread of the insurrection to Sirsa in the beginning of June Lieutenant Elphinstone immediately detached as many as could be spared of the Police Battalion, together with a troop of Mounted Police completed to full strength, as also a body of the district police, to the aid of the force moving from Ferozepore under General Cortlandt to oppose the insurgents. This detail of Police rendered most eminent service in the Military operations which ensued.

Assistance sent by Lieutenant Elphinstone to General Van Cortlandt's force moving against Sirsa.

Outbreak in Gugera Jail.

17. On the 26th July a most daring attempt was made by the prisoners in the Googaira Jail to effect their escape

during the night. Several of them succeeded in getting over the outer wall and about 20 fled into the jungle. The outbreak was suppressed by the energy of Lieutenant Elphinstone and Mr. Berkely aided by the effective assistance of the jail guard furnished by the Police, but about 40 of the prisoners were killed and wounded.

18. Under instructions from the Chief Commissioner, a Resallah of Irregular Cavalry was raised at Googaira by Lieutenant Elphinstone, and on being completed was sent out of the district for general service. A resallah of Belooch Horse, which had been pushed on before, was found wanting in discipline, and consequently sent back across the Indus to be disbanded. Half a resallah, newly raised in the Jhang district, was then substituted for the performance of their duties, and a considerable body of the district Police was further taken for service in the North-Western Provinces.

Levies raised
in Gugera.

By order of the Punjab Government a levy was also raised at Googaira for recruits for the new Punjab regiments.

19. The station of Jhung is about 100 miles from Mooltan. In the district there are some powerful pastoral clans formerly much addicted to robbery, but since the establishment of the British Government they have in a great measure reformed.

Precautions
taken in the
Jhang District
by Lieutenant
Hawes, De-
puty Com-
missioner.

Ismail Khan, chief of the Syals, has a pension and holds the command of a troop of Police Horse. The Chief of the Bhutwannahs, the most powerful clan of the Syal tribe, had faithfully adhered to the British during the last war, and from their character no apprehension was entertained that they would swerve from their allegiance. Subsequent events fully proved the correctness of this opinion.

The troops at Jhung consisted of a company of the 16th Regiment, Native Infantry, furnishing a guard to the treasury, a company of the Kuttar Mookhee Police Battalion employed in guarding the jail and other civil duties, and a troop of Mounted Police.

In this district the necessary precautions were taken by Lieutenant Hawes, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, to guard the ferries and apprehend suspected characters. The company of Native Infantry was not disarmed, but in June was relieved and marched to Lahore, their ammunition being kept at Jhang. A troop of Mounted Police was raised from the yeomanry of the district. On the mutiny of the 14th Regiment, Native Infantry, at Jhelum in July a party of the mutineers, consisting of a Soobadar and 8 sepoys, seized possession of an officer's pleasure-boat and dropped down the Jhelum River. They were, however, arrested by the river police near Kadirpoor, brought into Jhang, tried, convicted and executed.

Measures
taken against
mutineers of
the 69th
Native In-
fantry.

20. On the evening of the day of the disarming three or four sepoys of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, deserted; one was caught, brought to trial before a Court-martial and condemned to death.¹ Sundry disclosures, however, made by him to Major Chamberlain the night before obtained him a reprieve, but the execution parade was to allow some arrests to be made from among the mutineers.

On this occasion Nahur Khan, Soobadar-Major of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, and some others of that regiment were arrested and at once confined in separate guards.² Most of them subsequently were released from the want of thoroughly convincing evidence against them, but the enquiries instituted in their cases produced evidence which led to the conviction of the leading mutineers.

Passage of
troops
through the
Multán Dis-
trict.

21. On the 14th June the 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry marched towards Ferozepore, and on the same morning three companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry arrived from Derah Ghazee Khan.

¹ NOTE.—A man of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was tried at the same time and another of that regiment had been previously condemned to imprisonment by the Commissioner for seditious language.

² NOTE.—Nahur Khan was sent to the fort. A horse was provided for him from the 1st Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, but he had scarcely mounted when it reared and fell on him,—an omen which the natives present were not slow to interpret as a warning of his fate.

On the 19th, 20th and 21st idem the left wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers arrived from Sind on steamers, disembarked and marched into cantonments, where ample provision had been made for their accommodation through the exertions of the Executive Officer, Captain Rose, in a position which enabled the European troops to protect the guns. Previous to this the barracks had been held by a detail of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, the guns having been removed from the charge of the Native Horse Artillery and placed under care of the European detail, who were also employed in manning a light field battery drawn by bullocks.

Arrival at Multán of left wing of 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Sind.

22. In accordance with instructions received from Lahore the wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers was immediately despatched to Lahore. The heat at that time was excessive, and from its effects and the previous exposure to which the men had been subject during their voyage up the river they suffered severely, losing eight men at the first stage, but during the remainder of the march there was no further mortality.

Transfer of wing of Bombay Fusiliers to Lahore.

23. Mooltan was thus again doomed to an outbreak before it could be secured by the arrival of the right wing of the Fusiliers. The risk was great, but the demands for additional troops to oppose the mutineers at Delhi were most urgent, and the success which had hitherto attended the conduct of affairs at Mooltan fully justified the authorities in endeavouring to maintain their position, however precarious it might be, without the aid of a competent European force.

Insufficiency of European troops at Multán.

24. On the 8th of July the right wing of the 1st Belooch Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Farquhar arrived by water from Sind and on the 10th idem the 2nd Punjab Infantry marched for Ferozepore. On the same date 100 men of the 3rd Police Battalion and 110 sowars of Ghoolam Moostapha Khan's resallah, which had been recently raised in the district, left for Sirsa.

Arrival of Baluch Battalion and right wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers at Multán.

On the same date and a few following days the principal portion of the right wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers under Major Hogge arrived by steamers from Sind, and the left

wing of the 1st Belooch Battalion followed after a short interval.

Search for
arms in
Multán.

25. To prevent any chance of arms being concealed, a rigid search was made for them everywhere. All employés of Government in the Civil Department and their servants had been previously restricted in carrying arms, and the same order was now extended to cantonments and its bazars, whence a considerable supply was procured. These arms were found of great use in arming the extra police levies and newly raised resallahs. Restrictions were also placed on the sale of gun powder and percussion caps by shopkeepers.

Meetings held
by the sepoys.

26. About this time Major Voyle and Major Chamberlain were in almost daily communication touching the meetings held at the Shewallah, and it was whilst in consultation upon the subject that some discharged men of the 69th were brought up for transportation beyond the Sutlej. It is an odd circumstance, but nevertheless a fact, that the Native Officers of the 69th by false representations secured the discharge as *badmashes* of some men whose greatest crime appeared to be a disinclination to be mixed up in the feeling of mutiny extant in the corps.

Manner in
which a clue
to the designs
of the 69th
Native In-
fantry was
obtained.

It was an individual of the above description who unhesitatingly stated he was only one of several who would be ejected, and, as the remark was too good to be lost, his evidence was at once committed to paper.

Names were divulged as also intentions, and it was loudly asserted that but for the sudden disarming the smothered desire to mutiny would have burst forth in all its fury. It appears that arrangements had been made for the fulfilment of plans and that possibly attempts would still be made to cause bloodshed.

In further view to preserving secrecy, the Native Officers of the 69th had begged their Commanding Officer not to allow the men to leave their lines. Outsiders were also forbidden, so that it was a matter of difficulty to have any communication with them at all.

The difficulty now existing was to secure trustworthy evidence.

Various methods were put into play. One was to send men of the 1st Irregular Cavalry disguised as fakeers into the lines of both regiments, but especially of the 69th, to converse with men who were named as being able to disclose; and the other was to secure the co-operation of a Native Officer. Happily both were successful.

Steps taken
to procure
evidence.

The men to whom the first task was assigned had to deny themselves repeatedly, and on more than one occasion found their legs more useful than argument.

The other was arranged upon a suggestion of Major Chamberlain by his excellent and energetic Woordee-Major Burkut Allee, who entered heart and soul into the task upon which his Commandant's energies were bestowed.

Another Native Officer of the same regiment, Naib-Resaldar Shydad Khan, also did very excellent service in the cause, and by the middle of July the chain was sufficiently complete for investigation by a General European Court-martial of five Officers, at which Major Chamberlain was Government prosecutor.

Evidence
obtained.

27. On Monday, 20th July, Nahur Khan, Soobadar-Major, was arraigned on the following charges and found guilty:—

Court-martial
of Nahur
Khan, Suba-
dar-Major,
69th Native
Infantry.

Charges.

Soobadar-Major Nahur Khan, of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, placed in confinement by order of Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks, Commanding at Mooltan, and charged with sedition and exciting mutiny in the following instances:—

First instance.—In having at Mooltan at evening roll-call, on or about the 7th June 1857, said to the men of (his) the Grenadier Company, 69th Regiment, Native Infantry: "Whatever orders you receive from Government obey, but if you keep your hands and feet strong you can get service wherever you go, or words to that effect,

thereby conveying to the minds of the men he addressed that they should not allow themselves to be disarmed.

Second instance.—In having at the same place, on or about the 11th June 1857, falsely stated that the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, would be destroyed next morning, or words to that effect, thereby creating a feeling of despondency and alarm.

Third instance.—In having at the same place during the months of April and May 1857 come to the knowledge of a certain feeling of dissatisfaction in his regiment on the subject of cartridges, which he failed to report to his Commanding Officer.

The above being in breach of the Articles of War.

For submission to an European General Court-martial under the provisions of Act 8 of 1857 by order of Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks, Commanding at Mooltan.

| | | |
|-----------------|---|---------------------|
| MOOLTAN: | } | W. GORDON, CAPTAIN, |
| 18th July 1858. | | Major of Brigade. |

Guilt and
execution of
Nahur Khan.

Soon after dawn of the 24th July this arch-traitor and leader of the mutiny suffered the sentence passed upon him, and just as the execution was over two companies of the Fusiliers marched into cantonments under Lieutenant Mainwaring.

Trial of other
men of 69th
Native In-
fantry and
sentences
passed.

28. The trials of the other men of the 69th were continued on the 29th July on the following charge. The whole were found guilty and condemned to death:—

Charge.

| | |
|---------|------------------------|
| No. 418 | Naick Lutchman Tewary; |
| „ 332 | Sepoy Sewsahay Sing; |
| „ 565 | „ Ramdoolleh Sing; |
| „ 1001 | „ Seetaram Sing; |
| „ 901 | „ Mahiram Dooby; |
| „ 1254 | „ Thakoor Pandy; |

No. 1643 Sepoy Prang Sing ;
 „ 870 „ Adjoodiah Anusty ;
 „ 1624 „ Meer Sobhan Ullee ;
 „ 1577 „ Lutchmun Sing ;

all of the 1st Company, 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, confined by order of Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks on the following charge:—

For mutiny.—In having at Mooltan on or about the 7th day of June 1857 conspired to seize their arms from the *kote* or bells of arms of their company.

For submission to an European General Court Martial under the provisions of Act 8 of 1857 by order of Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks, Commanding at Mooltan.

MOOLTAN: }
 18th July 1857. }

W. GORDON, CAPTAIN,
Major of Brigade.

29. It is worthy of remark that on the evening of the 7th June about half past 8 p.m. the Woordee-Major and a Native Doctor, 1st Irregular Cavalry, went in breathless haste to Major Chamberlain begging him by all that he valued to fly for his life, taking with him his family; that positive information had reached them through a trooper of the Horse Artillery (who was told by one of the 69th sepoy) that 9 o'clock gun-fire was to be the signal for a rise, and that a general massacre had been agreed upon.

Warning given
 to Major C.
 Chamberlain
 on the 7th
 June.

The evidence before the Courts Martial proved how specially correct the information was, for, although it did not come off, it was not the less intended. Extraordinary to relate, the authority could never be traced beyond the Horse Artillery trooper, who declared he did not know, nor could he recognize, the man who told him what was to happen; that he thought it was meant to prepare the men of other regiments.

30. The night previous to their execution was passed by the condemned prisoners in the standard guard of the 1st Irregular Cavalry, and passed in feasting and revelry. One of the prisoners (the Naick) was particularly communicative.

Account of
 execution of
 sepoy.

Their plans, their failure, their want of pluck by not commencing the mutiny at the appointed time, was freely and openly discussed, mixed with regrets and taunts to one another.


One man said: "Did I not tell you that night that sooner or later we should repent not having carried out our intentions?" Whilst another upbraided his friend by saying: "It is due to *you* that we are now to die like dogs pinioned."

One of the gang, a boy of about 20, was in tears, whereon the Naick turned to him and said: "Were it not for these handcuffs and fetters you should now die by having your thorax torn out."

They feasted until past midnight, and at dawn were all ready for the order to move to the scene of their execution.

Cleanly dressed and with a jaunty air they marched down.

The troops were drawn up in front of the Artillery flag staff in the following order:—



The Native Horse Artillerymen were called upon to perform the act of destruction with a detail of European

Artillerymen in rear of each gun to enforce the order should any hesitation be evinced; but it is due to them to record that none was shewn in the slightest possible degree, either in these executions or those of the Soobadar-Major, and by 7 A.M. of the 30th July the mutineers had all paid the penalty of their crimes.

31. On the 24th July 1857 two companies of the European Fusiliers were located in the fort for a permanency. It had been impossible to place them there earlier from want of men, and even now they had mostly to live under canvas.

Location of two companies of Fusiliers in the fort.

32. The destruction of the mutineers did not put an end to the evil designs of those who hoped and wished for a reign of horror. To mention them would be idle. Suffice it to say all kinds of reports were circulated in view to securing the defection of the Irregular Cavalry, sometimes in a greater and sometimes in a lesser degree. The right wing and headquarters Belooch Battalion marched on the 1st August with a specie remittance of $2\frac{1}{2}$ lacs of rupees for Ferozepore.

Attempts to tamper with Irregular Cavalry.

33. On the morning of the 11th August the Native troop of Horse Artillery was disarmed. They were ordered for a foot parade, whilst the European Company of Artillery on one side and two companies of the Fusiliers on the other also paraded to be ready in case of hesitation. The men obeyed instantly and without a murmur, and a few words were addressed to them by order of Brigadier Farquharson.

Disarming of Native troop of Horse Artillery.

The horses were removed to an open space immediately in rear of the guns (which were between the barracks of the European Company, Artillery and Fusiliers) and a high wall thrown up around so as to prevent syces or others from unloosing them or being near them except at stable hours.

34. On this date also the formation of the 11th Regiment, Punjab Infantry, was commenced by the transfer of a portion of the 3rd Police Battalion. A further augmentation took place on the 22nd idem by a draft from the 1st Sikh Infantry at Derah Ghazee Khan.

Formation of 11th Regiment, Punjab Infantry.

Utilization
of guns of dis-
armed troop
of Native
Horse Artil-
lery.

35. With the view of making use of the battery of the disarmed troop of Native Horse Artillery, Volunteers were called for and selected from the 1st Bombay Fusiliers and European Foot Artillery, and arrangements made for making two of the guns effective and fit for field service.

36. On the 26th August the left wing of the 1st Belooch Battalion marched towards Lahore escorting a specie remittance of 5 lacs of rupees.

Establishment
of camel train
for carriage of
military
stores.

37. Under instructions from the Chief Commissioner a camel train for the conveyance of military stores was established between Mooltan and Lahore and Ferozepore. This train was found to be most useful in forwarding the large quantities of arms, ammunition and commissariat stores received from Sind.

Formation of
a Movable
Column.

38. At this time also a Movable Column was organized consisting of—

- 100 European Infantry ;
- 250 Punjab Infantry and Police Battalion ;
- 200 Irregular Cavalry ;
- 2 Horse Artillery guns manned by Europeans.

Precautions
during the
Mohurram.

39. The Mohurram this year fell in the end of August, and some apprehension existing that during that period of religious excitement some outbreak might take place among the fanatical Mahomedans of the Native troops, additional precautions were taken to prevent the occurrence of any tumult. The Police in the city were strengthened as well as the pickets and patrol along the canal between the city and cantonments, and a company of the 11th Punjab Infantry under an European Officer was placed in a central position. In cantonments corresponding arrangements were made. The Mohurram, however, passed over in entire tranquillity, and nothing of importance occurred during the remainder of the month of August.

Insurrection
in Gugera.

40. All continued quiet at Mooltan and the neighbouring districts until the 17th of September, when an insurrection broke out in Googaira. The first intelligence of this movement was given by the stoppage of the mail from Lahore, and

further information was received through a driver of the mail cart establishment who rode in from Cheechawutnee. The stoppage of the dawk had prevented the arrival of any reports from the local officers, and the extent of the insurrection was at first entirely unknown. All that could be ascertained was that the mail cart had been stopped and plundered by a party of marauders. The probability of a predatory movement among the Bar tribes had not been wholly overlooked, and the precautions which were adopted in the Mooltan district have already been noticed. In Googaira the Officiating Deputy Commissioner was instructed to follow similar measures, and to a certain extent this was done; but his confidence in the protestations of loyalty made by the Chiefs of clans, who were constant in their attendance on him, lulled his suspicions.

41. At that time the means available for suppressing an insurrection were very limited. The European troops in Mooltan were all required for the protection of the fort and for watching the disarmed regiments. The newly-raised Punjab Regiment consisted chiefly of recruits, and the Police Battalion had by drafts and detachments been reduced in numbers and efficiency. These regiments had to undertake all the duties of the station, and after reducing the guards to their lowest possible strength and without leaving a single relief only 250 Infantry were available for field service. The new battery of Artillery manned by European Volunteers had not been fully organized and equipped for field service; the additional resallah of Police Horse at Mooltan had not been completed; and a large portion of the Police consisted of newly-raised men who had been entertained to replace the dismissed Hindoostanees. In the Googaira district the available means of defence were even more restricted.

Means available for suppressing the insurrection.

The mounted police attached to that district had been detached to General Cortlandt's force with a portion of the Police Battalion and of the district police, the Hindoostanees of the latter establishment had been dismissed, and but few substitutes could be procured to replace them. The only available forces were a few newly-raised sowars and a levy

consisting entirely of recruits uninstructed in the use of arms, with about 30 of the Police Battalion.

Despatch of troops under Captain Fraser and Major Chamberlain.

42. At the requisition of the Commissioner, the Brigadier Commanding at Mooltan immediately detached a party of 80 sowars of the 1st Regiment Irregular Cavalry to Tolumba in company with Captain Fraser, Assistant Commissioner. The next day, the 18th idem, this detachment was followed by another of 100 sowars under Major Chamberlain. It was considered advisable to retain the Infantry until two guns of the new battery could be equipped for the field and also because the services of these troops might be more urgently required on the Sutlej.

Disaffection among the establishment of the Sutlej Preventive Line.

43. The order for the dismissal of Hindoostanees had been extended to the establishment of the Sutlej Preventive Line, a great proportion of which consisted of that class; but from the difficulty of obtaining substitutes the order could not at once be carried out. Symptoms of insubordination had appeared among the men, and several of them, chiefly Rangurs from the Hansee territory, had deserted with their arms and proceeded towards that district.

It was therefore necessary to arrange for the suppression of these dangers and also to provide for the safety of the country on the Sutlej, where many of the tribes are of predatory habits and where there are some towns of wealth and importance.

Measures for disarming members of the Preventive Line.

44. The Commissioner accordingly instructed Captain Tronson, Captain of Police, and Major Voyle, Deputy Commissioner, to proceed at once to Kuhror, the head-quarters of the Sutlej Preventive Line, with 100 Mounted Police, and after withdrawing a portion of the ferry guards from the Sutlej to disarm the men of the Preventive Line and then to proceed towards Pakputtun, the most considerable town in the southern portion of the Googaira district.

These duties were fully and efficiently performed by Major Voyle and Captain Tronson; but, as their operations have been detailed in the report of the former officer, it is unnecessary to repeat them.

45. The communication with Jhung had also been interrupted by the stoppage of the Lahore mail, but a fresh line was opened *via* Shorkot; and, as no assistance could be furnished from Mooltan, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner was instructed to apply for aid from the neighbouring districts, and the Deputy Commissioner of Leia was at the same time requested to forward to Jhung all available force from the former district.

Re-opening of communication with Jhang.

46. For the purpose of opening a communication with Lahore the Native Agent at Bhawalpoor was instructed to establish a line of runners along the left bank of the Sutlej to Sirsa; for these runners camels were substituted by order of the Chief Commissioner. Another communication with Lahore was also opened *via* Shahpoor.

Re-opening of communication with Lahore.

47. The Chiefs of the Lungreal clan, who held a strong position in the pasture tracts of the Mooltan district, were directed to join Major Voyle, and this duty they willingly performed, rendering good service during the whole of the insurrection.

Services of Chiefs of the Lungreal and other clans.

The Chiefs of the clans of the Mooltan district, on the Ravee, were also called upon for aid, and they at once obeyed the summons. Salabut, Singana, a leading man of that tribe, immediately attended at the tehseel of Seraie Sidhoo with 100 followers, and he was followed by the Hirraj and other clans. The services of these men were most useful. They not only protected the tehseel and the pergunna, but they prevented the spread of the insurrection into Shorkot and the country to the west of the Chenab, where there are many tribes of predatory habits.

48. On the 25th of September a despatch was received from Major Chamberlain giving intimation of his engagement with the insurgents at Cheechawutnee and of his being besieged in the seraie at that place. On the receipt of this intelligence the Brigadier Commanding at Mooltan, at the requisition of the Commissioner, immediately despatched two of the guns formerly attached to the Native Horse Artillery and now manned by European Volunteers and a detachment of 250 Infantry, composed of drafts from the 11th Punjab

Operations of Major C. Chamberlain against the insurgents who besiege him in the serai at Chichawatni.

Despatch of reinforcements and relief of Major Chamberlain.

Infantry and 3rd Police Battalion, and 100 of the 1st Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, under the command of Captain Dennis. These troops marched at once and joined Major Chamberlain's force at Cheechawutnee on the 28th September, but Major Chamberlain had been previously relieved by the column from Googaira under Lieutenant-Colonel Paton.

Despatch of reinforcements under Captain Hockin from Leiah to Jhang.

49. In the meantime the Deputy Commissioner of Leia, Captain Fendall, had readily complied with the requisition from the Commissioner of Mooltan and detached a party of the 17th Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Hockin, and some newly-raised levies and police to the assistance of the Deputy Commissioner of Jhung. Captain Hockin was requested to move on Shorkot and then to advance up the right bank of the Ravee towards Kummalia so as to co-operate with the column under Major Chamberlain. Captain Hockin's advance, however, was delayed by his pursuit of the mutineers of the 9th Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, and subsequently by other causes, and his detachment after advancing to near Sidhnai retired to Shorkot.

Arrival of reinforcements from Gujranwala and advance on Kamalia.

50. A wing of the 2nd Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, and some levies from Goojranwala had also reached Jhung, and Captain Hawes, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, was instructed to advance on Kummalia with the most efficient force he could muster. These movements, combined with the operations of Major Chamberlain on the left bank of the Ravee and of Lieutenant-Colonel Paton on the Googaira country, had for their object the enclosing of the insurgents within the tracts which they inhabited and preventing their incursions into the country occupied by peaceably-disposed tribes; and, although they were not fully carried out, the desired object was eventually effected and the great body of the rebels were forced to seek refuge in their stronghold at Jullee.

Retirement of insurgents into stronghold of Jalli.

Departure of Major Hamilton, Commissioner of Multan, for the scene of operations.

51. Unavoidable circumstances had detained the Commissioner at Mooltan, but on the 8th October he left that place to join Lieutenant-Colonel Paton's camp, accompanied by several of the leading men of the district with their followers. These native gentlemen have from the beginning of the

insurrection evinced their loyalty by voluntarily offering their services against the rebels. Their attendance served to augment the limited force in the field, but the moral effect of their presence was far more valuable in convincing the insurgents that they could not hope for the support of the higher classes of the country.

52. The Commissioner reached Mahomedpoor, 105 miles from Mooltan, on the evening of the 11th October, but Lieutenant-Colonel Paton had marched a few hours before for Koure Shah, where the Commissioner joined him on the 12th October. Colonel Paton returned to Mahomedpoor the same day, and, at the suggestion of the Commissioner, directed the march of the column to the left bank of the Ravee with the view of commencing operations against the insurgents at Jullee. Lieutenant-Colonel Paton was, however, recalled on duty to Lahore and made over the command to Captain Snow.

Arrival of Major Hamilton and his proceedings.

The subsequent operations of the column are detailed in Major Marsden's narrative.

53. While these operations were in progress on the Ravee the detachment under Major Voyle and Captain Tronson had continued to occupy Pakputtun, the smallness of their force preventing their undertaking any active operations against the insurgents on the Sutlej. On the 4th October Major Jackson, with the right wing of the 2nd Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, arrived at Pakputtun, and Major Voyle returned to Mooltan. The detachment was also reinforced by a party of 50 men, Hindoostanees of the 2nd Punjab Infantry.

Operations against insurgents by a force from Pakpattan under Major Jackson.

On the requisition of the Commissioner, Major Jackson marched towards Jumlera on the 15th October, and, receiving information of a large body of marauders near Jeevan Shah, he detached a party of about 25 Infantry and 50 Sowars to attack them. The marauders opposed the detachment, but were defeated with the loss of 70 killed (whose bodies were counted on the field), while only four or five of the troops were wounded.

Defeat of insurgents.

Return of
Major Jackson's force.

54. Major Jackson did not advance beyond Mullooka and returned to Pakputtun on the 19th October, whence he marched on the 24th October and arrived at Kubboola on the 25th October.

Plundering of
villages in the
Pakpattan
tahsil by the
insurgents.

During this period the insurgents had plundered several villages in the Pakputtun tehsel, but on the advance of Captain McAndrew's column with the Commissioner they returned to their strongholds on the Sutlej.

Measures for
attacking rebels in the jungles near Jumlera.

55. The Commissioner on the 28th October, leaving Major Marsden with Captain McAndrew's column to pursue the insurgents who had fled from the Ravee into the Bar, joined Major Jackson at Kubboola for the purpose of concerting measures with that officer for attacking the insurgents in the jungles on the Sutlej, near Jumlera. Major Jackson, however, determined to suspend that movement until reinforced by 200 of the 2nd Punjab Infantry under Captain Tulloh. The junction was effected at Kourea on the 31st October, and on the 1st November Major Jackson's detachment joined those under Major Chamberlain and Captain McAndrew at Jumlera.

Retirement of
rebels into
Bahawalpur
territory.

On the 2nd November strong bodies of Infantry were sent into the jungles on the Sutlej, supported by the Artillery and Cavalry on the open ground. These services were effectually performed, but the insurgents had taken advantage of the delay which had occurred and dispersed into the Bhawalpoor territory.

Surrender of
leading men.

56. After this no operations of importance occurred. The successful attempts on their stronghold at Jullee and their camp in the Bar and the incursions of the troops into their fastnesses on the Sutlej had shewn them the utter hopelessness of their attempts to oppose the Government. On the 7th November Mahomed, Kattya, the Chief of that tribe, surrendered himself to the Commissioner, and his example was ultimately followed by all the leaders of the rebellion who had not been arrested or slain.

57. After leaving a detachment of 100 Infantry and 100 Cavalry at Jumlera and providing for the protection of the road and country by additional posts of police, the force under Major Chamberlain returned to Mooltan on the 12th November.

Return of
Major Cham-
berlain's force
to Multán.

58. Subsequently the district officers have been engaged in recovering the plundered property and in bringing the most conspicuous of the rebels to justice. The murderers of Lieutenant Neville have been traced out, arrested, tried, condemned and punished. The principal leaders of the rebels are now under trial. Several notorious criminals have been executed, and the restoration of the plundered property has been nearly completed. Besides their losses in the field and by execution, the rebels have suffered by the capture of their cattle, and they will be still further mulcted to make good the losses of those whom they have plundered. Entire tranquillity has for some months prevailed in all parts of the division, and life and property are as secure as they ever have been since the establishment of the British Government.

Recovery of
plundered
property and
punishment of
rebels includ-
ing the mur-
derers of
Lieutenant
Neville.

Restoration of
tranquillity.

59. The Commissioner cannot conclude this narrative without prominently noticing the valuable services rendered by the district officers subordinate to him during the whole of this momentous period. Major Voyle, Captain Hawes and Lieutenant Elphinstone have on all occasions rendered him the most efficient support and have distinguished themselves by their zeal, energy and judgment. To Captain Tronson, Captain of Police, the Commissioner is much indebted for the readiness with which he assisted the public service, as well as for the courage, loyalty and efficiency which the Police force under his command have everywhere displayed. To Major Marsden his most grateful acknowledgments are due. This officer, when about to close a long and honorable official career by retirement from the service, putting aside all personal considerations and disregarding danger, exposure and labor, voluntarily undertook the charge of the Googaira district in the height of the insurrection. The services which his knowledge of the people and the district have enabled him to render are most invaluable, and to him is also due much of the success which has attended the suppression of the rebellion.

Acknowledg-
ment of ser-
vices of offi-
cers.

Major Voyle,
Captain
Hawes and
Lieutenant
Elphinstone.
Captain Tron-
son of the
Police.

Major Mars-
den.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 46.

47. *From Major F. E. VOYLE, Deputy Commissioner, Mooltan, to Major G. W. HAMILTON, Commissioner and Superintendent, Mooltan Division,—No. 72, dated 30th January 1858.*

Narrative of
events in the
Multán
District.

As requested by the Judicial Commissioner, I do myself the honor to make the following relation of the circumstances connected with the crisis in the Punjab.

Tranquillity
until middle
of May.

2. In this district profound tranquillity prevailed and not a suspicion was entertained of any probable disturbance up to the middle of May,—indeed, with regard to the mutiny at Barrackpore, and disquiet at other remote stations, they were looked upon in these parts as local affairs, and, from the great distance that intervened, not likely to affect the soldiery at Mooltan.

Receipt of
news of Muti-
ny.

3. On the evening of the 13th May an express reached the Commissioner from Mr. Montgomery, Judicial Commissioner, announcing the Mutiny at Meerut and the disturbances at Delhi, where the English were fighting for their lives.

Adoption of
precautionary
measures.

Immediately afterwards I was summoned to Major Hamilton's, where, in concert with him and Captain Tronson, the Captain of Police, we adopted the following precautionary measures :—

1st.—The removal of the treasure from the Edgah, an isolated position, into the fort.

2nd.—The stopping of the distribution of letters amongst the sepoys.

3rd.—Raising levies for the protection of the city.

4th.—The calling in from the thannahs and tehseels of the mounted Police, being men of this part of the country, on whom reliance was placed.

5th.—Repairs of the dismantled fort, together with storing supplies for the garrison in case of need.

6th.—The Police were directed to apprehend all “Poor-beas” suspected of deserting their regiments. Precautions were likewise taken to prevent fakeers entering Mooltan; at the same time a reward of 50 rupees was offered for the capture of each deserter.

7th.—The ferries on the Sutlej were limited to four and strong guards posted over each; those on the Chenab and Ravee were likewise reduced and guarded.

For several of these arrangements the orders of the Chief and Judicial Commissioners were subsequently received.

These were the principal expedients resorted to to guard against any danger that might arise from disaffection, which we then became aware was more general throughout the army than we had at first imagined.

4. It may be as well to mention that at this period Mooltan contained two regiments of Native Infantry,—the 69th and 62nd,—1st Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, a troop of Native Horse Artillery, with about 70 European Artillerymen.

Composition
of garrison of
Multán.

5. When the news of the disasters at Delhi and Meerut¹ became generally known a marked difference was observed in the bearing of the sepoys, many of whom omitted the salute, which had always before been punctiliously observed, and assumed an air of great independence; furthermore, it came to my knowledge that meetings began to be held by the sepoys at the different *mundirs*, or Hindoo temples, where, through the

Signs of dis-
affection
among Native
troops.

¹ The real circumstances of the outbreak at Delhi and Meerut were not generally known to the Native troops and inhabitants till long after these events. They were aware that some disturbance had occurred at these places, but of the result and extent of the mutinies they were ignorant. The disarming of the troops at Lahore and the occurrence at Ferozepore were very partially known.

medium of a spy, I ascertained that language of very seditious and treasonable character was indulged in. They plotted to seize the fort, to plunder the town, and to overpower the handful of Europeans. There being but one witness to these treasonable speeches, no arrest could be made, but in order to break up their assemblages a discharged sepoy, who had turned devotee and was looked upon as a sort of leader, was seized by me and placed in confinement, in which he remained till after the capture of Delhi.

Scrutiny of
correspond-
ence of sepoys.

The detention of their letters had a good effect in distracting their councils and preventing any outward display of mutiny, as they were thus kept in ignorance of the treason of their fellows.

Alarm of
townspeople.

6. A good deal of apprehension existed among the townspeople inasmuch so that they commenced burying their treasure, an alarm not without foundation, for about this time, or the morning of 8th June at 2 A. M., it was rumoured that a portion of the right wing of the 69th Regiment attempted insurrection by endeavoring to seize their arms, but who were dissuaded by the better disposed.

Disarming of
Native Regi-
ments.

7. The following evening instructions were received from the Chief Commissioner to disarm the two Native Infantry Regiments. Arrangements were made during the night by the Commissioner to carry out these injunctions, which were ably and efficiently accomplished on the morning of the 10th. This operation was greatly facilitated by the opportune arrival, a few days before, of the 2nd Punjaub Infantry and 1st Punjaub Cavalry, and the completion of this measure allayed the fears of the inhabitants, European and Native, of this district, who, from the presence of such a large suspected body with only 70 Europeans and no possibility of aid within the distance of 200 miles, were naturally in a state of intense anxiety.

Salutary
effects of the
measure.

8. This disarming had also a salutary effect on the districts adjoining. It may not be irrelevant here to describe the bitter disappointment of many of the men of the regiment aforesaid at being deprived of their arms that day;

not a few are said to have broken up their beds, intending with the side-posts to destroy their officers whilst at Mess; others again deserted, and many more would have left had it not been for the effective supervision maintained at the several ferries, coupled with the difficulty of crossing rivers when none but the most expert swimmers would attempt the undertaking; moreover, several soldiers, some of whom were subsequently ascertained to have been active agents in exciting to mutiny, took their discharge, were afterwards brought back, convicted of their crimes, and suffered the extreme penalty of the law. One man whose character had been previously good was discharged for leaving the lines after roll-call. The individual in question had served the Honorable Company for 18 years and been decorated for his services at Chillianwalla and Goozerat. Feeling himself aggrieved for being struck off the strength of the army for so slight an offence, I took advantage of his presenting himself for a passport to Hindoostan to enquire the causes of the disaffection in his regiment, promising him at the same time restoration and promotion if he gave true information on this subject. He then, in the presence of Major Chamberlain and myself, gave such intelligence as implicated several of the Native Officers and led eventually, on his statement being corroborated, to the conviction and execution of the Subedar-Major and ten others.

Attitude of
disarmed
sepoys.

Evidence ob-
tained against
Native Officers
of the 69th
Native Infan-
try from a dis-
charged sepoys.

Conviction
and execution
of Native
Officers.

9. It is due to the 62nd Regiment to affirm that, as far as my investigations went, nothing whatever has transpired against any of them whereby their loyalty may be impeached; the same may be remarked in respect to the Irregular Cavalry and 3rd Police Battalion, who have retained their arms throughout the rebellion, or the Native Artillery, though the events which elsewhere occurred rendered it advisable to deprive them of their guns, arms, &c.

Fidelity of
62nd Regi-
ment, 1st
Irregular
Cavalry and
3rd Police
Battalion.

10. In addition to the many other duties entailed on me, that of raising the new levies and drilling them for service was one of no slight labor. Some 300 men were enlisted, taught the platoon exercise and detached to guard the ferries in less than three weeks; their instruction was afterwards completed

Raising of
new levies.

at their respective posts. I found these men of great use during the rising of the insurgents on the Sutlej during September.

Insurrection
in Gugera.

11. This leads me to another important crisis, which, had it occurred a few months earlier, with doubtful friends in our vicinity, the result might have been disastrous indeed. There are many nomadic and predatory tribes in the Mooltan and Googaira districts whose occupation from time immemorial has been that of attending their own numerous flocks and herds and occasionally adding thereto by peculation. These men since annexation conducted themselves with propriety and seemed to appreciate the mild administration of the British Government. Perceiving, however, that our hands were full and the country denuded of troops, they seized the opportunity of making, as they conceived, a name for themselves by aiding *His Majesty of Delhi*, whose power they heard from various sources had become all paramount, and in whose cause, combined with that of Islamism, it was not only just and proper to rise, but needful as a means whereby they might secure to themselves the free pasturage of the broad lands which Nature had allotted to them. Inveigled into these anticipations, these prospects of favor and self-government,—hallucinations in some measure confirmed by the return to them of their long-absent brethren (the prisoners of Agra),—their innate temperaments could no longer resist the temptation thus afforded, and, regardless of the respectful awe hitherto observed towards the British Power, they burst forth in countless hordes to pillage and to burn Government buildings and, if possible, to exterminate the Christian.

Despatch of
troops from
Multán
under Major
Voyle and
Captain
Tronson.

12. About the 17th September intelligence reached Mooltan of these outrages and the rising of the tribes. Major Hamilton, the Commissioner, with his customary alacrity despatched a party of sowars to the Ravee; another detachment consisting of the Mooltan Mounted Police (about 100 sabres), under Captain Tronson and myself, proceeded to the Sutlej with a view to intercept the marauders should they make for that river and eventually for the territory of His Highness of Bhawulpore.

We marched without delay, making from 25 to 35 miles per diem over a country where the water from the late inundations covered the surface for miles, and during a period when the heat was so intense that even the natives seemed to sink beneath the all-powerful rays of a September's sun. At length, arriving on the confines of this district, we encamped at the village of Sahooka, where we were informed that large bands of insurgents had assembled in the Googaira villages for the purpose of giving battle to our small force either on their own ground or of surprising us during the night.

Owing to the non-arrival that day of 50 of the new levies and sundry sowars under one Surufraz Khan, we marched at noon, reaching the Sahooka encampment at 9 p. m. No sooner had the horses and baggage been got together than arrangements were made to secure the camp by forming up as close as possible, placing pickets at the most assailable positions, and by bivouacking on the ground.

The following day, on the Morning Star appearing, the enemy, with imprecations and loud shouts of "Ulli, Ulli," fell upon our camp, but were immediately received by a brisk fire, which so staggered their leading files that the whole body fled with the utmost precipitation; rallying again within the village they returned to the attack, but, meeting with a similar reception, the mounted portion made for the Bar, the foot for an island on the Sutlej.

Attack on Major Voyle's camp by the insurgents and their repulse.

At dawn of day we proceeded to the attack of the village, putting to the sword the whole male inhabitants, including the bearer of their war drum, divided the captured herds and flocks among the Lungreeals (a friendly tribe), destroyed their granaries, and burnt the town; afterwards we advanced to "Jumleyra," "Luckoke" and "Burra Beyla," where we did likewise, the inhabitants having joined the assailants that morning, and instigated the people of Sahooke to destroy our force.

Operations against the insurgents and their defeat.

13. We might have halted here for the night, the troops having had nothing since 10 A. M. of the previous day; but the enemy having made a parallel movement towards the

Relief of Pakpattan by Major Voyle's force.

ancient and important city of Pak Puttan, purposing to plunder it ere our arrival, we pushed on, making the 55 miles in 21 consecutive hours. On reaching the place confidence seemed to be at once restored, and such was the joy of the inhabitants at being thus speedily relieved, coupled with our announcement of the fall of Delhi, that they illuminated Pak Puttan in honor of the occasion.

Despatch of
a party to
punish the
village of
Ferozepore,
which is
burnt.

14. We rested here a-while, say a few hours, when on hearing from the Tehseeldar that the people of Ferozepore had deprived the Government servants of their arms, we considered it advisable to detach a party of Mounted Police, which not only fired the place, but captured some men on whom Government arms were discovered and who were subsequently sentenced under the Act of 1857.

Beneficial
effects of
punishment
inflicted.

15. The punishment inflicted on these people had the effect of quieting all around, and with the exception of an expedition to certain islands on the Sutlej in which Mr. Oliver, Deputy Superintendent of Butiana, evinced much skill and judgment, nothing particular occurred until my return to Mooltan by direction of the Chief Commissioner.

Apology for
imperfect
account
furnished
by Major
Voyle.

16. I am aware of the very imperfect sketch I have given in the above account; but, owing to the many and various duties devolving on me, especially at this peculiar time, I trust what has been said may be considered sufficient for the purposes required.

Success of
measures
adopted and
suppression
of mutiny in
the Multán
District.

17. I have only further to add that the measures which were adopted have, through the blessing of Providence, been attended with success.

The mutiny, as respects Mooltan, has been happily nipped in the bud, and now that European troops are passing through the feeling of security is established.

Services of
Mr. R. Shaw
of the Customs
Department.

P. S.—Mr. R. Shaw accompanied the Sutlej expedition, and was present at Sahooka, Pak Puttan, and the Islands, where he did good service.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 46.

48. *Detail of occurrences in the Jhang District from May to December 1857, by Captain H. J. HAWES, Deputy Commissioner.*

1. On the first receipt from the Judicial Commissioner of news of the mutiny and massacre at Delhi and Meerut and of the general disaffection of the Hindoostanees measures were immediately taken to keep in check and, if necessary, coerce the company of Regular Infantry (16th Native Infantry Grenadiers) on duty at the station, and which detachment, being one-third numerically stronger than the Police Company, also on duty here, and furnished with its full complement of spare ammunition, would, had they risen, have given much trouble. Under the circumstances I called in the guards of the Police Company from the district, replacing them with a like number of rural Police, and so distributed them,—the few Police Cavalry at head-quarters, the spare Sudder Police and city Chowkeedars,—as to admit of their collecting on a minute's warning at any threatened point. These arrangements were secretly made so as not to cause alarm or lead sepoys to imagine themselves distrusted. They were permitted also to retain their arms and to continue in the performance of their ordinary duties. At the same time the temper of the men themselves and their actions were strictly watched, their Native Officers kept informed, as far as it was deemed prudent, of what was taking place around them, but no doubtful characters were allowed ingress to the lines, and all correspondence underwent careful scrutiny before delivery to the men. Subsequently I urged the recall of this detachment to its own head-quarters, and this was effected in the most quiet and orderly manner, the men being disarmed on their reaching their cantonments at Meean Meer. It is but fair to state that some credit is due to Lieutenant Wall, Commanding the Detachment.

Narrative of events in the Jhang District.

Measures taken by Captain Hawes on receipt of news of the Mutiny.

2. It was not deemed necessary or expedient to increase to any extent the police establishments at the various tehseels and thanahs, as in case of any local disturbance a sufficient body of horsemen from head-quarters could have been despatched to

Instructions to Police.

any of the larger posts within 12 hours. The Police officers were, however, warned to be always on the alert, to send in daily reports of their respective jurisdictions, and in case of need to strengthen their posts by the addition of the village watchmen and retainers of loyal and trustworthy lumberdars. The heads of tribes had previously certified to me their willingness to afford the Government any assistance in their power. There is no doubt that at first the feeling of the people in general was with the Government, especially as their interests had become in a measure mixed up with ours, and their power of doing mischief greatly lessened by the wholesale entertainment in our service of their warlike population. Subsequent events, however, showed what little reliance was to be placed in any one class or caste when the protracted siege of Delhi, the partial stoppage of commerce and the numerous disparaging rumours of loot announced but too plainly that our power in the North-West had been shaken to its basis. The greatest endeavours were made to prevent the circulation and counteract the ill-effects of such rumours. The judicious orders of the Chief Commissioner regarding the reduction of the minor ferries and the strict guarding of the principal ones were carried out to their full extent; no Hindoostanees or other doubtful characters were allowed passage thereby; fakeers and other religious vagrants belonging to the district were confined to their own villages, whilst those from other districts, on failing to render good accounts of themselves, were detained in jail; spreaders of seditious libels and other malcontents were publicly and severely punished; the police was weeded of its Hindoostanee members and useless characters; and the principal posts were strengthened and provisioned in case of sudden attack.

Measures for preventing the circulation of mischievous rumours.

Measures for guarding ferries.

An early opportunity was taken to forward the surplus specie in the Treasury, amounting to about 70,000 rupees, to Mooltan by water under an escort of police.

Continuance of the current work of the district without interruption.

I need scarcely add that the current work of the district was carried on in both sudder and tehseel courts as usual, nor was any reason given to the population to suspect that our position in India was so critical as it really was.

A troop of Cavalry (100 sabres) was raised and organized within three months. In it the relations and dependents of all the influential lumberdars found honorable and well remunerative service. Half of this troop was afterwards sent to Googaira, where they did, I believe, good service, and many of them on the restoration of quiet in these parts volunteered for service down-country into the 2nd Sikh Cavalry.

Raising of a
troop of Cav-
alry.

3. The result of the precautions taken was that not only was the tranquillity of the district preserved, but on two different occasions parties of armed mutineers were seized or cut up. On the first occasion a body of one Subadar and nine sepoy of the 14th Native Infantry were apprehended whilst trying to escape down the Jhelum River and, after trial, publicly hanged. On the second a Rissaldar and 19 sowars of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, after making several fruitless attempts to cross the river, were met by a party under Captain Hockin and Messrs. Chalmers, Cowan and Thompson and killed to a man after a most desperate resistance, the villagers on the latter occasion rendering good service in tracking the mutineers.

Preservation
of tranquil-
lity.

4. Matters proceeded thus smoothly until the 17th of September, when the Googaira Bar tribes, many of whom graze their flocks in this district, rose and according to a preconcerted plan attacked and plundered almost all the smaller police posts situated in the Jungle Bar, chiefly, I am of opinion, for the sake of the arms. I may here mention that these police chowkees are, with one exception, mere open sheds guarded by three to four Burkundazes, and consequently incapable of defence. The exception, *viz.*, the thana of Gupni, contained on the night in question but four Policemen and two camel sowars, who, never dreaming of danger, were surprised by a stratagem and overpowered before they were well awake. On the first intelligence of this outbreak and before we were aware of its extent, Mr. MacMahon, Extra Assistant, and myself rode out with the few Cavalry at our command to the Gupni Thanah, too late, however, to intercept the rebels as on hearing of our approach they retreated into their dense jungles in the adjacent district of Googaira. A few horsemen

Insurrection
in Gugera.

Plundering of
Police chau-
kis by rebels
and operations
against them.

borrowed from the Deputy Commissioner of Goojranwala enabled me to clear the north-east end of the district and to seize a few of the rebels and their cattle. Thus far only a few small posts in the wild and thinly-populated jungle Bar had suffered; but, as the zemindars inhabiting the villages bordering the Chenab from one end of the district to the other are all more or less intermixed by marriage, conformity of interests, caste and habits with the Bar tribes, it became very evident that, unless measures were speedily taken to punish the rebels and inspire fear into the disaffected, the whole district would become disorganized. The whole military strength of Jhung at that time consisted of 75 Police Infantry, 73 Mounted Police and 45 newly-raised mounted levies, as 24 of the Mounted Police had previously been sent to join General Van Cortlandt's force and 50 of the new levy to the Gogaira district. More than two-thirds of the Cavalry remaining were on outpost duty in the district, nor would their recall to head-quarters have been prudent. It was therefore impossible for me to commence offensive operations against an enemy numbering from 2,000 to 4,000, or in fact to do more than ensure, as far as practicable, the safety of the public buildings, jail and treasury, the large cities of Jhung and Muggiana, and keep open the main communications.

Insufficiency
of force at the
disposal of
Captain
Hawes.

Arrival of re-
inforcements
and measures
adopted by
Captain
Hawes.

5. When, on requisition made both to the Chief Commissioner and direct to surrounding District Officers, one troop, 2nd Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Cureton, and one company, Goojranwala Levy, under Captain Legallais, also a company of the Leia Levy and 40 Mounted Police from Shahpore, as well as 250 17th Irregular Cavalry under Captain Hockin, arrived, I was enabled to spare at once for operations in the Gogaira district one-half of my own Police Cavalry in addition to the whole of the troops sent to my assistance, whereas had no troops been available I feel assured, from the increase of certain crimes, from acts of retaliation and other unmistakable signs, that the whole district would have been speedily disorganized. As it was, the villagers rendered every assistance to the rebels, whilst they withheld even common information from the Government.

6. The annexed statement¹ will show how severely those taking part in the rebellion who were apprehended in this district and tried by me were dealt with.

Punishments
inflicted.

7. To resume my history. The first to arrive were the Shahpore sowars and company of Leia Levy. To these I added a few matchlockmen and 40 of my own Mounted Police, sending them under Mr. MacMahon towards Kumalia (Googaira district) with instructions to open a communication with Major Chamberlain, 1st Irregular Cavalry, who was said to be on the left bank of the Ravee with a small detachment from Mooltan. I myself proceeded to Chineot to meet the detachment from Goojranwala and arrange for the protection of that end of the district. Returning to Jhung with the detachment two days after Mr. MacMahon's departure, I halted one day to lay in supplies, &c., and the following one proceeded to join Mr. MacMahon; but on the second march, finding no water and hearing from that officer that he had failed to gain any information of Major Chamberlain, and that the town of Kumalia had been plundered of every stick therein, it coming to my knowledge also that a body of the rebels threatened Jhung from the east, I recalled Mr. MacMahon, whose remaining at Kumalia would have been useless, and retraced my steps to Jhung. One day was spent by me in providing for the protection of the place and in sending Captain Hockin with his wing of 17th Irregular Cavalry to Shorkote, not only to look after that place, which was a good deal disturbed, but to prevent his regiment, which had lost many men by desertion at Delhi, from coming into contact with the troop of 2nd Irregular Cavalry. In the interim, having heard from Major Chamberlain, I joined that officer with the whole of the troops sent me and remained with the force until the dispersion of the rebels at Killawalla, in the capacity of Civil Officer, whilst my assistant, Lieutenant Lane, had command of the Leia Levy.

Arrival of re-
inforcements
and measures
adopted by
Captain
Hawes.

8. It is not my province to show here the proceedings of the force whilst employed in the Gogaira district. Suffice it to say that during the time I remained with the force

Result of
operations.

¹ Not printed.

Seizure of a party of armed rebels and their cattle.

Deputation of Lieutenant Lane to Shorkot and his services.

Result of an expedition through the Jungle Bar.

Withdrawal of troops from the Jhang District.

Difficulties of Captain Hawes' position.

Narrative of events in Gugera.

large seizures of grain and cattle were made, and the rebels finally obliged to abandon their position and seek safety in flight across the Ravee. On the 29th of October the Jhung detachment, minus the Leia Company, which was left at Kumalia, returned to Jhung, making on its way one large seizure of armed rebels and their cattle. Of the former three were hanged and the remainder sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment with labor. Arrived at Jhung, I detached Lieutenant Lane with a few men to Shorkote (the wing of 17th Irregular Cavalry having been in the interim removed to Kumalia), where he did excellent service in apprehending rebels, confiscating their property, recovering plunder and restoring order. I myself accompanied Captain Cureton in one more expedition through the Jungle Bar, making one seizure of rebels and cattle. Shortly after this, tranquillity and order being completely restored, the whole of the troops sent for our protection were withdrawn and a company of foot levies substituted for the newly-raised mounted levy and to replace the company of Regular sepoy formerly stationed here. It only remained to me now to reward the loyal and punish the guilty.

9. I have simply given here a brief outline of the events which actually occurred in this district and the measures adopted by me for the preservation of peace therein. It would be difficult, if not an impossible task, to convey an idea of the difficulties to be contended against, the daily and hourly anxieties incurred, the constant vigilance and unremitting exertions required during the last eight eventful months. You are doubtless aware of the difficult nature of the country, surrounded as it is on all sides by trackless wastes and intersected by rivers fringed with impenetrable grass and jhow jungle.

ENCLOSURE (3) to 46.

49. *From Lieutenant N. W. ELPHINSTONE, Assistant Commissioner (late in charge district Googaira), to Major G. W. HAMILTON, Commissioner and Superintendent, Mooltan Division,—No. A., dated Camp Tibbee, 30th January 1858.*

In compliance with the instructions contained in your demi-official letter of the 23rd instant, I have the honor to

submit a brief abstract of occurrences, &c., in the Googaira district from the outbreak of the mutinies to the 13th October 1857.

2. Early on the 13th of May 1857 a demi-official circular from the Judicial Commissioner reached me with the information that the Native troops at Meerut had mutinied, and that all the Europeans at Delhi had been massacred. A postscript added that the troops at Meean Meer had been quietly disarmed. Considering the isolated position of the station, the probability of the spirit of disaffection having spread to the greater part of the Native Army, and the embarrassment that was likely to ensue in the event of a local insurrection taking place, I thought it advisable to take away without delay the arms of the detachment of the 49th Native Infantry stationed here as a Treasury guard. This was accomplished without difficulty. The sepoys surrendered their arms after a little hesitation, but without resistance. I removed the whole company to the seraie and placed in the Treasury a Subadar and 24 sepoys of Captain Tronson's Police Battalion, who had assisted me in disarming the company of the 49th, their place at the jail being supplied by the servants of the Sikh Jageerdars, Babas Sumpoorun Sing and Khem Sing, who then happened to be at the station.

Receipt of
news of
Mutiny.

Disarming of
Treasury
guard of 49th
Native In-
fantry and
despatch of
the men to
Lahore.

3. The Officer Commanding the 49th Native Infantry asked me to retain his disarmed men at Googaira, but the reports which reached me about the general dissatisfaction prevailing among them, and the difficulty of watching so large a body of men with the small force at my disposal, rendered it impossible to comply with his request. I sent off the men without a guard to Lahore, and I believe no desertions took place on the road.

4. The tranquillity of the district in the meantime remained undisturbed. It was of course impossible to prevent reports regarding the disasters which had taken place in the North-Western Provinces from spreading among the native population. The letters in the post office were always carefully examined, and those containing allusions to the

Scrutiny of
postal corre-
spondence.

Raising of
extra Police.

Communica-
tion with
Sirsa and
Hissar and
despatch of
force to Fazil-
ka under
Lieutenant
Pearse.

Measures
adopted
during the
month of
June.

disturbances were withheld from distribution, but, as usual in such cases, the real state of affairs was soon generally appreciated. No excitement, however, was observable, and I found no difficulty in obtaining candidates for the extra Police which I entertained to strengthen the thannahs and guard the ferries on the Ravee and Sutlej.

5. Direct communication with Sirsa and Hissar by horse dawk had been established according to your instructions, and arrangements had been made to extend it to Agra, when about the end of May intelligence of the mutiny of the Hurriana Light Infantry and of the Irregular Cavalry stationed there reached Googaira. A few hurried lines from Captain Robertson informed me that all the Europeans at Hissar had been massacred and that he himself was about to attempt to escape towards Puttealla. A note from Mr. Oliver asking me to send to his assistance as many men as I could spare and requesting me to secure the ghaut opposite Fazilkha led me to believe at first that the mutineers after plundering Sirsa were advancing towards the Sutlej. I soon afterwards ascertained, however, that they had left Hurriana and had joined the mutineers at Delhi. No time was lost in despatching every available man to Fazilkha. As there was every probability of the detachments meeting with opposition, and the number of men I could supply must necessarily be small, I selected for this duty the most efficient and best disciplined portion of the police of this district. The force consisted of 30 of Captain Tronson's Police Battalion, 96 Police Burkundazes, and about 100 sabres of the Mounted Police, the whole under Lieutenant Pearse. I was glad to find afterwards that the Cavalry especially of this little force, did good service against the insurgent tribes in Bhuttecana.

6. The month of June passed away without any remarkable occurrence. Licenses for carrying matchlocks were withdrawn and the matchlocks distributed to the new extra Police; a new ressalah was raised to supply the place of the Mounted Police sent to Sirsa, and blacksmiths entertained to make up swords and repair arms. On the 20th, when visiting the jail with Mr. L. Berkeley, the Extra Assistant,

I discovered a quantity of tobacco, sweetmeats, and other prohibited articles under the prisoners' cots. An investigation took place, which resulted in the dismissal of the Jail Darogah for neglect; and a circumstance was then elicited which at the time appeared insignificant, but to which subsequent events have led me to attach more importance. The Darogah had allowed Uhmud Khan, the Chief of the Khurrals, to visit the jail without my knowledge,—a fact he then explained that Uhmud Khan was his religious father; that he had known him for many years; and that he had protected his family during former insurrections.

Dismissal of
Jail Darogah
for neglect of
duty.

7. On the 8th July 1857 a slight disturbance took place in the Pak Putton tehseel at the village of Lukhoke on the Sutlej. Some chuprassees, who had been sent there to collect a balance of revenue, were turned out of the village by the Lumbardars, and, on their returning with assistance from the Police chowkees, discovered that the Lumbardars had fled to the Bhawulpoor side, and that a large crowd of armed men had collected there apparently with the intention of landing on this side. I immediately despatched 100 of the new police and 30 horsemen to Mr. Davies, the Customs patrol on the river, gave him instructions how to act, and made arrangements to proceed there myself with reinforcements should the disturbance become more serious. The Bhawulpoor villagers made an attempt to cross, but, finding nearly 200 Policemen ready to receive them, they returned to their own side and soon dispersed. The Lumbardars who had commenced the disturbance gave themselves up and were fined and imprisoned, and tranquillity was again restored for the time. Cattle-stealing and highway robbery, chiefly committed by men from Bhawulpoor, was, however, still of frequent occurrence. Some time previous to this the Bhawulpoor villagers had forcibly possessed themselves of the boats of one of the ferries, and on the guard attempting to rescue them had assembled in large armed crowds and had threatened to attack them. All my endeavours to regain possession of these boats through the Kardars and the native agents proved unsuccessful. Like all other requisitions to the Bhawulpoor authorities at that

Disturbance
in Pakpattan.

Misconduct of
Bahawalpur
villages.

time, they were either not attended to or no real effort was made to comply with them. This was the more to be lamented in this case as these boats greatly facilitated afterwards the escape of the insurgents to the opposite bank, and enabled the Bhawulpoor plunderers to co-operate readily with their friends on this side.

Outbreak in
Gugera Jail.

8. My letter No. 369 of the 27th July described the outbreak which had occurred during the previous night at the Googaira Jail. Considerable loss of life took place on the occasion among the prisoners, but the time was not one for hesitation. The prisoners were in a savage state of excitement, and I found that Uhmud Khan, Khurral, had just fled from the station, leading me to suppose from his antecedents that he had done so for the purpose of taking advantage of this embarrassment to rise in insurrection. Fifty-one prisoners were killed and wounded, and the *émeute* was promptly suppressed. Mr. L. Berkeley distinguished himself by his presence of mind and energy on this occasion, and I brought to your notice the very satisfactory conduct of the detachment of the Kuttar Mookhee Battalion. Uhmud, Khurral, was again brought into the station and kept for some time under surveillance, but no satisfactory proof of his complicity was discovered. He was released after a time, and entered into heavy recognizances, like the other Chiefs of the predatory tribes on the Ravee and Sutlej, not to leave the sudder station without especial permission.

Services of
Mr. L. Berke-
ley, Extra
Assistant
Commis-
sioner.

Arrest of
Ahmad Khan,
Karal, his
detention at
head-quarters
and subse-
quent release.

Raising of
levies.

Deficiency
of arms.

9. The month of August passed without any occurrence of importance. The Chief Commissioner authorized a military levy for Googaira, and recruits came in rapidly; but a supply of arms was not obtained till the beginning of September. Their training therefore was still very imperfect when the insurrection suddenly broke out on the 17th of that month. Two hundred of the recruits had been despatched to Peshawur on the 15th. I was therefore still able to recall them immediately I received intelligence of the outbreak; and of the Mounted Levy sent to Lahore in two detachments (30 horsemen each) I succeeded in recalling one party before

they reached their destination. The first information of the intended insurrection was brought to me by Surfiraz Khan, Khurral, on the night of the 16th. He insisted on seeing me about 11 p. m., stating that he had something of great importance to communicate, and on being admitted informed me that all the Chiefs of the Ravee tribes, who were present at the Sudder on heavy *moochulkas*, had fled with all their followers, and that there could be no doubt that they intended to rise immediately. This was confirmed from other sources, and I lost no time in sending the intelligence to the Chief Commissioner and to yourself. Surfiraz Khan expressed great fears for the safety of Kumalia, which the Katheahs and Khurrals often lamented not having plundered during the last insurrections in 1848 and 1849, when they were allowed to retain all property plundered from Hindoo and Sikh villages. To allay his fears I gave him an escort of 15 horsemen, who were to aid the Thanadar and Police at Kumalia in protecting the town and thannah until the arrival of reinforcements. An express was also sent to the Tehseeldar of Hurruppa ordering him to arrest, if possible, the chiefs who had fled and to defend the tahseel as long as he could in the event of an attack being made. This express as well as the one sent to you I afterwards found was intercepted by the Moordana tribe near Mohammedpoor.

Intelligence of intended insurrection and measures adopted.

10. Mr. L. Berkeley was sent in the meantime with 20 horsemen to capture, if possible, Uhmud, Khurral, before he had crossed the Ravee opposite to his village of Jhumra, and Lieutenant Mitchell and myself commenced to make preparations for the outbreak which was now evidently about to take place. The levies were all armed and mustered; the few remaining horsemen were sent out in every direction to bring in intelligence; and arrangements made for the protection of the station. With the small and somewhat inefficient force at my disposal it would have been obviously impossible to provide a guard for each separate building in such a straggling and ill-laid out station as Googaira. I therefore determined at once to remove all Government records, stores, treasure, &c., to the

Despatch of Mr. Berkeley and a small force to arrest Ahmad Khan, Karal.

Defensive measures adopted by Lieutenant Elphinstone.

Selection of
Tahsil build-
ing for pur-
poses of
defence.

tahseel and transfer the prisoners from the jail, which would otherwise have required a very large guard and thereby crippled my resources, to the seraie, a building near the tahseel and commanded by it. All the other public buildings I found untenable in the event of a protracted defence becoming necessary. The Kutcherry was of course an open building, and as such useless. The Treasury had no well, and was besides commanded by the Kutcherry, whilst the jail again was too isolated.

Failure of
Mr. Berkeley
to intercept
Ahmad Khan,
Karal, and
proceedings
of the latter.

11. At daybreak I received a note from Mr. L. Berkeley informing me that he had not succeeded in intercepting Uhmud, Khurral; that the boat in which the latter had crossed had been moored in a creek on the opposite side beyond the reach of musketry; and that the chowkeedar in charge of it had declared that he had received strict orders not to let the boat return, an order he was determined to obey, as Uhmud, Khurral, had become king of the country. That Chief himself soon made his appearance, and in reply to Mr. Berkeley's threats and remonstrances informed him that he had renounced his allegiance to the British Government and considered himself a subject of the King of Delhi, from whom he had received orders to raise the whole country. His followers thereupon began a matchlock fire which was returned by the horsemen on our side, but without effect, until Mr. Berkeley himself brought down with his rifle a conspicuous personage who I afterwards found was the Moollah of the village. On receipt of this intelligence I immediately despatched Lieutenant Mitchell with 60 of the Kuttar Mookhee Battalion, and 100 of the levies to reinforce Mr. Berkeley, and after completing the arrangements at the Sudder and removing the prisoners, treasure, &c., joined the detachment myself at the ferry. Fresh boats from a point higher up the river had in the meantime arrived, and we lost no time in crossing our detachment and marched towards Jhumra, where the rebels had collected in some force and were apparently preparing to oppose us. On our approaching nearer, however, they wavered, and without standing the first volley of musketry dispersed in every direction. Our

Despatch of
reinforce-
ments to Mr.
Berkeley.

Advance on
rebel village
of Jhamra
and its des-
truction.

Cavalry only consisted of 15 sowars, but those under Mr. Berkeley were sent to pursue the fugitives, and they soon returned with about 20 prisoners, all the families, and 700 cattle. After setting fire to the village of Jhumra we returned to the station.

12. This defeat and the loss the Khurrals thus sustained was not without effect. The Khurrals of that part of the district could never be induced again by Uhmud Khan to combine against us, and that Chief after several fruitless efforts to accomplish this was obliged to join with his immediate dependents, the Wattoo tribe, on the left bank of the river. The next morning, the 18th of September, I sent Mr. Berkeley with a detachment of horse and foot police towards Koure Shah to endeavour to re-open the communication with Mooltan, and if necessary to assist the Tehseeldar at Hurruppa, who I presumed was still in possession of the tehseel there. On his arrival at Ackbur, however, Mr. Berkeley discovered that a large body of Wuttoos had assembled in the neighbourhood with the intention of plundering the village during the night, the Lumbardar owing to his loyalty having become obnoxious to the insurgents. The detachment therefore did not move on to Koure Shah till the next day, and a party of Burkundazes was sent in the meantime to Ackbur for the protection of the village.

13. On the 19th a detachment of the 1st Sikh Cavalry under Lieutenant the Hon'ble A. Chichester arrived at Googaira, but the rain was falling in torrents and the horses were so tired that no new movement could be undertaken that day. Early the next morning, however, I despatched Lieutenants Chichester and Mitchell across the river with instructions to scour the country as far as Pindee Sheikh Moosa, and attack and disperse any insurgents they might still find assembled on the other side. A few hours after their departure I received intelligence that some Khurrals under Uhmud Khan had crossed to this side during the night and had been joined by a large body of Wuttoos, and that they had signified their intention of attacking the station during the day. An

Desertion of followers of Ahmad Khan, Karral, who joins the Wattus.

Despatch of a force under Mr. Berkeley to re-open communication with Multán.

Assemblage of Wattus near village of Akbar, which is reinforced.

Despatch of 1st Sikh Cavalry under Lieutenants Chichester and Mitchell to scour the country.

Threatened attack on Gugera.

Application
made to Colo-
nel Paton for
aid.

express was immediately despatched to Colonel Paton, who was then within a few miles of Googaira with a detachment from Lahore, and letters were sent to Lieutenant Chichester and Mr. Berkeley communicating this intelligence and requesting them either to co-operate or to cut off the retreat of the insurgents in the event of an attack taking place.

Arrival of
Colonel
Paton's force
at Gugera.

14. Colonel Paton's detachment, consisting of three Horse Artillery guns, one company of Her Majesty's 81st, one company of Soobhan Khan's Regiment, and a party of the Lahore Mounted Police arrived at Googaira about 8 A. M. The camp had been pitched near the Kutcherry, and arrangements had been made to quarter the European soldiers in that building when intelligence suddenly arrived that the insurgents had silently approached the station under cover

Approach of
rebels and
their flight.

of some Joar fields, and that they were rapidly advancing. Colonel Paton ordered the camp to be struck and prepared to receive them by placing one gun on the puckha road leading to the village of Googaira and the others on the road towards the jail. When the rebels had approached within 400 yards the guns opened upon them with grape, and after a few rounds they retired slowly. I pursued them with 40 men of Sobhan Khan's Regiment, which had been placed under me

Unsuccessful
pursuit.

by Colonel Paton, but soon found it impossible to keep up with them and therefore sent several urgent messages to Colonel Paton requesting him to send the Cavalry and guns after the retiring enemy. These messages were either not understood or did not meet with Colonel Paton's approval, for they did not produce the desired effect. I at last met the Colonel marching with his whole force towards the village of Googaira. We thus advanced for about a quarter of a mile, but as the enemy was retreating at the rate of about six miles an hour, and our own pace was only about three miles an hour, it was soon discovered that the pursuit was not likely to be effectual, and the troops returned to camp. The loss sustained by the rebels on this occasion was not severe, although they were exposed to several rounds of shrapnel and grape, and the detachment of Soobhan Khan's battalion with me contrived to give them one volley; six men

were killed and a few more wounded. The rebels retired rapidly beyond the village of Futtehpoor and into the jungles near the river, but were not met by the detachments under Lieutenant Chichester and Mr. Berkeley, the latter being too far to co-operate effectively and the former having found some difficulty, I understand, in crossing the river.

15. On the following day, the 21st, I received reliable information that Uhmud Khan and some of the other Khurral Chiefs had retreated into the jungles near Gishkowree, about five miles from Ackbur, and had been joined there by a large body of Wuttoos. Captain Black was thereupon directed to proceed with a party of horsemen to Ackbur, and, after being joined there by Lieutenant Chichester's detachment, to surprise and if possible to destroy this body of insurgents. Captain Black it appears divided his Cavalry (about one hundred and fifty men) into three detachments, himself taking command of one of these, and the others being placed under Lieutenants Chichester and Mitchell. The Infantry not being able to advance with sufficient rapidity were left behind. When within a mile or two of the rebel encampment, scouts were met with and Captain Black's party dashed after them at a rapid pace. The rebels were prepared for the attack. They received Captain Black's party with a discharge of matchlocks, which killed the Ressaldar on the spot and unhorsed several others. This created a confusion, which the insurgents immediately took advantage of by advancing with loud shouts, and surrounding the sowars. The jungle was heavy; 14 or 15 of the sowars were killed, and the remainder had some difficulty in extricating themselves. They were, however, soon rallied by their officers near a ravine, and several of the insurgents who had ventured so far in the pursuit were cut down,—among them Uhmud Khan himself, his nephew Moorad and Sarung, the Chief of the Begke Khurrals. This expedition, though attended with severe loss on our side, thus ended in irreparable disaster to the insurgents. Uhmud Khan had been the chief instigator of the movement; his reputation for success in former insurrections was considerable and his influence over the tribes on the Ravee

Movements of Ahmad Khan, Karral, and despatch of a force against him.

Attack by rebels on Captain Black's force, which loses several men.

Counter-attack on rebels in which Ahmad Khan, Karral, and others are killed.

unbounded. The important results, however, which would have followed his death were counteracted for a time by the disastrous occurrences I have now to describe.

Rebels attacked by Mr. Berkeley and defeated near Kaure Shah.

16. It was of paramount importance to re-open the communication with Mooltan which had been obstructed by the Moondanahs under Wulleedad, and Mr. Berkeley, as already stated, had been sent for that purpose to Koure Shah with instructions to communicate with the Tehseeldar at Hurrappa. He was unable to co-operate on the 20th, but on the morning of the 21st he left Koure Shah for Mohumudpoor, leaving a small guard in the seraie behind him. He had hardly advanced a couple of miles, however, when he heard the drums of the insurgents and some musketry fire in the direction of the Koure Shah Seraie. This induced him to retrace his steps, and he soon came upon a considerable body of insurgents composed of the Futt्यानah, Turhanah and Moordanah tribes, and led by their Chiefs Bhawul Sullabut and Wulleedad. Mr. Berkeley immediately charged them at the head of about 60 horsemen, killed 14 of them and dispersed the remainder. A note received from him during the day mentioned with high approbation the conduct of Baba Khem Singh on this occasion. He also intimated that he would again advance the next day, but by a circuitous route, so as to be able to disperse any insurgents that might have again assembled. This easy victory on the 21st seemed to have rendered him somewhat incautious, and he advanced without hesitation into the jungles near Koure Shah on the morning of the 22nd. He was not molested until he reached a swampy spot between the village of Koure Shah and the Ravee. A considerable body of insurgents, who were hiding in the long grass which covers the banks of the river here, suddenly attacked his party. The unfavourable nature of the ground, and the unexpectedness of this onset prevented the men from forming up and all was soon in confusion. Mr. Berkeley was cut off and surrounded by the insurgents. He had been wounded in the arm by a matchlock ball and had dismounted, but disdained to save himself by flight like the remainder of

Service rendered by Baba Khem Singh on the occasion.

Disaster to Mr. Berkeley's force and his death.

his detachment. After discharging his fowling-piece and rifle, he defended himself with his sword, and after cutting down several of the insurgents was himself overpowered and killed by them. According to all native accounts the first fatal blow was struck by Moorad, Futtayanah, who speared him from behind. This miscreant is now in custody and will no doubt be brought to condign punishment. Upwards of 50 of Mr. Berkeley's detachment were killed on this occasion, and the loss would have been still more severe had it not been for a party of the Kuttar Mookhee Battalion, who rallied their comrades near the banks of the river and opposed a determined front to the pursuing enemy.

Gallant conduct of a party of the Katar Mukhi Battalion.

17. The news of this disaster reached me the same evening on my return from an expedition with Captain Black to Gishkowree, the ground on which Uhmud, Khurral, had been killed the previous day. A party of Soobhan Khan's Regiment was despatched to Noorshah, where Mr. Berkeley's detachment had retired to after their engagement in the morning, and on the arrival of Mr. Egerton from Lahore I made over the station to him and started towards Koure Shah on the afternoon of the 23rd, accompanied by Captain Black and Lieutenant Chichester. At Ackbur authentic intelligence reached me of the plunder of the Hurrupa Tehseel, and all the native accounts agreed that the whole country as far as Toolumba, in the Mooltan District, was in open insurrection. This induced me to apply to Colonel Paton for two guns, but he joined us himself in the morning with three guns and the whole of his Infantry. We remained the 24th at Koure Shah, and, after fortifying the seraie there and garrisoning it with a force of 50 horsemen and 80 Infantry, the latter, principally levies, proceeded on the 25th to Hurrupa. On our arrival there information reached us that a party of Cavalry from Mooltan had been surrounded by the insurgents and were there being besieged in the Cheechawutnee Seraie. A note from Major Chamberlain received during the day confirmed this and intimated besides that the insurgents intended to attack us either during the night or on the march the following day.

Despatch of reinforcements to the scene of the disaster.

Plundering of Harappa Tahsil.

Arrival of force under Colonel Paton.

March to Harappa and receipt of intelligence of Major Chamberlain's position at Chichawatni.

Attack on
Colonel
Paton's force
by rebels
and their
defeat and
dispersion.

18. On the morning of the 26th accordingly after we had advanced about two miles from Hurruppa a noise of drums and *sunks* from a line of jungle about a mile to the right of the road announced the approach of the insurgents. The troops were drawn up with the guns in the centre, and as the ground was open the engagement promised to be a decisive one, but, as on a former occasion at Googaira, the guns again opened when the enemy had approached within 400 yards and no use was made of the Cavalry when they fled. The whole force was sent in pursuit at the usual rate of about three miles an hour, and the rebels had of course disappeared when we reached the low line of jungle before alluded to. This jungle was found impracticable for Artillery. The pursuit was therefore given up and the force continued its march to Cheechawutnee.

Halt of Colo-
nel Paton at
Chichawatni
and arrival of
a detachment
from Lahore.

19. Colonel Paton halted at Cheechawutnee for some days chiefly with the view I believe of allowing a reinforcement from Mooltan to join Major Chamberlain. A detachment from Lahore under Captains Snow and McAndrew arrived there also on the 28th. They had met a body of the Moordanahs near Mohumudpoor during the night and one or two of the party had been wounded in a slight skirmish which had ensued. On the 30th Colonel Paton's detachment returned towards Googaira after leaving a strong guard at Cheechawutnee. The tahseel of Hurruppa was also repaired and garrisoned, and on the 1st of October the detachment marched to Mohumudpoor for the same purpose. About five miles from Mohumudpoor fresh cattle tracks across the road made it evident that considerable droves of cattle had recently entered the jungle to the left of the road. Captain Snow thereupon received permission to make a reconnaissance which proved however far from successful. A party of insurgents surrounded the Lahore Light Horse under Captain Snow in a dense jungle, wounded that officer himself as well as the Sergeant-Major and killed one of the troopers. As soon as this intelligence reached Colonel Paton he halted the column and tried to pursue the insurgents with his Infantry, but without success. After traversing the jungle for about two

Return of
Colonel
Paton's de-
tachment
towards Gu-
gera.

Reconnaiss-
ance under-
taken by
Captain Snow
and Lahore
Light Horse.
Casualties.

Unsuccessful
pursuit of in-
surgents by
Colonel
Paton's force.

hours we returned to Mohumudpoor with a few stray buffaloes which had been picked up in a deserted cattle farm.

20. On the 2nd of October I rode into Googaira to complete the dawk arrangements. Dawk horses had again been stationed at each sereaie; these buildings had all been slightly fortified, and a strong guard of horse and foot had been placed in each to protect the communication. I found on my arrival that a considerable body of Wuttoos had collected on the right bank of the river opposite Googaira and that a party of them under Nadir Shah, Kooreshee, had destroyed the boats at the Maree ferry and had driven away some workmen who were constructing a tower for the protection of the ghauts. Early on the morning of the 3rd I accordingly proceeded with the detachment under Major Jackson, who had arrived during the previous night on a reconnaissance towards the river, but we found no trace of the insurgents. On the 4th I rejoined Colonel Paton's camp and on the 5th of October his force returned to Googaira.

Assemblage
of Wattus
opposite
Gugera.

Despatch of a
force against
the insurgents
and their dis-
appearance.

21. A considerable body of Wuttoos had re-assembled opposite to the Maree ferry. It was therefore determined to cross over a detachment and, if possible, to attack and disperse them. A small party of the Lahore Light Horse under Captain Balmain and some Infantry under the Assistant Commissioner, Lieutenant Millar, were sent on the 6th of October to the ferry to protect some new boats that had arrived there in the meantime, and early on the morning of the 7th Colonel Paton with a strong detachment of Infantry, including the European company, proceeded to the ghauts. On arrival there it was unfortunately discovered to be necessary to cook a warm breakfast of meat, &c., for the Europeans, and much valuable time was thus lost. We proceeded as far as Pindee Sheikh Moosa without seeing the enemy, and as the Commanding Officer was of opinion that the safety of his force depended on our immediate return, we retraced our steps after resting about a quarter of an hour.

Re-assembling
of Wattus
opposite the
Maree ferry.

Despatch of a
force against
them and its
return with-
out seeing
the enemy.

Intention to
attack the
insurgents
at Jalli.

Despatch of a
force under
Captain Snow
to co-operate
from the left
bank of the
river.

Failure of
Major Cham-
berlain to
attack rebels.

Attack by
rebels on a
picket under
Captain
McAndrew
and their re-
pulse.

22. Information in the meantime had been received from Major Chamberlain that he had crossed the Ravee near Hurruppa and was about to attack the insurgents at Jullee on the right bank of the river. The relief of Kumalia by a detachment from Jhung and the subsequent retreat of that detachment has no doubt been reported to you in ample detail. I therefore refrain from any further allusion to this subject. The Wyneewals and Bugghelabs, after aiding the Katheahs in thoroughly plundering and sacking the city of Kumalia, had joined the Futtayanahs, Moordanahs, &c., and retired with them into the Jullee jungles, a place renowned as having successfully withstood the attack of the Sikhs in former insurrections. Major Chamberlain determined to attack them in this position on the 9th of October and requested Colonel Paton to co-operate with him from the left bank of the river. We accordingly marched on the morning of the 8th to Koure Shah, the Europeans and guns having been left this time at Googaira to protect the station. Colonel Paton being laid up with fever, the command of the detachment devolved on Captain Snow, and early on the morning of the 9th we advanced towards Jullee *via* Kootoobshurrah and Dowlah. The rebels were collected in some strength on the opposite bank of the river, but we waited in vain for the promised attack from Major Chamberlain. The insurgents at first exposed themselves very freely, but a few well-directed rifle shots from some of the officers who accompanied the force soon caused them to take shelter in the jungle. Information having been received that the insurgents had moored some boats lower down the river, a detachment under Captain McAndrew was sent in that direction to take possession of them, but the jungle was found to be so dense that they returned after advancing for about half a mile, and a party of them were posted by Captain McAndrew on the other side of a nullah about four hundred yards from the remainder of the force. The day was far advanced, and we began to give up all hope of an attack from Major Chamberlain when our attention was attracted by firing from the picket at the nullah. We immediately advanced with the Infantry in that

direction and attacked a body of insurgents who had advanced under cover of the nullah and surrounded the picket. They were soon beaten off, but the dense jungle rendered all pursuit impossible. I understand that they lost about 20 men on this occasion, but they contrived to surprise and kill four of our horsemen and five of the Infantry belonging to the picket. As it was near sunset and Major Chamberlain's attack had evidently not taken place, we returned to Mohumudpoor with about 700 head of cattle which the insurgents had abandoned on our approach. The experience gained in this little expedition was very valuable. It was obvious that an attack on Jullee from the left bank in combination with Major Chamberlain's force would be of great importance, but in order to accomplish this it would be necessary to seize the boats moored by the insurgents on the opposite bank. We had, however, discovered that it would be impossible to protect a passage of troops with musketry, and the road from Mohumudpoor was found practicable for Artillery. Captain Snow's application for two guns from Googaira was, however, not approved of by Colonel Paton, and we returned to his camp at Kowre Shah on the 10th of October.

Return of
force under
Captain Snow
with a large
herd of cattle
abandoned by
the insurgents.

23. On the 11th you joined the detachment yourself, and on the 12th we returned to Mohumudpoor. On the 13th we marched to Bowunnee, and Major Marsden there joined the camp and informed me that he had come to take charge of the district.

Movements of
troops and
change of
District
Officers.

24. The Khurrals in the meantime had submitted and the Wuttoos had returned to their villages, but the tribes assembled at Jullee and the Katheeahs, who after their defeat near Hurruppa had retired towards Jamlera, were still in arms. A slight demonstration made by the Begke Khurrals at Mooharrunwallah was put down by the approach of a detachment from Lahore under the Commissioner, Mr. Roberts. The reports submitted by Captain Tronson will have supplied you with detailed information regarding the operations against the insurgents in the Pak Puttun Tehseel. It would therefore be unnecessary for me to attempt to describe them here. In

Submission
of Karrals,
and attitude
of other
tribes.

Acknowledg-
ment of help
received from
the Commis-
sioner.

conclusion, I have only to add my acknowledgments to you for the kind support and encouragement you have invariably extended to me since the commencement of the mutinies.

ENCLOSURE (4) TO 46.

50. *From Major F. C. MARSDEN, Deputy Commissioner, Goo-
gaira, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Mooltan
Division,—No. —, dated Camp Kumalia, 1st Febru-
ary 1858.*

Narrative
of events in
the Gugera
District
by Major
F. C. Marsden.

IN obedience to your request I have the honor to forward a narrative of events which fell under my immediate observation during the late disturbances in this district.

I have not entered into the action or motives of others concerned more than I could avoid, as I do not consider it falls under my province.

Major Mars-
den's previous
acquaintance
with the dis-
trict.

It may not be superfluous to add that I formerly held charge of the district for some years immediately after annexation and became intimately acquainted with the habits and mode of thought of these nomad tribes which have risen in insurrection; so that I entered on my duties with considerable confidence, and never for a moment doubted that they would be speedily overcome. The result has shown my expectations to have been well founded. The Chiefs are humbled to the dust; they have restored the property they plundered in great part, and are hastily bringing in the remainder. They sorely repent of their madness and are now supplicants for mercy to the Government they have offended.

ENCLOSURE TO 50.

51. *From Major F. C. MARSDEN, Deputy Commissioner, Goo-
gaira, to Major G. W. HAMILTON, Commissioner and
Superintendent, Mooltan Division,—No. —, dated
Camp Kumalia, 31st January 1858.*

Orders
received by
Major Mars-
den.

ON the 9th October I received orders from the Chief Commissioner to proceed to the Googaira district, of which I had for some years been in charge after annexation, to assist Major Hamilton, Commissioner of the Division, in quelling an insurrection of the pastoral tribes of Khattiyas, Khurruls, Futteenahs, and others, who inhabit the banks of the Ravee

and the jungle tract which stretches from that river to the Sutlej.

2. On the 10th I reached Googaira, which I found had been attacked by the powerful clan of Khurruls under their old Chief Ahmad Khan, a wealthy, determined old patriarch, who had paid for his temerity with his head and whose clan had tendered their submission.

Position on
Major Mars-
den's arrival
in the district.

3. The sudder station of Googaira was occupied by European troops and Artillery.

4. Mr. Roberts, Commissioner, Lahore Division, entered the district about the same time as myself with some troops from the Boochooki, or north-west side, to march up the right bank of the river.

5. Major Chamberlain was encamped at Killianwalla with a detail of Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry, whilst a force under Captain Snow occupied a position on the left, or opposite bank of the river.

6. Between Killianwalla and a village called "Mal Futteeanah," about three miles from Major Chamberlain's camp and six from the village, the insurgents had taken up a strong position in a jungle fastness known by the name of "Jhullee." In their front was the Ravee, running between high banks, covered with tall thick grass jungle to the water's edge. They were surrounded by jungle on every side, which was further strengthened by a long sheet of water and swamp, stretching for a considerable distance along their rear.

7. On the 14th Captain Snow marched with his detachment to Bowany, with Major Hamilton in camp, where I also joined them, reaching the ground about the same time as they did.

Movements of
Major Mars-
den.

8. I offered my services to Captain Snow to reconnoitre the ground; he was kind enough to lend me a horse, and place a small party of the Lahore Light Horse and an European Sergeant at my disposal for that duty.

9. The ground was found to be very unfavorable for the passage of the Ravee, the intermediate space between the

Change of
position of
camp.

camp and the river being intersected by a deep nulla, a swamp and a belt of heavy grass jungle. This was reported to Major Hamilton and Captain Snow, who immediately determined to march the following day to Jhullee Futteeanah.

Attack on
camp by in-
surgents and
their repulse.

10. Major Snow surrounded the camp with bushes, posted pickets, and made everything snug for the night. It was well he did so, for just before dawn the insurgents attacked the north-west picket in some force; they were beaten off with loss.

11. On the following day, the 15th, he marched to Jhullee Futteeanah and pitched about a mile from the Ravee.

Unsuccessful
attempt made
by Major
Hamilton to
seize boats at
Jalli.

12. On the 16th Major Hamilton determined to attempt the seizure of the boats at Jhullee. A passage was cut through some miles of jungle and a detachment of troops* marched to a spot on the Ravee immediately opposite where the insurgents had moored the boats, Major Hamilton directing the movements.

* 20 Cavalry—Cap-
tain Snow.
200 Infantry—Major
Marsden.
Some Irregular horse-
men.

Information had been received that, although most of the boats had been sunk on the opposite bank, the insurgents were in the practice of using two of the boats for crossing the river. This was found to be the fact, and a well-trodden landing place was discovered on the left bank of the river.

13. It was found that five boats were drawn up under the high banks, on the opposite side of the river, and protected by matchlockmen completely under cover; on the right of the boats was a small open space, from which jungle had been cleared, the jungle on both sides of which was occupied by the insurgents.

14. Some Machees who had been sent across to fetch the boats were speedily driven back, when Oodet Singh, a Police Jamadar (a Poorbeea), stripped and volunteered for the duty, but the fire became so heavy that he was not allowed to make the attempt. It was found that our muskets could not keep down the matchlock fire, and thus whilst their longer range enabled them to do us considerable damage they were in perfect safety,

15. Whether we inflicted any loss on the enemy or not

Our casualties.

Captain Snow shot through the leg.
Duffadar shot through the knee.
2 Sepoys wounded by matchlock balls.
Major Marsden's horse shot through the flank.
1 Horse killed.

could not be ascertained as the Ravee was between us. Our casualties are noted in the margin.

16. On 17th Major Hamilton sent for guns to Googaira, constructed a raft on *ghurras* and exerted himself to prepare for another attack.

Application to Gugerā : guns.

17. During the whole of this time the "dholes" kept up a continual beating from the opposite side of the Ravee, and reports were frequent that the insurgents intended an attack on either our camp or that of Major Chamberlain.

18. On the 18th we heard three guns from the direction of Major Chamberlain's camp, and concluded he had been attacked, but it was not so.

19. Syud Rahmut Ally, brother of the Hoojrah Peer, now Kotwal of Ferozepoor, informed me, on the authority of a Mirasee, that Bahawal, Julla, Nourung and other influential Chiefs were desirous of coming in, but feared being put to death. He also added that they had 600 stand of firearms, besides swords, spears, &c. This information was also repeated by Oodet Singh and Dara Singh, but probably emanated from the same source.

20. On 21st two Horse Artillery guns under Captain

* 2 Horse Artillery guns.
200 Infantry.
About 12 Irregular Horse.

Major Marsden.
Captain McAndrew.
Lieut. Chichester.
Lieutenant Norgate.
Lieutenant Graham.

† Intimation of this intended movement was sent to Major Chamberlain to allow of his co-operating.

camp, giving me my choice of duties.

Delaine arrived, and on the 22nd the detail per margin* was under arms at daylight. Major Hamilton determined on at once renewing the attack.† As there was some expectation of a counter-attack on our camp, during the absence of the troops, by the insurgents who crossed the river with facility at any point on bundles of grass, Major Hamilton determined that either he or I should remain in

Arrival of guns and despatch of a force to operate against the insurgents.

Success of
operations.

21. The force soon reached the ghat where the boats were. The fire from the opposite side was kept down with grape and round shot. 50 men were pushed across the Ravee, 8 and 10 at a time, on the raft, with *Lieutenant Mitchell, Major Marsden, three officers,* drove the enemy out of the jungle, and brought away three boats. The boats were all found to have been scuttled and aground, partly filled with mud, water, and brushwood, and could only be moved with great labour and difficulty. Evening began to close in, and it was necessary to reach camp before dark. A village opposite to Mal Futteenah Ghat, which had continually fired on our vedettes was burnt and the force reached its ground by dark.

Casualties of
enemy.

22. The number of casualties were never accurately ascertained, but I believe the list per margin will be found tolerably correct, except that, perhaps, some of the six named may have fallen in the subsequent engagement at Choorur Tezi ka.

| | | |
|---|---|--------|
| Julla, Tirana. Maneen, Ditto. Syce, Ditto. Naurunga, Ditto. Missiree, Sipera Sixth, a son of ditto, Bar. And 12 or 13 men. Moorad, dangerous- ly wounded | } These are all men of some note. | Ditto. |
|---|---|--------|

Despatch of
a force across
the Ravi and
its return
without seeing
the enemy.

23. On 23rd Major Hamilton sent a party of Infantry and a few horse across the Ravee at Malee Nuthooke, which marched through Jhullee in its whole length without finding a single insurgent, visited Major Chamberlain's camp, who was absent in pursuit with some Cavalry, and passing through the deserted camp of the insurgents returned to Mal Futteenah.

| | |
|---|--|
| Major Marsden. Captain McAndrew. Lieutenant Graham. Ensign Crally. " Hammond. | |
|---|--|

Determina-
tion of Major
Hamilton to
follow the in-
surgents
across the
"Bar."

24. On 24th Major Hamilton determined to follow the insurgents across the Bar, as they were reported to have gone with the intention of joining their friends in the Jumlaire and Sahoke Koonds on the Sutlej.

25. Lieutenant Elphinstone was sent to remain as Civil Officer with Major Chamberlain's camp, and the whole detachment marched to Hurrappa on 24th, Kumbeer 25th, Jevun 26th, and Shaikoopoora 27th.

A night attack was here threatened by the insurgents, and on the 28th the force marched out as far as Russoolpoor, a ruined fort, passing several places shewing unmistakeable signs of recent encampments and returning to its original ground without seeing an insurgent.

26. Major Hamilton thought it necessary that a Civil Officer should be with Major Jackson's force, which had advanced at his instigation to Kaboola; so leaving me in charge with Captain McAndrew he joined Major Jackson the same day.

March of force and its return without seeing the enemy.

Movements of Major Hamilton and Major Marsden.

27. The force* in camp was ample. I received good information that the enemy were in the Bar which we had recently crossed, and I knew there were only certain spots in which a large nomad camp, encumbered with their families and numerous herds of cattle, could exist. I was therefore certain they must either be at a Jhoke, dependent on the small Jhoke well, or at one of the "Rehnas" or "Choas,"† where they could also obtain a supply of water; it was also evident that any of these places could equally supply the force. I also knew that these tribes almost possess the power of ubiquity. They assemble and scatter in an incredible short space of time and, anomalous as it may appear, the very people they plunder will afford them aid and shelter. Suddenness of movement therefore was the only chance of success. The camp moved off at half an hour before daylight from Shaikoopoor, passed the ruined fort of Russoolpoor, and made a short halt at Oomurpoor, an old ruined fort in the jungle, which, though deserted, has the advantage

Force at Major Marsden's disposal and position of enemy.

Movements of Major Marsden's force.

*2 H. A. guns,—Captain Delaine.

5 Soobadars

4 Jemadars

17 Havildars

21 Naicks

281 Sepoys

4 Havildars

4 Naicks

48 Sepoys

1 Soobadar

2 Jamadars

7 Havildars

5 Naicks

92 Sepoys

Some Lahore Light Horse,—Captain Balmain;

Lieutenant Graham.

Moostapha Khan's Horse,—Moostapha Khan.

† "Choas" are hollows or pools, so called in the Vernacular, in which rain water collects and remains till an advanced period of the season.

Lahore and Umritsur
Police Battalion.

Sooruj Mookhee.

Kuttar Mookhee.

Captain McAndrew.
Ensign Crally.
Ensign Hammond.

of a good well; here the intelligence was varied and uncertain. Baza Thirana, Hassanwalla Rehna and other places were mentioned as their probable encampment. Whilst the troops were resting I galloped a few miles into the jungle to reconnoitre, and distinctly heard the *dhole*, which at once decided our movements. We marched on Hassanwalla *

* A small pool of muddy water, but eagerly drunk by all hands, some of the horses rushing into it. Rehna; here some shepherds with their flocks were seized, and on the promise of reward and impunity conducted us faithfully to the insurgents' camp at

Surprise of
enemy's camp.

Choorur Tezi Ka. The surprise was complete; we attacked at once with grape, round shot and musketry. The whole camp fell into our hands, even to the clothes, food and small articles of domestic use, together with numbers of camels and cattle. The Infantry having marched some 34 miles under a hot sun were much too tired to follow up the fugitives; the Irregular Horse were too much engaged in plundering the camp. Myself, and Captain Balmain, with the Lahore Light Horse, followed the fugitives for some miles, but, either they were too quick, the jungle too thick, or, which is most probable, we took a wrong direction, we did not come up with them, and finally returned, bringing back a herd of camels. Between 4 and 5 p. m. the camp was pitched and the troops made comfortable for the night. This was the end of the insurrection; not a shot has since been fired.

Pursuit of
enemy and
their escape.
Capture of a
herd of
camels.

End of in-
surrection.

Despatch of
troops to
Jumlera.

28. Captain McAndrew the same evening received orders from Major Jackson to be at Jumlara with his detail of troops on 1st November, where the insurgents were said to have collected in the Koonds bordering the Sutlej between Jumlara and Saooke.

Movements of
Major Cham-
berlain.

29. On the 30th we heard that Major Chamberlain was crossing the Bar and after the fugitives with his Cavalry, but there is little hope of catching Kattiyas and Futteenahs in their native jungles, when they are once afoot; besides, few men understand bush-fighting better than they do or are better shots: they scatter and assemble by beat of *dhole* in a very short space of time, with the

different sounds of which they are as familiar as trained Light Infantry.

30. All the forces* were assembled at Jumlara on 1st November under Major Chamberlain. Assemblage of force at Jumlara.
- *Major Hamilton. The Koonds were beaten, but the enemy Dispersion of the enemy.
- „ Chamberlain.
- „ Jackson.
- „ Marsden.
- Captain McAndrew. had fled, some into the Bhawulpoor State,
- „ Tulloh. where they were watched by a force
- „ Tronson. under Peer Abbas; others scattered over
- „ Balmain. the Bar, whilst many found security in
- &c., &c., &c. friendly villages.

31. On the 4th November the force broke up; the Breaking up of force.
insurrection was at an end.

32. I accompanied Major Jackson's force to Hurruppa, Seizure of large herds of cattle.
seizing large herds of cattle, the property of insurgents, on the road.

33. On 7th Nuttoo and Rujjub, Kattyas, gave them- Surrender of insurgent leaders.
selves up; on 12th Mulla, Pawaye, and
† Mahomed, Kattyas, had previously given Surrender of insurgent leaders.
himself up to the Commissioner. Dad, Arra, Talla (*sic.*), came in; on 13th†
we reached Hurruppa.

34. From this time the insurgents, hotly pressed by the Police, were only desirous of giving themselves up, fearful of being captured for the rewards offered. Much plundered property has been restored and is daily being brought in from long distances, and safety has been as fully re-established as before the outbreak, and certainly on a more secure foundation.

35. On 11th January Bahawul, Futteenah, was brought to me by Oodet Singh, who, though a Poorbeea and unable to read, I had promoted to a Thanadarship for his activity, loyalty and intelligence, both at Ferozepore and in the district. Ameer, Kathya, Gharib ke, followed on the 29th.

36. There are now no Chiefs of importance at large. Measures for recovery of plundered property and trial of insurgent leaders.
They are employed on heavy security in bringing back plundered property which, without their co-operation, it would be almost impossible to collect. Bahawul, Futteenah, Ameer, Kathya, Gharib ke, Nuthoo, Gharib ke, are on their trial;

others, when the plundered property has been all brought in, will follow and such measure of justice meted out to them as will effectually prevent them from again indulging in the luxury of insurrection and plunder.

Punishment
of murderers
of Lieutenant
Neville.

37. I must not conclude this report without saying that I have not heard of any of these tribes committing atrocity against persons. The Joyas and villagers of Jumlara, and Sahoke, who murdered Lieutenant Neville, are distinct, and have suffered accordingly.

52. *Narrative of the movements of Major C. CHAMBERLAIN'S Column.*

Despatch of a
party to
re-open com-
munication
with Lahore.

1. On the first receipt of the intelligence of the outbreak in the Googaira district, by order of Brigadier Farquharson, Commanding at Mooltan, and at the requisition of the Commissioner, 70 of the 1st Irregular Cavalry were sent off on the 17th September at midday under Captain Fraser,¹ Assistant Commissioner, to promenade up the road and re-open the communication with Lahore.

Spread of
insurrection.

2. On the 18th further information reached Major Hamilton to the effect that the movement was gaining ground very fast; the large town of Kumalia had been sacked and gutted; the dak horses carried off the road; the Police disarmed; Government property destroyed; and rebellion popular. It at once became necessary to take measures for its suppression, and what were the means? In cantonments there were *a wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers*, of which two companies were fixtures in the fort and the Hospital full to overflowing—possibly the effective number might be 300 men; the *11th Punjab Infantry*, as yet incomplete and with some 5 to 600 recruits unskilled and ignorant of the use of a musquet; *an embryo troop of European Horse Artillery* improvised as before recorded, but quite unequal to field service; and two squadrons, 1st Irregular Cavalry: whilst Captain Tronson had only a few of his efficient Horse and Foot Police, which marched the same night to reinforce the permit posts on the

Necessity for
action and
means at the
disposal of
the Military
authorities.

¹ NOTE.—The sickly season had already set in and not a single officer of the regiment was fit for detached duty.

Sutlej Salt Line. Major Voyle, the Deputy Commissioner, accompanied Captain Tronson, and but for this detachment in all probability the rebellion would have extended throughout the Mooltan district.

But these troops in cantonments had the responsible task of coercing two disarmed corps, outnumbering them considerably, and the very fact of an insurrection in the district caused greater uneasiness on their account. The stoppage of all communication left everything in the dark regarding Delhi. The troops might have been defeated from any quarter.

3 But it was necessary to meet the rebellion at once, and it was decided by Brigadier Farquharson in consultation with the Commissioner to detach 100 more sabres and headquarters, 1st Irregular Cavalry, to reinforce the advance party under Captain Fraser. On the night of the 18th they marched, and on 21st joined him at Tolumba, where were also Messrs. Taylor and Page, of the Postal and Engineer Departments, whose duties were suspended by the rebellion and who offered their services.

Reinforce-
ment of party
under Captain
Fraser.

4. A hostile movement on the opposite side of the Ravee in the direction of the Seraie Suddoo Tuhseel had induced Captain Fraser to detach a party of 35 of the 1st Irregular Cavalry for its defence; whilst the people at Makdoompur had prepared for flight in dread of a visit from the tribe of Lungreeals, who occupy that portion of the Bar immediately east of it and with whom there was a feud.

Despatch of
party for the
defence of
Seraie Sidhu.

The reports brought in during the day being favorable, the detachment marched on 22nd to Doboorgee, close to which place was the village of a Khatea Chief, "Hashim," said to be in enmity, and which being found deserted was at once fired.

March of
detachment
to Doburji,
which is
found desert-
ed.

5. During the day drums were heard in the jungle in different directions, but no one could, or would, tell the meaning, although it did not require much to guess that it was the method employed in a heavy grass jungle country to collect the people at particular spots. A letter was received in the afternoon from a bunya named "Kunya" at Cheechawutnee stating that the news of the arrival of a small party of Cavalry

News of enemy at Chíchawatni.

at Dobooree had reached his village, near which was a strong gathering of rebels, and that no advance should be made in that direction without guns. The messenger who brought the letter computed the rebels at 3 to 4,000, led by Mahomed, Lall and Nuttoo, Chiefs of the Khatya tribe, who would undoubtedly oppose the detachment.

Cautious advance towards Chíchawatni.

6. The village of Dobooree was deserted and supplies very scarce, and the means of obtaining information of the rebels was *nil*. It was therefore necessary to be cautious in any movements, and two patrols were despatched under very smart Non-Commissioned Officers to move through the jungle on either side of the road in order to ascertain whether any parties were moving. In the afternoon they returned, reporting the country quite clear as far as they could see. The jungly nature of the country necessitated videttes to guard against any sudden surprise. Towards sundown a party was sent out under a very sharp Native officer, but had not left camp very long ere a sowar came galloping back saying that the rebels were moving down in thousands to attack the detachment, and that the Native officer was watching them.

7. The detachment was immediately mounted and formed in the direction from which the attack was anticipated, whilst all the baggage and camp followers were sent into the serai. Darkness came, but still no enemy, and some anxiety was felt for the party which had sent information. About 7 o'clock they returned. It appears that they saw a horseman in the jungle, gave chase and came upon a few others who made off at speed duly pursued, and who as they approached their own encampment fired their matchlocks to warn the camp. Shots were exchanged, and one man more impudent than the rest proclaimed the fate on the morrow of those who fought under the infidel flag.

8. It was adjudged advisable to allow the whole detachment to pass the night in the serai, as in the event of a night attack no good could be hoped for ; whilst several men and horses would to a certainty be wounded and killed from the extreme proximity of the heavy jungle which gave excellent cover.

The night passed quietly. At dawn fresh patrols were sent out,—one party to beat up the direction whence the enemy had been seen the previous evening, and another to move up through the jungle some four or five miles and return by the high road.

The latter party saw nothing. The former found the encampment of the previous night, which they considered to have been occupied by a large body, from the number of fires and cooking places and the litter of 70 horses.

At 1 P.M., 23rd, the detachment marched to Cheechawutnee. Not a soul was to be seen. The different horse stages of the mail cart were all destroyed and many burnt; the fittings of the wells smashed. The village of Cheechawutnee was reached soon after 4 P.M., and a deputation of bunyas, headed by the before-mentioned "Kunya," met the detachment as it halted momentarily near the dak bungalow. These people declared they had paid ransom that afternoon for the third time within the last few days, and that the rebels had taken their departure into the Bar an hour before the arrival of the detachment. The regular encamping-ground being distant from the village, and the detachment being entirely dependent upon it for supplies, it was decided to encamp close to the village and in front of the serai, which is immediately contiguous to, and may be considered a part of, the village itself.

Arrival of
detachment at
Chiehawatui.

9. About $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5 P.M. drums were suddenly heard beating in the jungle on the banks of the Ravee, and from a tower men could be seen on the opposite side moving to the direction from whence the sound came.

Advance of
the rebels.

Soon after this some of the grass-cutters came back hurriedly, reporting having heard a distinct noise of many men talking, and that the sound becoming louder induced a belief that they were moving down to the serai.

Mr. Taylor, being ready on horse-back, proceeded to reconnoitre, whilst a party of 50 men were ordered to mount at once.

It was very unfortunate that at this moment, save and except the guards, all were undressed,—some engaged in cooking, others making arrangements for the night fast approaching.

An engagement takes place and the rebels retreat to cover.

Occupation of Chichawatni Serai by Major Chamberlain's force and defensive measures adopted.

By the time the sowars had mounted the rebels had shewn a front and emerged from the jungle. Their numbers were perhaps about 250 to 300. An engagement took place immediately; the rebels retreating to the cover which gave them great advantage. A wounded man returned, telling that the rebels were falling fast, and that some others of the sowars were wounded.

It being suspected that the villagers were playing false—from the fact of their assurance that there were no rebels within some distance—measures were adopted to take possession of the tower, the key of the serai, as also of the serai itself. Whilst this was being done, the look-out man reported a mass of men moving down the high roads by a detour, as if to assist their friends engaged. It was further reported that a party had entered the village on the opposite side, evidently in view to seizing the serai. To guard against this, dismounted parties were put upon each of the towers. Unfortunately there was no shelter. The gates also were closed.

It being now sundown orders were at once sent to recall the detachment engaged. This was effected without molestation until the party met the head of the rebel reinforcement close under the serai amongst some garden walls, where swords were again crossed, and men wounded on both sides.

It was considered the enemy lost from 50 to 60 men from both parties, whilst in the detachment the loss was 1 Duffadar killed, 1 Resaldar, 1 Naib-Resaldar, 6 sowars and 3 horses wounded, and 3 horses lost.

Attack on serai. Incidents of the siege.

10. The rebels now numbered about 2,000,¹ and it was evident from shots fired from the village that matters were worse than had been anticipated. It was barely dark when a sharp fire was opened from the village and from garden walls,

¹ NOTE.—After the surrender of Mahomed, Khatea, to Major Hamilton it was ascertained that Lall, Khatia, had moved parallel with the detachment as it marched from Dobooree and had sent a message to the rebels who had moved downwards from Hurrappa that morning to make a combined attack upon it on its arrival at Cheechawutnee. It was also at one time meditated attacking it as it halted at a well about five miles short of that village, but preference was given to the combined attack which was delayed by the tardy arrival of the messenger.

thus proving that firearms were no scarcity. As the night set in, the fusilade increased, and perhaps was attributable to stringent orders being given to the garrison to reserve fire until there was some certainty of the shots taking effect. Ammunition, moreover, was very precious.

11. Messrs. Taylor and Page with a party had occupied the tower. It has been stated that it was detached from the serai, but it was within a few yards and the neutral ground was under fire of both places.

The base was solid for some 14 to 20 feet, and a rope was the means of ingress and egress. It had two stories, but the upper only admitted of shelter breast high, and the loop-holes were utterly useless for the purpose for which built.

The fire from this elevated position was effectual over a large portion of the town, as also of the approaches on three sides to the serai; but there was the drawback of exposure above recorded, whilst the rebels had admirable shelter in houses in the village.

12. Towards morning the firing ceased, but drums beat in all directions throughout the night, and at early dawn the rebels collected in greater force on some high ground near the dak bungalow, which building they occupied.

During the night a messenger was despatched to Mooltan for reinforcements, which were evidently necessary for the suppression of the rebellion, and it was decided to remain in the seraie until their arrival, and for the following reasons:—

Application
for reinforce-
ments and
determination
to hold serai
until their
arrival.

1st.—The disaffection extended upwards to Googaira—a distance of about 60 miles—which was besieged, and downwards to close to Tolumbah, 30 miles distant. It was highly advisable to confine its spread.

2nd.—The country could hardly be more unsuited to entirely Cavalry operations, and the detachment could not muster 120 effective sabres.

3rd.—To attempt anything it would be necessary to move out with every man capable of

using arms, and this could only be done by deserting the baggage, sick, wounded, and camp followers, all of whom would have been sacrificed. The very thirst for plunder would have induced the rebels to attack them, and, as the camp followers were unarmed, resistance would have been impossible.

4th.—Once the serai was evacuated it would to a certainty be seized by the rebels, many of whom were in the village, and the detachment would have severed itself from the only means of procuring food for men or horses, neither of which had been fed since early morning of the previous day. Moreover it was too hazardous to hope for success in such a country, with a handful of men opposed to very superior numbers, by no means badly armed.

5th.—It is not denied but that in a charge they might have cut their way through even superior numbers, but every wounded and dismounted man must have been massacred. Unable to push on or make head against the rebellion, a retreat would have been necessary, and of course the insurrection would have increased and pursued the detachment, and possibly extended to Mooltan. To retreat upon Tolumbah would have been useless, for the country from thence to Kubeerwalla, 26 miles, was equally unadapted for Cavalry.

Under all these circumstances it appeared advisable to remain in the serai, taking advantage of any opportunities which might offer to make a sally.

Operations of
insurgents.

13. The numbers of the rebels increased almost hourly, and throughout the morning the garrison stood to arms momentarily expecting an attack which they seemed to be arranging.

The rebels in the village possessed themselves of spots from whence a very galling fire could be poured on to all the bastions and one face of the serai, and several men were wounded. A shot fired at the party in the tower fortunately missed Mr. Page, but wounded a Duffadar standing at his side rear and passing through him killed a sowar behind him.

Two more sowars were killed in the serai, 1 Duffadar, 1 sowar and 3 grass-cutters wounded, and all from shots from the village; but neither from the tower or serai could it be discovered whence they came.¹ Early in the morning a small party were engaged in carrying grain from a house immediately under the fire of the tower, and about 40 maunds had been collected, when suddenly a very large body of rebels entered the village from the rear and with much drumming and firing appeared to be about to assault. The value of the tower was now manifest. Nine of them were shot down by Messrs. Page and Taylor, ably assisted by some Sikhs of Gordon's Corps, who being bound to Umritsur on a recruiting duty had accompanied the detachment from Tolumbah. They were provided with the arms of the dead and wounded sowars.² It was necessary at once to improvise some parapet wherewith to enable the garrison to repel any attack, and the saddles were at once taken off the troop horses and the loading saddles off the ponies; these with the men's tents, bedding, &c., were piled on to the walls. No sooner was the motive apparent than all hands eagerly set to work, and by putting the saddles crossways on to the walls, excellent loop-holes were formed, which enabled the men to return the fire wherever parties were visible. Four men were killed.

Measures taken to protect the defenders of the serai.

This and the aid afforded by the tower perhaps prematurely assured the rebels of the impregnability of the serai, and they sheared off to a plot of jungle close to the far side of the village.

¹ NOTE.—The women of the village holding out their petticoats brought men over the tops of the houses and put them under loop-holed cover, whence they gave great annoyance with perfect impunity.

² NOTE.—The Commander of this party by name Nihal Sing, Naick, was made a Jemadar. The others were made Naicks.

14. The night passed quietly, notwithstanding they threatened annihilation, and called out that they had killed Mr. Berkeley and other soldiers of the infidels, as also that they fought by order of the King of Delhi, whose kingdom and rule extended to Lahore.

The Wordie-Major was also invited by message to give up the five Feringhees with the detachment and join the common cause.

Movements
of insurgents.

The 25th was passed much as the previous day, but suddenly the rebels moved across the front, round to the right rear as if to cross the river, and a sepoy informed that the sudden movement was consequent on the arrival at Hurruppa of a detachment of Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry; he also stated that it was intended as a ruse, hoping the garrison would be tempted to fall upon them when a party of rebels would seize the serai. Nothing was therefore attempted. In about a couple of hours they retraced their steps; and towards evening moved off bodily to take up a favorable position between Cheechawutnee and Hurruppa in view to opposing the detachment, next morning.

Arrival of
reinforce-
ments at
Chichawatni.

15. About sunrise the firing of guns was heard from that direction, and at midday Colonel Paton and his Field Force encamped in front of the serai. The Lahore Field Force consisted of—

3 Guns, European Horse Artillery,
1 Company Her Majesty's 81st Foot,
2 Companies, Levy Infantry, and
A Wing of Wale's (Seikh) Horse,

and was joined next day by a party of Lahore Light Horse and Police Infantry.

On the 28th the Mooltan Field Force, consisting of—

2 Guns, European Horse Artillery,
200 of the 11th Punjab Infantry,
100 1st Irregular Cavalry

also arrived, making a show of troops sufficient to disperse the rebels without ever seeing them.

16. It was considered a primary object to reopen the communication between Lahore and Mooltan, as all despatches were stopped, to the great injury of the public service.

Employment
of force avail-
able.

In view to effecting this Colonel Paton decided that his force should hold the road from Cheechawutnee to Googaira, whilst the Mooltan column under Major Chamberlain should undertake a similar duty downwards.

17. On the 29th Colonel Paton's column moved to Hurruppa, the Mooltan column halting a day, partly to refresh the cattle wearied by very long marches and partly to see the serai defences finished and its garrison (30 horse and 30 foot) fairly in possession.

On the 30th they marched to Doboortee, the serai of which place was garrisoned with 20 horse and 20 foot and parapets ordered for the defence of the place if necessary; but on the 2nd October had to retrace their steps in order to hurry to Kumalia (across the river), where Mr. McMahon with 1 company Leia Beloch Levy, 100 armed villagers and 80 horsemen was beset. The want of boats and the inutil-
ity of proceeding to Kumalia unless in force necessitated a return to Hurruppa, from which town there runs a road to Kumalia and at which part of the river there is a good ferry.

Difficult posi-
tion of Mr.
McMahon,
Extra Assist-
ant Com-
missioner, at
Kamalia
and despatch
of reinforce-
ments.

18. Reports were constantly received from Mr. McMahon of his dangerous position, and, as there was no certainty of finding boats anywhere, seeing how carefully the rebels had destroyed all they could lay hands on, he was desired to fall back upon the Hurruppa ferry, where he could be protected by the fire of the Horse Artillery guns which would be moved down to cover his retreat. Whilst the column was moving down to the river, information was received of the retreat of Mr. McMahon upon Jhung and of the re-visitation of the rebels to Kumalia. It was equally necessary to push on. The operation of crossing over the force was vigorously prosecuted, but a severe wind and rain storm came on, swamping two of the boats and preventing

Retreat of
Mr. McMahon
on Jhang.
Advance on
Kamalia,
which is found
in flames.

communication; and the whole of the troops had not crossed until midday of the 6th, when a move was immediately made upon Kumalia, parts of which were found in flames.

Destruction
and plunder-
ing of Kamá-
lia by the
insurgents.

19. On visiting the town it presented one scene of misery, desolation, and wilful destruction; the streets from one end to the other were literally paved with the shredded books of the *bunneeahs*. The rebels it appears revelled for several days at the expense of the inhabitants, and, as the cultivators (which sect alone formed the rebel forces) are always deeply indebted to the money-lenders and *bunneeahs*, it was an object with them to efface all proof of their indebtedness. They did so most effectually.

Forcible entry had been made into the people's houses by aid of the carpenters and masons who knew the secret spots in the houses and who were forced to divulge by having swords held over them; walls were dug into, roofs uncovered, and torture applied to make the owner divulge the whereabouts of his valuables. In fact, neither shop nor house could boast of procuring a decent *lotah*; everything had been gutted except grain, which was immoveable, and in some cases that had been fired. Numerous camels, bullocks and donkeys had been driven away laden with *spolia opima*, and the dejected inhabitants flocked to meet the detachment, remembering in their wretchedness the gluttonous avarice they had long evinced and the enormous profits they had made at the hands of the very men who had now reduced them to beggary. The losses were coolly set down at one crore of rupees.

Advance on
Killawála.

20. On the 8th the force was joined before dawn by a detachment under Captain Cureton consisting of 114 Cavalry and 234 Infantry, the half of which latter had never fired a shot in their lives and were utterly innocent of drill and military customs. At sunrise the column marched for Killiawála, but the difficulties of the *road* (or more properly speaking of the jungle) were such as to cause constant delays to enable bushes to be cut down or nullahs filled up for the passage of the guns. The village of "Dhowluree" was reached at 1 p. m., and being less than half way to Kamalia the camp

halted. At night it rained in torrents, accompanied with very high wind, and caused much discomfort. Everything was wringing wet, and the men having been cheated of their evening meal, and wearied by a night of wretchedness, it was late before a move was made on the 9th upon Killiawala, upon nearing which a few horsemen were seen. The afternoon was passed in making snug the camp from a night attack which was said to be a certainty, and in collecting information regarding the rebels as to their position, numbers, intentions, &c., &c., as also to the approaches to the positions they had taken up in the far-famed Jullee jungles, considered to be impracticable by all the people of the country.

21. The night passed without an attack, and on the 10th the force moved to Jhullee. In front was an open plain, upon which a few horsemen and footmen were watching the movements of the force. The information received during the evening led to the belief that the column would be directed to a mound upon which the guns could be placed and from which the whole of the position could easily be examined. On arrival at the said mound it was found to be something under three feet high—a fact recorded to prove the *value* of the information supplied by the few men remaining in the villages, whose hearts were of course in favour of their brethren in the jungle who had retired there for safety. The whole population was against Government. For miles the villages were deserted with the exception of the very old men and old women who were unequal to the exertion of moving.

Move to Jal-
li.

22. On approaching the jungle a wigwam village was discernible a short way in, and the rebels were seen driving camels and cattle into the denser jungle in their rear.

Burning and
plundering of
a village be-
longing to the
insurgents.

The guns were opened on a knot of horse and foot to the left and the Infantry pushed into the jungle; but no sooner did they reach the aforesaid village, the approach to which was through jungle much above a horseman's head and across a stream sufficiently deep to wet some of the men's ammunition, than the untrained sons of Mars were down on their knees grubbing for treasure and jewels, and loading them-

selves with pots and pans and all kinds of goods suited to their wants: in fact they were ungovernable. The rebels retired into the heavier jungle in their immediate rear. The village was burnt. It was entirely surrounded by dense jungle within musket range, and several shots were fired into the men, of whom fortunately none were wounded. To push undisciplined rabble into such jungle whilst utterly ignorant of its extent could only be effected at a hazardous risk which the circumstances did not justify. There was no doubt whatever but that loss must occur in so doing, and more so than justifiable; and, as 300 Infantry and 300 Cavalry could not beat a jungle three *coss* long and two wide, it was decided to defer all operations until the arrival of another detachment from Googaira, when it was hoped a combined attack would be successful.

Occupation
of force at
Jalli and
difficulties
encountered.

23. The days intervening that period were employed in patrolling in various directions, preventing, if possible, the egress of the rebels and in attempting to burn the jungle; but only those who were in the camp can have a just conception of the difficulty of the undertaking. It was no wonder whatever that Jhullee was held in such high estimation, for it is a perfect tiger jungle with small open strips in the heart of it, which are cultivated and left to Providence. If rain falls, well and good, otherwise no crop; and perhaps the outturn of the various wretched strips may be a few maunds of grain. Many parts of it are so dense that a camel or horse can with difficulty force their way, and nothing can be seen a yard distant on either side.

24. The patrolling duties were no labours of love, and the only possible means of ascertaining anything were to put men into trees, when the invariable remark was "no break a-head." A legion of rebels might have been within 20 yards, and yet nothing could have been known. As an enemy the rebels were despicable, for they were badly found in weapons of defence; but in such a wilderness they were equal to trained soldiers, and their numbers might have been as 8 to 1. The rebel encampments were moved away on to the banks of the Ravee

to increase the strength of their position. The information gleaned regarding them was only just what their friends chose to reveal or invent, but upon two points all were decided, *viz.*, the density of the jungle and the absence of any possibility of getting at them except through heavy jungle. On several occasions patrols went up to the heavy jungle, and as often as they did were fired upon from the jungle which fringed the plain.

25. At night of the 21st an escort was detached to convoy stores to the camp, and at early morning of the 22nd the guns of the Googaira detachment were heard covering (as it was supposed) the party seizing the boats. It having been arranged that no attack should be made until the following morning, and the convoy party being absent, no counter-movement was made to divert the attention of the rebels. At midnight information was brought in that the Jhullee was empty and that a move had been made by the rebels for the Sutlej. At dawn a column pursued in the direction they were said to have taken, and the Cavalry, which went ahead, came up with the last remnant, crossing at a ford some eight miles down-stream.

Despatch of
an escort for
the convoy of
stores to the
camp.
Proximity of
the Gugera
detachment.

Departure of
rebels from
the Jalli for
the Sutlej.

Unsuccessful
pursuit.

About 20 men were seen close to the jungle, but, though the Cavalry were not one minute behind them in entering it and beat it in skirmishing order, yet not a soul was seen. A few head of cattle were seized and a drove of buffaloes were seen landing on the opposite side of the stream.

It was subsequently discovered that the rebels left Jhullee the previous day at *midday*, and, although they passed within 200 yards of the village of a Syud who had professed the greatest friendship and subservience to the British Government, he gave no information whatever and denied all knowledge of their departure until the "koora" or spoor of many cattle, goats, sheep, horses, men, &c., gave him the lie.

26. An examination of the Jhullee jungle fully confirmed the soundness of the determination not to hazard an attack upon the rebels whilst ignorant entirely of the nature of their position, &c. It was found that they had dammed up a

stream running parallel with their position, so as to increase the difficulty of fording it, and had selected spots for their encampments bordering on the heaviest jungle. A road was found running from a village daily visited by the detachment, by which an attack could have been made with success upon the rebels' first position, but to get on to this road it was necessary to pass through a belt of jungle, and as long as the villagers' friends remained in Jhullee of course they protested ignorance of anything connected with a track. Had some of these men been hanged they would only have met a just death.

Further
movements
of force.

27. By this time a party of 23rd Punjab Infantry under Captain Obbard had moved down to Pindee Sheikh Moosa, together with some Pathan Horse, and it was therefore decided at once to return to Kumalia and thence move as seemed most desirable. Before arriving there Captain Hockin had reached it with a party of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, and, as the rebels had all crossed the Bar to reach the Sutlej, the column recrossed the Ravee at Cheechawutnee on 27th and 28th, and on 29th moved to Shaikh Fazil in the Bar.

Defeat of
rebels by
Captain
McAndrew.

28. On the afternoon of that day Captain McAndrew fell upon them at a spot called Mukhara and routed them with some loss. A large number of cattle were lifted by Major Chamberlain on the 30th, and on the 31st the Lahore and Mooltan Columns were reunited at Jumlaire on the Sutlej, augmented by a party of 2nd Irregular Cavalry under Major Jackson and Police Horse and Foot under Captain Tronson. The next day, 1st November, the heavy *khoonds*¹ in that neighbourhood were beaten without success, the murderers of Lieutenant Neville having crossed into the Bhawulpore territory. The insurrection was at an end. The rebels broke up into twos and threes and hurried homewards, and in a few days the principal Chiefs surrendered to Major Hamilton and the troops returned to Lahore and Mooltan respectively.

Dispersion of
rebels and
return of
forces to
Lahore and
Multán.

¹ NOTE.—The name by which the heavy jungle is known in those parts,

CHAPTER VI.

REPORTS ON EVENTS IN THE LEIAH DIVISION.

53. *From Major C. BROWNE, Commissioner and Superintendent, Leia Division, to R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 33, dated Camp Khangurh, the 15th February 1858.*

IN compliance with your Circular No. 5 of the 16th ultimo I have the honor to forward in original the reports received from the District Officers of this division detailing the measures taken by them to meet the emergency caused by the late mutinies.

Narrative of
events in the
Leiah Division.

2. The position of the districts of Khangurh and Leia, situated between the Indus and Chenab, without any garrison of Regular troops and with inhabitants for the most of a peaceable character, has prevented their feeling to any great extent the shock of this great Mutiny.

3. The district of Khangurh has entirely escaped any ill-effects, beyond the alarm felt by the European community at the proximity of the mutinous regiments at Mooltan and the possibility of invasion of the lower portion by bands of robbers from the ill-governed and known to be disaffected territory of Bahawulpore.

Tranquillity
in Khangurh
District.

4. The feeling of security at Leia was first in some degree ruffled by the arrival of a part of the 17th Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Hockin, and again by

Feeling at
Leiah.

Operations
against
mutineers of
the 9th Irreg-
ular Cavalry.

rumours of the mutiny of the 9th Irregulars at Meanwallee ; but there appears to have been no real cause for alarm—Captain Hockin's men were too few in number to be mischievous, if even so inclined, and it turned out that only 30 men of the 9th Irregulars had mutinied ; 25 of these, however, did come towards Leia, but were attacked and destroyed by a detachment sent from thence under command of Captain Hockin.

Services of
Mr. Thomson,
Extra Assist-
ant Commis-
sioner.

5. Mr. Thomson, Extra Assistant, went with this party and behaved with distinguished gallantry, receiving some severe wounds.

Anxiety for
Dera Ismail
Khan and
Dera Ghāzi
Khan.

6. The districts of Dera Ishmail Khan and Dera Ghazee Khan, situated on an ever-troubled border and containing very many Hindoostanees in the nominally Punjaub regiments, gave grave cause for anxiety.

7. This feeling was by no means lessened by the unwelcome, but unavoidable, advent of the 39th Regiment, Native Infantry, at Dera Ishmail Khan and subsequently of 200 of the 9th Irregular Cavalry to Bunnoo.

Loyalty of
people.

8. The feeling of the people, themselves a warlike race, was providentially on the side of Government ; and the District Officers were thus able to raise from them Irregular Levies, capable of keeping in check with the aid of the loyal portion of the Punjaub regiments, the leaven of sedition within the ranks of the latter, as also the larger body of the mutinously disposed, of whom the newly-arrived Regular troops were supposed to be composed.

Disarming of
the 39th
Native In-
fantry.

9. The 39th Regiment, Native Infantry, was disarmed, but not without a show of opposition, and they have since continued in a state of sulky discontent ; indeed it is well known that the happy thought of sending them away from Jhelum with only 10 rounds of ammunition in pouch has been one of the chief causes of their not breaking out.

10. The 9th Irregulars did not arrive at Bunnoo until the end of September and have given no cause for complaint.

11. There are no documents in my office to show the orders or suggestions which emanated from my predecessor to his subordinates; most probably they were issued in a demi-official form.

12. The several directions which proceeded from yourself or the Chief Commissioner have been duly carried out.

13. All the officers in the division are, I consider, entitled to credit for the intelligence, zeal and energy they have displayed during this anxious period; but Government have, I consider, been especially fortunate in having at such a crisis officers like Captains Pollock and Coxé on the frontier: their intimate knowledge of the country and the people, with the estimation in which they are held, must have been of great importance.

Services of
officers:
Captains
Pollock
and Coxé and
Mr. Cowan.

14. The good conduct of Mr. Cowan in his pursuit of the mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry is also deserving of notice and has received the commendation of the Chief Commissioner.

15. I fear you will find this a very insufficient report, but you are aware that I have only lately joined this division, and I must therefore trust to the fuller narratives from the Deputy Commissioners to supply the deficiency.

Apology for
meagre re-
port.

16. A statement¹ shewing the extra establishments entertained with the cost is annexed.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 53.

54. *Memo. of the means adopted by Captain FENDALL, Offg. Deputy Commissioner of Leia, to preserve the peace of the district during the late rebellion.*

IN reporting the measures I have adopted during the late disturbances I beg to commence by pointing out that Leia is a perfectly unimportant district, too thinly inhabited to take the

Narrative of
events in the
Leia District.

¹ Not printed.

initiative either for or against Government. I therefore awaited the arrival of the late Colonel Ross before doing anything.

*I was the first from whom he heard of the Delhi and Meerut massacres. He was close by.

I was *daily* expecting him,* and he knew the country so well that I did not like to commence on anything till he arrived. He was of opinion that no force should be levied in Leia; I therefore confined

my exertions to sending men over to Captain Coxe. In June leave was granted me to raise 240 Infantry and 40 Cavalry.

Measures
adopted to
ensure tran-
quillity.

2. The means to keep the country quiet besides raising levies were as follows:—To put temptation out of the way I kept the amount in my treasury as low as possible, sending all spare cash to Dera Ismael Khan, where money was urgently required to pay the new levies. The dawk bags were opened in my presence, but no letters, except those to fakeers, &c., were opened. I nevertheless kept a note of any man receiving an undue number of letters, and twice I opened letters to Khutrees, but there was nothing to note in them. All strangers, especially fakeers, were stopped, and unless they could give a good account of themselves, they were kept in jail. The ghauts were all guarded and all boats removed to ghauts. I employed no spies, as I thought it would do more harm than good. Besides, the people are sufficiently headstrong to allow of an officer, who keeps his eyes open, to judge of the temper they are in. I warned the people of the city, especially the office Moonshes, not to hold secret meetings. The latter tried it, but it was reported to me, and I took measures to put a stop to such a practice amongst them. The Judicial Commissioner's bulletins were regularly translated and sent to each tahseel to be read in open court. This enabled the well affected to contradict authoritatively all stupid bazaar reports. Thinking Mooltan was in danger and that thereby the Lahore and Derajat communication would be stopped, I laid a dawk from this to Jhung. Finally, I warned Tehseeldars and Thanadars to hold their posts, unless threatened with overwhelming odds, and in that case to retire on the Suddur or the nearest military post. No fortifications were erected at Leia. It was not a place to hold; in fact it

was worthless to enemies or friends. My own people I could have kept quiet, if necessary, by the levies and police battalion and sowars. Against any mutineers the best plan would be to go and meet them, and, besides, great preparations would have alarmed the people. We acted in fact on the principle of *quieta non movere*. Therefore no fortifications were thrown up. The above is a statement of the general measures. It savours strongly of doing nothing—the very worst thing a man can do in any emergency; but Colonel Ross, whose judgment I knew to be sound, and who had had great experience as regards rebellions and commotions, ordered these measures to be adopted, and he has proved that it is sometimes best to do nothing with an ulterior end in view. For not one single day has the ordinary routine been interrupted.

3. The particular occurrences of the rebellion as regards this district are as detailed below :—

Instances of
insubordina-
tion.

Three cases of insubordination occurred. In one case I flogged a man for saying it only remained for the Punjab “to close the door and the English were done for.” In another the Commissioner sentenced a man to one year’s imprisonment for upbraiding a chuprassee for serving our Government. Both cases were mere ebullitions of temper. The third case occurred in Kuchee, where a village was fined rupees 100 for assaulting a Burkundaz. In ordinary times one or two men would have been slightly fined, but in such times as these it was necessary to punish more severely.

4. Next was a chronic fear of the troops at Mooltan breaking out. But I hardly think that they would have come here had they mutinied. The temptation was small, the fatigue would have been great, and it was taking them out of their road, in an opposite direction in fact. Nevertheless, I kept myself fully acquainted with everything that was going on there, as, though the troops might not come here, there was no knowing what would have been the effect on the country.

Apprehensions
of danger
from Multán
troops and
39th Native
Infantry.

5. As to the 39th, I troubled myself less about them (except once) than about the Mooltan troops. Had they

mutinied they would have been pursued by the Dera Ismael Khan troops, opposed by the Leia and cut off by the Dera Ghazee Khan troops. Once on a note of warning from Lieutenant Minchin I thought there would have been a fight. I could not guess whether, if they broke out, they would march down or come by boat. This embarrassed me in regard to the clerks' families, as I did not know where to send them to get out of danger. Happily our anxiety was superfluous.

6. Next as to the 17th Irregular* Cavalry. To my great disgust I was forced to use spies,

*I must mention that Lieutenant-Colonel Ross died three days after their arrival.

because they might be of more use than mischief. The men, however, behaved very well. Captain Hockin when he

Good behaviour of 17th Irregular Cavalry.

marched left 40 of the most suspected men here, but they behaved so quietly that I had not even a complaint of any kind against them. The Googaira rebellion did not affect us much. I sent 100 of the new levy under Ahmed Newaz Khan, Subadar, (subsequently increased by 40 Infantry and 20 sowars) to assist Jhung. These were to have accompanied Captain Hockin with 120 of his men, but they were sent elsewhere. I also sent Mr. Thomson (with Captain Hockin) to hold the right bank of the Chenab, with some sowars and matchlockmen.

Extent of help given to Gugera.

Mutiny of a portion of the 9th Irregular Cavalry.

7. In the midst of these preparations, when the Infantry had already gone one march and Captain Hockin and Mr. Thomson were about to follow, came the news that the whole of the 9th Irregular Cavalry had mutinied at Meeanwalee. This was at 10 p. m. I certainly at first thought it was a deep-laid scheme for raising the whole country—that the 9th Irregular Cavalry were to appear before Dera Ismael Khan, be joined by the 39th Native Infantry, come on to Leia, pick up the wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, go towards Googaira, coalesce with the tribes and march on to Mooltan. It was feasible, and would have temporarily lost us the Lower Punjab. I wanted to make arrangements to disarm Captain Hockin's men, but as he refused I did not make any arrangements for fear of raising suspicions. Next morning came the news of

only 30 men having mutinied. You are already aware of Captain Hockin and Mr. Thomson having destroyed these men, and how dangerously the latter was wounded and how gallantly he behaved; also of the good service performed by Thanadars Ghulam Moostafa Khan and Davee Ditta. On the news reaching me of the destruction of the mutineers I sent out a quantity of Cavalry in twos and threes to cut up stragglers, as also all Thanadars into the Thul to raise the country. The receipt of the news of the mutineers having been seen and destroyed followed each other close.

Destruction of party by Captain Hockin and Mr. Thomson : gallant conduct of latter.

8. In conclusion, I may remark that in my humble opinion no station in the whole of India has been so safe as Leia. Nowhere has there been less commotion and nowhere has the usual routine of work gone on so smoothly.

Tranquillity of Leiah.

P. S.—I forgot to mention that Major Hamilton, on the second day of the Lahore dawk being stopped by the Googaira rebels, informed us of the cause. Two days later Captain Hockin determined to move with 120 of his men towards Jhung and Googaira. I sent 100 of the levy with him, and Mr. Thomson with sowars and matchlockmen to hold the right bank of the Chenab. It was then Captain Hockin left 40 of his men here.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 53.

55. *From Captain F. R. POLLOCK, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to Major C. BROWNE, Commissioner and Superintendent, Leia Division, No. 29 B., dated Camp Jampoor, 25th January 1858.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge receipt yesterday of your docket of 21st instant, with Circular No. 5, dated 16th instant, from the Judicial Commissioner, calling for a report from all District Officers of measures adopted for public safety during the past year, and of all local incidents connected with the revolt of persons confined on account of it.

Narrative of events in the Dera Ghazi Khan District.

2. News of the Meerut and Delhie mutinies reached Dehra Ghazee Khan on the 16th May 1857 in a demi-official letter from the Major of Brigade, Mooltan, Captain Gordon, to myself. From the tenor of his letter it became at once a

Receipt of news of Mutiny.

Action taken.

question whether the Native troops at Mooltan might not rise in a similar manner, and whether we should not at once prepare to render assistance. I sent off an express to Captain Hughes, Commanding 1st Punjab Cavalry, and at Asnee, giving the news and expressing my opinion that he should immediately move a wing of his corps to Dehra Ghazee Khan to be ready to move on to Mooltan, if required, and within a few hours of receiving the news he was marching up with all the men he could withdraw—I think 300 sabres. I also sent an express to Dehra Ismael Khan with the news, and recommending that two guns of the Battery at that place should be sent down to Dehra Ghazee Khan, and they were sent off immediately in boats under Lieutenant Cumberland.

False alarm
of outbreak at
Multán.
Despatch of
troops to
Muzaffargarh.

3. On the evening of the 18th a false report of an outbreak at Mooltan reached us from the Deputy Commissioner of Khanghur and from Captain Graham. It was thought by them that guns were heard in the direction of Mooltan. In consultation with Major Gordon, Commanding station, and Captain Gill, Commanding 3rd Punjab Cavalry, it was arranged that a detachment should march straight to Moozafferghur and it left as per margin in* less than two hours. The report proved false, but the troops remained at Moozafferghur, ready to move on Mooltan if wanted.

200, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
300, 2nd Punjab Infantry.
100, 1st Sikh Infantry.

Raising of
levies.

4. Two days later came the Chief Commissioner's orders directing the 1st Punjab Cavalry and 2nd Punjab Infantry to proceed to Mooltan, and directing me to raise a levy of 300 Cavalry and 300 Infantry for outpost duty principally, but also for the protection of the district generally. Prior to this some of the leading men of the district had waited on me and begged for employment, and I found no difficulty in raising the levies within a very few days. I write in Camp, and do not think it worth delaying my memo. for dates, but the levies were speedily got together, and the Chief Commissioner expressed his satisfaction at the promptness with which his order had been carried out by Lieutenant Munro and myself. To the former officer was

entrusted the raising of the Mittunkote Levies. The Muzaree tribe furnished the greater part of these, but many Dreeshuks and Shumbanees were also entertained. The levies raised at Dehra Ghazee Khan consisted of Cavalry,—50 Lugharees, 50 Khosehs, 20 Loonds and 30 mixed classes; Infantry,—all mixed classes.

5. On the withdrawal of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and 2nd Punjab Infantry the district levies occupied all the frontier outposts except Vehowah, Mungrotah and Mittunkote, and also took a large portion of the jail and ferry duties. In September the 4th Punjaub Cavalry was ordered to Asnee, and the lower outposts were garrisoned by it. This move was made in consequence of the Murree raid on the 18th August, which was separately reported on in that month and also further made mention of in my annual criminal report lately submitted. After this raid and pending the arrival of the 4th Punjaub Cavalry, the 3rd Punjaub Cavalry under Captain Gill was sent to Asnee for the protection of that border. Of the 300 Cavalry raised in May 100 have been recently reduced, and of the remainder 100 are employed in the Mittunkote sub-division and 100 at the Dehra outposts. When orders were issued for guarding the Indus ferries it was found necessary to obtain sanction for enlisting 32 men at 5 rupees for the Mittunkote ferries at a monthly expense of rupees 160. No other extra expense has been incurred during the year except the raising of levies who took the places of the Regular troops removed to other districts. No mutineers have been punished in this district up to the present time.

Employment
of levies.

6. A son of the Khoseh Chief, who was discharged by the Chief Commissioner from a Ressaldarship in the Mounted Police, was tried for using seditious language, committed, and sentenced by you to seven years' imprisonment, but the tribe was in no way implicated, and the Chief had long before disinherited this son for his dissipated habits and recklessness.

Punishment
of a son of
the Khosa
Chief.

7. Along the whole of this border the only tribe whose conduct gave even room for suspicion was the Goorchanee, one numerically contemptible, and whose only idea, even if one

Misconduct
of Gurchani
tribe.

existed, must have been to consult how they could best fleece their neighbours if the good old days of anarchy returned. They, especially the Lisharee Goorchanees, are expert thieves, and soon after the news of the disturbances reached us I was not surprised to hear that they had sent to sound the Khoseh tribe and had held a meeting of headmen when oaths had been taken. I sent for them, and the ~~answer given was that~~ they were preparing to petition me about some land which had just before by an order of my Court passed into the hands of Ghulam Hyder, the Goorchanee Chief. This was a transparent falsehood; and as their stories varied, I detained them as a precaution at Dehra, releasing them on security at the latter end of the year. The Lisharees after the Murree raid in August absconded into the hills and have given trouble by petty thefts. Measures in course of adoption will, I hope, put an end to their depredation, and this is the only tribe on our immediate border that has not ceased from plundering. After the Bozdar expedition in March not one case of cattle-stealing occurred on their border.

Trouble given
by Lisharis.

Seditious
language used
in lines of 3rd
Punjab Cav-
alry.

8. Some seditious language was used in the lines of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry between May and September. A Ressaidar of the 1st Punjaub Cavalry, who had been left behind by Captain Hughes, seems to have been the leader of the bad spirits, and, through the exertions of the Kotewal of Dehra (Sheikh Fuzldeen, Punjabee), I managed to receive daily reports of what went on. I continually compared notes with Captain Gill, Commanding the Corps, who received reports from the Sikhs of it; and on a report of Gunga Singh's behaviour, the Chief Commissioner ordered him to Lahore, dismissed and imprisoned him. Other men of the Cavalry were summarily dealt with, and from the time the news of the fall of Delhi arrived nothing more was heard of mutinous language.

Dismissal and
punishment of
the instigator.

Acknowledg-
ment of ser-
vices of Lieu-
tenants Munro
and Smyly.

9. I believe the foregoing narrative includes everything worth recording, but I may add that Lieutenants Munro and Smyly deserve my thanks for their share in the work of the year.

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 53.

56. *From Captain H. H. COXE, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, to Major C. BROWNE, Commissioner and Superintendent, Leia Division,—No. 61, dated Bunnoo, 4th February 1858.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Circular No. 15, dated 21st January, received 28th idem, calling for a statement of occurrences in this district connected with the insurrection, and in reply to report as follows.

Narrative of events in the Dera Ismail Khan District.

2. The first intimation of the outbreak was received at Bunnoo on the 16th May in a letter from Brigadier Chamberlain to Major Coke, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, informing him that a serious outbreak had taken place at Meerut, and directing him to march at once with his regiment to Jhelum to join the Moveable Column. The force at Bunnoo at this time was composed of the 1st and 4th Punjab Infantry, the 3rd Punjab Field Battery, the 5th Punjab Cavalry and 100 Police Sowars; at Dera Ismail Khan the troops were 3rd Sikh Infantry, 6th Police Battalion, 1st Punjab Field Battery, 4th Punjab Cavalry and about 80 Police Sowars.

Receipt of news of Mutiny.

3. On Major Coke's communicating the above intelligence to me, and prepared in some measure by the numerous instances of discontent displayed for some time previous by the Native Army to find that the present outbreak would result in a general disaffection, I sent off expresses to the Khans and Chief men in the Derajat, who had so ably and faithfully supported Colonel Edwardes in the Mooltan Campaign, bidding them be prepared to raise men for the service of Government. Two days afterwards I received a despatch from Colonel Nicholson, which justified this precaution, announcing that 2,000 horsemen were to be raised from the Derajat and sending purwanahs for the Khans which were duly forwarded. Colonel Nicholson further requested me to send off within 24 hours the ressalah of Police sowars at Bunnoo and that at Lukkee, the ressalah at Dera to follow within four days. He was very urgent in his request for their

Raising of levies.

Requisition from Colonel Nicholson for Police sowars.

immediate despatch, saying that "the presence of a few hundred of these men here would be of incalculable benefit to us. You will understand the emergency when I tell you that one of the Irregular Cavalry Corps here has been talking disaffectedly, and we are not at all sure of another one. Two of the Native Infantry corps have long been in a bad state, and any open mutiny on their part would be the signal for the rising of the country." Under these circumstances I did not hesitate to despatch at once the horsemen Colonel Nicholson asked for. The first *ressalah* marched within 48 hours and the second the following day. Meanwhile the 1st Punjaub Infantry had marched, and orders had been received for the 4th Punjaub Infantry also to move at once, to be relieved by the 3rd Sikh Infantry. The 4th Punjaub Infantry and a squadron of 5th Punjaub Cavalry, Sikhs and Punjabees, marched on the 25th before the arrival of the relieving corps, which did not come in till the 27th, and thus with the exception of the two squadrons of 5th Punjaub Cavalry, composed chiefly of *Poorbeeahs*, Bunnoo for two days was guarded by the *Bunnoochees*,—an experiment which it might have been dangerous to have protracted. The movement of troops recorded above caused a panic among the wealthier inhabitants of the town, and money and property was removed, to a considerable extent, to the neighbouring villages before I got notice of it, but by closing the gates and communicating with the more intelligent and influential *Khutries* I succeeded in restoring confidence.

Other movements of troops.

Insufficiency of troops at Dera Ismail Khan.

4. Meanwhile, by the departure of the 3rd Sikh Infantry for Bunnoo and the detachment of two guns of the 1st Punjaub Field Battery to Dera Ghazi Khan, the station of Dera Ismael Khan had been left very ill-defended. There remained four guns of the Battery, the 4th Punjaub Cavalry, in which regiment *Poorbeeahs* largely prevailed, whose fidelity was more than suspected, and the 6th Police Battalion,—the latter a battalion only in name, for with 200 men detached at Leia, 50 at Tank, and other out and station guards there was not a relief in the lines, and most of the guards were "standing." At this inauspicious moment (the beginning of June) the

39th Native Infantry arrived from Jhelum. They had been sent from that station (with only 10 rounds of ammunition) lest they should join with the 14th Native Infantry, and, as it turned out, it was well that the precaution was taken of separating the regiments as the guard of the 39th which remained at Jhelum joined the 14th mutineers. The arrival of this large body of men, however, with no available means at hand to overawe and punish them caused grave anxiety for some days, but by the middle of the month (June) there were some 6 or 700 Mooltanee horsemen collected at Derah, and it is to their presence, I believe, and the care and vigilance exercised by Captain Sladen, Commanding the Battery, and the Assistant and Extra Assistant at Derah that is to be attributed the comparative quiet maintained by the 39th and the facility with which they were disarmed at a period shortly subsequent. This measure was effected on the 14th July on the parade ground of the regiment without the presence of other troops.

Anxiety on arrival of 39th Native Infantry from Jhelum.

Disarming of 39th Native Infantry at a later period.

5. In the middle of June I proceeded from Bunnoo to Derah Ismael Khan to collect and inspect the horse levies, which had been raised. Of these 6 or 700 were continued at Derah Ismael Khan, as noted above. Finding that for the time confidence was tolerably restored, I proceeded to visit the frontier posts, where I had placed newly-raised foot levies to supply the place of the 3rd Sikh Infantry guards, the 6th Police Battalion being too weak to furnish a Corporal's party. Having made what arrangements were necessary for the posts, and strengthened some of the more exposed border villages with foot levies, I returned to Bunnoo the first week in July.

Inspection of levies and Frontier posts.

6. On the 10th July I received intelligence that Councils were being held among the Mahsood Wazeerees discussing the advisability of making a demonstration upon the more unprotected part of the Bunnoo Valley, but I did not apprehend that any measures would be attempted during the height of the hot season.

Attitude of Mahsud Waziris.

Disloyalty of
3rd Sikhs and
action taken.

7. On the 11th July Captain Renny, Commanding 3rd Sikhs, acquainted me that he had received information of a plot among the Poorbeeahs of his regiment to murder the officers and seize the magazine. These men, 113 in number, were disarmed the same evening, the troops being paraded for the purpose. The crime could not clearly be brought home, but there were sufficient and grave grounds for suspicion. These Poorbeeahs, 113 in number, were, by directions of the Chief Commissioner, located in an open spot in the town of Bunnoo, under the surveillance of the Police, and were subsequently discharged and sent to their homes.

Disarming of
39th Native
Infantry
at Dera Ismail
Khan.

8. On the 11th July we received news of the outbreak of the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum, and the following day I received an express from Derah Ismael Khan to the effect that the Commanding Officer of the 39th, who had maintained confidence in his men I believe up to this time, on hearing the same intelligence had resolved upon disarming them. This, as I have stated, was quietly effected, but the men were allowed to retain their bayonets, and subsequently, to restore their confidence as it was urged, the Assistant and Extra Assistant at Derah, without consulting me, recommended that the 39th should furnish the Jail and Cutcherry guards, the former a very strong one, with arms and ammunition as usual. To their supplying the Jail guard I positively objected, and they were relieved by the 6th Police Battalion, which held the post before.

Discovery of
plot to make
over the fort
at Dera Ismail
Khan to the
39th Native
Infantry.

9. On the 24th August I went down again to Derah Ismael Khan to make over four companies of the 6th Police Battalion, then under my charge, to the 10th Punjab Infantry being formed at Derah Ismael Khan. On the 27th one of the Havildars of the 6th Police Battalion on duty at the Fort, a Poorbeeah, reported to me that there was a plot afoot to make over the fort to the 39th Native Infantry, the prime instigator being the native Commandant of the fort, also a Poorbeeah. I immediately relieved all the Poorbeeahs on duty in the Fort by Punjaubees, summoned the native Commandant and instituted an enquiry into the matter. I could not bring the conspiracy home, though enough transpired to

warrant strong suspicion, and as the case properly belonged to the Military authorities, I made over the proceedings to Colonel McDonald, Commanding at Derah. The 39th Native Infantry were reported at this time to be in a state of considerable excitement, and as a precautionary measure the guns were removed from their neighbourhood and placed in the 6th Police Battalion's lines.

10. Early in September I was informed that the 9th Irregular Cavalry were on their way from Delhi to Bunnoo to be cantoned at the latter place. On the 22nd September I received an express from the native Extra Assistant at Meeanwalee to the effect that the 9th Irregular Cavalry had mutinied on their march from Meeanwalee to Kalabagh and murdered some of their officers. I marched immediately with a party of Mooltanee Sowars who reached the banks of the Indus, 60 miles, in 17 hours. I had previously sent expresses to the Kalabagh Mulliks to raise the country and render what assistance they could, and they responded well to the call, for they crossed the river immediately with numbers of horse and foot, and were prepared to act at once. Fortunately their assistance was not required. I found on arrival at the Indus that the matter was not so bad as had been reported; that a small portion of the regiment only had mutinied; and that the officer's lives had been providentially preserved, although both had been repeatedly fired at by the mutinous horsemen. I made arrangements for the crossing of the regiment at Kalabagh, and then returned to Bunnoo. I may mention here incidentally that Mr. Cowan, the Extra Assistant at Derah, followed some of the mutineers who had taken a southerly direction towards Jhung, with a party of Irregular levies, and was, in a great measure, the means of effecting their destruction. One of this party of mutineers, the only one I believe who escaped death at the time, was subsequently apprehended and sent into Bunnoo, where he was hanged by order of the Judicial Commissioner. The 9th Irregular Cavalry came into Bunnoo on the 29th September only 250 strong. Two troops were immediately sent out to the outposts. Matters have since remained tolerably quiet both at Bunnoo and Derah.

Mutiny of party of 9th Irregular Cavalry at Mianwali and measures adopted.

Services of Mr. Cowan, Extra Assistant Commissioner.

Hostilities
between
Northern
Waziris and
inhabitants of
Dour.

11. In the middle of September my attention was urgently called to hostilities which were going on on our frontier between the Northern Wazeerees and the inhabitants of Dour, and which still continue at intervals, but this perhaps may hardly be regarded as an incident connected with the mutinies.

Rumours of
demonstra-
tions on part
of Mahsud
Wazirs and
Shiranis.

12. During the whole of the period I have received constant reports of agitation and intended demonstrations on the part of the Muhsood Wazeerees and Shecranies, but, thanks to the activity of Shah Niwaz Khan and the vigilance of the frontier scouts, we have been enabled to maintain so strict a watch upon the movements in the hills that no serious outbreak has occurred, and the presence of the Moveable Column, which on my application the Chief Commissioner ordered to the frontier in October, has kept the whole line from Peyzoo to Vehowa in comparative security.

Statistics of
troops, &c.

13. I beg to annex a statement¹ of the number of troops in the district before the outbreak and a statement of their number during the insurrection, with an abstract¹ of the monthly cost of the additional levies, suggesting at the same time that as they were raised in substitution of, not in addition to, the regular complement, they can hardly be termed extra establishments.

Punishments
inflicted dur-
ing the Mu-
tiny.

14. One Sowar of the 9th Irregular Cavalry has been hanged at Bunnoo and three camp followers of the 3rd Sikh Infantry imprisoned by the Commissioner's order for offences connected with the Mutiny.

Acknowledg-
ment of the
services of
Lieutenant
Minchin, Mr.
Cowan and
Captain Ross.

15. I have mentioned above the assistance I received from Lieutenant Minchin, the Assistant, and Mr. Cowan, the Extra Assistant Commissioner at Derah. I have in conclusion to record the obligations I am under to Captain Ross, Assistant Commissioner at Bunnoo, for his ready and active co-operation throughout this trying period.

¹ Not printed.

ENCLOSURE (4) TO 53.

57. From H. B. HENDERSON, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Khaungurh, to Major C. BROWNE, Commissioner and Superintendent, Leia Division, Leia,—No. 81, dated Camp Sher Sultan, 13th February 1858.

I HAVE the honor to reply to your Circular No. 15, dated 21st January, received on the 27th at Juttooe, forwarding Circular No. 5, dated 16th January, from the Judicial Commissioner, calling for a report of the measures adopted in this district for the public safety during the late crisis.

Narrative
of events in
the Khangarh
District.

2. On the first news reaching me of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi and of the anxiety felt at Mooltan, I at once posted sowars at the ghauts between Moozuffurgurh and Mooltan and Dera Gaze Khan, and at a station between Mooltan and the Chenab, and established a line of communication between Mooltan, Moozuffurgurh and Dera Gaze Khan. Shortly after, the orders were received to reduce the ferries, collect the boats, and to post guards at the ferries that were to be retained. Along the Chenab and Indus the ghauts being under control of the Jhung, Mooltan and Dera Gaze Khan authorities, I posted *vis-à-vis* guards to theirs, taking the precaution to establish two or three others under the immediate superintendence of the thanahs to collect and keep guard over the private boats employed by traders. Most of the boats at the ferries opposite the Mooltan district belonged to boatmen, residents of this district, and these were placed under the charge of my ferry guards. I also had a guard of a Duffadar and eight men at the ghaut connecting the Customs line of the Mooltan and this district, and below the junction of the Chenab with the Sutledge I reduced the ten ferries under me to three, the largest and most important opposite the Bahawulpore State, and placed strong guards at each. The officers of my extra ferry Police were all selected men, who could read and write, and I received diaries from them regularly until they were discharged. The guards were constantly visited by the Police officials, who took it in turns to inspect them, and for the south of the district I made Nawab Khan, Badwal, the

Precautions
taken on
receipt of
news of the
Mutiny.

Guarding of
ferries.

Thanadar of Juttooe and my best Police Officer, Darogah of ferries, and I gave him four sowars to accompany him in his rounds. I should have lost his services, which I could have ill-afforded, had I not thought of this way of making him useful, as he was anxious to get away and find service in one of the Pathan Rissalahs sent to Hindoostan. He is thoroughly acquainted with all the bad characters of the south tehseel, and as he is a man of great activity, energy and courage, his rapid movements, unexpected visits to all parts of the tehseel and his knowledge of, and influence over, the people tended in a very great measure to keep down crime.

Extra
establishment
for ferries.

My extra establishment for the ferries was as follows :—

| | |
|---|-------|
| 1 Darogah on rupees | 30 |
| 4 Sowars at 15 rupees each | 60 |
| 3 Jemadars at 10 rupees each | 30 |
| 3 Jemadars at 8 rupees each | 24 |
| 16 Duffadars at 7 rupees each | 112 |
| 3 Duffadars at 6 rupees each | 18 |
| 183 Burkundazes at 5 rupees each | 915 |
| 1 Moonshee at Sudder to keep the papers and accounts at rupees | 15 |
| Total rupees | 1,204 |

Arming of
ferry police.

and cost from June to December about Rs. 8,500. I armed them with swords, the greater number of which were made up in this district, old matchlocks found in the Malkhannah and repaired, and 100 muskets obtained from the Mooltan magazine. Men from the old Police were placed with each guard to teach them their drill, and those at the centre ferries were dressed in Burkundaz uniform. The rest of the force in this district may be computed as follows :—

A troop of Police Cavalry.

A company of the Kuttar Mookee Regiment.

146 Thannah burkundazes rank and file.

65 Tehseel chuprasees rank and file.

25 Jail contingent burkundazes.

Tranquillity
of district.

3. The district has remained perfectly tranquil throughout the disturbances, and with the exception of cattle thefts

mentioned in my annual criminal reports crime has been suppressed. Shortly after the commencement of the disturbances the Tehseeldars reported to me that the zemindars were disinclined to pay in their revenue readily and appeared to be watching events. The revised settlement was in progress, and many of them were in attendance at the Sudder. I procured their dismissal, and, by fining the refractory and with the aid of the influential and better disposed, the rubbee *kists* were more expeditiously collected than during preceding years, and moreover subscriptions to the Punjab 6 per cent. loan have been collected of nearly a lakh of rupees. Increasing anxiety at Mooltan naturally added to the alarm felt in neighbouring districts on account of the Native Infantry Regiment there. I wrote to the Dera Gazee Khan authorities explaining the reasons that urged me to write and suggested the advisability of despatching troops to act if necessary at Mooltan. The Commanding Officer of Dera at the same time received information other than my letter conveyed, *viz.*, that heavy guns had been heard firing in the direction of Mooltan, and this induced him to send off troops at once.

6 per cent.
loan.

Collection of
revenue.

4. When the disturbances broke out in the Googaira and Jhung districts, to protect my north and south tehseels, in the event of other tribes following their example, I ordered the sowars detached at outposts to collect at the tehseels. I increased the sepoy's guard at each to 14 bayonets, and directed the Tehseeldars to retain on duty in the tehseels a certain number of the chuprassees and thannah burkundazes, all of whom are more or less drilled and tolerably expert in handling the musket. A strong gate was made up for the Rungpoor Tehseel, a kuteha building on the old standard plan, and for the Seetpoor Tehseel, held in an old ruinous fortification at the east edge of the elevated site of the town, a loop-holed mud wall was built up in the long gap where the old wall had fallen and two gateways were blocked up. As some of the tribes of the Ooch ilaqua opposite the north part of the Rungpoor Tehseel were showing symptoms of disquiet, and men had been frequently seen on the river on inflated skins, to preserve order and assure the people on this side I deputed Lieutenant Ferris,

Precautionary
measures
adopted in
connection
with the dis-
turbances in
Gugera and
Jhang.

Assistant Commissioner, with a small force to patrol the right bank of the Chenab down to its junction with the Ravee. His orders were to co-operate with Mr. Thompson from Leia, to restrain our own bad characters and to keep up a vigilant surveillance along the river to prevent parties from the opposite side crossing over and contaminating the people on this, and to seize fugitive rebels. Some of the principal lumberdars of the tehseel happened to be in attendance with the Settlement Officer at the Sudder. These were sent off to assist Lieutenant Ferris, and through their aid and influence he was able to establish a line of posts manned by the villagers themselves along the river bank at intervals of $\frac{1}{4}$ mile for a distance of 26 miles.

The licensed Shikarees of two tehseels, together with some sent by Captain Fendall from Leia, amounting in all to 12 horsemen and 15 footmen, accompanied his force. Lieutenant Ferris remained out from 27th September to 23rd November, and was quite successful in maintaining order. The chief lumberdars who assisted him are Ahmed Khan and pensioner Khan Beg, Chief of the Seeal tribe, Shah Ahmed and Sujawul, Chiefs of the Truggur, and Khooda Buksh and Imam Bukhsh, sons of Sooltan Shah, Koreyshee.

Measures for
protection of
public build-
ings.

5. Both as a police arrangement and to give a feeling of greater security to the inhabitants strong gates were put up at the entrance of both the walled towns of Moozuffurgurh and Khangurh. The thannahs in both places and the tehseel at the former being inside the town, the walls and bastions of Moozuffurgurh were repaired, and opposite the gateways breastworks were thrown up: with 40 men at some of the bastions and over the gateways, the town of Moozuffurgurh could have been held against a rabble for days.

The serai at the Sudder was fortified for the Rissalah to retreat to, if necessary, by breastworks thrown up opposite the entrances, and by four feet parapet walls raised all round. A semicircle six feet breastwork, loop-holed, with a broad ditch outside, was thrown up opposite the jail gateway, embracing

the barracks of the sepoy guard, and a short loop-holed passage was built up inside the gateway to break if necessary a rush of the prisoners.

The three towers agreeably to instructions were built up outside the jail, and walls and jungle that could afford cover for a distance of 150 yards were cleared away.

To protect the Kutcherry and Treasury the numerous doorways were blocked up, leaving only three defended entrances, and five loop-holed enclosures were built up inside the verandahs to command and enfilade every approach to the building. It could have been held, I think, by 36 of the guard if well commanded, and a small force would still have been left at the disposal of officers for movement about the station. The Medical Officer and clerks were armed with guns and muskets, and in time of need, I doubt not, all would have rendered good assistance. With the exception of the old Tehseeldar of Seetpore, Quaja Ahmed, a native of Moozuffurnugurh in the North-West Provinces, who has since been allowed to resign, I do not think any of my Police officials were under much alarm; with an exception or two they were even more active in discharging their duties in detecting criminals and keeping down crime.

6. The people generally throughout the district have never been famous for organizing or taking lead in disturbances, and it would only be under circumstances they considered most favorable for themselves that any numbers of them would be inclined to follow a rebellious example. There are not many influential lumberdars in the district, with the exception of a few at the north of the district, two or three in the centre tehseels, and one or two not particularly good characters in the Seetpore Tehseel, and there are no men of sufficient influence to effect combinations or sway any formidable body of men whether for good or evil, and the generality of the people would never be earnest either for assistance or opposition. They have received passively every change of rule. With the exception of one Allahdad Khan, a cunning money-making Pathan of Khangurh, who has dealings with Cabul

Attitude of
the people.


merchants and has been known to trade as far as Delhi, there is not a commercial man in the district who trades at markets more distant than Shikarpore, and the circle of correspondence is extremely narrow.

Arrest of
suspicious
characters.

7. A few fakeers and wandering Hindoostanees were apprehended about the district and at the different ferries, and detained until the proper time arrived for releasing them, and I doubt not had any fugitive mutineers made their escape to this district they would have been speedily seized also. Three Post Office hurkaras were fined Rs. 25 each for giving false information.

Tranquillity
of district.

8. In conclusion, I have but to repeat that the district has remained perfectly tranquil. The Cazee of the Sudder town was apprehended at the request of the Commissioner of Mooltan under suspicion of carrying on treasonable correspondence with the Bhawulpore Nawab, but was acquitted and released. Once, under the first alarm on hearing of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi and consequent anxiety on account of the Mooltan troops, our wives were sent over to Dera Gazee Khan for a week. Once I went out with a party of the rissalah to arrange if possible for a line of boats across the river to intercept a body of mutineers reported to be dropping down the river in boats from Jhelum, and a line of sowars and police were stretched across the district from river to river to intercept or give intelligence of the movements of the fugitive sowars of the 9th Irregular Cavalry should they succeed in escaping down so far ; and once on false information, for which the two informers,—one a sepoy and the other a zemindar,—were punished at Mooltan, the first with seven years' imprisonment and the other with three years, I procured the exchange of the Hindoostanee sepoys amongst my Treasury guard. These are the few and only little exciting episodes I have to record. I may say, however, that during the whole period the English officers attached to the district were both alert themselves and kept up vigilance amongst the native officials.





Photogravure.

Survey of India Office, Calcutta, September 1908.

Herbert B. Edwards

MAJ. GENL. SIR H. B. EDWARDS, K.C.B. K.C.S.I.

COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWAR IN 1857.

CHAPTER VII.

REPORTS ON EVENTS IN THE PESHAWAR DIVISION.

58. *From Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDES, C.B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 44 of 1858, dated Peshawur, 22nd February 1858.*

IN partial reply to your circular No. 5 of 16th January, I have the honor to forward copies of the reports noted in the margin*. They are replies to a call of my own made in anticipation of your circular. The only points omitted were those required by your paragraph 4, (Returns of Extra Establishments and of Military Establishments); and I therefore called for that additional information, which you will find conveyed in the marginally† noted copies, which I also have the honor to forward.

*No. 23 of 22nd December 1857, from Captain Henderson, and No. 1 of 4th January 1858, from Major Becher.

†No. 33 of 13th February, from Hazára; No. 4 of 3rd February from Kohát—(Not printed).

Submission of reports of Kohát and Hazára Districts.

2. I will report on the Peshawur events myself with as little delay as possible; and add thereto a few general remarks as to the admirable conduct of the District officers.

Report of Pesháwar District to follow.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 58.

59. *From Captain B. HENDERSON, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDS, C. B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division,—No. 23, dated Kohat, 22nd December 1857.*

Narrative of
events in the
Kohat Dis-
trict.

As directed in your letter No. 1058 of the 13th November to my address, I have the honor to submit a short record on the points adverted to regarding the Kohat District during the recent crisis in Hindoostan.

Strength of
force in Ko-
hat District.

2. The strength of the Kohat force up to the middle of May was, as usual, three complete regiments of Punjaub Infantry, one regiment of Punjaub Cavalry, one 9-pounder battery with a 24-pounder Howitzer, and two mountain guns, also a detachment of Garrison Company of Artillery.

| | |
|---------------|-------|
| Infantry . . | 2,700 |
| Cavalry . . | 580 |
| Artillery . . | 186 |
| Total . . | 3,466 |

3. These regiments would muster about the number as per margin, and the

LUTTUMUR.
1 Native officer, 6
non-commissioned, 40
sepoys.

Luttumur outpost garrisoned from Bunnoo, strength as per margin, was in

Sowars.
1 Native officer, 2
Duffadars, 23 sowars.

addition to the above.

Despatch of
reinforce-
ments to
Attock and
substitution
of Khattak
levies.

4. On the 14th May one regiment of Infantry was moved upon Attock through the Khuttuck hills; its detachments having on one day's notice been relieved by Khuttucks, collected and sent by Khwajah Mahomed Khan, were enabled to march to rejoin their head-quarters from Bahadoor Khail and Murree on the night of the 15th May.

Alacrity of
Khattak
Chief.

5. The alacrity with which this relief was made was most remarkable and highly creditable to Khwajah Mahomed Khan, Khuttuck, and his people, the instructions having only reached me in Kohat on the 14th May, and Bahadoor Khail being 54 miles distant from Kohat and 22 from Teree, the Khan's residence, and he having, of course, no previous idea of such a call, had to collect the relieving garrisons among his people during one night.

6. On the 18th May the ordnance from Bahadoor Khail was withdrawn under escort of a detachment from this station and the garrison company of Goolundauz.

Withdrawal
of ordnance
from Bahadur
Khel.

7. From this date also a company of the 3rd Punjaub Infantry has, up to the present time, garrisoned the upper fort of Kohat, into which the treasure was removed from the treasury on the 23rd May.

Garrison of
upper fort
of Kohat.

8. On the 18th May all the Police Sowars of the district, excepting Upper Meeranzye, and a portion of the Akhora Sowars, with 50 Khuttuck contingent, proceeded into Peshawur in one march, and were followed during that day and the next two days by about 600 foot Police and village militia, collected from the country, and all in good spirits and willing to serve. These you retained, some for a longer period, and some were very shortly sent home again ; and it is worthy of remark that all Upper Meeranzye, so recently brought into order, furnished its contingent cheerfully.

Despatch of
Police Sowars
to Peshawar.

9. One or two villages, from which in their exposed position at a time of disturbance I deemed it inexpedient to withdraw men, were excused.

10. On the 22nd May a party of 160 rifles was called for at 9 P. M., marched at 10 P. M., and reported themselves in Peshawur, 40 miles, next day with their ammunition and baggage ; and this detachment was employed in disarming the 64th Native Infantry at the outposts, the 10th Irregular Cavalry in Peshawur, and the 24th Native Infantry detachment at Fort Mackeson, after which it returned to Kohat on the 8th July.

Despatch of
a party of
rifles to
Peshawar to
assist in dis-
arming
troops.

11. In the meantime a further detachment had been called for to proceed to join the late lamented General Nicholson's Moveable Column. This detachment marched under Lieutenant J. Boswell on the 24th June: 4 Native officers, 24 non-commissioned and 160 privates, with 4 buglers, or a total of 184 carefully picked rifles ; and with tents,

Despatch of a
detachment
to join the
Movable
Column.

baggage and ammunition, the detachment moved on Lahore by forced marches, and, after aiding in the disarming at Umritsir, was present and took the 46th Native Infantry colors and 9th Cavalry standard at Trimmoo, and, after the annihilation of these mutineers, was employed with some companies of European Infantry and guns in watching the 35th and 59th Native Infantry at Umritsir, and there remained until the middle of September, and afterwards escorted stores and treasure to Peshawur, rejoining at Kohat on 20th October after nearly 4 months' absence.

Despatch of
2nd Punjab
Cavalry to
Peshawar.

12. Under orders from the Chief Commissioner, on the 31st May, the 2nd Punjab Cavalry marched into Peshawur, leaving this district without any Cavalry.

Rumours of
disaffection
and measures
taken.

13. Also on the 22nd of May it came to my knowledge that some evil-disposed persons had spread a report that the last ammunition received in the station, and some portion of which all the regiments had received, was prepared with "the mixture" of pigs and bullocks' fat grease; and that on the 1st June it was intended to coerce the whole of the soldiers in the station into using these cartridges. It was said that there was no other grievance, but all those who were spoken to were said to have declared that they would refuse these cartridges. The traders began to conceal their property and to carry it secretly to the houses of Syuds and powerful villages, and the common bazaar report was that the Cavalry would not take the cartridges, and made no secret of it. There was a circumstantiality of detail about the information which satisfied me that there was some truth in it; so, strong Infantry pickets were put over the guns, and the treasure was moved into the fort.

14. In addition to this, the Officers Commanding the regiments were informed of the report, and were requested, in order to avoid giving the schemes of the ill-disposed any possible lever to work with, to avoid target practice for a time, and this was accordingly attended to.

15. After this period not a whisper of anything improper amongst the force forming the regular garrison has ever reached me, though on the 29th May there was an increase of Hindoostanees, being 3 companies, about 230 men, of the 58th Native Infantry, which, with 2nd Punjaub Irregular Cavalry, mostly Hindoostanees (the Sikhs having gone under Lieutenant Nicholson towards Lahore), about 250 Hindoostanees in 6th Punjaub Infantry and 50 in 3rd Punjaub Infantry, gave this race a strong body for evil had there been any bad feeling in the country or neighbouring hills.

Continued tranquillity of the district.

16. Early on the morning of the 8th July orders were received for the disarming of the 58th detachment, and this was done quietly within an hour on parade and without resistance. The measure was well timed, as some men of the detachment had once or twice been heard speaking in a manner which evinced bad feeling, although they made no attempt so far as was known to plot mischief or incite others, but after being disarmed even improper talking ceased, and it was time that it should, for from the various heavy calls on the two regiments, the 3rd and 6th, the former had only 5 Native officers, 29 non-commissioned officers and 236 Sepoys remaining fit for duty on the 1st July, and the latter only 2 Native officers, 47 non-commissioned officers and 162 Privates.

Disarming of detachment of 58th Native Infantry at Kohat.

17. On the 23rd July the force was further reduced by the detachment to Peshawur of one European officer, 3 Native officers, 25 non-commissioned and 200 Privates, leaving the 6th Punjaub Infantry with 40 non-commissioned and 129 Privates "present fit for duty," and the 3rd Punjaub Infantry, at the same time, 7 Native officers, 38 non-commissioned and 327 Privates, or a total Infantry force, exclusive of guards, &c., of 534 rifles, and the Artillery and 150 horsemen (*sic*).

Despatch of further reinforcements to Peshawar.

18. The military force became so reduced, as stated, in consequence of the parties despatched on duty and the transfers to form new regiments: the latter amounting to about 200 old soldiers per regiment.

Raising of a
levy of
Sowars.

19. An Irregular levy of 300 footmen and 100 Sowars was sanctioned and raised in July to garrison the outposts and aid in the general duties.

Attitude of
neighbouring
tribes.

20. On the first breaking out of the mutiny and rebellion all the neighbouring tribes came in or sent to offer their services to Government, but their feeling was a strange mixed one, their best wishes at heart being in favor of the King of Delhie, in whom they clearly felt a great interest, though they were inimical to the Poorubeahs.

21. It was a constant subject of anxiety, the temper and feeling of the tribes all round; and we have not many real friends amongst them, though so long as we have power they hesitate to break their connection with us, but they were worked upon to rise against us day after day by fakeers and moollahs bearing every imaginable falsehood that could be invented against Government; but though the excitement was everywhere intense, and common report was everywhere that we were about to make our escape from the country, it was not until the end of August and early in September that any attempt at collecting men with any hostile intent was made; and before any harm was done, or matters had been brought to a head, dissension was happily brought about in their councils, and all angrily separated: one attempt at a petty raid with about 120 men having resulted in the helter-skelter flight of the would-be assailants, who narrowly escaped destruction, and never got an opportunity for attempting the raid for which they came, good information of their intention having been furnished; and those concerned in it have since paid the usual fine for their intended misconduct.

Circulation
of authentic
news.

22. In contradiction of the false reports spread about the country, all good news was carefully circulated by me through the District Khans, and also through our friends in the hills.

23. The same was done through the station and neighbourhood, and I believe in all cases with the best effect.

24. The people of the district never evinced the slightest tendency to revolt ; and although in Upper Meeranzye people talked of our rule being ended, no one ever disobeyed an order or delayed a day in paying revenue.

Attitude of
people of
district.

25. The Toorees* at one time appeared disposed to be troublesome ; but they did no harm and soon ceased to require watching.

*Inhabitants of Koor-
rum and subjects of
Cabul.

Behaviour
of Turis and
Wazirs.

26. The Wuzzeerees have behaved in the most unexceptionable manner since the chastisement of the Meanee branch of the Kabul Kheyl at Thull in December 1856 ; they have just sent a deputation to me to offer Government Rs. 1,000 as a nuzzur for the use of a gun with which to breach the walls of the Dour villages, against which they have been unavailingly breaking their heads for upwards of two months ; should the gun be granted in addition to the money, they vow undying friendship.

27. The glorious news of the fall of Delhie ended the deep anxiety I felt as to the eventual conduct of the powerful tribes along this frontier, all of whom sent in deputations to offer congratulations on the success of our arms.

Congratula-
tions of tribes
on fall of
Delhi.

28. The Afreedees of the Kohat Pass have, as you are aware, for some time kept their Pass the safest portion of the road in the whole country ; but since the beginning of these disturbances there has not in the seven months, to the best of my belief, been one single charge of crime for them to answer to, not even a petty theft ; and this I consider alike creditable to the Afreedees of the Pass and to Bahadoor Shere Khan, under whose immediate superintendence the affairs of the Pass are.

Good conduct
of Afridis of
Kohat Pass.

29. A party in Boree were inclined to give trouble by plundering on the Peshawur side, but they were peaceably brought to reason and forced to make restitution by calling on their securities to coerce them, which was done.

Commenda-
tion of ser-
vices of
Khans and
Maliks.

30. Though the conduct of the people has been invariably good,—in fact so much so that I could have confidently entrusted the cantonment to their keeping, had occasion required me to call out the few troops,—yet there is no doubt that it is to the Khans and Mullicks that we are mainly indebted for this good feeling; and these classes were, as a body, most ready and forward in serving Government, and meeting my wishes with alacrity in every way. Several of the Mullicks might worthily receive some small rewards, and the Khans are several of them deserving of notice, and will be separately reported upon as directed; but Khwajah Mahomed Khan's hearty and energetic good will, and his craving for news of our successes, his bounty to any messenger who brought him any, and his gifts when he heard of the fall of Delhie, give unmistakable evidence of his feeling, as a further proof of which I may mention that at one time, beginning to be alarmed from the stories that reached him, he was in search of an asylum for his family in Teerah, in case his fears should chance to be realized.

Acknowledg-
ment of
services of
Khwaja Mu-
hammad
Khan.

Services of
Bahadur
Sher Khan.

31. Next comes Bahadoor Shere Khan, whose services were with you in Peshawur from the day of the disarming, when with a few horsemen he joined you, leaving this at a couple of hours' notice. He too is worthy of notice as having done some good, zealous service.

Notice of
services of
other Chiefs.

32. Gholam Mahomed Khan, Shukkurdurra, Jaffir Khan, Khuttuck, and Moozuffer Khan, Tahsildar of Hungoo, showed a very proper feeling, and did good service in every way in their power.

Services of
Shahzada
Jambur,
Extra Assist-
ant Commis-
sioner.

33. The Extra Assistant Commissioner, Shahzaduh Mahomed Jumboor, is an able servant of Government, and has served with much devotion, and exerted his knowledge of his countrymen and his personal and family ties in every way in the service of Government, amongst whose meritorious servants he is entitled to a high place. His two sons have each gone, taking 100 Sowars, towards the North-West Provinces.

34. The detail of men furnished from this district to aid in preserving order and to coerce mutineers elsewhere is as detailed below, in addition to the military force already stated:—

Detail of
forces fur-
nished by the
district.

| Date. | — | Horse. | Foot. | Station. |
|------------------|---------------------------------|--------|-------------|-----------|
| 19th May . . | Khuttucks . . . | 50 | 83 | Peshawur. |
| | Hungoo . . . | 42 | 198 | Ditto. |
| 20th May . . | Kohat Police and Jail guard. | ... | 42 | Ditto. |
| 16th to 18th May | Bahadoor Shere Khan | 50 | 80 | Ditto. |
| 21st May . . | Jaffir Khan, Khuttuck | 11 | 82 | Ditto. |
| 27th May . . | Kohat villages . . | ... | { 125 49 | { Ditto. |
| 26th June . . | Shukkurdurra . . . | 1 | 44 | Ditto. |
| 5th June . . | Meer Mobarick Shah | 80 | ... | Dellie. |
| | Total . . . | 234 | 703 | |

35. The above is in addition to the garrison of the outposts, &c., mentioned above, 300 foot and 100 Sowars.

36. A body of Zyemoosht and Tooree Sowars offered their services, as also a number of frontier Khuttucks and Bungush, but as I found none of these disposed to serve out of the Kohat district, their services were declined, though being admirable Irregular horsemen their services would have been valuable with the army, if they could have been made satisfied to go and serve with it.

Offer of
services by
Zaimushts
and others.

37. False reports prejudicial to Government continue to be circulated, but are not so generally credited as before, and I can see no cause for uneasiness at present anywhere on this frontier: the only two tribes still not settled with, Aleh-sherezye and Mumoozye, being now urgent for terms, and likely to be settled with very shortly.

38. The roads have continued as safe as before, but there has, I think, been more violent crime than in the last year or two. This may be accidental, or it may have been caused by people criminally disposed speculating on the chances of the overthrow of a Government giving them hope of impunity in their crime.

Increase of
violent crime.

Good conduct of Afridi and other Pathan soldiers.

39. The conduct of the Afreedee and other Pathan soldiers has been admirable, rejoining their regiments when summoned before all others, and showing their mettle by their keenness for active service. Unequalled by any other natives as soldiers, they might, even in considerable numbers, be employed with much advantage away from their own people, near whom, however, large bodies of them might not be safe soldiers to have.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 58.

60. *From Major J. R. BECHER, Deputy Commissioner of Huzara, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDS, C. B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division,—dated Abbottabad, 4th January 1858.*

Narrative of events in the Hazara District.

IN reply to your letter No. 1057 of 13th November 1857, I have the honor to submit a memorandum of the political position and military resources of the Huzara District during the mutiny in India, and of the effect which was produced.

Memorandum.

Military force in the Hazara District and withdrawals.

1. The troops in Huzara at the time of the mutiny in India consisted of a mountain train of six guns and two regiments of Irregular Infantry (the 2nd and 4th Sikhs), concentrated at Abbottabad.

2. 150 Police horse, a company of 60 men of the hill tribe of Suttees, and 24 zumbooraks (or gunners attached to camel swivels), were under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner for general duties, to serve as escorts or to strengthen the several posts and forts.

3. On the outbreak of the mutiny three companies of Detachments sent to the 2nd Sikh Regiment, consisting of

| | |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| Murree— | 225 rank and file, were withdrawn for |
| 3 Subadars, | the protection of the hill station of |
| 3 Jemadars, | Murree, in Rawul Pindee, and on the |
| 18 Havildars, | 19th May the 4th Sikh Regiment |
| 18 Naicks, | marched to Delhi under command of |
| 6 Buglers, | Captain Rothney. |
| 225 Sepoys, and one full regiment sent to Delhi. | |

4. To supply its place I was directed to raise a body of levies of the country to the extent of 150 horse and 500 foot, and to assume military command in Huzara; these levies were enrolled by quotas from the Chiefs and principal mullicks, and were the representatives of so many clans; they brought their own arms, and all were men accustomed to hill warfare. A portion was detached to watch the ferries and strengthen the most exposed positions, and all the available police horse was sent to guard the left bank of the Indus up to the fortress of Attock until arrangements could be completed by the authorities of the Rawul Pindee District for the security of their own extent of the border.

Enrolment
of levies.

5. The most important ferries in Huzara are those of the Indus, one at Pihoor, in the Yoosufzye border near the fanatic village of Sittana, the other belonging to Jehandad Khan, the Chief of Umbh. At the former the boats ceased to ply, and were drawn to the left bank under a strong guard, protected by a tower and breastwork. The mullicks of Srikote (on the Gundgurrh Mountains) took upon themselves and their brave clan of Mishwanees to aid in watching this point. At Umbh, although the passage of boats was not entirely discontinued, because it is necessary for the Chief to hold both banks of the river, yet the boats were brought to the left bank, and securely guarded under my own orders, and every passenger was searched and questioned.

Guarding of
ferries.

6. By these arrangements several deserters from the 51st and 55th Native Infantry were arrested, tried and punished with death.

7. Parties were placed on the principal roads and passes leading from the surrounding country into Huzara to arrest deserters, Hindoostanees, or seditious messengers. Some fakeers and suspicious characters were thus brought in; and an outpost in the Khanpoor hills was able to assist in the seizure of some of the mutinous sepoys of the 14th Native Infantry on their escape at the time of disarming the regiment at Rawul Pindee.

Arrest of
suspicious
characters.

3 Subadars,
3 Jemadars,
26 Havildars,
22 Naicks,
10 Buglers,
341 Sepoys, exclusive of the detachment at Murree.

8. After the departure of the 4th Sikh Regiment the available strength of the one remaining Infantry regiment amounted to only 341 sepoy.

Execution of
two mutineers
of 55th Na-
tive Infantry.

9. On the 10th June the Kumaon Regiment under Captain Ramsay marched into Huzara, and three days afterwards occurred an opportunity for testing the feeling of the force, and for a first example to the country, by the blowing from guns of two mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry, who were tried and sentenced to death that morning by a court composed exclusively of Native officers.

10. The most perfect order prevailed during this execution, which took place on parade before all the sepoy and the levies and a crowd of men of the district. The two regiments which were not without Hindoostanees in their number were addressed by their Commanding Officers and by myself, and marched back to their lines.

Despatch of
Kumaon
Battalion to
Delhi.

11. Three days afterwards the necessity for further reinforcements from the Punjab called away the Kumaon Battalion to the walls of Delhi, where its bravery has gloriously aided to protect our empire.

Garrisoning of
fort of Hari-
pur.

12. The fort of Hureepoor, 22 miles to the rear of the cantonment of Abbottabad, is the chief place of defence in Huzara. It was built by Sirdar Hurree Singh to maintain the first Sikh conquest of the country, and always continued to be their base of operations.

13. It contains a large magazine, and had been stored with supplies. It was now garrisoned by the Suttee company, augmented to 100 men, and by some of the most trustworthy of the levies, with a party of Zumboorchees and Burkundauz, drilled to act as Artillerymen for two Sikh guns which were on its walls.

Fortification
of detached
Hill Forts.

14. Supplies were also furnished and repairs made to the detached hill forts held as police stations ; and the frontier

posts along the Indus considerably strengthened in numbers to prevent any successful affront, which even on the part of robbers would at such a time be distorted into a disaster.

15. I believe that aggressions from beyond the border are generally assisted, if not invited, from within ; and where there are so many Chiefs, all more or less connected in former days when they needed an asylum, or still in communication with outside tribes, and having in times of excitement great feudal influence, the main difficulty of administration is to maintain justice, and at the same time to secure the attachment of both Chiefs and people.

Rallying
of principal
Chiefs.

16. Among themselves these Chiefs have still their own partizans connected by mutual assistance in the Sikh days, when the revolt of one on his mountain was the beacon for others to rise in the remotest and most unexpected points, and thus, by constant combinations, they succeeded in harassing the troops and garrisons which covered the country.

17. They had then, however, much cause to rise against tyranny and insult, but since the English rule they have been ever treated with the greatest regard and consideration, and rewarded for their adherence to our side during the Sikh War of 1848 ; and hence the continual disaffection and disquiet and the large army have been succeeded by general content and quiet and by a control moral rather than physical.

18. A time then had arrived when, after ten years of our rule, their loyalty could be displayed to good purpose ; so I rallied the principal men to assure them of my reliance, and at the same time, by daily intercourse, to dispel the alarming and mischievous reports and influences which must reach them and more readily be accepted at a distance.

19. The 55th Regiment of Native Infantry in Yoosufzie had mutinied and held the fort of Hoti Murdan ; and on 25th May a force was sent against them from Peshawur, but before that force reached the walls, all but about 100 had made off in the direction of the difficult hills which separate our border from the independent Mahomedan tribes and the Swat country. They were at once most courageously pursued;

Mutiny of
55th Native
Infantry at
Mardán and
measures
taken.

with a small party of horse, by Colonel Nicholson,—that great soldier whose death we all mourn ; many were slain and taken prisoners, but the regiment was very strong in numbers, and had obtained a considerable start, so that about half succeeded in crossing the border, with their arms, ammunition and plundered treasure, into a country where they could be followed no further, and made their way to the son of Syud Akbur, the so-styled king, and to the more famous Akhoond or minister-priest of Swat.

20. They were readily welcomed as our enemies and the religious martyrs they represented themselves to be, but in that poor country there were neither the means nor the inclination to pay and maintain a standing army, and the sleek well-fed soldiers, most of whom were high-caste Hindoos, soon discovered the impossibility of remaining in a strange land of lawless Mahomedans, whose language they did not even understand.

21. Reports reached me of their desire to reach the country of Maharajah Goolab Singh and their hope of sympathy and welcome among the soldiery of Cashmere ; and as the road lay either through Huzara or along its border, I desired all the chiefs and headmen to be alert and ready. I hardly expected they would proceed in a body, but rather endeavour to steal through by degrees and in disguise.

Arrival of
mutineers in
Aliai.

22. At Abbottabad, on the evening of the 23rd June, a letter reached me from Mahomed Khan, a mullick of the village of Buttul, in Kounsh, enclosing another to his address from Jumal Khan of the village of Karg, one of the most influential men of the Jirgah of Ullye. In this, assistance and a safe passage through Kounsh was asked for 600 Hindoostanee soldiers who had fled from the "Feringhees." This intelligence was corroborated by another report to the same effect from the frontier district of Agrore. A messenger had seen the sepoys, 700 in number ; they had crossed the Indus on rafts of skins, at a ferry above Tahkote, and were halted under the shade of the "umlok" trees and by the stream in Jumal Khan's village.

23. I had with me the sons of the Khagan Syuds, of Moozuffur Khan of Nundyar and some others of authority on the frontier, and I despatched them to gather their followers and secure the principal passes at the head of the Pukhlee valley.

Application to Chiefs to arrest progress of mutineers.

24. The independent district of Ullye, which the sepoy had reached, is about two days' journey from our extreme possession of Kounsh; between them intervenes the independent district of Nundyar; all are held by Swattees of a common ancestry, and Kounsh is held in jageer or fief by Mahomed Ameen Khan, Chief of Gurhee and head of the Swattees in Huzara.

25. Adjoining this are the frontier "durwalis," or glens of Agrore, Bogurmung, Balakote and Khagan, all wild and mountainous, but through each of them are several roads by which men on foot can penetrate into Pukhlee, the more direct road being through Kounsh, Shinkyaree and Dodyal to Gurhee Hubeboollah and Moozufferabad.

26. Mahomed Ameen Khan was directed at once to proceed and guard his jageer of Kounsh, holding the gorges and passes, preventing supplies and communicating with Moozuffur Khan, of Nundyar, to whom I immediately wrote to check their progress.

27. On the 24th June I was at Dodyal, 25 miles in advance of Abbottabad, with a detachment of the 2nd Sikhs under Lieutenant Bernard, half the Zumboorchees and some levies of foot and horse.

Movements of Major Becher to intercept the mutineers.

28. There I met Mahomed Ameen Khan on his way to

Kounsh, and as I learnt that the sepoy would in all probability attempt the direct road, I sent for Captain Harding, Commanding the regiment, who, with a further detachment, completing three companies of Infantry and three guns of

3 Subadars.
4 Jemadars.
29 Havildars.
25 Naicks.
6 Buglers.
159 Sepoys.
66 Recruits.

the mountain train, under Lieutenant Butt of the Artillery, joined me the next day.

29. The cantonment of Abbottabad in rear was held by Lieutenant Boulderson, the Assistant Commissioner, with the small remainder of the regiment, and a portion of the horse and foot levies, and the remaining three guns were for safety placed in the fort of Manserah.

30. Dodyal (as you will see in the map) is a central position in the plain, about three miles from Shinkyaree, controlling all the principal roads; and on the approach from Kounsh I selected a strong position at the gorge of the valley to be occupied in advance.

31. My intention was to contest and obstruct the passage of the sepoy by the armed zemindars of the country and to meet them with regular troops as they debouched into the plain, in whichever direction over this large extent of frontier hills their line of march might develop itself.

32. The spies I had sent returned with accounts exaggerating the numbers and describing their doings, how they were bribing and flattering, and addressing Jumal Khan by the title of "Nawab," until he told them they would excite the jealousy of his fellow mullicks, how the Mahomedan women were shocked by these strange, dark (Kala) men cooking and bathing almost naked; they were most of them armed with muskets, or rifles and swords, but had little clothing and no cover from the rain and night dews. They were accompanied by confidential messengers from the Akhoond of Swat, and had letters calling on all good Mussulmans to aid and escort them, and excommunicating and denouncing as unbelievers all who should oppose them.

Movements of
mutineers.

33. Mahomed Ameen Khan on reaching Kounsh was joined by Mozuffur Khan from Nundyar, and both communicated with the party in Ullie adverse to Jumal Khan and his party. They proposed to me that they should cross the frontier, enter Ullie and by this means attack the sepoy, but this I forbade. Both Chiefs had doubtless purposes of their own to serve; it must involve a fight between the two parties, and even if there should be no treachery and it should succeed (which was doubtful), it would have greatly complicated

matters on the frontier. After considerable hesitation and leaving behind their sick, who became Mahomedans and found shelter in the musjids, the sepoys, on 27th June, made a march to the village of Raeshung on the Nundyar border, and in the direction of Kounsh, but finding in their front the difficult passes of Kundora and Ujjree-ke-Gullee occupied by the men of Mozuffur Khan, they turned back the next day to Butteelan, the village of Syuds Gholam Ali Shah and Dilarum Shah, resolving not to attempt the passage by Pukhlee, but to try the far more difficult route near the Indus and through the Kohistan.

34. Little did they know the country through which they must thread their way: on the narrow ledges of tremendous precipices, by tracks with scarcely footing for the practised peasant; through gorges where a few could prevent a host; and over wastes where seldom was to be found even the hut of the shepherd Goojur.

35. Destruction was before them. At Raeshung, the first ill-omened day of their advance, a Jemadar shot himself with a musket, vainly urging the direct and easier way, and declaring that it was better to perish in fight than to starve or die miserably among those frightful rocks.

36. I had once an opportunity of serving the two Syuds of Ullye, at whose village the mutineers were now arrived, in the matter of a betrothal in which they felt their honour compromised; they were also friends of Moulvee Mahomed Ally of Ogee, a jageerdar of Huzara, and of the Khan of Agrore; and as they had great influence on the northern border, I wrote to them to disabuse the people of the false report which had been spread that the British Government wished to touch the religion of its soldiers, and urging them to view these soldiers not as martyrs, but as mutineers, and to bid the Kohistanees, who were their disciples (*morees*), and all true men oppose such rank traitors to their salt.

Rousing of
Kohistanis
against
mutineers.

37. I also wrote to the jeerga or council of the Kohistanees reminding them of occasions when their cattle had been forayed by subjects of Huzara, and they had recovered them

and met with justice and partiality, and how they were free from all duties to come and go in their trade with Huzara.

38. These letters served the purpose. One or two of their sons, with their followers, fell on the rear of the sepoy, after leaving Butteelan, when they reached a point called Undrukke-ke-Gullee, just beyond the boundary of Ullye, while some Goojurs of Kohistan assailed them in front, hurling down huge stones from the rocks above. In this encounter the son of Gholam Ally Shah was wounded, and one of the Kohistanees, by trade a smith, was shot, while eight of the mutineers were killed.

39. The loss of their countrymen enraged the Kohistanees, and again they gathered to contest a pass known as Banda Dewan, where several more of the sepoy fell. Every step of the advance now brought new embarrassments; the knapsacks and bayonets and many of the muskets were cast down the rocks, and a large payment in silver could scarcely procure a seer of flour.

Destruction of
mutineers by
Sayads of
Khagán.

40. At this time our subjects, the Syuds of Khagan, who in 1852 had rebelled, and after an expatriation of three years and the forfeiture of their estates had only lately been restored to their country, sent me word of the situation of the sepoy, attacked in front and deprived of all retreat, and that some of the leading men in Kohistan had invited them to join as their Peers or religious guides. Should they go revered as Syuds, there was no likelihood of deceit, so I bade them go at once to prove their loyalty and obliterate all remembrance of their recent disgrace.

41. On the 5th July the mutineers, haggard and hungry, halted on the edge of the Blue River (Neelee Nuddee), a tributary to the Indus, at a narrow, stony place, called the Serpent's Bank (Beyla Sanpan), below the village of Guddarh, which village the Syuds and the headmen of Khaggu, Balakote and Konhar reached the same day. Towards afternoon a party of six sepoy came there for provisions and were instantly seized; two of them, however, contrived to escape, giving the

alarm to the rest to prepare and resist the new wild force which was hovering above their heads, while the bands of the Syuds and Kohistanees closed in, firing down from the surrounding hills.

42. The fight lasted for some time during the next morning; many of the sepoy were killed or wounded, or drowned in the rapid stream, over which the narrow bridge had been secured, till at last they, with a desperate rush, took possession of the bridge and the village, and their further molestation was forbidden by a moollah from Palas, on the Indus, to whom the Akhoond of Swat had commended them.

43. The Syuds were then compelled to leave, sending me word of this success, which took place three long days' march beyond their own country, and adding that they were on their way to meet me with a number of captives.

44. I replied that the remaining sepoy who had escaped them, moving parallel with their border, would probably cross the extremity of Khagan, and that they must not abandon the chase while yet there was a prospect of further prey.

45. Beyond the river Nynsookh and between Khagan and Kashmeer lies the territory of Durawah and Kurnah, belonging to Shere Ahmed Khan, a chief tributary to Cashmere: I warned him of their approach, and called on him to arm his followers and close his frontier against their passage, and he readily answered the call.

46. On the 15th July the Syuds conveyed 54 Poorbeah prisoners to my frontier post at Balakote, of whom 13 were brought in across the hills to Shinkyaree, where we were then encamped. These were immediately tried and sentenced to death by a military court of European and native officers: on an eminence above the town, where a gibbet was erected, and the guns drawn up, and before all the troops these men underwent the just retribution of their mutiny: they met death with the calmest bearing. Those who were hung spoke only to request they might be blown from the guns instead.

Execution of
prisoners
taken by the
Sayads of
Khagan.

Further operations of Sayads and Kohistanis against the mutineers who surrender and are tried and executed.

47. As I had anticipated, the moollah who had protected the remainder, conveyed them to Kote Gullee, on the border of Chilass, and from thence they made for Durawah. The scouts who had been left on the mountains then conveyed the intelligence that the Poorbeahs had reached Nooreenar by the Laloosur Lake, near the border of Durawah, and the sons of the Syuds immediately armed and repaired there.

48. It was a rainy day, and as they appeared through the mists on the hills beating their drums and flaunting their pennons the hearts of the mutineers despaired. Checked everywhere, there seemed no hope, and after a faint resistance and a slaughter of a few of their number, they surrendered their arms, and 124 more prisoners (amongst whom were two soobadars) and 102 muskets were afterwards made over to the escort which I had despatched to receive them. Except a few recruits (two of whom were Sikhs) and one or two camp followers, the rest were all executed at different stations of the district.

Surrender and execution of mutineers who took refuge in Kashmir.

49. About 20 days afterwards, 43 more of these men, who had been seized in Durawah by the soldiers of the Cashmere Government at the fort of Shardeh, were made over from Moozufferabad to my guards by order of His Highness Maharajah Runbeer Singh, who had just succeeded to the rule of his father, Maharajah Goolab Singh, and who thus early evinced the sincerity of his alliance.

50. These were similarly tried and punished with death. Since then six wretched men, sick and foot-sore, converted to Mahomedanism and disguised as Goojurs, have been picked up at different times. A few changing their religions remained behind in the musjids at Ullye, and a few may have crossed into Chilass, where they probably serve as slaves.

51. Thus hunted down to the last like wild beasts was consummated the miserable fate of the 55th Regiment, and thus they afforded a salutary example to other mutinous regiments by proving the far-reach of our power, and that there was no refuge even beyond our border.

52. After the force returned to its cantonments at Abbottabad matters remained quiet and undisturbed in Huzara, although the delay before Delhi gave rise to the wildest rumours of retreat and disaster and the downfall of the English power. It cannot be surprising that Mahomedans, who had experienced in their lives their own rule in this country succeeded by the Sikh, and again only lately the disappearance of those conquerors whom they had expelled on the breaking out of our battles on the Sutlej, should believe in the feasibility of our ruin and the return of their ancient independence; and some of the Chiefs, as I could see, began to recall their former feuds and to reckon up their own chances and their old allies in case we should lose or leave the country. I made it my main employment to see as many as possible; and, treating the mutiny as a thing easily to be subdued, to spread cheerful intelligence of our prestige and our victories, the fidelity of the native princes and the stern rebuke of our enemies, which even here they had witnessed. An opportunity was also taken in one or two instances of punishing, by public whipping and imprisonment, men connected with our public offices who had given circulation to dispiriting reports.

Tranquillity
of district.
Measures
taken to
restore
confidence.

53. As I had hitherto remained in Upper Huzara and as the excitement at Seikh Jana and Shewa, on the border of Yoosufzye, made me anxious regarding my own opposite border of the Indus, to which the son of Syud Ukbur of Swat had betaken himself, I rode down to Hurreepoor on 7th August, where I met Jehandad Khan of Umbh, the first in rank of the chiefs of the country, who has throughout shown himself steadfast and sincere. The principal men of Lower Huzara too seemed all in good heart. The Khuttree traders of Hurreepoor who were somewhat alarmed, remembering two pillages of their town by the Mahomedans of the country in former days of disturbance, were, I believe, reassured by my presence, and I daily visited the fort, the small garrison of which was much diminished by the prevailing sickness of this season.

54. About the end of August I heard that many alarming reports were bruited about in the hills among the Dhoond tribe round the station of Murree, but the men whom I had sent to ascertain particulars reported that no danger or disaffection existed.

Attack on
Murree by
Karrals.

55. Past midnight on the 2nd September I received an express of that date from Mr. Thornton, the Commissioner of Jhelum, at Rawul Pindee, informing me that he had heard of a confederacy formed about 10 days before among the men of the villages of Bhagun, Mukole and Nuggree, belonging to the Khurral tribe in Huzara, to attack and plunder Murree, but that the attack had been deferred for further news from below. Another letter written later in the day, at half-past 6 p. m., which reached me at the same time, contained a report from Lieutenant Battye, the Assistant Commissioner at Murree, of an attack actually made the night before, which he supposed to be on the part of a few of the nearest villages and which had been repulsed by means of timely information given to Lady Lawrence by Hakim Khan, a mullick of Lohra, who was in service as a jemadar.

Measures
taken and
despatch of
troops to the
relief of
Murree.

56. On receiving these letters I summoned Kazee Mahomed Hussan (the vakeel of the Khurral Chief, Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan) and Cazee Ubdool Gaffoor, the tehseeldar of Huzara, and instantly sent them off by day-break by the fort of Narra to inquire from Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan what was happening among his people. I wrote to him to the same effect. I also sent off a party of Suttee Sepoys from the fort under their soobadar, all men of the hills and well acquainted with these tribes. Rajah Hyder Buksh Khan of Khanpoor, who happened to be with me at Hurreepoor, accompanied him with a small band of his men from the levies, and I sent word to Rajah Ally Gohur Khan, the Gukkur Chief, and Ally Bahadoor Khan, the Khurral Chief of Dabran (the rival of Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan) to muster what men they could and reach Murree rapidly from the border of their estates. In the evening a telegraphic message reached me from General Cotton at Peshawur, requesting me to send troops from

Huzara as there was not a single available soldier in the Peshawur district.

57. The matter was urgent and might be of very great consequence. Captain Harding was therefore immediately directed, by express, to march with the head-quarters and three companies of his regiment and about 100 men of the foot levies to the relief of Murree, while I despatched from Hurreepoor 100 more of the foot levies with 10 zoombooraks to join him on the road at the entrance to the hills; wrote off to Narra to get supplies, and sent Ubdoolla Khan of Kullabut and Fuzul Khan, Jemadar, of the Abbottabad Kotwallee, as agents to escort the detachment by the road of Shaj Kote, Sutturah and Lohra, which would take the disaffected country in rear, advance close upon the residence of the Khurral Chief, and, I judged, most likely bring the matter to a satisfactory issue.

Despatch of
troops to the
relief of
Murree.

3 Soobadars.
3 Jemadars.
18 Havildars.
18 Naicks.
4 Buglers.
151 Sepoys.
98 Recruits.

58. It rained heavily and incessantly during the night of the 3rd and the day of the 4th September. The road after entering the hills is more difficult than I can describe; but Captain Harding, overcoming all difficulties by his determination, marched from Abbottabad early on the morning of the 4th September and reached Shaj Kote before dark, a distance of 17 or 18 miles, drenched with rain and without tents or baggage. They found shelter for the night in the village, and for food contented themselves chiefly with parched Indian corn.

59. Captain Davies, the executive officer of Huzara, with much zeal and spirit, accompanied the troops as a volunteer, being well acquainted with the roads and in every respect likely to be of much use.

60. At Shaj Kote it was proposed to proceed to Peerkote and Moree as being a more direct road than the one by Sutturah. Against this change Nawab Khan (brother of the Khurral Sirdar) strongly protested, urging that the people in that direction were assembling and excited beyond his control, and that if his advice were neglected he would not be responsible for the safe conduct of the regiment, but would at once go

Route taken
by the force.

off with his family to Hurreepoor. I had also heard that this change of road was contemplated, and knowing that it would bring the column through a precipitous pass rising from the Summoondhur stream, near to which a large force under Sirdar Lehna Singh, Majeethea, had once been defeated by these very Khurrals, and that it led directly on to the villages which were said to be disaffected, I sent off a hasty despatch that the Sutturah road should be taken. This reached in time, and the troops, again in the midst of rain, reached Sutturah in much the same plight as the day before.

Arrival of
force at
Murree, where
the distur-
bance had
been quelled.

61. Reports were there brought that a large number of the people had mustered to oppose in front ; but Captain Harding resolutely pushed on, and without any opposition brought his men under the walls of the fort of Dhunna (within a few miles of Murree) on the evening of the 6th September, from whence he communicated with Mr. Thornton.

62. By that time the danger had gone by ; the rebels who had gathered round Murree had been dispersed, and many of them followed up and captured ; the disaffection appeared but partial and confined to a few of the nearest villages, as the Peers of Plasseh, jageerdars of Huzara, the most influential men in the Dhoond country, had been summoned, and had repaired with their followers to Murree the morning after the attack, with the principal Mullicks around, and had assisted in burning the villages and seizing the cattle of the rebels.

63. Those of the Dhoonds, about the fort of Dhunna, had also reported themselves there. Situated as Murree is in the extensive country of the Dhoonds, who boast of the armed thousands they can assemble, the great danger to be apprehended was a general and extensive combination, and most serious to the peace of the Punjab would have been the moral effect of any disaster at a station crowded with English ladies and children.

Return of
force to
Hazara.

64. To make sure of the feeling of the country while in a controlling position, the troops continued till the 15th September at Murree, when the detachment of the regiment

returned towards Huzara by Rawul Pindee, while the irregular levies who, with the Chiefs I sent, had been very useful in dragging forth the fugitives from their retreats in the hills, came back through the Dhoond country by Beerungulle, finding all peaceable and well-disposed in that direction.

65. On the 20th September Captain Harding and his men reached their cantonment after some hardship and much willing and praiseworthy exertion.

66. While all this took place, I had been strengthening the cantonment of Abbottabad by sending up the men, chiefly horsemen, of Lower Huzara, for by drafts to new regiments the 2nd Sikh Infantry had been so reduced that only 27 sepoy and 82 recruits of about a month's standing in the regiment were left behind in all the district after despatching three companies to Murree.

Strengthening of cantonment of Abbottabad and Hill Forts.

67. Three of the guns, with their magazine stores, were withdrawn to the fort at Hurreepoor, and with horsemen and some levies I thus commanded both ends of the Sulhud Pass, in the event of any attack on Abbottabad, which was said to have been concerted, but which I hardly expected.

68. I also considerably strengthened the garrisons of the hill forts at Narra and Dhunna, and provided them with a supply of water in case of an attack.

69. Late at night of the 4th September, after Captain Harding had marched, a man from Mahmood Khan, Mullick of Banda, came with a message that Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan had assembled all his men, stopped all the detachment, and was in rebellion. There was reason for crediting this, although the informant was hostile to the Khurral Chief.

Unfounded report of attack on force marching to Murree and measures adopted.

70. Fuzul Khan, of Topee, and Nawab Khan, of Shingree, were at hand, both men of tact and discernment, and on whom I thought I could rely. The latter is married to a daughter of the Khurral Chief. They were ordered to ride at

once to assist the force, bring in Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan, and send me instant word of what had occurred.

71. They wrote me that, although there had evidently been some original ill-intention on the part of the Khurrals, many of whom had assembled, yet on their arrival as my deputies the people had all declared their allegiance and returned to their homes, and that the Sirdar and his brother had assisted the force to the best of their ability. On their return to me they were accompanied by Nawab Khan, the brother, and Azad Khan, the favourite son of Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan, to whom I explained that the matter was serious, and the Sirdar must come himself, whether well or ill, as he represented himself to be, or stand the consequences.

72. The next day he came, bringing also Pahulwan Khan and other Mullicks of Barsin, the village said to have been confederate in the project of attack, but not overtly concerned.

Measures
taken for
arresting
fugitive
Dhunds
from Murree.

73. I sent back these Mullicks with parties of my own to arrest the fugitive Dhounds from Murree and prevent their finding an asylum in their country ; but Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan I retained until, hearing that rumours were afloat of my intention to seize and imprison him after the Sikh mode, and knowing his blind credulity, I allowed him to return, leaving his son with me as his representative.

74. Although the parties I had sent to Bagan were taken here and there about the mountains and caverns, and clefts and dense forests, yet it was generally believed that the rebels who had escaped from Murree were concealed near that portion of Huzara and eluded discovery by moving from one retreat to another. In such a wild tract an army could be baffled in its search, unaided by the assistance of the people.

75. In a few days came the glad tidings of our successful assault of Delhi, then the complete possession of the city and defeat of the rebels, then the capture of the King; but notwithstanding the illuminations and salutes of guns, it gained slow credence ; it was said to be our last desperate invention. The truth was, men were slow to believe in the

dissipation of visions which had generally accorded with their wishes and raised them in their own self-esteem.

76. When it should really be believed that fortune had returned to our standard, I knew that the fate of the fugitive Dhoonds would resemble that of the 55th Regiment. They would be delivered up or driven out, if they really were lurking there ; so after some pause, I poured into the country all the levies I could command, amounting to some 300 men, in five principal bands, forming a ring round the base of Murree, guarding the River Jhelum, and cutting off escape.

77. Of the villages whose inhabitants were present, and engaged in the attack, only one hamlet of 10 or 12 families, called " Bhutteean," belonged to Huzara, and they were nearly related to Baz Khan, and other headmen of Muttolo, in the Rawul Pindee district, who had originated the whole plot and were the most active of the assailants.

78. These Bhutteean men were, I was told, concealed in the Huzara Dhoond villages of Seer and Myra. Years ago, before our rule, on the occasion of some opposition among the Dhoonds, Maharaja Goolab Singh, having in vain hunted for the escaped ringleaders, at length obtained them by imprisoning the headmen of the neighbourhood ; and, with the example of this subtle ruler, I now called into Hurreepoor the Mulicks of Seer, Myra and Nuggree, and told them they must remain there till the Bhutteean fugitives were discovered and until I was convinced that no others were also secreted by their connivance.

79. I again sent my two former deputies to Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan, ordering him to stay at Bagun with them ; and to secure their valuable influence, I called in the Peers of Plasseh. The result was that all the Bhutteean fugitives were unconditionally made over by the Mullick of Myra, whose daughter is married to the principal man. The other Dhoond fugitives, rejected everywhere, have mostly been arrested in their own homes by the Pindee police or my own, and but very few now remain at large. The confederation,

Arrest of fugitives and their punishment.

whatever it may have been, has been entirely broken up; and of those proved to have been actually engaged, some have suffered death, and very many have been imprisoned by the authorities of Rawul Pindee, their cattle confiscated, and their villages fired.

Participation
of Hindustan-
is in plot.

80. Among those put to death were some Hindoostanees of Murree, and undoubtedly the disturbance was planned and incited by the Hindoostanee Mahomedans, who worked upon the credulity and avarice and fanaticism of these hill tribes, assuring them of an easy plunder, in which they would have all their assistance.

81. The account of this outbreak would properly belong to Rawul Pindee, but it was so closely connected with this district that I could not avoid dwelling on it; and undoubtedly had it not been promptly managed, or had it been supported and followed up by the people of Huzara, it would have been a far more serious matter, occurring as it did at a time of great weakness in troops.

Arrival of re-
inforcements
in Hazára.

82. Shortly afterwards two companies of the new 12th Punjab Infantry were sent me from Peshawur, and Major-General Cotton was good enough to extend his tour with an escort of European Infantry and Cavalry into Huzara, as far as Manserah—a measure, I believe, productive of much good at that time, as a renewal of opinion, and a most convincing proof, of the tranquil strength of Peshawur. On the General's departure I was reinforced by four more companies of the 12th Punjab Infantry under Captain Blaggrave, while the returned confidence and prospect of quiet since the fall of Delhi has enabled me to curtail the expenses by reducing two-thirds of the levies.

Services of
officers.

83. I have now sketched the principal characteristics of the last eventful eight months, during which I have reason to thank my assistant, Lieutenant Boulderson, for his sound sense, good feeling and entire co-operation. I am also much obliged to the Extra Assistant Mirza Azim Beg, who remained alone for some months in charge of Hurreepoor and inspired general confidence by his serenity and temper.

84. And now that I believe the worst time of trial has passed, I look back with some satisfaction at the peacefulness of this district as a portion of the Punjab frontier, during a hurricane which has torn and raged across India with such terrible force.

61. *From Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDS, C. B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner, for the Punjab,—No. 49, dated Peshawur, 1st March 1858.*

IN continuation of my No. 44 of 22nd February, I have now the honor to forward copy of No. 55 of this date from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, reporting that he had no extra police (properly so-called) during the crisis, and that the number of mutineers who suffered death at Peshawur was 1,110.

2. I am now drawing up my own report for the district of Peshawur, with a general review of the frontier.

ENCLOSURE TO 61.

62. *From Captain H. R. JAMES, Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDS, C. B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division,—No. 55, dated Peshawur, 1st March 1858.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 31 of the 22nd January, forwarding copy of the Judicial Commissioner's circular calling for a brief record of the circumstances connected with the late mutiny of the Bengal sepoys as affecting this district.

Remarks by Captain H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner, on events in the Peshawar District.

2. During the first month of the outbreak I was officiating as Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, returning to Peshawur on the 20th June. I am not therefore personally cognizant of the circumstances attending the disarming of the troops in cantonments or the outbreak of the 55th Native Infantry at Noushera and Murdan.

Remarks by
Captain H. R.
James, Deputy
Commissioner,
on
events in the
Peshawar Dis-
trict.

3. A narrative of the several events which have since transpired, though highly important and interesting, would exceed the limits of this report, and involve a detail of our relations with the numerous tribes on our frontier at the period of the outbreak.

4. Without such explanation the conduct of the Kookee Khel in submitting to our demands at such a time, and of other Afreedee tribes taking service in our cause, the withdrawal from the Swat frontier of those restless marauders to whom such days of general disaffection held out prospects of the license they loved, and the unwonted tranquillity of the Swat district, with many other results of your policy and labors, would not be fully appreciated.

5. Moreover, I had scarcely arrived at Peshawur when my presence was considered necessary in Eusufzie, where rebellion began to shew itself in some of our villages, and where Moolvie Inayut Allee had raised his standard with a view to excite our subjects to a crusade.

6. The details and results of our operations in that quarter in July and August have been already laid before Government, and do not seem to call for further remark here.

7. The outbreak of the 51st Native Infantry at Peshawur and the almost entire destruction of the regiment which followed, will be included in General Cotton's report, the only circumstance connected with it bearing upon the district being the readiness displayed by the villagers and the success of the police in bringing in the fugitives; 150 sepoy of the 51st were captured by the police at Hurree Singh's Thannah, near the Khyber.

8. At this time our difficulties were increased by the establishment of a Syud in the Khyber with the green flag of Islam, whose presence there could not but excite the hopes and agitate the minds of our disaffected but baffled soldiery. His dismissal by the Afreedees and subsequent reappearance at

Michnee with the Mohmunds, with the measures successfully adopted for averting the threatened inroads, more properly belong to the general policy of the times.

Remarks by
Captain H. R.
James, Deputy
Commissioner,
on
events in the
Peshawar Dis-
trict.

9. Every circumstance therefore connected with the mutiny will be either fully reported by General Cotton as regards the troops, or by yourself as regards the frontier. It is not from any unwillingness to enter upon details that I avail myself of the permission granted in the second paragraph of your letter under reply, but from a knowledge that such a report on my part would be superfluous.

10. With few and temporary exceptions, I was located with you during this anxious period, and my labors have consisted in endeavouring to carry out your views and instructions, so that Mr. Montgomery's object will be better attained by your general report than by any more partial narrative that I could offer.

11. No extra police has been entertained by me, but when a thannah or post appeared to be threatened from the hills, some of the levies raised for military service in cantonments and elsewhere were temporarily employed for its protection.

Extra estab-
lishments.

12. But indeed in the district generally the police required no support. Crime of a heinous nature, raids and gang robberies decreased in a remarkable manner. In no single instance (except that of a portion of Eusufzie above alluded to) has there been the slightest appearance of disaffection or revolt in the villages or towns of this district.

13. The ferries have been carefully watched throughout the year, and this I think has tended in no slight degree to prevent outbreaks amongst portions of the troops which might have occurred had they seen any road open to them for escape.

Detail of
punishments
inflicted.

14. It only remains to append the number of executions which have taken place in the district for crimes connected with the rebellion and which may be classed as follows :—

| | |
|--|-------|
| Blown from guns | 47 |
| Shot by musketry | 715 |
| Hanged by Military authorities | 28 |
| Hanged by Civil authorities | 20 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 810 |
| | <hr/> |

In addition to the above about 300 sepoy were slain during pursuit in endeavoring to escape.

63. *From Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDS, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 64, dated Peshawur, 23rd March 1858.*

Report on
events in the
Peshawar Dis-
trict and Divi-
sion generally.

WITH my No. 44 of the 22nd February I forwarded the detailed reports of Major Becher and Captain Henderson on events in the Huzara and Kohat districts during the revolt of 1857, and with my No. 49, of 1st March, Captain James' detail of the military punishments in the Peshawur district. I now proceed to report on the latter district in detail, and to remark generally on events in the whole division.

Political
situation in
May 1857.

2. In the beginning of May 1857 perfect peace reigned in the districts of Huzara and Kohat and upon their mountain borders. Their irritable and bigoted, but simple and manly, races had been tamed by easy revenue and kindly rule into that chronic contentment which is the nearest approach to loyalty that new conquerors can expect. In the rich valley of Peshawur the same ease and prosperity prevailed. But for one crime or another almost every powerful tribe beyond the border was under a blockade.¹

¹ This consists in forbidding an offending tribe to trade with Peshawur and imprisoning any member of it caught in the valley till the tribe submits.

3. The Mullickdeen Kheyl Afreedees had basely assassinated a Police officer of ours (a clansman of their own) while visiting at his home, and were blockaded till they should pay a fine of 3,000 rupees and do justice to the heirs of the murdered man.

4. The Zukka Kheyl Afreedees were under blockade for innumerable highway robberies.

5. The Kookee Kheyl Afreedees were under blockade for murdering Lieutenant Hand as that officer thoughtlessly and against orders was venturing into the mouth of the Khyber Pass.

6. The Michnee and Pindalee Mohmunds were excluded for a long course of robberies and raids.

7. Totye had become the asylum of Ajaon Khan and Mokurrub Khan, two noted outlaws, round whom gathered every villain who escaped from our police, so the people of Totye were under ban.

8. Mokurrub Khan, the chief of Punjtar, though not under actual blockade, was known to be meditating mischief because we had refused to aid him with troops in oppressing his own clan; and he had just called into Punjtar as auxiliaries a detachment of Hindoostanee fanatics from the colony of "Ghazees" (or martyrs) who have for years been settled at Sitana on the Indus, supported by secret supplies of money from disaffected Indian princes.

9. The valley of Peshawur, then, at the beginning of the eventful month of May, stood in a ring of repressed hostilities.

10. Beyond this mountain ring lay the kingdom of Kabul, over the disastrous memories of which some treaties of friendship had freshly drawn a veil.

11. Three British officers, Major Harry Lumsden, Lieutenant Peter Lumsden, and Doctor Bellew, were on a political mission at Candahar; envoys to-day, but possible hostages to-morrow.

12. On the western frontier of Candahar hovered the skirmishers of the Persian army, which had captured Herat in breach of treaties with the English.

Strength of
military force
in the Peshā-
war Valley.

13. To face these elements of danger, what forces garrisoned the Peshawur Valley? About 2,800 European and 8,000 native soldiers, horse and foot, with 18 field guns and a mounted battery; in numbers and high discipline a goodly army, deemed on the 10th of May equal and ready to meet the shock of Central Asia.

Receipt of
news of
mutiny.

14. On the night of the 11th May the telegraph announced that sepoys from Meerut had arrived at Delhi that morning, and were burning the houses and killing the Europeans. The message, apparently, was not official, or addressed to any one in particular. In it the officer in charge of the Delhi telegraph was expressly said to have been killed; and one of his assistants, probably a mere lad, had thus nobly done his duty in flashing this warning up to the frontier before seeking his own safety in flight. If the lad be alive he deserves well of the State. It required no ordinary nerve to manipulate such a message in the midst of a mutiny.

15. Nor can too much public gratitude be shown to Sir R. O'Shaughnessy, by whose personal energy the electric wire had in an incredibly short space of time been laid down from one end of India to the other before this mutiny broke out. The ignorant sepoys, rising against European civilization, were slow to appreciate its most imperial triumph, and the wire was not cut till it had done its work and electrified the empire.

News of
mutiny at
Meerut.

16. On the morning of 12th May a second message, dated midnight of 10th, was received from Major Waterfield, Deputy Adjutant-General at Meerut, and explained the Delhi news. The native troops were in open mutiny, and "the European troops under arms defending barracks." This last sentence was read at Peshawur with indignation. It described with fatal fidelity the Meerut policy. There was but one

place in India at which a General could have crushed the mutiny in the bud, and at that place General Hewitt stood on the defensive.

17. It is well to learn all we can from experience, so I will here mention how forcibly it recurred to our minds that General Hewitt had been withdrawn two years previously from the Peshawur frontier, for the emergencies of which he was physically unfit. (During the time he commanded the Peshawur division it is believed he never once visited the outposts, and he used to inspect his troops in a buggy.) Yet he was appointed to another large division at Meerut ; no doubt a quieter place, but wherever it is necessary to keep troops, it is surely necessary to keep a commander who can lead them in the field. It is not a question of age, but of efficiency. There are Radetzky's, though not many.

Inefficiency
of General
Hewitt.

18. On receipt of this intelligence from Meerut, Colonel John Nicholson (a man of how different a mould !), who was then Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, proposed to me the formation of a Moveable Column of picked troops to put down mutiny in the Punjab ; and we went together and proposed it to Brigadier Sydney Cotton, who was then commanding the Peshawur Brigade. He entirely agreed, and obtained the concurrence of Major-General Read, who commanded the division ; so that orders were issued that afternoon (12th May) for the 55th Native Infantry to march from Nowshera and relieve the Guide Corps in charge of the Fort of Murdan, and for the Guides (on being relieved) to join Her Majesty's 27th Foot at Nowshera, in anticipation of Sir John Lawrence's approval of the Moveable Column, for which I had telegraphed to him at Rawul Pindee.

Proposed
formation
of a Moveable
Column.

19. There was one corps in the Peshawur Contingent (the 64th Native Infantry) of such mutinous notoriety that we ordered it out to three of the outposts, as if to meet an expected raid of the Mohmunds, and it marched off on the morning of the 13th. Thus it was broken up into detachments, and much crippled for intrigue, whether in its own ranks or with other regiments.

Disloyalty of
64th Native
Infantry.

Scrutiny of
postal
correspond-
ence.

20. Orders were also issued on this day (12th May) for the rigid examination of all sepy correspondence in the post office.

Summoning
of Brigadier
Neville
Chamberlain
to Peshawar.

21. Another measure taken on the 12th May was to invite Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, who fortunately happened to be at Kohat, to come over to Peshawur and join us in a council of war. This was with the full concurrence of General Reed and Brigadier Sydney Cotton, and I may here remark that perfect unanimity and good feeling has prevailed from first to last between the Military and Civil authorities here, each striving only to aid the other in meeting the common danger. It is hence difficult to assign the respective shares in every successful measure.

22. Early on 13th May Brigadier Chamberlain arrived at Peshawur. At half past 10 A. M. I received from the Chief Commissioner telegraphic intelligence that the native troops at Lahore had that morning been disarmed, and that he approved of the Moveable Column, and had applied for the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

Meeting of
Council of
war.

23. At 11 A. M. the council of war met at General Reed's house, and consisted of General Reed, Brigadier Sydney Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel John Nicholson and myself. The measures resolved on were briefly these :—

Measures
resolved
upon.

1st.—The concentration of all military and civil power in the Punjab, by General Reed (the senior officer) assuming chief command and joining the head-quarters of the Chief Commissioner, leaving Brigadier Sydney Cotton in command of Peshawur.

2nd.—The organization of a Moveable Column of thoroughly reliable troops, to assemble at Jhelum, and thence take the field and put down mutiny wherever it might appear in the Punjab.

3rd.—The removal of a doubtful sepoy garrison from the Fort of Attock, and the substitution of a reliable one in that important post.

4th.—The levy of a hundred Pathans under Futteh Khan, Khuttuck, a tried soldier, to hold the Attock ferry—a vital point in our communications with the Punjab.

5th.—The deputation of Brigadier Chamberlain to consult further with the Chief Commissioner.

6th.—The deputation of Colonel John Nicholson as Political officer with the Moveable Column (but this was objected to by the Chief Commissioner).

24. An abstract of these measures of the council of war was telegraphed at once, not only to the Chief Commissioner, but to the officers commanding every station in the Punjab, with a view to inspire public confidence.

25. And in reporting these proceedings more fully by letter¹ to Sir John Lawrence, I suggested authorising some of the best of the Commandants of the Punjab Irregular Force to enlist recruits from the Punjab and British frontier, with the double object of absorbing the floating military material of the country and of filling the gaps made by the mutiny.

Proposed enlistment of recruits and increase of Multani Horse.

26. At the same time I recommended that each of the ressalldars of Mooltanee Horse in the Derajat be authorised to double the number of his men from the same reliable races.

27. The Guide Corps marched from its cantonment at Murdan this day (13th), six hours after it got the order, and was at Attock (30 miles off) next morning, fully equipped for service—a worthy beginning of one of the rapidest marches

Despatch of Guides to Delhi.

¹ No. B of 13th May 1857.

ever made by soldiers ; for it being necessary to give General Anson every available man to attempt the recovery of Delhi, the Guides were not kept for the Moveable Column, but were pushed on to Delhi, a distance of 580 miles, or 50 regular marches, which they accomplished in 21 marches, with only three intervening halts, and those made by order. After thus marching 27 miles a day for three weeks, the Guides reached Delhi on the 9th June, and three hours afterwards engaged the enemy hand to hand—every single officer being more or less wounded. Amongst them fell Lieutenant Quentin Battye, with a bright career of chivalry in his heart ended (poor lad) in his first fight.

Characteristic
features of
the Guide
Corps.

28. And here I may be excused if I recall attention to the characteristic features of this distinguished frontier corps, its mixed races and nominal uniform. These do not strike us now-a-days. In 1858 we have got well accustomed to them ; but in 1846, to set Poorbeah sepoy aside and raise a corps of "Shikarees" of all nations, and say they should neither be strapped down nor braced up, nor button-strangled, but wear their own loose dusky shirts and wide *pijamahs* and sun-proof, sword-proof turbans, and as few accoutrements as possible, was an invention—a stroke of real genius ; and who conceived it?—one who was as great a soldier as statesman, to whom such simple truths came by intuition ; one who had served all his life with native soldiers, yet remained an Englishman, neither Hindooized nor Moslemized ; one who knew and loved the native army well, yet had for years been lifting his voice to proclaim that it was a moribund body, which must have new life infused into it or die ; and who ended a life spent for others in nobly meeting the storm which he had foreseen. And now that 50,000 mixed irregulars have risen by acclamation out of the ruins of a pipeclay Hindoostanee army, it is only just to remember that the Guide Corps, on which they have been modelled, was the thought of Sir Henry Lawrence. May the new native army long remain a monument of his prescience and wisdom.

29. On the 16th May General Reed and Brigadier Chamberlain joined Sir John Lawrence at Rawul Pindee, and that evening I was also directed by telegraph to repair there for consultation, and started at once.

Summoning to Ráwalpindi of chief Military and Civil officers.

30. This day's post carried with it to many stations of the army a lithographed circular, drawn up by Captain Bartlett, the Cantonment Magistrate. It was in the common character of sepoy correspondence, and contained an appeal to every loyal feeling and personal interest of the native soldiery, couched in their own provincial dialect, and admirably calculated to come home to their understandings. It was one of the many genuine and kindly efforts made by the English officers to save their men from ruin—with how little effect, we all know.

Circular to Native troops.

31. Dark news kept coming up now to Peshawur, and a rapid change was observed in the native regiments; precautions began: Colonel Nicholson promptly removed the treasure (about 24 lacs) from the centre of cantonments to the fort outside, where the magazine was, and Brigadier Cotton placed a European garrison in it at once. At Colonel Nicholson's request the Brigadier removed from the outskirts of the cantonment and established his head-quarters at the old Residency, which was central for all military orders and was close to the civil officers for mutual consultation. The Residency is a strong double-storied building, capable of defence, and it was named as the rendezvous for all ladies and children on the occurrence of any alarm by day or night. Full oft was it crowded during the eventful months that followed.

Precautions taken at Pesháwar.

32. The troops in garrison were divided into two brigades, under the Colonels of the two European regiments, with guns attached to each, ready for immediate action at either end of the cantonment.

33. European guards were placed in the Artillery lines.

34. A watch was set on every ferry of the Indus.

Raising of
Multani
Horse.

35. I think it must have been on the 16th of May that Sir John Lawrence consented to my raising 1,000 Mooltanee Horse, for before leaving Peshawur for Pindee that evening I left the orders with Colonel Nicholson, to be issued in our joint names (for the Khans in the Derajat were as much his friends as mine). On the 18th of May, however, permission was given to raise 2,000 ; matters were growing worse each day, and it was now clearly understood by us in the council assembled at Pindee that, whatever gave rise to the Mutiny, it had settled down into a struggle for empire, under Mahomedan guidance, with the Mogul capital as its centre. From that moment it was felt that, at any cost, Delhi must be regained.

Disloyalty of
troops at
Nowshera and
Mardán.

36. On the 18th May the Commanding Officer of the 10th Irregular Cavalry at Nowshera reported to Brigadier Cotton that the 55th Regiment of Native Infantry at both Nowshera and Murdan were in a state of discontent ; and next day Colonel Nicholson telegraphed to us at Pindee that the detachment of 10th Irregular Cavalry at Murdan showed signs of disaffection. A wing of Her Majesty's 24th was immediately ordered to march from Pindee and garrison Attock.

Imprisonment
of the Editor
of a Native
newspaper at
Pesháwar.

37. On the 19th May the native newspaper at Peshawur published a false and incendiary report that the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment had murdered its officers at the outposts. Colonel Nicholson immediately put the editor in prison. He was a Mahomedan and a native of Persia.

Appointment
of Brigadier
Chamberlain
to command
the Moveable
Column.

38. The Commander-in-Chief most wisely telegraphed for Brigadier Chamberlain to command the Punjab Moveable Column, and declared that Brigadier Cotton (who had been proposed) could not be spared from Peshawur ; and certainly all at Peshawur have reason to be thankful for this order.

Troops con-
tributed by
Hazára and
Kohát to the
Moveable
Column.

39. Major Becher now contributed to the Moveable Column one of the two irregular regiments of Infantry stationed in Huzara. Captain Henderson, at Kohat, had from the first offered similar succours. Perfect confidence was felt

by both those officers (and fully shared by me) in their ability to keep their districts quiet. None of us knew then, however, what we should have to go through.

40. On the 20th May I took leave of the Chief Commissioner at Pindee, and reached Peshawur again at noon on 21st. The aspect of things was gloomy to a degree. The Military and Civil authorities were not decided as to the temper of the native garrison. The most rancorous and seditious letters had been intercepted from Mahomedan bigots, in Patna and Thaneysur, to Naik Kurreemoollah and other soldiers of the 64th Native Infantry, revelling in the atrocities that had been committed in Hindoostan on the men, women and children of the "Nazarenes," and sending them messages from their own mothers that they should emulate these deeds, and, if they fell in the attempt, they would at least go to heaven, and their deaths, in such a case, would be pleasant news at home.¹ These letters alluded to a long series of correspondence that had been going on, through these men of the 64th Native Infantry, with the Hindoostanee fanatics in Swat and Sitana, mentioned in paragraph 8 of this letter.

Return of
Colonel Ed-
wardes to
Peshāwar and
state of affairs
there.

41. The conduct of the 64th Native Infantry as a regiment (while containing these desperate traitors in its ranks) was at this juncture very peculiar. On the 18th May the 51st Native Infantry in Peshawur despatched by the hand of a Brahmin² to the 64th Regiment, Native Infantry, and Kelati-Ghilzie Regiment, at Shubkudder, the following letter:—

Treasonable
correspond-
ence between
51st Native
Infantry and
64th Native
Infantry at
Peshāwar.

*Name of 64th Native
Infantry.

whole Heriot* regiment, to all the whole
Heriot regiment. May it reach the
Subadar Bahadoor." The letter then

opens with some Indian apostrophes and proceeds:—"For the rest, this letter is written to convey from the whole camp at Peshawur obeisance" (to Brahmins) "and benediction" (from Brahmins) "and salutation and service" (from Mussulman to Mussulman) "to the whole regiment of

¹ Kurreemoollah was ultimately tried by a commission and hanged.

² This man, Seetul Misser by name, was subsequently tried by a commission and hanged. Gokul Misser, who wrote it, was blown from a gun.

Heriot and Kelat-i-Ghilzie. Further, the state of affairs here is thus: that on the 22nd day of the month the cartridges will be given to the Doobarun Regiment. So do whatever seems to you proper. Again (*i. e.*, it is repeated), the cartridges will have to be bitten on the 22nd instant. Of this you are hereby informed. On reading this letter, whatever your opinion is, so reply; for, considering you as our own, we have let you know beforehand. Therefore do as you think right. This is addressed to you by the whole regiment. O brothers! the religion of Hindoos and Mahomedans is all one. Therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are at the bidding of Jemadar, Soobadar-Major and Havildar-Major. All are discontented with this business, whether small or great. What more need be written? Do as you think best. High and low send their obeisance, benediction, salutation and service." (Postscript by another hand):—"The above is the state of affairs here. In whatever way you can manage it, come in to Peshawur on the 21st instant. Thoroughly understand that point. In fact, eat there and drink here."¹ This letter reached Fort Shubkuddar about sunset of the 18th May, and was given by a messenger to a sepoy of the 64th Native Infantry. The existence in its ranks of such men as the Naik Sheik Kurreemoollah, carrying on treasonable correspondence, and the very confidence with which the 51st Native Infantry addressed this letter to the 64th, leaves little doubt that the corps was in a disaffected state; and it would have been natural to expect that the men of the corps should deliberate on this letter, and if not act on it, at all events keep it secret; but they gave it up to their officers, and thus furnished to Brigadier Cotton invaluable proof of what was going on. Why did they do this? I wish I could suppose it was because they were innocent; but I can only conclude that, being broken up into three detachments, at a distance from Peshawur, and it thus being impossible to collect and act together without the co-operation of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment, which was similarly placed in the same outposts, and having

¹ This is a proverb for letting no delay intervene.

ascertained that the Kelatees¹ were not prepared to co-operate, they made the only use of the letter that was left and gave it up to gain a name of loyalty for themselves.

42. The letter is a most valuable historic document; for it is the genuine confidence of one sepoy regiment to another on the question of the mutiny. It proves beyond a doubt that whatever moved the Mahomedans, the Hindoos were moved by the cartridges;² and it is lamentably characteristic of the conservative barbarism of India that a common piece of civilization—an improved rifle—has convulsed the empire, and called up 150,000 Asiatics to affirm by force of arms that spirit can be defiled by matter and religion converted in the stomach.

43. On the following day (19th May) Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant Commissioner at Peshawur, saw a fakeer sitting under a tree near his house; arrested him, searched him, and found nothing but a bag with 46 new rupees in it, which the fakeer said he had just got by begging in the lines of the 24th Native Infantry. A strong suspicion had, however, possessed Mr. Wakefield's mind, and he searched the man a second time, when a small bag, or "housewife," was detected in the hollow of his armpit, of which the ostensible purpose was to carry antimony for the eyes, but on careful examination it was found to contain a small Persian note, of which the following is a translation:—"My beloved Moollah, salam, salutation to you! After salutation and good wishes, this is the point, that instantly on receiving this, on the second day of the festival of the Eed, you must—yes, must—come here; and, if it be easy, bring a few pounds of fruit with you. Now is the time; admit no fear into your heart; such an opportunity will not again occur. Set out, I enjoin you.

Paper found by Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant Commissioner, on the person of a fakeer at Peshawar.

"Fakeer Moollah, Naieem."

¹ This distinguished regiment maintained its good behaviour throughout the crisis, though, of course, it was an object of suspicion.

² This is farther confirmed by Mahomedan correspondence; for a rabid letter from a "Kuleefa Nathoo" at Thaneysur to friends in Swat, through a Naik of 64th Native Infantry, says, "On all four sides there is disturbance, and on account of the cartridges the whole of the native army as far as Lahore have become disaffected.

The names of the writer and of the addressee were probably false names, adopted for secret correspondence. The fakeer declared that the paper was an old one which he had picked up accidentally a long while ago and kept to wrap up snuff. But there was no sign of either age or snuff in it, and the festival of the "Eed" alluded to was to fall on the 25th and 26th instant; and already the rumour was abroad that on that religious occasion the Mahomedans of the city and valley were to rise and help the sepoy. The fakeer admitted that he was a frequenter of the sepoy lines; and though sepoys do give cowries and pice to beggars freely enough, they do not give 46 bright new rupees for nothing, neither do fakeers¹ conceal to the last, under their armpit, a housewife with nothing in it but antimony and snuff. There was no doubt, therefore, on Colonel Nicholson's mind that this letter was from Mahomedan conspirators in the garrison to Mahomedan conspirators at the outposts, inviting them to come in with a few English officers' heads, and join in a rising on the 26th May.

Failure of
Colonel
Nicholson to
raise levies in
the Pesháwar
District.

44. Warned by these discoveries and by secret information from both the city and cantonment, Colonel Nicholson had endeavoured to raise levies through the most promising of the chiefs of the district to help the European soldiers in the struggle that was coming. But the time had passed, a great danger impended over the cantonment, a profound sensation had been made by the startling fact that we had lost Delhi. Men remembered Cabul.² Not 100 could be found to join such a desperate cause.

Levies obtained from
Kohát.

45. Finding things in this state, I wrote express to Captain Henderson at Kohat for any trusty levies he could send from thence; but to be of any use they must come next morning. He at once despatched about 100 men under

¹ This man, on whom the letter was found, was subsequently tried by a commission and hanged.

² The ex-Vizier of Shah Shoojah is a pensioner at Peshawur and a man of considerable ability. When Colonel Nicholson consulted him, he said plainly, "This is a crisis in which you will have to rely upon yourselves." It was true, almost prophetic, but not encouraging. Happily Colonel Nicholson was one of those men who require to be alarmed.

Bahadur Shere Khan (the head of the Bungush tribe), who travelled all night and gathered about 50 Afreedee volunteers as he came through the Kohat Pass—a strange resource truly.

46. The train of mutiny had, however, already been fired. Early on the morning of the 21st May, Futteh Khan, Khuttuck (who, with a hasty levy, had been posted at the Attock ferry) gave information to Major Vaughan in the Attock Fort that a detachment of 55th Native Infantry, which was on duty at the ferry, was in a highly mutinous state and ought to be disarmed. They were, indeed, soon observed to be in motion, leaving their post. Lieutenant Lind, second in command, 5th Punjab Infantry (Major Vaughan's corps), quickly went across the river with a small party of his own men, halted them, and advanced alone to recall the Soobadar of the 55th Native Infantry to his duty. The Soobadar¹ warned him off, called on his men to load if they had not yet done so, and the men fixed bayonets and prepared to charge. Lieutenant Lind then called to his own men to come up, and the 55th detachment marched away towards Nowshera. As they went they were joined by another detachment of 24th Regiment, Native Infantry, which was escorting commissariat stores to Peshawur; and leaving the stores to take care of themselves, the two bands of mutineers, between 40 and 50 in number, pushed on together for the cantonment of Nowshera. Lieutenant Lind pursued them for several miles, but only succeeded in capturing one straggler. He, therefore, with great forethought, got a horseman to ride across country and inform the Commanding Officer at Nowshera of the approach of the mutineers. Major Verner at once went out on the Attock road with a party of 10th Irregular Cavalry, met the mutineers at the entrance of the cantonment, and disarmed

Mutiny of detachments of 55th Native Infantry at Attock and Nowshera.

¹ This Soobadar was named Sewdeen Dooby, and it has been ascertained that he was in close correspondence with Jewrakhun Dooby, a ringleader of the 3rd Cavalry at Meerut, from whom he had no doubt heard of the events at Meerut and Delhi, and had in consequence arranged to light a corresponding flame in the Peshawur garrison. The 55th Native Infantry and 3rd Cavalry had been stationed together at Meerut from 1845 to 1846, and at Nowgong from 1850 to 1852, so that the men of the two regiments were intimately acquainted.

them. No sooner, however, did some companies of 55th Native Infantry, who were in Nowshera, see their comrades brought in as prisoners, than they broke out, and fired on the sowars, who forthwith dispersed. The mutineers, now largely reinforced, proceeded to break open the regimental magazine, and having supplied themselves with ammunition, rushed to the bridge-of-boats to cross the Caubul river, and join the main body of the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan, 12 miles north of Nowshera. The bridge, however, had already been broken up by that energetic and able engineer officer, Lieutenant F. S. Taylor, who had also dispersed the boatmen, so that the boats might be useless. The sepoys, about 200 in number, endeavoured for some time to repair the bridge, and failing in that, flung themselves into the boats, and pushed off into the stream. Some were drowned, but the majority got safe to the other bank. The sowars of the 10th Irregular Cavalry did not join the mutineers, but they did not act against them.

47. Colonel Nicholson was living with me at Peshawur, and we had laid down to sleep in our clothes in a conviction that the night could not pass over quietly. At midnight the news of what had occurred at Nowshera reached us ;¹ and a most anxious council did we hold on it. It was probable that the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan would already be in open mutiny and in possession of the fort. But to send a reliable force against them from Peshawur would only have been to give the native regiments a preponderance in the cantonment. Again, the news from Nowshera must soon reach the sepoys in Peshawur and probably be the signal for a rise. The advantage, therefore, must be with whoever took the initiative ; and we resolved at once to go to the General and advise the disarming of the native garrison at daylight.

Proposal of
Colonels Ni-
cholson and
Edwardes to
disarm the
native garri-
son of Peshá-
war.

48. Well was it for the State that General Sydney Cotton, not General Hewitt, then commanded at Peshawur. General Cotton thoroughly understood the danger

¹ The distance is only 24 miles, but everybody at Nowshera had probably been too busy for some hours to think of writing.

which the proposition involved. Hitherto a large garrison of Hindoostanee troops had been deemed necessary to occupy the Afghan Valley. It was now proposed to reverse matters: to disarm the majority of the troops and call in the people and the mountaineers instead, this too when our prestige was gone. But it was the least of evils, and the General chose it with characteristic promptitude. All the Commanding Officers of corps were summoned. Day dawned before they were collected at the Residency, and for two hours the Commandants of the condemned regiments protested against the measure. It was impossible not to sympathise with the soldierly feelings of Colonel Harrington and Major Shakespear, but when Colonel Plumbe declared his "implicit confidence" in the 27th Native Infantry to be unshaken by events in Hindoostan and had nothing to recommend but conciliation, while the Colonel¹ of the 51st Native Infantry, on the other hand, predicted that his men "would attack the guns if called on to give up their muskets," hesitation was at an end. General Cotton announced his determination to disarm the four most doubtful regiments, and ordered them to parade each on its own ground at 7 A. M. for that purpose (already it was past six).

Concurrence
of Brigadier
Cotton and
protestations
of Command-
ing Officers.

49. The events of the next hour were to decide the fate of Peshawur during this war, and those who best knew the disaffection of the sepoys and had been most convinced of the necessity for disarming them felt most anxiety as to the issue. The corps to be disarmed were—

Disarming of
a portion of
the Native
garrison of
Peshawar.

5th Light Cavalry.

24th }
27th } Regiments, Native Infantry.
51st }

There was one other regiment of Native Infantry in the cantonment (the 21st Native Infantry) and two regiments of Irregular Cavalry (7th and 18th), but it was absolutely indispensable to keep one Native Infantry corps to carry on the duties of the station. So the 21st was selected for two

¹ Since dead, from exertion and exposure to the sun in quelling the ultimate outbreak of his corps.

Disarming of
a portion of
the Native
garrison of
Peshawar.

reasons : partly because it was the senior Native Infantry regiment, but chiefly because all accounts agreed that it had in that capacity hitherto declined to set a mutinous example. The two irregular corps of Cavalry were spared, partly from the natural desire to keep them if possible, partly because at that early period of the mutiny there was some hope that as a body the Irregular Cavalry would at least be kept quiet by its stake in the service, partly because the 7th, which was the most doubtful, was commanded by a firm and vigilant officer (Colonel Mulcaster), who was not infected with the disease of " implicit confidence ", and, lastly, because after disarming three regiments of Native Infantry and the regular Cavalry we could at any time coerce the Irregular Cavalry if necessary. It remained, however, to be seen whether the condemned regiments would submit to be disarmed, and if they resisted whether the three excused regiments would not fraternize with them at once and reduce the struggle to the simple issue between the black and white races.

50. The two European regiments (Her Majesty's 70th and 87th) and the Artillery were got under arms and took up positions at the two ends of the cantonment within sight of the parades, ready to enforce obedience if necessary, yet not so close as to provoke resistance ; Colonel Nicholson joined Brigadier Galloway's staff at one rendezvous and I General Cotton's at the other.

51. These prompt and decided measures took the native troops completely aback. Not an hour had been given them to consult, and isolated from each other no regiment was willing to commit itself ; the whole laid down their arms.

52. As the muskets and sabres of once honoured corps were hurried unceremoniously into carts, it was said that here and there the spurs and swords of English officers fell sympathizingly upon the pile. How little worthy were the men of officers who could thus almost mutiny for their sakes ; and as weeks and months passed on with their fearful tale of revelations there were few of those officers who did not learn, and with equal generosity acknowledge, that the disarming had been both wise and just.

53. For the results of this measure we had not long to wait. As we rode down to the disarming a very few Chiefs and yeomen of the country attended us, and I remember, judging from their faces, that they came to see which way the tide would turn. As we rode back friends were as thick as summer flies, and levies began from that moment to come in.

Effect of
measure on
Chiefs.

54. That night about 250 sepoy of the 51st Native Infantry deserted and fled in every direction. They were promptly seized by the people of the district and the police, and, extraordinary to say, were brought in alive, though loaded with money, the savings of their pay. The ringleader, the Soobadar-Major¹ of the regiment, had about 800 rupees upon his person, every rupee of which was brought in.

Desertion of
some sepoy
of 51st Native
Infantry and
their arrest.

55. As an instance of the obstinate infatuation of the older Commandants of the native troops at this juncture, I may mention that the Colonel of the 51st Native Infantry when called on to draw up the "charge" for the trial of these deserters, simply charged them with "being absent without leave," though General Cotton soon changed it to the plain English of "desertion."² The Soobadar-Major was hanged before the whole garrison on parade, and was the first mutineer executed at Peshawur.

Execution of
Subedar-
Major.

56. When the mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry at Nowshera broke across the river, on 21st May, to join the main body of their regiment at Murdan, we in Peshawur from that moment considered the whole regiment practically in revolt and the fort of Murdan as in the hands of an enemy; and one reason for disarming the Peshawur Native Garrison on the 22nd was to be free to march against the 55th Native Infantry. Accordingly, as soon as the disarming was accomplished a force was organized to start that evening. But rumours came in that the 64th Native Infantry was marching

Proposed
despatch of
a force to
Mardán.

¹ This man wrote one portion of the letter of the 64th Native Infantry, which has been given in para. 41.

² On the former charge, simple imprisonment or dismissal would be awardable; on the latter, imprisonment with hard labour, transportation, or death.

on Peshawur, and it was deemed best to wait till we could see how that corps and the Kelat-i-Ghilzies had taken the disarming of their comrades. All that was done, therefore, on the 22nd was to bring Major Vaughan's regiment (5th Punjab Infantry) from Attock to Nowshera, to protect the families of Her Majesty's 27th Regiment against any return of the mutineers from Murdan or any outbreak of the 10th Irregular Cavalry.

Disaffection
at Mardán:
escape of
Lieutenant
Horne, Assist-
ant Commis-
sioner.

57. On the 23rd May the Officer Commanding the latter regiment at Nowshera reported that the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan were in a state of mutiny. The Colonel of the 55th at Murdan reported much the same of the 10th Irregular Cavalry (of which he had a detachment). Each lamented the sad effect of such neighbours on the corps he commanded. Lieutenant Horne, the civil officer at Murdan, an unprejudiced party, arbitrated between the two, and escaping from the fort took refuge with the Chiefs of Eusoofzye, for the sufficient reasons that the sepoys of the 55th had threatened to murder their own officers and the men of the 10th Irregular Cavalry proposed "roasting Lieutenant Horne."¹

Confidence of
the Colonel of
the 55th Na-
tive Infantry
in his regi-
ment.

58. It seems almost incredible, but the Colonel of the 55th Native Infantry (a devoted soldier who lived for his regiment) reported to General Cotton that he had implicit confidence in his men, whom he considered to be only acting under a "panic."² He begged earnestly that no force might be moved against them from Peshawur; and he declined an offer secretly made to him by about 200 Sikh recruits to fight the rest of the regiment if the Colonel would only separate them from the Poorbeahs and give them arms.

Despatch of
force to Mar-
dán.

59. But the do-nothing policy was not for General Cotton. In the course of the 22nd and morning of 23rd it was seen that all was quiet at the other outposts; and at 11 o'clock at night of 23rd a force of 300 European Infantry, 250 Irregular Cavalry, horse levies and police, and eight guns

¹ The duffadar who was spokesman on this occasion was shot by order of a drum-head court-martial on the morning of the 26th May.

² At this very moment his men were arranging to join the 64th Native Infantry at Abazye and then march on Peshawur and raise the garrison.

(of which six were howitzers) left Peshawur under command of Colonel Chute of Her Majesty's 70th, accompanied by Colonel Nicholson as Political Officer, and neared Murdan about sunrise of 25th after effecting a junction with Major Vaughan and 200 Punjab Infantry from Nowshera.

60. No sooner did this force appear in the distance than the 55th Native Infantry, with the exception of about 120 men,¹ broke from the fort and fled, as Colonel Chute well described it, "tumultuously" towards the hills of Swat.

Flight of 55th
Native In-
fantry.

61. Then followed a pursuit, which to look back on is to renew all sorrow for the dear-bought victory of "Delhi." Chase was given with both Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry, but the mutineers had got far ahead, and bad ground so checked the guns that they never got within range. Colonel Nicholson with a handful of horsemen² hurled himself like a thunderbolt on the route of a thousand mutineers. Even he (in a private note to me, for he seldom reported officially anything he did himself) admitted that the "55th fought determinately as men always do who have no chance of escape but by their own exertions." They broke before his charge and scattered over the country in sections and in companies. They were hunted out of villages and grappled with in ravines, and driven over ridges all that day from Fort Murdan to the border of Swat, and found respite only in the failing light. 120 dead bodies were numbered on their line of flight, and thrice that number must have borne off wounds; 150 were taken prisoners, and the regimental colours and 200 stand of arms recovered. Colonel Nicholson himself was 20 hours in the saddle, and, under a burning sun, could

Pursuit by
Colonel
Nicholson and
destruction of
mutineers.

¹ At first it was supposed that these men were loyal, but the European officers had stopped them as they were following their comrades, and by threats and persuasions divided them from the rest.

² I speak here of his own police sowars. There were some irregular Cavalry, but they only pretended to act. Captain Law, who commanded a party of 10th Irregular Cavalry, got wounded in setting a vain example to his men, one of whom treacherously fired into the 5th Punjab Infantry and was instantly killed. The 5th, under Major Vaughan, followed as close as Infantry could do, and showed an admirable spirit throughout the day.

not have traversed less than 70 miles: his own sword brought many a traitor to the dust.

62. The people of the border valley of Loond Khor favoured rather than opposed the fugitives, and upwards of 600 made good their flight into Swat.

Suicide of the
Colonel of the
55th Native
Infantry.

63. The Colonel of the 55th Native Infantry, unable to endure the disgrace of the corps he had so loved and trusted, committed suicide. Never, perhaps, had any mercenary troops in the world foreign leaders who so thoroughly identified themselves with their men as the English officers of the Bengal Army, and never was generous confidence more diabolically abused than theirs.

Intrigues
between
Native troops
and Hindu-
stani fanatics
in Swat.

64. It appeared afterwards that there had long been intrigues going on between the 55th and 64th Native Infantry and the 10th Irregular Cavalry and the Hindoostanee fanatics in Swat and the neighbouring hills, and that two Hindoostanee moulvies in the collectorate of Murdan were the hosts of the emissaries who passed to and fro. They both fled the night before the force came from Peshawur, but one was caught months afterwards and hanged.

Arrival of
Ajun Khan
at Prangar
and measures
adopted.

65. And now another cloud seemed gathering on the frontier. The noted outlaw, Ajoon Khan, came down to Prangar, invited, as it was believed, by our Hindoostanee troops¹ in the fort of Abazye at the head of the Swat river. His native home and former lands lay close to Abazye, and had he been joined by the 500 armed fugitives of the 55th Native Infantry, boldly come down to Abazye, and got the fort betrayed to him by the garrison the whole frontier would have been in a flame. Nothing seemed more likely. But the danger was promptly met. The force with Colonels Chute and Nicholson was nearly doubled from Peshawur, and moved rapidly to cover the threatened outposts; and both the Hindoostanee troops and the frontier tribes saw that, after disarming four regiments and routing

¹ These troops were detachments of 64th Native Infantry, Kelat-i-Ghilzies, and 10th Irregular Cavalry, but our information was to the effect that the Ghilzies were not concerned in this conspiracy.

another, we still had a moveable column in the field and were standing in an eminently aggressive attitude, challenging any one to move. Ajoon Khan withdrew into the hills, and our little force encamped upon the border till Delhi should be regained.

66. Delhi was, however, not to be recovered by a *coup de main*. The Hindoo sepoys having mutinied about a cartridge had nothing to propose for an empire, and fell in of necessity with the only policy that was feasible at the moment, a Mahomedan King of Delhi: and certainly no other policy could have given such life to the coming struggle. Hitherto the question had been purely domestic between the English and their Hindoostanee army,—a quarrel in which the Afghan tribes would merely desire to be on the conquering side. But a war between the Moslem and the Christian for empire must needs agitate every village in which there was a mosque and a moollah; and the city of Peshawur in particular, with its 60,000 inhabitants, had always been a hotbed of intrigue. Humanly speaking, I consider that the border at this critical period was mainly kept under by the levying of a militia. Afghans are fanatical, but avarice is their ruling passion. Every idle vagrant, every professional robber, every truculent student in the mosques at whose finger-ends fanaticism was beginning to tingle found a market for his sword. The population of the Peshawur Valley had never been disarmed. Being liable to raids from their neighbours, they had been allowed to keep arms in their houses; though none but outside villagers might wear arms abroad. It was not difficult therefore to collect any number of armed footmen at a short notice. Good horses are not plentiful in this irrigated country, but the headmen of every village have two or three hacks, and the enlistment of their farm servants on these ribs attached all the hamlets, one by one, to our cause, and got up quite a hearty feeling such as certainly I never saw before among them. One can smile now at the scenes that took place morning and evening at the hours of enlistment. It was necessary to sustain the dignity of the Imperial Government even in our distress.

Attitude of
people and en-
listment of
horsemen.

Long before the time crowds of candidates for employment thronged the gateways and overflowed into the garden, the jockeys of unconquerably vicious horses endeavouring to reduce them to a show of docility by galloping them furiously about till the critical moment of inspection came. At last sick at heart from the receipt of a bad telegram from the provinces, but endeavouring to look happy, out I used to go and face some hundreds of the chiefs and yeomen of the country, all eager to gather from the Commissioner Sahib's countenance how the "King of Delhi" was getting on. Then the first horseman would be brought up. The beast perhaps would not move. The rider, the owner, and all the neighbours would assail him with whips, sticks, stones, and Pushtoo reproaches that might have moved a rock, but nothing would do till the attempt was given up and the brute's head turned the other way, when he went off at a gallop amid roars of laughter from the Pathans who have the keenest perception of both fun and vice. No. 2 would make a shift to come up, but every man and boy in the crowd could see that he was lame on two or three legs. Then the argument began, and leg by leg, blemish by blemish, the animal was proved by a multitude of witnesses (who had known him for very many years) to be perfectly sound: and so the enlistment went on from day to day, affording immense occupation, profit and amusement to the people and answering a great many good ends. Now and then an orderly of the Hindoostanee Irregular Cavalry, admirably armed and mounted, would pass the spot and mark his opinion of the "levies" by a contemptuous smile. But, nevertheless, he told his comrades in the lines that the country-people were all with the English, and it was of no use to desert or to intrigue.

Proclamation
regarding de-
serters.

67. About this time, too, I issued a proclamation that any deserter might be killed wherever found in the district and the property on his person be appropriated by the captor. About 40 or 50 sepoys were killed in consequence in making for the Indus, and this destroyed all confidence between the soldiery and the people.

68. As an instance of the strange things that happened in those days, I may mention that one morning 300 Afreedies of the Mullikdeen Kheyl tribe (who were in disgrace and under blockade) marched from the hills into cantonments, armed to the teeth, and said they had come to fight for us and be forgiven. I accepted them at once, and they now form the nucleus of one of the new Punjab regiments. (They were the men who repulsed the first assault of the 51st Native Infantry when it rose.)

Enrolment of
Afridis of the
Malikdin
Kheyl tribe.

69. Now, too, our old friends, the Mooltanee Pathans, began to arrive from the Derajat to help us through a second crisis, and their example did a world of good. At first the moollahs abused them for coming to the aid of infidels, but it was soon seen that the Mooltanees were rigid Mussulmans who never missed a prayer, and many of whom rode with the Koran at their saddle-bow, yet they announced that they came to fight for friends who had used them well ; and most of the officers had a tale to tell of what they had got for their services in the last campaign, a pension or a garden, or perhaps even that climax of good things, a bit of land in perpetuity : and what Peshawuree had not heard that Foujdar Khan, the present British Vakeel at Cabul, was one of these very Mooltanees ; that he began the war of 1848 as a Jemadar of 24 sowars, and is now a real Nawab and the ambassador of a State? It is impossible indeed to overrate the good influence that was exercised in the district by the marked loyalty of the Mooltanees. They have set a fashion which the Peshawurees have followed as well as double-minded men can copy a simpler race, and I hope that the feeling will not altogether die away.

Arrival of
levies of Mool-
tani Pathans
and the effect
produced.

70. While Colonel Nicholson's activity in the field and the enlistment of levies were thus keeping the district quiet, General Cotton was day by day getting the mastery over his mutinous sepoy garrison by a stern unswerving maintenance of discipline. On 29th May the Subadar-Major of the 51st Native Infantry (alluded to in para. 55) was hanged in presence of the troops. The whole garrison was made to stand and see their ringleader executed with ignominy. It

Maintenance
of discipline
by General
Cotton.

was said that they would not come out of their lines, but had they refused, or had there been a move among them on the parade, the General had prepared everything to put them to the bayonet; the scoundrels felt it, and stood like statues.

Loyalty of
Kelat-i-Ghil-
zai Regiment.

71. On the 30th May a single sepoy of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie regiment broke out into frantic mutiny and rushed to the magazine; he was instantly shot down by his comrades, and the incident deserves to be recorded to the honour of the regiment and the officers¹ who held it in that state of good feeling and discipline.

72. On the 3rd June 12 of the 51st deserters were hanged before the paraded garrison.

Disarming of
detachments
of 64th Native
Infantry.

73. On the same morning one detachment of the 64th Native Infantry at Abazye was disarmed by the force with Colonel Chute and Colonel Nicholson, and another detachment of 64th at Shubkuddur was disarmed by a party under Major Brougham of the Mountain Train, who next day went on to Michnee and disarmed the rest of that disaffected corps. It was hopeless for the 64th Native Infantry to resist this measure, because at each of the three outposts they were placed between the loyal Kelat-i-Ghilzies and the disarming force.

Staunchness
of Kelat-i-
Ghilzai Regi-
ment.

74. So marked was the staunchness of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment that General Cotton published a division order on the 3rd June specially exempting them from being disarmed, as in no instance had a breath of suspicion as to the fidelity of that corps been entertained.

Measures of
military re-
organisation
adopted by
General Cot-
ton.

75. And here I will turn to measures of another kind, not of repression, but of military reorganization, which were originated at this early period. The eventful month of May had not elapsed before General Cotton had begun to make the most of his reliable material. He began by drawing volunteers from the Queen's Infantry regiments and mounting and arming them with horses and arms taken from the 5th Light Cavalry, thus securing an escort for his Artillery, which could be relied on in the worst emergencies. The design was subse-

¹ Captain F. Mundy and Lieutenant G. E. Rowcroft.

quently improved by an entirely new idea, and one which may yet be found extensively useful in reorganizing an army for India, *viz.*, the association of native with European soldiers in the same corps in a proportion sufficient to be useful and moderate enough to be safe. To two European troops General Cotton gave one native troop of selected men from the 5th Light Cavalry; the natives relieve the Europeans of many a harassing duty and thus leave a maximum of Europeans for actual service. By working continually with the Europeans the natives acquire a degree of *esprit de corps*, and the system is a step towards bringing the two races together in daily life and ignoring caste. For this reason it is less likely to be popular with the Hindoo than the Mahomedan soldiers. The Patans, whose manners at least are open and frank, take to the idea readily; and should the future native army be organized on the system of the Punjab irregular force, the success of which entirely depends on the selection of officers (which selection will have then to be made from the officers of the European regiments), it would seem almost indispensable to have some plan such as this of the Peshawur Light Horse for bringing officers to a knowledge of native soldiers and eliciting an aptitude to command them.

76. On the 4th June another excellent idea was telegraphed by Sir John Lawrence to General Cotton, *viz.*, to pick out all Sikhs and other Punjabees from the Hindoostanee regiments of the line (where they were lost among a crowd of rebels) and form them into a separate corps. General Cotton acted on it at once, and a fine regiment was thus raised by Captain Cave, which took its part in all subsequent operations.

Formation of
Sikhs and
Punjabis
in Hindustani
regiments into
a separate
corps.

77. On 5th June General Cotton projected a new European battery of Artillery of 9-pounder guns lying in the magazine to be manned and driven by more volunteers from the Queen's Infantry regiments and horsed by the horses taken from the 5th Light Cavalry. This was entrusted to Captain Stallard (*sic*) of the Artillery, and in three months, notwithstanding the hot weather, the battery was perfectly efficient,—a result which could only have been obtained by extraordinary exertions on the part of both officers and men.

Formation of
a new Euro-
pean battery
of Artillery.

78. The measure was extended with the same happy result to Captain Cox's troop of Native Horse Artillery, the native Artillerymen being replaced with European Volunteers.

79. It is true that these measures diminished the strength of the European Infantry regiments, but it does not require much reflection to decide that they strengthened the garrison a hundred-fold, and it is in this economy and mastery of resources that an able General is discovered.

Establishment
of a depôt for
Afghan re-
cruits.

80. I believe it was some time in May that the Chief Commissioner ordered every Commandant of the Punjab Irregular Infantry regiments to raise four additional companies, but there was only one such regiment in the Peshawur Valley, and on 6th June I obtained authority to establish a separate depôt at Peshawur for Affghan recruits, which soon after was embodied as the 18th Regiment of Punjab Infantry, commanded by Captain Bartlett.

Raising of
three irreg-
ular regiments
in the Peshá-
war Valley.

81. Indeed, the necessity of raising a new native army in the Punjab, with which to replace the Bengal regiments that were rebelling at station after station and eke out the forces available for the siege of Delhi, soon became self-evident, and Sir John Lawrence set himself vigorously to the work in every part of his province. Thus in the Peshawur Valley three more irregular regiments were raised—the 8th by Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, the 9th by Captain Thelwal,¹ and the 14th by Major Shakespear.

82. These four new Punjab corps are still in the valley, and during the late cold season have been worked up by General Cotton to a high state of efficiency; so that it may be truly said that, what with new Artillery, new Cavalry and Infantry and levies of border horsemen, the Peshawur division not only passed through this great Mutiny without disaster, but moulted a bad garrison and replumed itself with a better.

83. Before quitting the subject of new organizations which grew out of the Mutiny, I ought here to mention the "Land Transport Train," though it was not matured till the middle of July. In a crisis caused by the native troops of course the main reliance of Government was on the European

¹ This corps was begun at Kohat and completed at Peshawur.

soldiers, and no expedition of any importance could be undertaken without them. It became therefore a great object to move them in the hot season with the least possible fatigue; and during the earlier months of the Mutiny General Cotton transported his Europeans from point to point on elephants and in the small carts of the Engineer department, but both these means of conveyance were found troublesome and fatiguing to the men. This led to the construction of the "Land Transport Train" out of material that was at hand. A number of spare ammunition waggons were fitted up by Lieutenant R. H. Brownlow, Deputy Commissary of Ordnance, so that 16 men could ride in each waggon and their arms be stowed away in the lockers on which they sat. The waggons were to be drawn by relays of commissariat bullocks at regular stages along the road, and it was found that, if necessary, the train could thus accomplish 40 miles in one night. The trial trip was made in the cantonment on 14th July by General Cotton, with 15 ladies and gentlemen as passengers, the waggon being ornamented with evergreens and drawn (for this occasion only) by six Artillery horses which were ridden by six Staff Officers. The experiment created much amusement in very gloomy times, and having been pronounced perfectly successful, the train was regularly organized the very next day and proved of invaluable service when continual sickness set in with more than its usual virulence. The European soldiery viewed this thoughtful effort in their behalf with gratitude. It literally opened a way to them to get out of this fatal valley when prostrated by fever; and though many fine fellows fell victims to the disease, there is no question that many were rescued from death by being removed to Rawulpindee in the "Land Transport Train."

Establishment
of a "Land
Transport
Train."

84. I return now to the narrative of events. It is well known to you that in the first years of our rule in this valley the border was chiefly disturbed by the hostility of the neighbouring country of Swat. An aged priest called the Akhoond had hitherto been the Pope of that country, but taking the usual Asiatic view of the English career in India, that it was one of aggressive designs, he expected us to annex Swat as

Affairs in
Swat.

soon as we had settled at Peshawur. He therefore advised the Swatees to create one Syud Ukbur King of Swat and pay him a tithe of their crops to enable him to keep up soldiers for their defence. This was accordingly done, and the King, to justify his own existence, made himself as bad a neighbour to the English as he could do without actually drawing down an expedition on his head.

Arrival of
fugitive se-
poys of 55th
Native Infan-
try in Swat.

85. It might naturally have been expected therefore that this Padshah of Swat would be at the head of all mischief when the troubles of 1857 overtook us. It is a remarkable fact, however, that he died on 11th May, the very day that the first news of the mutiny reached Peshawur, so that Swat itself was simultaneously plunged into civil war and entirely pre-occupied with its own affairs. The question was as to the succession: king or no king? Syud Mobaruk Shah, son of the deceased Syud Ukbur, wished to succeed his father, but the Swatees had grown tired of tithes and called on the Akhoond to excommunicate the heir-apparent; both sides called in their friends and allies and prepared to settle it by arms. It was at this juncture that 500 of the fugitive sepoys of the 55th Native Infantry who had escaped from Colonel Nicholson's pursuit burst upon the scene. They were at once taken into the young King's service, but after fighting one battle demanded pay. The King not being in funds borrowed 100 rupees from the leader of the sepoys (a grey-haired Jemadar), and distributed them among the mutineers, but when this supply was exhausted the full extent of their folly and misery seems to have struck the hoary ringleader, for he blew out his own brains. The Swatees tied a stone to his body and flung it into the river, which perhaps before many days may have carried it down through that cantonment of Nowshera where the 55th Native Infantry had month after month drawn the high pay of the most indulgent Government in the world for doing little but pipeclay belts and varnish cartridge boxes.

Action of the
Akhoond
which ensures
the peace of
the frontier.

86. Had the Akhoond of Swat at this time, standing forward as the champion of the faith, preached a crescentade against us, and hushing intestine strife moved across the passes and descended into the Peshawur Valley, with all the

prestige of the 55th Sepoys in his favour, I do not doubt that he would have excited among our subjects that spirit of religious zeal which may be overlaid for a while, but never extinguished by material prosperity. Instead of this he suddenly sided with the popular party, dismissed the 55th Sepoys with guides to conduct them across the Indus and expelled the young King from Swat.

87. This conclusion assured the peace of our northern frontier, and Colonel Nicholson with Colonel Chute's Moveable Column returned to cantonments in the second week of June.

88. But we were soon to lose him. The death of Colonel Chester at Delhi called Brigadier-General Neville Chamberlain to the high post of Adjutant-General, and Colonel Nicholson was instinctively selected to take command of the Punjab Moveable Column with the rank of Brigadier-General.

Selection of
Colonel
Nicholson to
command the
Moveable
Column.

89. How common sense revenges itself upon defective systems when real dangers assail a State ! Had there been no struggle for life or death when would Neville Chamberlain and John Nicholson, in the prime of their lives, with all their faculties of doing and enduring, have attained the rank of Brigadier-General ? Why should we keep down in peace the men who must be put up in war ?

90. Captain James, the Chief Commissioner's Secretary, now took General Nicholson's place in the Peshawur district, of which he had previously had charge for several years. A stranger would indeed have been useless at this crisis when success depended on local knowledge and personal influence.

Appointment
of Captain
H. James as
Deputy Com-
missioner of
Peshawar.

91. After the break-up of Colonel Chute's column the fort of Murdan was garrisoned by head-quarters of Major Vaughan's regiment (5th Punjab Infantry) and the Nowshera cantonment by the 4th Punjab Infantry commanded by Captain Wilde, both ready to move to the Swat frontier should it be again disturbed.

Garrisons of
Mardán and
Nowshera.

Raising of a
corps of Maz-
bis.

92. On the 19th June I advocated, in the search for new military classes, the raising of a corps of Muzzubees,¹ of whom many hundreds were working on the canals of the Punjab. The idea was ultimately carried out and improved by making them pioneers.

Precautionary
measures at
Peshāwar.

93. About this time, and indeed frequently throughout the crisis, rumours were rife of a rising in the Peshawur city; and on 22nd June the military arrangements on the city side of the cantonment were greatly improved by the establishment of a strong picket in the houses of the late Colonel Mackeson and Colonel Phillips.

94. I may here say that the mischief to be feared from the citizens of Peshawur is more of the pen and the tongue than of the sword, though the town is full of a rabble who would plunder and stab freely in the rear of a disaster.

Dismissal of
the 10th Irreg-
ular Cavalry.

95. On 26th June General Cotton brought the 10th Irregular Cavalry to account for their repeated instances of disaffection. Part of the regiment was in Peshawur and part in Nowshera. Both were simultaneously dealt with: their arms, horses and property were taken from them² and confiscated, and the whole of the men were hurried down to Attock, where they were dismissed with two rupees each, just enough to carry them to their homes. It was a sight indeed to see these traitors brought from their saddles to their feet and told to walk to their own provinces or starve. Their countenances when stripped and searched in a masterly manner by a company of 3rd Punjab Infantry I never shall forget.

Indebtedness
of the corps.

96. The winding up of the accounts of this regiment afforded a lesson. The corps was 60,000 rupees in debt to its bankers; and all the horses and arms and property and arrears of pay did little more than clear the account. To give a banker to a native regiment is to invite two-thirds of the men to run in debt; and a corps that is in debt can never be really in sound discipline or serviceable condition. It would be far better for Government to advance to needy recruits the price of

¹ Sweepers who become Sikhs.

² In pity to the women and children a baggage pony was left with every family.

their horse and equipments and recover it by instalments. The pay of Irregular Cavalry has wisely been raised from 20 to 25 rupees, but this will be of little use if money-lenders are allowed to eat it up.

97. In the beginning of July General Cotton not only deprived all the disarmed regiments of their extra batta, but put them on subsistence allowance to their great disgust.

98. Two of the frontier outposts, Forts Mackeson and Barra, were garrisoned at the outbreak of the Mutiny by detachments from the 24th Native Infantry. Barra, being only six miles from cantonments, was promptly dealt with. The sepoys were withdrawn and disarmed and a garrison of my Mooltanee levies was thrown in, but Fort Mackeson was allowed to stand over till we were more at leisure. It was soon reported to me that the sepoys in this outpost were brewing all kinds of plans. At first they ventured to think of marching by night on the cantonment of Peshawur and raising the other troops; but they finally turned their attention to escaping from the valley, and offered 3,000 rupees to the Afreedees of Boree, to pilot them through the hills to some ferry of the Indus. These overtures were readily entertained by the worst characters of Boree; but were disapproved of by the elders of the tribe, who reported them to Captain Henderson at Kohat. It was highly probable that had the garrison trusted themselves to the Afreedees they would have been all robbed and murdered, but it was possible also that the Afreedees might keep faith and a dangerous example be set. General Cotton decided to take the initiative and disarm them, and the duty was entrusted to me. I had Mooltanee levies coming at the time from the Derajat to Peshawur and a detachment of the 3rd and 6th Punjab Infantry returning from Peshawur to Kohat. By a simple arrangement these two parties were made to meet near Fort Mackeson on 6th July, so that it was only necessary to slip out of Peshawur cantonment at night with two of Major Brougham's mountain guns and an escort of horse and join them. Before dawn on 7th we had surrounded the fort and placed the guns in position. The sepoys were

Disarming of
the Sepoy
guard of Fort
Mackeson
and execution
of a Havildar.

entirely surprised, and at the summons of their Commanding Officer, Major Shakespear, who was of our party, came out and laid down their arms. One of their number, a havildar from Oudh, was absent, and in the course of the day was brought in to us from the hills where he had gone to arrange matters for his comrades. And on examining the men's pouches 230 rounds of ball ammunition were missing, doubtless having been given to the Afreedees in the course of the negotiations.

99. A Mooltanee garrison was then left in Fort Mackeson.

100. The Oudh havildar was tried, convicted and blown from a gun.

Attempt of
Afridis of
Sipah tribe
to tamper
with the 18th
Irregular
Cavalry.

101. Scarcely had this little affair been disposed of than (on 9th July) two Afreedees of the Sipah tribe entered the lines of the 18th Irregular Cavalry and presented to the Hindoostanee Sowars a letter from Mullik Surajoodeen, the head of their tribe and one of the most powerful men in the Khyber. The letter offered an asylum in the writer's hills to any "blackmen,"¹ either of the Cavalry or Infantry, who chose to mutiny and come to him; and it artfully hinted that he had authority from Cabul for giving this invitation. Strange to say, the men of the 18th Irregular Cavalry at once took the emissaries and the letter to their Commanding Officer, Major Ryves, an act of loyalty for which two or three of them were promoted. The whole affair was so mysterious that instead of hanging the emissaries I put them in prison, and sent to ask the Sipah chief if he had written the letter. He at once acknowledged it and said: "if the blackmen had come he meant to give them up." At my invitation he came down to see me and adhered firmly to this account, and is at this moment doing everything he can to deserve the release of his two messengers. More unaccountable people than these hill men I suppose never were.

102. On the 13th July General Cotton introduced into the regiments of regular Native Infantry the principle of caste

¹ Hindostanees are generally thus described by the Afghan tribes even in written correspondence.

companies which had been a distinctive feature of the Punjab irregular system : while Hindoos of Oudh were mixed up indiscriminately with Mahomedans of Oudh, the Mahomedans could always carry away the Hindoos by superior force of character. By separating the castes and religions a series of class feelings were evoked and an approach made to counteraction. It is also much happier for the men, and the principle should not again be lost sight of. The Poorbeah soldiers have always perfectly comprehended the political action of this principle, and when, after the annexation of the Punjab, Government ordered 200 Sikhs to be enlisted in every regiment of the native army, they wheedled their Colonels into distributing them 20 into each company, by which the intention of Government was quietly neutralized. Some regiments went still further and persuaded their English officers that these Sikhs were "dirty" and "spoilt the appearance of the old Pultun", so that the officers "did not like those Sikhs," and somehow or other the Sikhs were not enlisted. Insurmountable difficulties were found in procuring them : never was any order of Government wiser or worse attended to.

Introduction
of principle
of caste com-
panies by
General
Cotton.

103. In para. 86 I related how Syud Mobaruk Shah, son of the late King of Swat, as well as the mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry had been dismissed by the Swatees and told to seek their fortunes elsewhere. The mass of the fugitive sepoys, with desperate courage, set their faces towards Cashmere. They could not imagine that Maharajah Goolab Singh, who had a foot in each boat in the war of 1848-49, would not in this more awful crisis leap into the argosy of rebellion, and they anticipated a ready asylum at his court if they could only reach it. Major Becher has vividly described in his report their wretched wanderings from glen to glen, mountain to mountain, to starve, drop, die, fight, fall, drown, or hang at last. But there had been a few who shrunk from the perils of that enterprise and accompanied Syud Mobaruk Shah into the valley of Punjtar, which adjoins the Eusufzye side of the valley of Peshawur. Here they found a colony of Hindoo-stanee Mahomedans of the Wahabee sect (headed by a moulvie named Inayut) who in return for lands at a place called

Suppression
of attempt to
raise rebel-
lion on the
border of
Yusafzai.

Mungul Thannah support the Khan of Punjtar in oppressing his own clan. Either this chief (Mokurrub Khan) or the clan used to be constantly calling in our border officers to arbitrate their mutual disputes, and our decisions being generally in favour of the people incurred for us the hatred of the Khan. The present was a good opportunity to vent it, and he determined to light a flame upon our border.

104. He commenced by sending a party of the Hindoostanees and other vagabonds, under his cousin Meer Baz Khan, into our nearest villages, and instigating them to "raise the standard of the Prophet," or, in other words, to refuse to pay their revenue. The news reached Lieutenant Horne, the Assistant Commissioner at Murdan, on 1st July, and by daylight next morning Major Vaughan (then commanding the fort at Murdan) fell upon them with about 400¹ horse and foot and two mountain guns, killed Meer Baz Khan, took prisoner a Rohilla leader named Jan Mahomed Khan, hanged him and Mullik Zureef, the headman of the rebels, burnt two of the villages which had revolted, fired others, and extinguished this spark of mischief. Nothing could have been better than the promptness of this example.

105. Captain James at once repaired to the scene of these disturbances, and by his judgment, courage and intelligence the Eusufzye border was saved at this period from a general rise. The most disastrous tidings came daily from Hindoostan and echoed in still more alarming voices among the hills. Special messengers made their way from Delhi and proclaimed the extinction of the Nazarenes in the Mogul capital. Others came from the Peshawur cantonment and invited the Ghazees to descend and inflame the country. The Ghazees came with the moulvie at their head and planted their standard [embroidered with butchery from the Koran] on the heights of Nowrunjee.

106. This mountain village was so strongly situated that the police scarcely dared to go near it, and it became a

Raising of
standard of
rebellion at
Narinji.

¹ 270 Rifles, 5th Punjab Infantry, 80 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and some Police.

refuge for every evil-doer. Its inhabitants, about 400 in number, welcomed the moulvie with delight. The holy war seemed auspiciously opened with every requisite: a priest, a banner, a fastness, a howling crowd of bigots and several days' provisions. But on the morning of 21st July Captain James surprised them with a force of 800¹ horse and foot and four mountain guns, under command of Major Vaughan, and put them to a disastrous flight, which the moulvie headed so precipitately that his mystic banner remained in the hands of the infidels. No less than 50 or 60 of the Ghazees were slain, and the lower village of Nowrunjee was destroyed.

Operations
against reb-
els, their
defeat and
the destruc-
tion of Na-
rinji.

107. The weather was fearfully hot and the troops were too exhausted to destroy Upper Nowrunjee. In a few days the moulvie returned with a larger band than ever from Boneyr and Punjtar and reoccupied the position.

108. General Cotton sent reinforcements from Peshawur, and on 3rd August Captain James and Major Vaughan with 1,400² men assailed the place again. The Ghazees had thrown up some formidable entrenchments, and danced and yelled as they saw a small column advancing in their front. Their shouts were answered by British cheers from a second column under Lieutenant Hoste, which had gained the heights by a bye-path and now appeared above Nowrunjee. A general fight took place, 30 of the Ghazees died fighting stoutly, and three were taken prisoners, amongst whom was a moulvie from Bareilly who was summarily hanged. The village was then knocked down by elephants and its towers blown up by the engineers. Nowrunjee was at last destroyed.

109. General Cotton in his division orders passed a well-merited encomium on Captain James for his management of these affairs.

¹ One troop 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 270 Rifles 4th Punjab Infantry, 400 5th Punjab Infantry, 50 Police horse, 100 Mooltanee horse.

² Two 24-pounder howitzers, 4 Mountain Train guns, 150 European Riflemen, 400 Rifles, 5th Punjab Infantry, 200 men 6th Punjab Infantry, 150 Captain Cave's new regiment, 50 Rifles, 21st Native Infantry, 325 Levy and Police horsemen, 150 sabres 2nd Punjab Cavalry.

Attitude of
Khans of
Yusafzai
and other
Chiefs.

110. In one of his reports, Captain James made the following just remarks:—"I do not myself entertain the same high opinion of the services of the Khans (*i. e.*, of Eusufzye) as is held by Lieutenant Horne * * * * I have observed a general wish on the part of the Khans to strengthen themselves and to induce me to place the armed 'ooloos'¹ at their disposal, but I believe they are none of them actually disloyal. Their apparent restlessness is caused, I think, by a fear lest our power should fail us and circumstances oblige them to look after their own interests." Major Becher in Huzara and Captain Henderson in Kohat observed the same restlessness and anxiety among the chiefs as to the result of the struggle. Those out of possession were the only parties glad of the convulsion. Those in possession (of course the large majority) were restless from fear of our Government being overthrown. Thus the loyal and the disloyal alike had to cast about for their old factions and supporters. I watched the matter closely throughout the division, and my deliberate conviction is that the masses of both chiefs and people, though retaining their prejudices of race and religion, have no material grievance and are conscious of the solid advantage of our rule.

Reluctance of
inhabitants
to subscribe
to the 6 per
cent. loan,
and measures
adopted by
Colonel
Edwardes.

111. To show, however, how entirely native confidence was at this time destroyed, I would adduce the conduct of the commercial classes for whose special protection and profit our revenue system would seem to have been devised. If there was any body of men in India who ought to have come forward to help us in difficulty it was "the moneyed interest." An opportunity was afforded them about the middle of July by the Financial Commissioner opening a 6 per cent. Punjab loan repayable in a year. I first summoned the chief native gentlemen of the city, and consulted them on this delicate topic. They looked very grave, made many wise remarks on the duty of everybody to help such a paternal Government, affected an entire freedom from the vulgar belief that the English raj was coming to an end, but it was clearly their opinion not a rupee would be subscribed. Kazie Gholam Kadir, the wealthiest man in Peshawur, fell into a complete stupor the instant a

¹ Pushtoo for "clan."

loan was named, and was evidently considering how to escape rather than how to raise it, and Nazir Kheiroollah, for whom our Government had recovered the best part of a lakh of rupees from a subject of Cashmere and on whom a pension of 500 rupees a month had been conferred, shook his head seriously, and prophesied that to raise a loan in the city at this crisis would be found "no child's play." However, they all undertook to sound the city corporation and bring up the chief capitalists before me the next day.

112. About two hours after the appointed time the city magnates slunk in, each trying to make himself as small as possible and to sit in any row except the front. That hyperbole of gratitude for the prosperity enjoyed under our shadow, that lavish presentation of trays of fruits and sugar-candy with which these comfortable men formerly rolled into "the presence"—what had become of it? Alas, all vanished with our prestige! Behold a Government not only opening a loan, but imperatively needing it. Not a man would lend a farthing if he could help it.

113. Seeing this written in their faces I opened the meeting by fining them all round for wasting two hours in times like these, and then asked them what arrangements they proposed. They asked leave to withdraw to the next room, and after half an hour's more consultation deliberately came back and said they thought 15,000 rupees might be raised with a little contrivance in the course of a few months.

114. Whether they subscribed a few lakhs or not to the loan seemed to me, under the existing circumstances, quite a secondary consideration to whether the prestige of Government should be destroyed in the Peshawur valley by being denied a loan in the city. It was a trial of strength, and I told the corporation that with reference to the wealth of the merchants I considered they could, without any inconvenience, subscribe five lakhs, which amount I intended to realise, but would rather they assessed themselves according to the means of the respective firms. So I gave them a day to make out the assessment.

115. They at once settled down to the details ; but as every house desired to throw an unfair share on its neighbour I placed the assessment in the hands of the Government Treasurer, Man Mull, who carried it out with a patience, firmness, good nature and impartiality which I cannot too highly praise.

Raising of a
loan of 4
lakhs.

116. In the end a loan of four lacs was arranged, and up to the present time the realisations are as follows :—

| | Rs. |
|-----------------------------------|----------|
| Subscribed by Europeans | 24,000 |
| „ „ Natives | 3,95,300 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 4,19,300 |
| | <hr/> |

117. No less than half a lakh was put upon Kazie Gho-lam Kadir, and having once assured himself that it must be done he took the lead in all the arrangements, and rode up to my house with about 20,000 rupees worth of gold coins in his saddle-bags, which he threw down on the floor, laughing heartily at the whole business.

118. The loan operated very well on public opinion. The people enjoyed seeing the money-lenders brought to book, and respected the power which asserted itself in difficulties. The capitalists themselves were at once interested in the cause of good order.

Attitude of
the Chief of
the Mohmands
and action
taken against
him.

119. There was one Chief, Mahomed Khan, the Moh-mund Urbab, who had fallen much under suspicion. For years he had done as little for Government as he could help, his sons had not come forward now with any efficient aid and he him-self was reported to be sending his money off to safe places in the hills. At one time I contemplated treating him in the most summary manner, but it seemed a duty to put off all severe measures as long as possible, and though the Urbab did nothing for us he did nothing against us. When the loan was organised I turned it to good account with this Chief. I sent for him and told him how he stood in my judgment and how impossible it was for a jageerdar to remain neutral and keep his jageer. "What would you have me do?" he asked. I

told him to pay in 12,000 rupees to the loan and send two sons down to Hindoostan with 50 horsemen. He agreed and became a new man from that moment. His sons are with Major Stokes watching the ferries of the Ganges and rendering good service. The Urbab himself is, I believe, as grateful as he can be for being thus saved from disgrace, and has exerted himself in several negotiations with hill tribes.

120. There being no better index of public confidence than the stock exchange, I will here mention that this 6 per cent. paper fell during the crisis of the rebellion as low as 26 per cent. discount and that as much as two out of the four lakhs is said to have changed hands, the purchasers being chiefly European officers. At present the stock is nearly at par, the slight depreciation being rather due to native dislike of such security.

Value of 6 per cent. paper.

121. On the 27th July our reliable forces were much weakened by the march of the 4th Punjab Infantry to reinforce General Wilson at Delhi, but the new levies in the valley had now attained an importance which fully justified the withdrawal, and we have all watched with pride the deeds which have marked the track of that corps through Hindoostan.

Despatch of 4th Punjab Infantry to Delhi.

122. On the same day (though the news did not reach me till 25th August) the Persian army evacuated Herat under pressure of the operations in the Gulf, and agreeable to treaty made it over to an Affghan Sirdar. The extent of the Indian mutinies could not at this time have been known at the Court of Teheran.

Evacuation of Herat by the Persians.

123. And here I take leave to quote some highly suggestive passages from the diary of a native correspondent at Meshed:—"On 2nd January 1857 a proclamation from the Shah (which has been made in every province of Persia) reached Meshed to the effect that the British having landed in Persia had taken Bushire, that it was therefore necessary that true Mahomedans should rise against them and make a religious war to cleanse these infidels from off the Persian soil * *

Intrigues of the Shah of Persia with Indian Chiefs.

* * Shazada Nujjuf, a descendant of the ex-King of Delhi,

at Teheran, had told the Shah that the Princes and Chiefs of the Indian States were ripe for a revolt against the British Government, and that a very slight movement from the Shah would be sufficient to emancipate India. The Shah, therefore, sent letters under his own sign manual to the address of the several Indian Chiefs and to Bahadoor Shah, King of Delhi, through Hajee Mirza Kazim. This Hajee is a brother of Mirza Hubeeb, who was a writer in the British Commissariat and who was killed by his own servants between Lahore and Pindee, and Hajee Mirza Kazim some time ago recovered all his deceased brother's property through the exertions of the English officials. He has now taken service with this Shahzada Nujjuf from Delhi, and has deposited his family at Meshed. He himself was deputed to go to India and deliver some of the letters from the Shah to the Kings of Delhi and Lucknow and other letters he was to send by emissaries. He left Meshed for Herat on 28th January with ten of the King's sowars, and his intention was either to go through Cabul if he could, or else despatch the letters by other messengers."

124. The latest entry in the journal from which the above are extracts was 12th March 1857, and it reached me not many days after¹ the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi, so that no suspicion can arise of these items having been concocted afterwards.

Rumoured
rising at Peshawar on
the 1st.

125. A rising in the city of Peshawur on the feast of the "Bukra Eed" (1st August) was much rumoured in the last days of July, but nothing came of it.

Rumoured
transfer of
trans-Indus
territory to
the Amir of
Kabul.

126. A far more dangerous report, which had first been whispered in May (owing, it was thought, to the removal of stores from the magazine of Dera Ishmael Khan) was now revived and became very rife among the border tribes, that the trans-Indus territory was to be given up to the Ameer of Cabul. Our very best and staunchest supporters, such as Khwaja Mahomed Khan, Khuttuck, were distressed and

¹ Reported in my No. 584 of 5th June 1857 to Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

unsettled by this rumour, so that it is not surprising that enemies eagerly caught it up and detailed the very date when a son of Dost Mahomed Khan was to come down and receive charge of Peshawur. An emissary of that restless villain, Sooltan Mahomed Khan, Barukzye, named Fuzl Hadee, took advantage of the rumour and raised a high degree of excitement among the Oruckzye tribes of Teera, who for some days in August threatened a descent upon the Kohat district. The combination was, however, broken up by the sagacity of Mozuffur Khan, the chief and tehsildar of Hungoo, and the report died away as our circumstances improved.

127. On the 14th August two out of the three divisions of the Zukka Kheyl Afreedies made their submission through Shahzada Jumbhoor and got their blockade¹ removed and prisoners released.

Submission
of Zukka
Khels.

128. On [the same day the Kokee Kheyl Afreedies of the Khyber (through the influence of the ex-Urbabs of Khuleel who had to regain in this crisis the position they lost in the last) were induced to surrender and submit to a fine of 3,000 rupees for the murder of Lieutenant Hand.²

Submission of
Kuki Khels.

129. Nothing certainly could have been more fortunate, for the very next day a red-hot fanatic, named Syud Ameer (of the family of the known Koonar Badshahs), came down into the Khyber to incite the Khyberees to a holy war. This man had all his life been a mendicant wandering in Peshawur, Cabul, Teheran, Constantinople and Mecca, and had just returned from one of these pilgrimages with a few thousand rupees, seed enough for a goodly harvest of devilry on the frontier. He planted his green flag at the village of Gaggree, in the Peshawur mouth of the Khyber Pass, and sent a summons to the Kokee Kheyl Mullicks to leave me and join him in a crescentade. There is something delightful in the good conduct of thorough rascals. Who would have expected the Kokee Kheyl to stick to their agreement of yesterday? But they did; they went back and told the Syud to be off. He

Attempt of a
fanatic named
Syad Amir to
raise a holy
war in the
Khaibar.

¹ See para. 4. ² See para. 5.

cursed them well and frightened them a good deal with his Koran, flag, and various incantations ; but the most he could get from them was five days' hospitality. He certainly made the most of his time, for his emissaries came to every regiment in Peshawur with invitations to join him ; it was a most anxious period, for at any moment the Khyberees might have risen in the pass and the Hindoostanees in cantonments, but at the end of the five days when the Syud showed no signs of leaving, the Kookee Kheyl pulled up the pickets of his horses and camels and even reverently shut up his flag, and the Syud left the pass in a storm of Arabic.

Syad Amir
tampers with
the Native
troops in
Pesháwar.

130. But we had by no means done with him. He be took himself to the next tribe under blockade, the ousted Michnee Mohmunds, who received him with open arms, and again his incendiary letters and messages were introduced among the troops. The most evident restlessness pervaded the disarmed regiments, arms were said to be finding their way into the lines in spite of all precautions, and symptoms of an organised rise began to appear. General Cotton as usual took the initiative. On the morning of the 28th August he caused the lines of every native regiment to be simultaneously searched, the sepoy lines being moved out into tents for that purpose : swords, hatchets, muskets, pistols, bayonets, powder, ball and caps were found stowed away in roofs and floors and bedding, and even drains ; and exasperated by the discovery of their plans and by the taunts of the newly-raised Afreedee regiments, who were carrying out the search, the 51st Native Infantry rushed upon the piled arms of the 18th Punjab Infantry and sent messengers to all the other Hindoostanee regiments to tell them of the rise.

Searching of
sepoy lines
and mutiny
of the 51st
Native Infantry.

Flight of
mutineers and
pursuit.

131. For a few minutes a desperate struggle ensued ; the 51st Native Infantry had been one of the finest sepoy corps in the service, and they took the new irregulars altogether by surprise. They got possession of several stands of arms and used them well ; Captain Bartlett and the other officers were overpowered by numbers and driven into a tank. But soon the Afreedee soldiers seized their arms, and then began that memorable fusillade which commenced on the parade ground at

Peshawur and ended at Jumrood. General Cotton's military arrangements in the cantonment were perfect for meeting such emergencies: troops, horse and foot, were rapidly under arms and in pursuit of the mutineers. Every civil officer turned out with his *posse comitatus* of levies or police, and in a quarter of an hour the whole country was covered with the chase.

132. The following return, for which I am indebted to Captain Wright (General Cotton's Assistant Adjutant-General), will show at a glance how the regiment was in 36 hours accounted for—

Number of
mutineers ac-
counted for.

| | |
|---|-----|
| Total strength before the rise | 871 |
| Shot by Captain Bartlett's 18th Punjab Infantry | 125 |
| Killed by district police under Captain James, Lieutenant J. Havelock and Mr. G. Wakefield | 40 |
| Killed by Mooltanee Horse levies under Lieutenant Gostling | 15 |
| Killed by villagers, Peshawur Light Horse, Her Majesty's 27th and 70th and 16th Punjab Infantry | 36 |
| Shot by Her Majesty's 87th by sentence of drum-head Court-martial on 28th August | 187 |
| Ditto ditto ditto on 29th August | 168 |
| Shot by Her Majesty's 27th and 70th Regiments by sentence of drum-head Court-martial on 29th August | 84 |
| Wounded and killed by police at Huree Sing's Tower | 5 |
| <hr/> | |
| Total killed | 660 |
| Prisoners in confinement | 110 |
| Drummers | 23 |
| Men on duty as orderlies | 10 |
| Supposed to have reached the hills | 60 |
| <hr/> | |
| | 863 |
| Remaining to be accounted for | 8 |
| <hr/> | |

133. General Cotton in a stirring division order thanked the troops warmly for the promptitude with which they put down this rising, and made a similar acknowledgment by letter of the services of the civil officers. The exertions of all on this occasion were indeed very great. The mutineers rose at noon and the heat was dreadful. Colonel Cooper, who commanded the 51st and joined in the pursuit of his own men,

Acknowledg-
ment of serv-
ices of troops.

died before evening from the effects of the sun. Several horses dropped down dead after only an hour or two of work.

Effect of punishment of 51st Native Infantry on other troops.

134. But the example sufficed. The disarmed regiments were paralysed with the sudden retribution. Seven hundred comrades, who yesterday were ripe for the murder of European officers, ladies and little children, to-day lay dead in three deep trenches. The Hindoostanee soldiers in cantonments underwent a marked change from this date. Still no precautions were relaxed, and the 64th Native Infantry in particular (which was encamped between the cantonments and the city) had a cordon of levies drawn round it night and day.

Services of Major Becher in connection with the outbreak at Murree.

135. On the night of 1st September the hill station of Murree (in the district of Rawulpindee) was threatened with attack, and though the numbers of the insurgent villagers were insignificant, it was clear that their clansmen on the Huzara frontier sympathized in the movement, and this new anxiety oppressed the whole division for many weeks. I need not enter here into its details as they have been most fully narrated by Major Becher in his Huzara report, but I must express my admiration of the wisdom and tact with which Major Becher restrained the ill-disposed from committing themselves and the successes with which one by one he arrested the refugees. I believe that any false step on his part during those never-to-be-forgotten days of September would have lost him the control of his district.¹

Attack by Syad Amir and some rebel sepoys on Michni.

136. At this time every Englishman in India knew that Delhi at last was to be assaulted and that the possibility of holding our own till the tardy succours from England should arrive depended on the issue. Natives, too, appreciated the moment, and breathlessly watched the effect of each day's, each hour's, news upon their European masters. Great, then, was my anxiety when on the 9th September the fanatic Syud Ameer, who had been expelled from the Khyber, re-appeared

¹ Even this rising of the Dhoonds about Murree is understood to have been instigated by Hindoostanee officials and servants, some of whom were convicted and hanged.

among the Mahomedans of Shah Misr Kheyl and with 40 or 50 of the escaped 51st sepoys made a night attack upon the fort of Michnee. The fort was garrisoned by men of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment and the corps had hitherto behaved well, but they were mostly Hindoostanees, and who could rely on them? The Mohmunds opened on the fort with their juzails, but the 51st deserters, with a far more formidable weapon, appealed to every prejudice in the garrison, and screamed to them to betray the fort if they valued their country or their religion. It could have surprised no one if the loyalty of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie sepoys had then succumbed, if they had murdered their officers, opened the gates of the fort and let in the Mahomedans and the Syud leader. Had they done so their comrades in the forts of Shubkudder and Abazye would have followed the example and we should have lost the command of the frontier.

Loyalty of
the Kelat-i-
Ghilzai
Regiment.

137. A party of Afreedie sepoys (of Captain Bartlett's regiment) were thrown into the fort of Michnee and installed in the fort, but something more was necessary. The Mohmunds were in the highest excitement, sending "the fiery cross" to all their neighbours, and evidently determined to strike a blow for the recovery of a fief that they had forfeited some three years before. We had no troops to move out against them. It was a time for yielding with as good a grace as could be assumed.

Reinforce-
ment of
Michni.

138. I sent them word that they were just going the wrong way to work, and that if they wanted to regain their confiscated privileges they must render some marked service to the Government instead of adding to the embarrassments of a passing crisis. For instance, let them send the fanatic Syud Ameer up to the Court of Cabul and there make him over to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. If they did that and gave hostages for their good conduct till this war was over I would gladly ask Government to reinstate them, though not on such favorable terms as formerly. Whatever the errors and shortcomings of Englishmen in the East may be, they are undoubtedly believed. The Mohmunds sent in their hostages to Peshawur, packed the Syud off unceremoniously and sat

Negotiations
with Moh-
munds, who
dismiss Syud
Amir.

down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindoostan. The relief was indescribable.

139. Nor do I now (looking back on that concession) regret that it was made even on its general merits. It was right to expel the Mohmunds in 1854 because they were faithless and unmanageable. But the trouble they gave while out fell upon our subjects, whom they attacked and robbed. They have now suffered three years' deprivation of their income. They have experienced the fact that the Ameer of Cabul had no influence to get them reinstated, and they now resettle in our country with diminished privileges as a memento of their breach. I do not anticipate that the lesson will have to be repeated.

Fall of Delhi.
Death of
Nicholson.

140. Anxiety and suspense about Delhi reached its climax on the 14th September, the day fixed for the storm, and when the telegraph at last announced that desperate feat of arms and General Nicholson dangerously wounded, it did not sound like victory, and day by day as gate after gate, and quarter after quarter, of the rebel city was mastered by that band of heroes, the question still was—"Is Nicholson any better"? On the 20th Delhi was completely in our possession, and every English heart thanked God for it. There seemed a hope too that Nicholson might live. On the 23rd that hope was extinguished, and with a grief unfeigned and deep and stern, and worthy of the man, the news was whispered "Nicholson is dead."

End of crisis.

141. ~~Am~~ I leave this narrative of the year 1857 at Peshawur. The crisis was ~~the~~ the worst was over. It remains only to make some general re

General
remarks.

142. I thought it best not to break the report by noticing each military execution as it occurred, but a record of them all is indispensable to a right idea of the crisis and of the way in which it was met by the military authorities. I therefore subjoin a chronological list of the

military executions in the Peshawar Valley in 1857, compiled from the records of Captain L. B. Jones, Deputy Judge Advocate, and the Assistant Adjutant-General's Office.

Return of
Military ex-
ecutions in
Peshawar.

| Date. | Regiment. | Rank and Number. | Crime. | Mode of execution. |
|--------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|---|
| 27th May | 51st Native Infantry. | Soobadar Major 1 | Desertion | Hanged before the garrison. |
| 27th " | 55th Native Infantry. | Non-Commissioned Officers } 4 | Mutiny . | Shot by order of drum-head Court-martial. |
| | | Sepoys . 3 | Mutiny . | |
| 27th " | 10th Irregular Cavalry. | Sowars . 3 | Mutiny . | |
| 28th " | 51st Native Infantry. | Havildars . 2 | Desertion | Hanged before the garrison. |
| | | Naiks . 2 | Desertion | |
| | | Sepoy . 1 | Desertion | |
| 31st " | 51st Native Infantry. | Sepoys . 7 | Desertion | |
| 10th June | 55th Native Infantry. | Soobadar . 1 | Mutiny . | Blown from guns before the troops. |
| | | Havildars . 6 | Mutiny . | |
| | | Naiks . 11 | Mutiny . | |
| | | Sepoys . 22 | Mutiny . | |
| 18th " | 55th Native Infantry. | Havildar . 1 | Mutiny . | Hanged. |
| | | Sepoy . 1 | Mutiny . | |
| 23rd " | 5th Light Cavalry. | Trooper . 1 | Desertion | Blown from a gun. |
| 23rd " | 24th Native Infantry. | Havildar . 1 | Mutiny . | Hanged. |
| | | Sepoys . 3 | Mutiny . | |
| 24th " | 55th Native Infantry. | Sepoy . 1 | Mutiny . | |
| 11th July | 24th Native Infantry. | Havildar . 1 | Desertion | Blown from a gun. |
| 18th August. | 51st Native Infantry. | Havildars . 2 | Desertion | |
| 28th August. | 51st Native Infantry. | Of all ranks 187 | Mutiny . | Shot after drum-head Court-martial. |
| 29th August. | 51st Native Infantry. | Of all ranks 168 | Mutiny . | |

| Date. | Regiment. | Rank and Number. | Crime. | Mode of execution. | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------------|----|
| 5th Sep-tember. | 51st Native In-fantry. | Jemadars . 2 Havildars . 4 Naiks . 2 Sepoys . 70 | Mutiny . Mutiny . Mutiny . Mutiny . | Shot after drum-head Court-mar-tial. | |
| 21st Sep-tember. | ... | Havildar . 1 Naiks . 2 Sepoys . 13 | Mutiny . Mutiny . Mutiny . | | |
| A B S T R A C T. | | | | | |
| Number hanged | | | | | 20 |
| Number blown from guns | | | | 44 | |
| Number shot by musketry | | | | 459 | |
| TOTAL | | | | 523 | |

Misplaced
confidence
of officers
in sepoy.

143. It is matter of history that when this mutiny began in the Bengal Army the European officers did not believe in it. Whatever may have been the feelings of the sepoy to their officers, the feelings of the officers to the sepoy were unquestionably those of kindness, confidence and sympathy even to the verge of mutiny. We have seen how the generous Colonel Spottiswoode persuaded himself that the 55th Native Infantry in the fort of Murdan was only "under a panic." We have seen how Colonel Plumbe deprecated the disarming of the native garrison and proposed to conciliate them, and certainly the public opinion of the European officers generally in the native force gave at first no support to the General in any vigorous measure. A Court-martial assembled on 28th May, sentenced a sepoy of the 51st Native Infantry to be simply imprisoned for the high crime of "desertion." General Cotton at once directed a revision of this sentence, which in his opinion would be "fatal to discipline," and called on the officers to pass sentence of death on all men convicted of desertion. "Let us," said he, "so deal with this mutiny that the Native Army will never venture on another." The court, to its honour, was fully awakened by this appeal, and from that moment discipline was sternly upheld.

144. The criminals themselves seemed to take a pride in the very discipline they had dared, and stood up in line to be shot with the accuracy and steadiness of machines. They obeyed the words of command to "close to the right" or "close to the left" (so as to bring them opposite the firing party) and "dress up" with habitual obedience. Many put their right-hand on their heart to assist the European soldiers' aim. In a few instances the blowing away of one batch of prisoners from the guns broke down the courage of some whose turn was next, so that they could not be made to face the gun, and were necessarily shot by musketry, but the majority showed remarkable courage, almost to apathy.

Determined bearing of sepoy sentenced to death.

145. Once or twice a single criminal escaped the volley of the firing party, and though unhurt fell as if shot, pretended to be dead and was carted off and thrown into the trench with the corpses of his comrades, whence he afterwards crept out. One or two such were again arrested by the police or villagers in the district and had their former sentence rigidly carried out.

146. In spite of the number of executions sepoy prisoners became so numerous that there was no room for them in the district gaol, and the fort at Khyrabad and Fort Barrah were converted into military prisons, guarded by Mooltanee and Pathan levies. Whenever military works had to be executed the sepoy prisoners were made to throw them up; nothing, in short, was more marked than the entire subjection of the mutineers at Peshawur.

Conversion of forts of Khairabad and Bára into military prisons.

147. Every European soldier slept throughout the crisis with his loaded musket beside him, and took it to church with him on Sunday, and this latter precaution ought to remain a standing rule at all times, for the impolicy of collecting together all the Europeans of a station in one building without arms in a conquered country is so obvious as to look like infatuation.

Necessity for European soldiers carrying arms to Church.

148. A strong feature in the Peshawur arrangements was, and still is, the number of country levies who were called in to help the European soldiers in controlling the mutinous

Return of irregular levies raised.

sepoys. The whole of the miscellaneous military duties fell to their lot: they escorted treasure, guarded guns, watched prisoners, protected private houses, and held forts, and I believe they have given uniform satisfaction to General Cotton and to the European community. I remember no instance of misconduct on their part. Annexed is a return of their numbers :—

Return of Irregular Levies raised from the middle of May 1857 up to 1st April 1858.

| No. | District from which raised. | TOTAL RAISED. | | | SENT TO HINDOOSTAN ON GENERAL SERVICE. | | |
|-----|-----------------------------|---------------|-------|--------|--|-------|--------|
| | | Horse. | Foot. | Total. | Horse. | Foot. | Total. |
| 1 | Derajat . | 1,798 | 819 | 2,617 | 891 | 254 | 1,145 |
| 2 | Peshawur . | 1,223 | 1,101 | 2,324 | 471 | 191 | 662 |
| 3 | Kohat . | 133 | 593 | 726 | ... | ... | ... |
| 3 | TOTALS . | 3,154 | 2,513 | 5,667 | 1,362 | 445 | 1,807 |

| No. | District from which raised. | SERVING AT PESHAWUR. | | | DISCHARGED. | | |
|-----|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|--------|
| | | Horse. | Foot. | Total. | Horse. | Foot. | Total. |
| 1 | Derajat . | 649 | 309 | 958 | 258 | 256 | 514 |
| 2 | Peshawur . | 182 | 326 | 508 | 570 | 584 | 1,154 |
| 3 | Kohat . | 53 | 150 | 203 | 80 | 443 | 523 |
| 3 | TOTALS . | 884 | 785 | 1,669 | 908 | 1,283 | 2,191 |

N. B.—These are all independent of regiments of disciplined Infantry raised in the valley during the crisis by military officers.

149. Most of those who went down country have been actively engaged at Delhi, Lucknow and along the line of the Ganges, under Lieutenant Lind, Captain Smith, Lieutenant Vivian and Major Stokes. Others are now mounted police in the districts of Delhi, Meerut and Hissar.

Employment
of levies down
country and
their services.

150. Perhaps nothing tended more than these levies to keep the frontier quiet; they absorbed all the idlers and adventurers of the Peshawur valley, and made the campaign against the Hindoostanee mutineers a highly popular service. To use a common phrase of the natives, it put the people into our boat.

151. I am bound to confess (at the risk of any inferences disadvantageous to the previous career of the levies) that crime was never so rare in the valley as during this crisis. Indeed it must be admitted that one troop alone that is now fighting at Lucknow contains no less than 60 outlaws, headed by the redoubted Mokhurrum Khan. These men had harried our border for years, and would undoubtedly have rioted in this hour of our weakness if not suddenly put in the way of an honest livelihood. As the native gentleman who raised the troop remarked, "Whether they kill the Poorbeahs or the Poorbeahs kill them, it will be an equal service to the State." Lieutenant Vivian informs me that General Franks complimented them by saying that "he never saw better skirmishers,"—a tribute which many a luckless Bunyah on the Peshawur border had previously had occasion to render.

152. Amongst the foot levies who guarded the kutcheries and other public buildings in Peshawur I ought to mention the Afreedees of the Kohat Pass under Bahadoor Shere Khan, Chief of the Bungushes of Kohat. The incident is as great a revolution as the mutiny of the Hindoostanee army.

153. But successful as (by the hearty co-operation of military and civil authorities) all our measures proved for the maintenance of the peace of Peshawur during this eventful war, there can be no question that if one event had happened nothing could have saved us—I mean if Dost Mahomed Khan, the Ameer of Cabul, had followed in 1857 his policy of 1843. That policy was a mistake, and the Ameer reaped nothing

Attitude of
Amir of
Kabul in
1857.

by it but disgrace and loss of character as a politician. But men do not always profit by the lessons of the past. Some difference in the circumstances too often misleads them again into the former error. The crisis of 1857 was infinitely graver than that of 1848. The embarrassments of the English in India were incomparably greater. The Anglo-Indian Empire had been based on a native army and that army was in rebellion. If ever we were open to a death-blow it was now. Our power in India was staked on the recovery of Delhi, to achieve it taxed the whole strength of the Punjab to the very utmost, and left the Provincial Government so weak as to be unable for the moment to put down a petty rising in the Googaira district: a feather more would have turned the scale against us. No reasonable man can doubt what would have been the result had the Affghans sided against us in September 1857. That they did not do so is, under Providence, due solely to the treaties which had been made with them in March 1855 and January 1857. By the former the past was condoned, and we engaged to respect the territories of the Affghans so long as they respected ours; by the latter we went further, sent a mission of able British officers to aid them in defending their western frontier from the Persians, and gave them a subsidy of a lakh of rupees a month to enable them to increase their army while that emergency should last. These were solid proofs of a community of interest, and the policy has been blessed with equally solid advantages to ourselves. That policy was much questioned at the time in India, and, as far as I am aware, has never yet received the approval of the Home Government. It is a satisfaction therefore to find it approved by the unerring verdict of the hour of trial. It may be said that when these treaties were made no one foresaw that this mutiny would happen, which is true; but treaties are made as anchors are thrown out to enable the vessel to ride through any storm from whatever quarter it may blow.

Services of
British officers
in Afghānis-
tān.

154. And here I would beg to acknowledge the very great services of our officers in Affghanistan during the late crisis. At Candahar with the Heir Apparent were Major

Harry Lumsden, Lieutenant Peter Lumsden and Dr. Bellew, accompanied by Gholam Sirwur Khan, Khagwancee. At Cabul in the Ameer's Court was Nuwab Foujdar Khan, Bahadoor, our vakeel. It was thought to be a service of great enterprise, for the English officers especially, when they set out for Candahar, even in a time of peace; and their situation became one of decided peril when India was in a blaze with a Mahomedan struggle. But these officers and Khans, by soldierly equanimity, by a fortitude equal to the occasion, by a calm trust in the cause of England, by the good feeling which their previous demeanour had created, and by keeping the Cabul Government candidly and truthfully informed of real events and thus disarming monstrous exaggerations of our disasters, preserved the confidence of the Ameer and his best counsellors, and were largely instrumental in maintaining those friendly relations which were of such vital importance to our success. For these unusual services I would venture to solicit for all these officers and Khans some mark of honourable distinction from Government.

155. Nor can I conclude this report without preferring a similar request for Major Becher, Captain Henderson and Captain James. The crisis was a military one, and these officers, who had charge of the three most exposed frontier districts, met it as became soldiers, and I would ask for them a soldiers' reward. It is true that they were on the civil staff like other district officers, but it has fallen to few district officers to perform the same military duties. Major Becher and Captain Henderson besides being in civil charge of Huzara and Kohat held the chief military command of those districts. Captain Henderson, indeed, has been in command of his regiment on the frontier since 1849; on him, therefore, devolved both the civil and military anxieties of the time. It was he who disarmed the wing of the 58th Native Infantry with such promptitude. It was Major Becher in person who stopped the passes of Huzara against the 55th Native Infantry. Captain James conducted two expeditions against Nowrinjee and was engaged in personal conflict with the enemy. During the seven years he has

Services of
Major Becher,
Captain
Henderson
and Captain
James.

been at Peshawur he has been in numerous expeditions and engagements with the hill tribes, has had his life more than once attempted, and repeatedly received the thanks of Government. So has Captain Henderson. So inseparable indeed are the military and civil duties of these three districts that no civilian is ever charged with them, either as Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner. And the successful control of such warlike borders as those of Kohat, Peshawur and Huzara in such a crisis as that of 1857 should, I do think, be regarded as military service, fully entitling Major Becher and Captains James and Henderson not to be superseded. I beg to annex a memorandum of their military services for the consideration of Government, and to add that the whole merit of preserving the peace of Huzara and Kohat belongs to Major Becher and Captain Henderson, Peshawur matters having been quite enough to absorb the whole attention of both Captain James and myself.

Services of
Native Chiefs.

156. The services of Native Chiefs who have done well in this war will be reported separately in obedience to the call of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, and I will only say here what a pleasure it is to have passed through such a time of unparalleled disaster without one Chief coming to disgrace. The district of Peshawur, heretofore considered the least loyal in the Punjab, has entirely changed its character, and its levies are now fighting on our side, wherever we have an army in the field. The border people have been drawn to our officers in this one year more than they would probably have been in 20 years of peace ; and I believe a lasting kindly spirit has been evoked. In this as in all the occurrences here it was impossible not to trace the overruling hand of God and to be thankfully reminded continually that "the strength of the hills is His also."

Necessity for
a bridge at
Attock.

157. As a last word upon the crisis of 1857 I implore the immediate attention of Government to the imperative necessity of bridging the Indus at Attock. If it be not done, some day we shall bitterly repent it.

64. *From Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDS, C. B., Commissioner of Peshawur, to E. THORNTON, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab.*

IN continuation of my mutiny report No. 64 of 23rd March I have the honour to forward copy of No. 83 of 30th March from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, enclosing one from Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant Commissioner of Peshawur, which is highly illustrative of the state of ferment in which the Hindoostanee sepoys were before the mutiny actually broke out. Indeed the preparedness of the native soldiery indicates unmistakably that the corps at Barrackpore had communicated with the whole army.

Report by Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant Commissioner, on the state of the Hindoostani soldiery at Peshawar before the outbreak.

2. A reward will be proposed in the proper place for the chupprassie, Narain.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 64.

65. *From Captain HUGH R. JAMES, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, to the Commissioner, Peshawur Division,—No. 83, dated Peshawur, 30th March 1858.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you a copy of a letter to my address from Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant, Peshawur, detailing certain circumstances connected with the Mutiny which occurred prior to the disarming of the native troops on the 22nd May last.

Acknowledgment of services of Mr. Wakefield.

2. Mr. Wakefield appears to have zealously sought for the information regarding the state of the Hindoostanee soldiery during those days of excitement and to have elicited much that was useful. The seizure by him of the "faqueer," who was bearing a treasonable letter to the native regiments on the frontier from the corps in cantonments, was certainly at that time an important event.

3. He likewise seems to have evinced much tact in superintending the removal of the treasure to the fort

4. Since my arrival at Peshawur in June last I can testify to Mr. Wakefield's active co-operation on all occasions, and I trust that he may meet with due reward.

Services of
Narain, chap-
rassi.

5. I concur in thinking the chupprassie, Narain, worthy of some mark of favour, but do not consider a pension advisable. I would rather recommend him for a present of 150 rupees and promotion in the service, which, with your approval, can be carried out without reference to the higher authorities.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 64.

66. *From G. E. WAKEFIELD, Esquire, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Peshawur, to Captain H. R. JAMES, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur.*

The report by
Mr. Wakefield
already notic-
ed.

HAVING learnt that a report on the late Mutiny and revolt has been called for throughout the Punjab, I have the honor to submit an account of certain circumstances connected with the mutiny which occurred at Peshawur in the interval when the late Brigadier-General Nicholson was acting both as Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner here during the temporary absence of Colonel Edwardes at Rawul Pindee.

2. During that period, *viz.*, from 17th to 21st May 1857, I was, from circumstances which will be hereafter detailed, in constant communication with General Nicholson.

Bearing of
sepoys and
steps taken by
Mr. Wakefield
to ascertain
their tempera-
ment.

3. Soon after the disarming of the 19th Native Infantry at Barrackpore, and while the incendiary fires were occurring at Umballa and other stations, I had remarked the altered bearing of the Hindoostanee sepoy here as coming under my observation among the "kutcherry" and treasury guards, and I mentioned the circumstance to several, and among others to General Nicholson and to an officer of the 64th Native Infantry.

On the announcement of the outbreak at Meerut it appeared necessary to ascertain the temperament of the Hindoostanee sepoys here, and the only man I could find to assist me was a Hindoostanee orderly chupprassie named Narain. This man is an inhabitant of the Etawah District (North-Western Provinces), and had just returned from Calcutta, where he had gone to see his late master, Lieutenant-Colonel Wakefield, off to England.

On being questioned by me he told me that the 19th Native Infantry when disarmed had, distrusting the public post, made a subscription and despatched emissaries to every regiment of Native Infantry in the Bengal Army, and that at every station from Calcutta to Peshawur where there were Hindoostanee troops the cry was "We will not bite the new cartridges and we won't give up our arms." He also told me a number of other circumstances which it would be superfluous to detail here, but which plainly showed that the disaffection extended over the whole Bengal Army. I immediately went to General Nicholson and detailed most of what the man had said, and at his request sent the chupprassie to him. General Nicholson heard his story, put a number of questions to him and told him to continue reporting to me any information he could obtain. I should mention that from the first this man reported the extension of the agitation to the Hindoostanee troops here as observed by him while mixing with the sepoys. After this he used to go daily in disguise and brought me intelligence of the increasing agitation, till, finally, about the 16th or 17th of May, he attended a meeting of delegates from the 24th, 27th and 51st Native Infantry held under a tree on the north side of cantonments. At that meeting the subject of discussion was a combined movement on the 21st of the month. The comparative numbers of Europeans and natives were calculated, and the only drawback appeared to be that the 21st Native Infantry held aloof. The 64th and Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiments, which were at the frontier outposts, were talked of as "expected in." They evidently counted on assistance from the whole of the Cavalry, regular and irregular, but the 5th Light Cavalry were reported as actively agitating,

Seizure of a
Muhammadan
fakir with a
seditious
letter on his
person.

while the impression on my mind respecting the irregulars was that they would not commit themselves. They promised the others nothing, but their assistance was counted on. All this was duly reported by me to General Nicholson. On the morning of the 19th I seized, not far from my house, a Mahomedan "faqeer," and taking him over to the "kutcherry" searched him ; although the man was stripped nothing suspicious was at first found. But on searching him a second time a bag was found concealed in the arm-pit. In this bag was another and in that a letter, which the Commission, composed of Colonel Edwardes, Captain Bartlett and yourself have since decided, was a traitorous invitation from the disaffected in the cantonments to their comrades on the frontier. I need not enter into details here respecting the circumstance, as the papers in the case furnish all particulars : but to continue the narrative of what occurred at the time, the man was taken to General Nicholson, who read the letter, and after questioning him sent him to gaol.

Measures for
removing
treasure from
the Residency
to the Fort.

In the afternoon of that day, the 19th of May, General Nicholson told me he had written for a European guard for the treasure at the Residency, and directed me to be present when the guards were changed. This was effected late in the evening ; and then General Nicholson told me to arrange for moving the money (about 25 lakhs) early the next morning to the fort. He said he had written for an escort, and that a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry would be sent. From my previous knowledge of the disaffection of the 5th Cavalry I felt anxiety on the subject, and ventured to suggest the necessity of a European escort, and asked permission to take the European guard¹ at the Residency with me. This was readily granted, provided I could arrange with the Officer Commanding it. Lieutenant Tovey, although he had received no orders, was good enough to take the responsibility, and accompanied the treasure. General Nicholson subsequently applied for 50 mounted Artillerymen, who also joined the escort. The next

¹ Consisting of 50 men of Her Majesty's 79th Regiment under Lieutenant Tovey.

day General Nicholson told me that he had sent a spy with the squadron of the 5th Cavalry, and that one Native officer talked treason the whole way to the fort.

5. At 6 A. M. on the morning of the 20th a number of magazine carts came, but as they were not sufficient to take the whole of the money and it appeared desirable to remove it in one batch, I applied to Lieutenant Hyde, the Executive Engineer, at the suggestion of Captain Bartlett, who had no carts available in the Sudder Bazar, for Government horse carts. Lieutenant Hyde very obligingly placed 50 at once at my disposal. By the evening of the same day the whole of the money was removed in one batch, and, as far as I could gather, had been safely lodged before the intelligence had time to spread. The disaffected, as I afterwards heard, could only talk of "taking it in five minutes." As one instance of how matters hung that day in a balance I may mention that the headman in charge of the magazine carts at about 11 A. M. appeared suddenly faint, and said he required rest from the heat, &c., but on my threatening to flog him into working he as suddenly revived and proceeded to work.

6. The 21st of May intervened, and on the morning of the 22nd the disarming occurred.

7. In this statement I have confined myself to facts which came under my own observation, and have tried to be as concise as possible. To narrate the details of information received would be tedious, and circumstances which at that period were of every importance have now lost interest.

8. In conclusion I beg to recommend, as a case for the special notice of Government and marked reward, the conduct of the chupprassie Narain.

Services of
Narain, chap-
rassi.

Although there have been many instances of fidelity and loyalty among the Hindoostances, as far as I was aware this was the only man out of the, say, in round numbers, 20,000 men of that class in this valley who thoroughly identified

himself with us and observed a uniform adherence at that critical time, when the first blow had to be struck, which enabled us to manage the wavering and secure the allegiance of the country-people. He mixed with men of all classes and reported every wave and ripple of agitation. His reports for months after the disarming were continued with the same fidelity. It was arranged that his name was not to be brought forward so as to impair his usefulness, and the excitement of subsequent events set aside all idea of report or recommendation then.

I beg therefore to submit his case, and if I may be allowed to suggest a reward that would best suit his circumstances and would best ensure the object of conferring on the man a benefit that would be most appropriate, I would recommend a pension of 5 rupees a month for his lifetime, commencing from the 22nd May, the date of the disarming; this would, on payment of arrears, secure a donation to commence with, with a provision for life.

67. *From E. THORNTON, Esquire, Officiating Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to R. TEMPLE, Esquire, Secretary to Chief Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 202, dated Lahore, 28th April 1858.*

Statement of
services of
Major Becher,
Capt. James
and Capt.
Henderson.

IN continuation of my letter No. 191 of the 24th current, and particularly with reference to the 155th para. of Colonel Edwardes' letter No. 64 of the 23rd of March, I have the honor to transmit, to be appended to the report of proceedings on the Peshawur frontier subsequent to the outbreak in the Bengal Army, statements of the military services of the three district officers of that division.

The statement of Major Becher's services has only just been received.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 67.

68. *Memorandum of the military services of Brevet-Major J. BECHER, Bengal Engineers,—dated Huzara, 22nd April 1858.*

I.—A. D. 1841-42.—Present with the army of Cabul, under General Pollock in 1841-42 A. D. ; at the forcing of the Khyber Pass, the action of Tehzeen and Khoord Kabul, and the expedition into the Mazeena Valley, under Brigadier Monteath, during that campaign. Mentioned in the Despatches of General Pollock and Brigadier Monteath. Received a medal.

Services of
Major J.
Becher.

II.—A. D. 1845-46.—Present with the army of the Sutlej at the battle of Sobraon on the 10th February. Attached as Field Engineer to the division of General Sir Robert Dick, K. C. B. ; severely wounded. Mentioned in the Despatch of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India. Received a medal. Recommended for brevet rank by Lord Hardinge, Governor-General of India.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 67.

69. *Memorandum of services of Captain H. R. JAMES.*

MY DEAR EDWARDES,

In 1844-45 I was employed as Political Officer with a force on the Sindh Border against the Gadhee tribe, capturing the leaders and receiving the thanks of the Government.

Services of
Captain H. R.
James.

In 1845-46 with Sir Charles Napier against the Boogtees.

In 1848 at the second siege of Mooltan and capture of city and fort, having in the former operations under you a Sikh regiment and troop of the force with which you took the Sheesh Mahal.

In 1851-52 at the first destruction of Michni and Dabb, and subsequent Mohmund campaign, under Sir Colin Campbell: thanks of Government.

In 1852 at the engagement of Punjpao: thanks of Commander-in-Chief.

In 1852 with the force acting against the Othman Khail and Ranezai, including the capture and destruction of Nawadun and Pranghar: thanks of Government.

In 1853 at the Boree expedition: thanks of Commander-in-Chief.

In 1854 at the second Michni attack, including the destruction of Shah Moosah Khail, under General S. Cotton: thanks of Government.

In 1855 with a force employed against the Bussee Khail Afreedies: thanks of Government.

In 1857 the operations against Narinjee in Eusufzaie: thanks of Government.

The above is a memorandum of the occasions on which I have been actually employed in the field with troops during the last 14 years.

With many thanks for your kind efforts on my behalf,

Believe me, &c.,

H. R. JAMES.

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 67.

70. *Memorandum of Captain B. HENDERSON's services,—dated Kohat, 4th January 1858.*

Ensign 4th February 1811; Lieutenant 21st April 1844;
Captain 5th June 1853.

Services of
Captain H. B.
Henderson.

RECEIVED the thanks of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, then General Commanding at Peshawur, in March 1852 for the state of the 3rd Regiment, with a promise of report to Government. Copy of a letter attached.¹

¹ Not printed.

Commanded 3rd Regiment in March 1853 in the expedition under Brigadier Hodgson into the Sheoranee hills to punish this tribe. The Brigadier and troops received the thanks of Government for the operations which were entirely successful.

Also served in operations which led to the settlement of the Kohat Pass in November 1853.

Meranzaie Expedition in April 1855, Commanding 3rd Regiment.

Commanded head-quarters of 3rd Regiment as one of the two columns of attack on the Rabeeah Khel Oruckzaie, succeeding in surprising them on the crest of the Sumana mountain before daybreak on the 2nd September 1855, which led to the capture and destruction of the two villages of the enemy, with their property, and to the capture of their cattle: was thanked by name by the Governor-General (*vide* Mr. Edmonstone's letter No. 737, dated 3rd November 1855, to Sir J. Lawrence, an extract of which is attached);¹ also received the thanks of the Brigadier commanding the force in Brigade Order No. 36 of the 3rd September 1855, a copy of which is attached.¹

Meranzaie and Khoorrum Expedition in October, November and December 1856, including night surprise and capture of Toorawarree; march into Khoorrum, night surprise and capture of the body of the Meeanee branch of the Kabul Khel Wuzeerees, with their property and cattle; both operations so completely successful as to have been accomplished without the loss of life of a single soldier; and each operation securing the submission and punishment of the whole tribe so perfectly as to have induced these turbulent, lawless people to respect the Government authority from that time and all through the recent crisis. A copy of the correspondence is attached.¹

Previous service,—Sutlej Campaign, Moodkee and Aliwall (medal and clasp); latterly as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General with General Wheeler's force.

¹ Not printed.

Served in command of Kohat district from May 1857 throughout the late crisis. Maintained tranquillity. A report of disarming a portion of the Hindoostanees and of the Chief Commissioner's approval is attached. ¹

¹ Not printed.

CHAPTER VIII.

REPORT BY MR. R. MONTGOMERY, JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER, ON OCCURRENCES IN THE PUNJAB DURING THE CRISIS OF 1857.

71. *From R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to R. TEMPLE, Esquire, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 149, dated Lahore, 24th March 1858.*

I HAVE the honor to forward to the Chief Commissioner a report of the measures adopted by the different authorities in the Punjab during the crisis, and in doing so desire to bring to your notice Mr. Henry Perkins of the Civil Service, Assistant Commissioner of Lahore, a young officer of great talent and promise, who has aided me in preparing the report.

ENCLOSURE TO 71.

72. *Report by Mr. R. MONTGOMERY, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, of the measures adopted by the different authorities during the crisis of 1857.*

I HAVE considered it due to the several civil officers employed in the Punjab from May 12th to December 31st of 1857 to place on record, for the information of Government, the following abstract of their proceedings and exertions during that eventful period of Indian history.

2. As the Chief Commissioner was absent when the news of the Delhi tragedy reached Lahore on May 12th,

Action taken by Mr. Montgomery on receipt of the news of the Mutiny.

and as, owing to the temporary stoppage of the telegraphic communication with Rawul Pindiee, there was no time to make a reference, I held an immediate consultation with the officers marginally noted, and proceeded at once to Meean Meer with

Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary.

Major Ommannay, Chief Engineer.

Captain R. C. Lawrence, Captain of Police.

Captain Hutchinson, Engineers.

D. F. McLeod, Esquire, Financial Commissioner.

A. A. Roberts, Esquire, Commissioner, Lahore Division.

R. E. Egerton, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Lahore.

the Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson. I urged on Brigadier Corbett, C. B., Commanding the station, the imperative necessity for taking the initiative and preventing the native troops from following the example of their brethren at Meerut and Delhi. I suggested that they should at any rate be deprived of their ammunition and percussion caps. To this Brigadier Corbett readily agreed, and subsequently, with most praiseworthy boldness, determined

Disarming of troops at Mián Mir.

to disarm them entirely. He executed this measure the next morning, the 13th May, in my presence, in the most masterly way.

The regiments thus disarmed are noted in the margin.

16th Native Infantry.

26th Native Infantry.

49th Native Infantry.

8th Light Cavalry.

This last corps was also dismounted at a later date.

Promptness of action was imperative. Secret information had reached us through the Police that the whole four regiments were on the watch to know what would happen down below, and that they were

quite prepared to follow the example of their brethren whatever it might be. Had the disarming not been effected when it was, while the electric telegraph had given us a monopoly of intelligence, it is quite impossible to say what might have happened within 36 hours.

Measures taken at Ferozepore.

3. The news from Delhi had been sent off by express to Ferozepore on the afternoon of the 12th, with an intimation of the proceedings about to be adopted at Lahore. The express reached Brigadier Innes, Commanding at that station, on the morning of the 13th, and enabled him to secure the Arsenal and avert the junction of the Lahore and Ferozepore brigades of native troops, which it is believed was intended.

The information conveyed thus rapidly to Brigadier Innes enabled him to act promptly and decidedly; and when in the afternoon of the 14th the 45th Native Infantry attempted to storm the Arsenal, they were repulsed and defeated by the force of Europeans whom Brigadier Innes had just before thrown in. Thus within 24 hours after the receipt of the telegram announcing the Delhi massacre the capital had been saved, and the great magazine of the Punjab, containing upwards of 7,000 barrels of powder, besides immense stores of material, had been secured.

4. Immediately after the disarming at Meean Meer, I circulated to all officers of districts west of Rawul Pindee a demi-official letter, which will be found in Appendix No. I. The Chief Commissioner, being at Rawul Pindee, arranged for the safety of the districts of the Leiah, Peshawur and Jhelum Divisions. The Commander-in-Chief came down to Umballa from Kussowlie and made every preparation for immediately moving on Delhi; the Guide Corps marched down to join his force with wonderful celerity, travelling the whole distance of 580 miles in 21 days. On the 8th June the siege of Delhi began. The exertions made by the officers of the Cis- and Trans-Sutlej States to procure carriage are detailed in the reports on those divisions.

Suggestions
to district
officers for
securing the
safety of their
districts.

5. The following mutinies took place in the Punjab during the continuance of the siege of Delhi:—

Stations at
which
mutinies
occurred.

- (1) Ferozepore, May 14th,—large portion of 45th and 57th Native Infantry.
- (2) Hotee Murdan, May 21st,—55th Native Infantry.
- (3) Jullundur, June 7th,—6th Light Cavalry, 36th and 61st Native Infantry.
- (4) Phillour, June 8th,—3rd Native Infantry.
- (5) Jhelum, July 7th,—part of 14th Native Infantry.
- (6) Sealkote, July 9th,—wing of 9th Light Cavalry and 46th Native Infantry.
- (7) Thanesur, July 14th,—part of 5th Native Infantry.

- (8) Lahore, July 30th,—26th Native Infantry.
- (9) Ferozepore, August 19th,—10th Light Cavalry.
- (10) Peshawur, August 23th,—51st Native Infantry.
- (11) Umballa, September 30th,—remnants of 5th and 60th Native Infantry.
- (12) Meeanwalee, in the Leiah District,—30 men, 9th Irregular Cavalry.

Of these mutinies the most serious as regarded the civil administration of the district was that which occurred at Sealkote; for the men burnt the Deputy Commissioner's offices and records and set free the prisoners from the jail; the villagers in the neighbourhood of the station plundered it, and it required the adoption of stern measures to reduce them.

Insurrection
in Gugera and
measures for
its suppression.

6. On September 11th it was reported that an insurrection had broken out in the Googaira district among the Khurruls, a wild tribe inhabiting the extensive tracts known as the Bar. Within six hours from the arrival at Lahore of the intelligence of this outbreak the Chief Commissioner despatched to Googaira, which was threatened by the rebels, a force of European and Sikh Infantry and guns. This force marched 83 miles in three days, and arrived an hour before the rebels attacked the station. Several other tribes had joined them, and for some days they so far held the road as to delay the mails and cut off communication between Lahore and Bombay. Routes were opened up by the post-office authorities for the mails to be carried *via* Jhung on the north and Bahawalpoor on the south, and towards the end of October this rebellion was quelled; but it greatly affected the whole of the Mooltan Division, and threatened at one time to involve the Lahore Division on its south-west border also, but no rising took place in this quarter.

Apprehensions
of danger at
Muhammadan
festivals.

7. The Mahomedan feasts of Bukra-Eed and the Mohurrum are often occasions of great excitement, and serious apprehensions were felt in some places lest there should be any attempt at an *émeute*. A merciful Providence averted all danger, and both these festivals passed off everywhere with even more than ordinary quietness.

8. Particular occasions and events called forth from me circulars on various points of the internal government of this Province. These are given in Appendixes II to IV.

Instructions issued on various points.

9. The 6 per cent. loan, which was first opened in his own division by Mr. Barnes, Commissioner, Cis-Sutlej States, in the end of May, and then extended to the whole Punjab, afforded a good barometer of the state of the feeling towards us entertained by the moneyed classes in this Province; and, as appertaining in this way to my department, I have procured copies from the Financial Commissioner of his circular extending the loan to the whole Punjab, and also a statement of the amounts subscribed thereto in each district. These are given as Appendixes V and VI. It is a remarkable fact that, while the independent Chiefs who gave us the help of their arms have also freely lent us their money, the wealthy bankers of the great commercial cities, as Umritsur, Lahore, &c., have shown a close-fistedness and distrust that augurs ill for their sense of the security and benefits they have enjoyed under our rule. The amount shewn in the statement alluded to as subscribed in the great and opulent division of Lahore is wholly incommensurate with the resources of its traders.

6 per cent. loan.

10. The peace which the Punjab has enjoyed in the midst of so much war is in a measure also attributable to the plenty with which it has been blessed by two or three consecutive fruitful harvests, and to the opportunities for employment offered to every idle hand by the immense number of men that have been entertained for levies, for extra police, and for the enlarged Sikh army.

Reasons for the tranquillity of the Punjab.

11. The danger of dissemination of treason through the post-office was recognized from the first; and in most places the district officers in person opened every post-bag and suppressed suspicious letters, especially those addressed to sepoys.

Scrutiny of postal correspondence.

12. The Native Press was early put under a strict censorship. At Peshawur the Editor of the *Moortizae* was imprisoned for publishing treasonable matter, and his paper

Censorship of Native Press.

was stopped. The native paper at Mooltan was likewise suppressed. The Editor of the *Chashma-i-Feiz* was ordered to remove his establishment from Secalkote to Lahore, where his paper, together with the two already published at the capital, was put under rigid surveillance.

Services
rendered by
officers.

13. In the succeeding paragraphs of this memorandum reference will be made to the miscellaneous duties which devolved upon officers. Where these duties were peculiarly onerous, as at Loodiana, a passing mention of them has been made ; but, in order to avoid repetition, a great deal of the work of most officers has been passed over in silence, as it was the same in every district. Thus there is scarcely a district where the European officers in person did not carry on regular night patrolling ; there is no district officer who had not the ferries of at least one river to guard, and many had those of two or even three. At first the levying of men for the new army devolved entirely upon civil officers ; the entertainment of men for extra police was always their own peculiar province, and demanded a vast amount of attention ; in many cases there were mutinous troops to be watched, and spies consulted and guided by District officers ; in every place much of their time was consumed in giving audiences to natives of rank, and in endeavouring to assure them of the firmness of our rule, and to enlist their good offices in inducing men to enter our service. These services were performed by District officers and Commissioners more or less everywhere, but are barely alluded to in the accompanying minute, to avoid tautological display.

Attitude of
the Punjab
Government
towards
natives of
Hindustan.

14. An opinion has gained very general credence that an undue and causeless dislike to Hindoostanees has been manifested in the policy of the Punjab Government. It is argued that the revolt was a military one, and that, even supposing the Hindoostanee army here to be untrustworthy, there was no ground for the universal antipathy to the Hindoostanee nation which the Punjab Government has evinced. I would appeal to every officer who has served under it during the memorable year 1857 to give his own private

experience as to the justice of the measures which have been adopted. I would not ask him to gather inferences from the narrations of any other person; let him mention the name of the class whom he personally, in his own sphere of labor, mainly feared; let him say whom he found to be the instigators of plots, the fomenters of sedition and the prime-movers in ill-feeling. The answer in almost every separate case would be "Hindoostanees." Were prominent instances of this ill-will necessary, I would quote the conduct of the Hindoostanee horse-keepers at Ferozepore, of the Hindoostanee servants at Murree, of the Hindoostanee native doctors at Murree and Umritsur, and the fact that the murders at Secalkote were all committed by Hindoostanees, but not all by military Hindoostanees, for three persons were killed by one of the jail police. There is no doubt that Hindoostanee emissaries to preach a Mahomedan crusade came up from Delhi. It is also to be borne in mind that nearly every office of value was held by Hindoostanees, who evinced a strong sympathy with the rebels. That there were loyal and true men I do not doubt; but it was impossible to distinguish them from the bad so truly as to make it safe to trust to any one.

15. In September 1856 the wise and great Sir H. Lawrence contributed to the *Calcutta Review* an article on army reform, from which the following is an extract. It is the expression of a great statesman's opinions, and now seems almost like prophecy. He is speaking of the Sikh wars, and says, "proportionally few of the instigators of opposition at Lahore in the Sikh army were Sikhs. They were mostly British subjects,—many of them British deserters. The general feeling of the Sikhs was hardly hostile; many of the Sikhs were friendly, decidedly so compared with the Hindoostanees in the Punjab service." Beyond this I feel that it is not necessary to go in justifying the conduct of this Government in regard to the treatment of the natives of Hindoostan.

16. I am glad to be able to speak most favorably regarding the working of the civil courts. Notwithstanding

Civil administration.

the alteration in the statute of limitations reducing the limit from 12 to 6 years, whereby an immense amount of extra work was thrown on the officers, and the quantity of miscellaneous work caused by the mutiny, the civil courts have been closed in but very few districts, and a much larger amount of civil work has been disposed of during the year than usual.

Criminal administration.

17. Criminal work has been more than ordinarily heavy throughout, and has been equally well performed. Act XIV of 1857, empowering any two officers sitting in commission to try and execute any traitor or participator in violent crime, has been largely acted upon. The Chief Commissioner had, however, issued for the guidance of all officers rules very much to the same purport as the Act, before its arrival in Lahore. As the only communication between Lahore and Calcutta was at that time *viâ* Bombay, considerable delay took place in its transmission. While serious and violent crime has somewhat increased, it is a remarkable fact that the number of misdemeanours has gone down to a minimum. Perhaps this may be because the police could not, or did not, report them; but I consider it is mainly owing to the state of men's minds and the intentness with which they were watching the result. This disinclined them from petty wrongs and acts of petty violence.

CIS-SUTLEJ STATES.

Events in Cis-Sutlej States.

18. The proximity of this division to the focus of the revolt rendered it a very difficult matter to uphold in it British authority as supreme. The inhabitants of a part of it are, to a certain extent, one with the rebels of Delhi in race, in feeling, and in creed; there is no natural boundary to separate the Punjab from the North-Western Provinces: and this undividedness of country, joined with the care entailed on the authorities by the imperative necessity for holding the Grand Trunk Road, has made this division a very anxious charge. But Mr. Barnes, the Commissioner, and his District officers have nobly and successfully exerted

themselves to put down all discontent and crime, and to shew that we still had power and means to keep it. The feudal Chiefs were ordered to furnish their quotas of horse and foot, and the revenue they have hitherto paid in commutation was remitted. The following extract from Mr. Barnes' report will show the inestimable value of the services rendered to us also by the Chiefs of the protected Sikh States; and I would take the opportunity to note that the first stroke towards securing their allegiance was taken by Mr. Forsyth, Deputy Commissioner of Umballa, in calling on the Raja of Puttiala, at the very first *émeute*, to send in his troops, thus leading him at once to take a decided part, from which he has never since swerved.

Exertions of
Mr G. C.
Barnes.

Mr. Barnes says:—"The station of Umballa was left with four weak companies (about 250 men) of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, the 5th Regiment, Native Infantry, and some 6-pounder guns, to man which we had only native Artillerymen. A redoubt was erected with the church in the centre, and the remaining residents were concentrated in the houses around. A militia was formed of uncovenanted officers; and the magazine, the treasure, and the commissariat stores were all lodged in the redoubt, which was garrisoned by a company of the Fusiliers. Owing to the defection of the Nusseeree Battalion, there was no available escort for the siege train or for the ammunition so urgently needed by the army. I offered, however, to furnish political escorts, and accordingly the siege train came down from Phillour under a guard of horse and foot furnished by the Nabha Raja, and accompanied by a detachment of the 9th Irregulars under Lieutenant Campbell. The ammunition was conveyed by a party of the district police, and so, throughout the campaign, the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the charge of contingents furnished by Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej States. Their troops protected our stations and patrolled the Grand Trunk Road from Ferozepore and Phillour down to the very walls of Delhi. The safety of this Province may be attributed to their loyalty and good example. The

Services rendered by Na-
tive Chiefs.

Chief of
Nabha.

Chief of
Jhind.

Raja of Jheend, with Captain McAndrew and a small but well-disciplined force, acted as the van-guard of the army, and by my directions kept always in advance. When the first detachment of Europeans reached Kurnal, this little band proceeded 22 miles further to Paneeput, quieting the country, securing the road and collecting supplies; and in this manner they advanced boldly to within 20 miles of Delhi. A detachment of the Jheend troops seized the bridge at Bhagput, and thus enabled the Meerut force to join headquarters. A party of the Jheend sowars, with Captain Hodson at their head, rode into Meerut and opened our communication with that station. The troops of the Maharaja of Puttiala guarded Thanesur and Umballa, and the safety of Loodiana was entrusted to the Raja of Nabha and the Kotla Nawab. These eminent services afforded by the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs are thus casually noticed as part of the history of the late campaign. I feel under the deepest obligations to them, and the Governor-General in the *Gazette* announcing the fall of Delhi, has declared that they shall not be without their reward."

Services of
Chiefs of
Patiāla and
Māler Kotla.

Measures for
protection of
treasure.

19. Next in importance to the securing of the Grand Trunk Road and of the loyalty of the Native Chiefs was the necessity for saving the treasuries from attack. They were all, at the commencement of the outbreak, under sepoy guards. Mr. Barnes promptly issued instructions to his District officers, in obedience to which the Umballa treasure (Rs. 3,50,000) was placed under the 1st Fusiliers, and the Thanesur money (Rs. 10,00,000) sent to the same guard. Mr. Ricketts sent his Rs. 1,50,000 to the care of the two companies of the 8th Queen's Regiment at Phillour. Major Marsden at Ferozepore placed his in the entrenchment, where it was guarded by Her Majesty's 61st Regiment. Only the Simla treasury remained under a guard of natives, and they being Goorkhas of the Nusseeree Battalion were considered staunch. However, during their temporary mutiny, although the Simla treasury remained untouched, the branch treasury at Kussowlee was plundered of Rs. 32,043-14-1, of which only Rs. 12,963 were recovered.

20. I cannot do better than give in Mr. Barnes' own words a history of the means adopted to secure ready and regular conveyance for stores and ammunition to the army and sick and wounded men from it—means which never once failed of their end, and on which the District officers reflect with an honest pride that in no case was a single cart unreasonably delayed or a single rupee's worth of stores plundered :—

Organization
of a Military
Transport
Train.

“The requirements of the army became incessant, and the road was thronged with carts laden with every variety of stores. A bullock train was suggested by Mr. Forsyth to be carried on by the District officers. This arrangement proved defective in practice for the want of a general superintendent in charge of the whole line. I obtained leave from the Chief Commissioner to organize a ‘Military Transport Train’ under the agency of Captain Briggs, an able and zealous officer of great experience. His exertions and complete success deserve the special thanks of Government. We had been drained of our carriage, and no assistance could be drawn from either the Ganges Doab or the Delhi territory. The army commissariat could give no help. Carts that reached Delhi never came back, and there was imminent danger of a dead-lock. All these difficulties were overcome by Captain Briggs. His jurisdiction extended from Ferozepore to Delhi, 265 miles. A train of 30 waggons per diem from each of the principal stations of Umballa, Loodhiana and Kurnal, and 14 waggons per diem from Ferozepore, was soon organized. The same number was also daily employed on the return journey. Stores of every description, especially the enormous demands for ordnance ammunition, were safely and regularly supplied to the army. The sick and wounded were comfortably conveyed from camp to Umballa. The train was in full operation from the 22nd July to the middle of October. The scheme was eminently successful owing to the skill, tact and indefatigable energy of Captain Briggs. He has fully acknowledged his obligations to the Civil authorities of the Cis-Sutlej States, who gave him their utmost support. The cost of the train was 97,317 rupees, and it has fully realized the objects for which it was organized.”

21. This division (in Mr. Barnes' words) “acted as a kind of breakwater: beyond was the raging sea, inside was comparative calm.” It would not, however, be expected that the surface should be unruffled. At first the natives seemed aghast at the enormity of the odds against us; but after the

Punishment
of offenders.

first shock came the desire to rebel; and it required the strongest determination to quell incipient insurrection. The Police were exhorted to use their arms freely against any one found in the act of perpetrating violent crime. The lawless and predatory were checked by the manifestation of a will on the part of the officers. Some were killed in pursuit, and 123 executed by process of law, partly by District officers sitting in commission and partly by Mr. Barnes. Besides these, 258 mutineers were executed, and 102 sentenced to imprisonment, who deserved death, as they belonged to the mutinous regiments at Ferozepore. It was only by such measures that districts were controlled which were quickly escaping from our grasp.

22. I turn to specify the operations which more particularly concerned each district.

Events in
Ferozepore.

23. At a court of enquiry assembled some time previous to the Delhi mutiny, a Native officer of the 57th Native Infantry at Ferozepore.

Occupation of
Arsenal by
British troops.

Attempt of
45th Native
Infantry to
seize the
Arsenal.

pore declared that it was the purpose of his regiment to refuse the Enfield cartridge if proffered to them. This raised a strong feeling of suspicion against the corps, but the 45th Native Infantry, which was not on good terms with the 57th, and had openly declared their contempt of the resolution of the 57th, was considered staunch. On the 14th May, as soon as news by express from Lahore of the Delhi disaster reached Brigadier Innes, who had the previous day taken command, he ordered the entrenched Arsenal to be immediately garrisoned by part of Her Majesty's 61st Foot and the Artillery. All ladies were also removed thither, and the two regiments of Native Infantry ordered into camp in positions of about three miles apart. The way of the 45th Native Infantry lay past the entrenchment. As they approached, their column insensibly swerved towards the glacis; the movement had barely been observed when they swarmed up the slope and attacked the position. The Europeans in an instant divined their intent, and rushed to the ramparts with the bayonet. The attack was repulsed; but before the 61st

could load, the sepoy dashed at the gate, whence they were also flung back, and then with an air of injured innocence they reformed their column and marched quietly with their European officers to the camp. During the night the church, the Roman Catholic chapel, the school-house, 17 officers' houses and other buildings were burnt to the ground by the men of the 45th, but not before the Chaplain, the Reverend R. B. Maltby, failing to obtain a guard of Europeans, had boldly rushed unattended through the infuriated sepoy and into the blazing church and had succeeded in rescuing the registers out of it. On the 14th the treasure was moved into the entrenchment, and it was discovered that of the 45th Regiment there only remained 133 men; the rest, with a large part of the 57th, had deserted. The remaining portions of these regiments were subsequently disbanded.

Burning of
public build-
ings.

Rescue of
Church
records.

24. Danger impended over this district from both north and south. To avert the threatened incursion of the mutinous troops from Lahore the large ferries on the Sutlej were guarded and the boats from the small ones sent to Hurreekoe. To check the approaches of the wild tribes from Sirsa and Bhuttecanah, General Van Cortlandt, in a fortnight, raised a levy of 500 Sikhs,—a force which, subsequently uniting with Raja Jowahir Singh's troops and other bodies sent down from time to time by the Chief Commissioner, amounted to 5,000 men of all arms, and performed excellent service in Sirsa and Hissar.

Levies raised
by General
Van Cort-
landt.

25. Major Marsden received information at one time that a faquir named Sham Dass was collecting followers with a treasonable intent. He promptly moved against the rebel, and coming upon him by surprise attacked and completely defeated him with the loss of several men. Sham Dass himself was seized and executed. This act of vigour on the part of Major Marsden was a most important step in the preservation of the peace of the district; for at that critical time any show of success for the evil-disposed would have raised the whole region in revolt. In the western division, 157 extra men were entertained in the police establishment, and the

Rebellion
raised by
Fakir Sham
Das, quelled
by Major
Marsden.

feudatory Chiefs furnished a body of 200 horse and 40 foot. Every highway robber was executed at once. This display of severity, with the presence of General Van Cortlandt's force, and increased energy on the part of the Civil authorities, I am happy to say, preserved the peace of the district well.

Mutiny of the
10th Light
Cavalry.

26. On the 11th July the 10th Light Cavalry was, as a precautionary measure, dismounted and disarmed; but on the 19th August the men made a rush at their horses, cut loose about 50 of them, and seizing every pony or horse they could find in the station, including many officers' charges, mounted and rode off for Delhi. With the connivance of the native horse-keepers of the Artillery, they also attacked the guns, but were repulsed, though not until they had killed three of the 61st Regiment and wounded three, of whom one was a female. They also cut down Mr. Nelson, the Veterinary Surgeon of their regiment. Of the 142 mutineers captured, 40 were executed, and the remainder, with 25 of the Artillery horse-keepers, transported or imprisoned. In the jail 18 persons, including the Nawab of Raneea, who had been captured by Mr. Ricketts in the Loodiana District, were hanged. The siege train was despatched from the Arsenal on August 18th, and more than 2,000 cart-loads of munitions of war were sent to Delhi during the siege.

Punishment
of mutineers.
Execution of
Nawab of
Rania.

Services of
Captain
Lewis, Com-
missary of
Ordnance.

27. Although not belonging to my department, I cannot close my report on this district without making mention of the eminent services rendered to the State by Captain Lewis, the Commissary of Ordnance, to whom the army at Delhi is deeply indebted for his unwearied exertions and incessant hopeful energy.

Measures
taken in the
Ludhiana Dis-
trict by Mr.
Ricketts.

28. Mr. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of this district, had a most difficult part to play, and ably has he acquitted himself. The town of Loodiana commands the high road from Delhi to the Punjab. It stands on the bank of the Sutlej at the head of the bridge-of-boats connecting Hindoostan with the Punjab proper. It is filled with a dissolute, lawless, mixed population of Cabul pensioners, Cashmeree shawl-workers,

Loodiana.

Goojurs, Bowreahs and other predatory races. There is a fort without Europeans to guard it, a city without regular troops to restrain it, a district traversed by roads in every direction, joining the seven commercial towns which form the emporia of its trade, and situated on a river which for months in the year is a mere net-work of fordable creeks, which could only be guarded by a cordon of regular troops. Mr. Ricketts had for his Jail and Treasury guard a company of enemies in the shape of a detachment of the 3rd Native Infantry, and on the breaking out of the Mutiny received another company of the same regiment. As there was no dependence to be placed upon these men, he summoned the feudal Chiefs and the independent States to send him troops. The Chiefs of Nabha and Mulair Kotla sent in their men, to whom the safety of the station was entrusted. Detachments of these troops were likewise charged with the protection of the eight high roads that intersect the district, of the ferries, the fords and the ghats. The undisciplined Nabha troops unfortunately failed Mr. Ricketts in his hour of need. They would not follow the Jullundur mutineers, but this is not to be ascribed to any lukewarmness of their master; he was a staunch ally to us throughout. Other natives who materially aided the Deputy Commissioner were Mith Singh, Busunt Singh, the Lulton chowdhrees; and of the Cabul pensioners the following, *viz.*, Hussun Khan, Abdul Rahman, Saleh Mahomed, Shahpore and Shahzada Secundar.

Co-operation
of Nabha and
Máler Kotla
Chiefs.

Services of
other natives.

29. On May 15th Mr. Ricketts sent his treasure to Phillour Fort. It was placed under the charge of Mr. Thornton, Assistant Commissioner, whose labour in connection with it was greatly increased by the necessity of having to go to and fro, a distance of seven miles, across the swollen river on sudden and constant calls for money. At the same time Mr. Ricketts concentrated his police from the district at the station, adding by this movement 80 men to the force at his disposal for overawing the city. As a specimen of the vast amount of miscellaneous work entailed upon District officers generally during this Mutiny, I take an extract from Mr.

Despatch of
treasure to
Phillaur.

Ricketts' report shewing what he was obliged to do in Loodiana :—

Details of
work done in
Ludhiāna.

“Supervision began to be exercised over the post office; every post without exception, till October, was opened and sorted by my assistants or myself, and great and endless were the irregularities; extra ammunition was distributed throughout the district police; supplies were accumulated at the different encamping-grounds and halting-places; the prisoners were looked to and re-ironed; materials were collected for the bridge-of-boats and the repair of its approaches; a staff of artisans and labourers and an increased guard of picked Sikhs were posted there. Parties of jageerdaree or contingent horse were posted at all the tehseels and thanas, and along all the roads. Proclamations of reward for the apprehension of deserters were promulgated; arms for the irregulars were escorted to Ferozepore, through the deserting sepoys; ladies and children were sent out of the station and across the Sutlej to Phillour, where they had the advantage of a place of refuge in the fort garrisoned by Europeans; carriage for the transport of all kinds of army stores was collected; the bullock train arrangements were taken in hand, and the commissariat for European detachments passing through, the executive in both these departments devolving, under existing circumstances, on the district officer, until at a subsequent date the transport service was separately organized; also supervision was instituted over all dealers in sulphur and lead and vendors of caps; a system of passports for all travellers was instituted; Hindoostanees supposed to be tainted were weeded out of all departments; the fort, after it was kindly vacated by the mutineers, was emptied of all its munitions of war, which were sent to Delhi,—it was provisioned in case its defence became essential, which was fortunately unnecessary, as its well supplies no drinkable water, and it was placed in some sort of repair; a regiment of Sikhs was raised, in which all furlough men belonging to the district and on leave from their regiments were incorporated; horses were collected for service at Delhi; 200 men were raised for Hodson's Horse; 50 old Sikh golundazes (or artillerymen), survivors from Sobraon, were enlisted for service before Delhi; 500 or 600 Sikhs and Muzbees were enrolled as Pioneers; 250 (I think) dooly-bearers were engaged and sent to Delhi for the transport service; 200 men were raised for the North-Western Provinces Police battalion; the men on furlough from the Ferozepore and Loodiana Sikh regiments were formed, to the number of 140 (or thereabouts), into one body, were armed and sent down to the Mozuffernuggur district, where they are still watching the Rohilkund rebels; estimates were formed of the amount of cattle

available for provisions for the vast increase of European troops; and, lastly, the manufacturing classes in the town were set to work at sand-bags for Delhi, at tent-cloth (of which 300,000 yards were made for tents for European troops), and on saddles for Horse Artillery; artisans were furnished for the magazines at Ferozepore and Phillour, and masons and carpenters for the new European barracks in course of construction in the hill stations; and so on, in various ways which have escaped my notes and my memory, the internal resources of the district were brought into play to meet the demands of the times, whilst the spirit of the people was taken advantage of to commit them to the quarrel against the common enemy, and the various subordinate official departments were roused by rewards freely given, and by punishments sharp and severe, to lend their co-operation."

30. Mr. Ricketts, Lieutenant Yorke, and Captains Cox (Her Majesty's 53rd) and Campbell nightly patrolled the streets of the city at any time between 10 P. M. and 2 A. M.; Captain Nicolls, Assistant Commissioner, was entrusted with the duty of forming a Sikh regiment which the Chief Commissioner ordered to be raised.

31. I now come to the event which has called into prominent notice the bad qualities of Loodiana and the excellence of its officers. I mean the transit of the Jullundur mutineers on the 8th June. I have slightly alluded above to the abandoned character of the population. A short time previous to the arrival of the mutineers, Mr. Ricketts had received information that all the armourers and furbishers of the city were plying a most profitable trade. This could be for no good purpose. He resolved to disarm the city on the first opportunity. One presented itself when Major Coke's corps, the 1st Punjab Infantry, reached Loodiana on its way to Delhi. At dawn on the 20th June, on the inhabitants issuing from their homes, they found themselves confronted at every street-crossing, at every market-place, by bands of these ferocious warriors, and sent back to their homes. Bodies of police under European officers entered each house and took the arms concealed therein. Eleven cart-loads of arms were thus discovered and seized. The inhabitants had shewn the animus which had prompted them in accumulating these arms by joining the Jullundur

Disarming of
population of
Ludhiāna.

Operations of
Mr. Ricketts
against the
Jullundur
mutineers.

mutineers on their passage through a few days previous, by burning the Church and the Mission, by pillaging the Mission houses, by aiding the mutineers to mount heavy ordnance on the fort, which the mutinous 3rd had delivered up, by supplying them with food and water, and by pointing out the residences of Government officers for plunder and destruction. This pillage could not be prevented by the Civil authorities. News of the Jullundur mutiny did not reach them till 11 hours after it took place, when the mutineers were already crossing the river, and had joined the 3rd Native Infantry at Phillour. Mr. Ricketts promptly went out to encounter the mutineers, searched for them all day, and came upon them after nightfall. His auxiliaries fled; his sole supporters were a detachment of Captain Rothney's corps, the 4th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Williams, who was severely wounded; he had to work a gun with his own hands until his ammunition ran out, and then was obliged reluctantly to retreat. At Jullundur and Loodiana, as in very many other places, the rebels had outwitted themselves. In their eager hurry to escape from Jullundur they took blank cartridges and left the ballad cartridges behind! They arrived at Loodiana, and in the height of their triumph at occupying the fort found, to their dismay, that it contained vast stores of guns and powder, but no shot. They had none with them, not even musket balls. To remain was useless. They evacuated Loodiana and reached Delhi in safety, owing to the weakness of the pursuit which was made by the military from Jullundur, and which I have adverted to in my remarks on that district. However Loodiana was saved. The Grand Trunk Road remained in our power. None suffered eventually from the riot except the rioters themselves and the city which harboured them. Twenty-two of the plunderers were hanged the next day, and the city was fined Rs. 55,294.

Fine imposed
on the city of
Ludhiāna.

32. The proposal to levy this fine emanated from Mr. Ricketts himself. It met my cordial approval and has been sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner. I consider it one of the most masterly strokes of policy of the whole Punjab. The

principle is well understood by the people that, when any members of a community disgrace themselves by violent encroachments on the rights of others, the whole community to which they belong atones for their guilt by pecuniary compensation to the sufferers and by a fine to Government for its outraged authority. In this case it produced the most strikingly beneficial effects. It quieted not only Loodiana, but all the six market towns of the district. It inspired a salutary dread of Government, which was so manifestly inclined to hold its own and care for neither prince, peasant nor mutineer. Compensation was made to all the sufferers to the full extent of their losses, leaving a small balance which will nearly cover the loss to Government property.

33. After the display of such an animus by the rabble of Loodiana and its neighbourhood, it was necessary to put it out of their power ever to display it again. To this end, all native houses within 300 yards of the fort were levelled, and the Goojur population turned out to the low-lands beyond the city. The Goojurs of the whole district were disarmed, but not the Jats, as their subsequent co-operation with the British Government was reasonably to be expected from the good feeling they had already shewn. The Goojurs were also deprived of their boats, and inflated skins (for crossing the river) were made contraband amongst them. The low Hindoostanee population swarming in the old cantonment was dispersed and sent home.

Disarming of
Gujar popula-
tion of Ludhi-
ána.

34. Particular instances of sedition occurred besides the great ebullition on June 8th. A fanatical Goojur Moulvee, after preaching sedition for some time, went off to Delhi. One or two of the Cabul pensioners (descendants of Shah Soojah) followed his example. The 3rd Native Infantry, before they left, were also known to be firebrands, but nothing could be proved against them. The Hindoo chowdrees were, as a body, timid and lukewarm in our cause. On the other hand, instances of good feeling were also manifested. Ram Singh, one of these Hindoo chowdrees (or headmen), was an honorable

Instances of
sedition at
Ludhiána.

Instances of
good feeling.

exception to his class. He was ever active in laying in supplies, and at a very critical time advanced nearly Rs. 3,000 for the public service. The Jats of the Raekote thana, when informed of the mutinies at Ferozepore and Jullundur, set themselves to watch all the roads and wells with the aim of seizing stragglers. It were an endless task to enumerate all the instances of good and bad feeling among the people of this district. I trust the outline I have here furnished will shew the difficulties that the District officers have had to battle with and the energy with which they have met them.

Measures
taken in
Thanesar by
Captain
McNeile,
Deputy Com-
missioner.

35. Captain McNeile's principal difficulty in this district arose from the presence of a company of the mutinous 5th Native Infantry, which obliged him to have always at hand part of the Puttiala force to keep them in check. The disarming of this company on the 14th July set the Deputy Commissioner at liberty, and from that time he made his head-quarters at Karnal. Mr. Levien, the Assistant Commissioner, was detached at Shahabad, and Lieutenant Parsons was sent from time to time to reduce turbulent villages, especially towards Kythul, or to watch the fords and ferries of the river Jumna. In anticipation of a visit from the Delhi mutineers, Captain McNeile had, at the first, destroyed the stamp paper, and soon afterwards sent his treasure to Umballa; while the jail was fortified and the jageerdars called out. At one time it was rumoured that the Ranghurs from Hissar purposed to rescue their fellow-clansmen from the Thanesar jail, and the 31st May was the date fixed upon for the attack. Every preparation was made to repel it, but it did not take place. The Ranghur prisoners were immediately afterwards secretly removed to Umballa to be beyond hope of rescue. On June 9th the Raja of Puttiala was compelled to draw off his forces from Thanesar in order to protect his own capital, which was in some peril from the Jullundur mutineers; but as soon as he learnt that they had passed by, his troops were sent back to Thanesar, much to the relief of Captain McNeile.

36. Captain McNeile reports that the population shewed an extreme reluctance to surrender to justice any of the fugitive mutineers from Ferozepore or Jullundur. They would plunder them, but would not give them up, thus evincing a disloyal spirit, which was further shewn by the refusal to pay the Government revenue. Such conduct was not to be borne. He, therefore, burnt the village of Asundh, which had made itself conspicuous in bad feeling, and heavily mulcted one or two others which seemed refractory. Murmuring was forthwith hushed, and the revenue was immediately paid, together with the fines.

Attitude of
population of
Thanesar.

37. Violent crime increased in this district also, and could only be checked by the same measures as were adopted elsewhere. Between the 13th and 29th June, 52 gang robbers and other offenders were hanged in this district alone. After the middle of July nothing occurred here worthy of note, as the people returned to their allegiance; and after these energetic measures the peace was not disturbed.

38. It was known for some weeks previous to the outbreak that the minds of the native soldiers in this station were unsettled.

Events in the
Ambála Dis-
trict.

Umballa. On the 19th April mysterious fires began to occur, and, though they were at first attributed to the thatchers, the eyes of all the residents were gradually opened to see that the soldiery and none others were the real authors of them. Mr. Forsyth obtained positive information on the 7th and 8th May that the prediction of a rebellious clique among the sepoy was "that in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Umballa and that a general rising of the sepoy would take place." On May 10th, the day of the Meerut mutiny, the 5th and 60th Regiments, Native Infantry, and the detached guard of the 60th at the Treasury simultaneously rushed to their bells of arms and began loading their muskets. The Treasury guard remained under arms the whole day in direct disobedience to orders. This overt act of mutiny was unconditionally forgiven by the military authorities, and the result was that large portions of these regiments

Fires.

Insubordina-
tion of Native
troops.

afterwards joined the rebels at Delhi; the remainder, when ordered into jail on September 1st by the directions of the Chief Commissioner, attempted to fly, but were killed by the European troops or afterwards captured and tried.

Exertions of
Mr. Forsyth
in procuring
carriage.

39. I desire to record prominently the success of Mr. Forsyth's exertions in procuring carriage at the first outbreak, when, as Mr. Barnes says, the natives, thinking our rule at an end, were deserting the town "like rats from a sinking ship."

40. Mr. Forsyth says :—"As soon as it was determined by the Commander-in-Chief that an onward move should be made, a sudden difficulty arose in the want of carriage. The Deputy Commissary-General having officially declared his inability to meet the wants of the army, the Civil authorities were called upon to supply the demand. At Umballa there has ever been a difficulty to furnish carriage of any kind, the carts being of a very inferior description. However, such as they were, they had to be pressed into service; and in the course of a week, after the utmost exertions, 500 carts, 2,000 camels and 2,000 coolies were made over to the Commissariat Department; 30,000 maunds of grain were likewise collected and stored for the army in the town of Umballa."

Raising of
levies.

41. As soon as this first difficulty had been overcome, the necessity for preserving the peace of the district led Mr. Barnes to call on the commutation tenure Chiefs to furnish men instead of their usual tribute in money. By the operation of this order a force of 459 foot and 259 horse was soon at our disposal, but the moral effect of these and the other influential Chiefs siding with us was of far greater value than even the force they supplied.

42. Mr. Barnes observes further :—"In addition to these jagheerdars, who were bound to supply levies, several public-spirited individuals volunteered their own services and brought several followers. Among these the most prominent were Rao Ruheem Buksh, of Punjlasa, who with 50 followers guarded the road between Umballa and Jugadhrree; and the Sirkurdahs of Sudhaura, who furnished 60 men to

protect the public and private buildings in the civil station, thus relieving our police from very heavy duty."

43. I regret to say that the civil courts in this district were for some time unavoidably closed. Mr. Forsyth's time was wholly engrossed by his pressing miscellaneous duties. Captain McAndrew, Assistant Commissioner, was on duty with the advanced guard of the Delhi field force. Mr. Plowden, Assistant Commissioner, was on detached duty on the River Jumna, and the time of the only remaining civil officer, Mr. Vaughan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, was entirely taken up with the very heavy duties of the treasury. It was not till Mr. C. P. Elliott was transferred from Lahore to Umballa that the court could be re-opened, and by his well-known industry and perseverance he rapidly cleared off all arrears in this department. The casual mention I have just made of Mr. Plowden will not, however, suffice to convey a sense of my appreciation of his services. He was detached with a squadron of the 4th Light Cavalry under Captain Wyld, and two companies of the 5th Native Infantry under Captain Garstin, to keep down the turbulent population of the banks of the Jumna. He was out in camp from 19th May to November, and was always to be found wherever danger was threatening or insurrection abroad. His force (Mr. Barnes states) was the means of saving Saharunpore, whither he had gone to act in conjunction with Mr. Spankie, the energetic Magistrate and Collector of that place. Even when deserted and fired at by his Hindoostanee troops, Mr. Plowden held on with his Sikhs, and eventually succeeded in checking the progress of the bold marauders and destroying their short-lived power. Captain Gardner, a Delhi refugee, was sent with two other companies of the 5th Native Infantry to guard Roopur. Mr. Barnes gave him authority to act as a magistrate, if needful, and he did excellent service. He remained there until the men were called in. The zeal he displayed while thus serving his country makes me the more lament his death, which occurred at Kussowlee a short time afterwards from illness induced by the exposure and exertions which he had undergone.

Unavoidable
closing of
courts.

Services of
Mr. Plowden,
Assistant
Commis-
sioner.

Services of
Captain
Gardner at
Rôpar.

44. I have minutely detailed the events which took place in this district owing to the most important geographical position it occupied. Any serious disturbance or suspension of our power in it would have been fatal to the success of the siege of Delhi on the one hand and fatal to the quiet of this province on the other; and I can but record my feeling of deep thankfulness to the wise and good Providence who overruled all events here to the final successful issue.

Events in the
Simla Dis-
trict.

45. This district contains the large sanatoria of Simla and Kussowlee, with the military cantonments of Dugshai, Subathoo and Jutogh.

At the time of the outbreak there were on the hills the 1st and 2nd Fusiliers and the Goorkha regiment known as the Nusseerce Battalion, and also the Commander-in-Chief and his staff. All troops were instantly ordered to march to Umballa, preparatory to moving on Delhi. The European regiments and the Commander-in-Chief started, but the Goorkhas refused to move. There was a guard of the regiment at Kussowlee. The head-quarters were at Jutogh. The Kussowlee guard, amounting to about 80 men, mutinied and marched off with a large sum of Government money to join their comrades at Jutogh, where a bad feeling had also been evinced. Some time previous to the Delhi massacre the regiment had been thrown into a state of excitement by reports which had reached them regarding the purpose of Government to subvert their caste. They afterwards said that the men of all the hill regiments assembled at the School of Musketry at Umballa had obtained leave from their respective corps to use the suspected cartridges, but the depôt from their regiment had not so obtained leave, and they believed that the letters which had been sent asking the opinion of the regiment had been wilfully suppressed by Government. On the manifestation by the European residents at Simla of the excitement consequent on the news of the disasters in the plains, and the relief of the various guards and the orders to march, the Goorkhas found they were distrusted. They knew of no enemy, and thought that all these preparations were merely to bring them into traps which

Misconduct
of Nasiri
Battalion.

had been laid to destroy their caste. They looked on the fact of the Europeans arming themselves as a mark of fear and as a sign of a fixed intention to destroy their creed and their nation. They rose in a body, turned out their "depôt men" with ignominy from cantonments, clamoured, raved, and shouted against their officers, the Government and the Commander-in-Chief. The more moderate men withheld the others from the actual perpetration of acts of violence, which they twice set out to perform, but for many hours the uproar in their lines was indescribable. Lord William Hay, the Deputy Commissioner, and Major Bagot, their Commanding Officer, at length allayed the excitement and succeeded in making them hear reason. On assurance of the speedy redress of what they considered as their grievances the tumult subsided; the men returned to their lines. They had heard of the march from Kussowlee of the Treasury guard, expressed themselves as feeling disgraced by its mutiny, marched out to meet the party, seized and confined it with its spoil of Rs. 7,000. Captain Briggs, Superintendent of Hill Roads, who had been specially deputed by the Commander-in-Chief, arrived. The regiment was induced to appoint representatives to confer on the subject of their imaginary wrongs. Their principal requests were the restoration to service of two of their comrades who had been dismissed for mutinous language by sentence of a Court-martial; the payment of arrears of pay due from Government, and a free pardon to all the regiment for what they had done. Their requests were granted; but the conduct of the Kussowlee guard, condemned as it was by the rest of the regiment, could not be overlooked. They were not forgiven. During the progress of these conferences the European inhabitants of Simla had been seized with a panic. Two guns, the signal of the advance from Jutogh of the murdering mutineers, had by some singular mistake been fired; the Bank house, which had been appointed the rendezvous, was soon deserted, and nearly the whole English population became scattered over the surrounding hills. Many took refuge with the neighbouring Chiefs, from whom they received much

Restoration of
order.

Panic of Eu-
ropean inhab-
itants of
Simla.

Restoration of confidence on the march of the Gurkhas to the plains.

Loyalty of Hill Chiefs.

kindness; many reached Dugshai or Subathoo, and were hospitably entertained; but I regret to say the temporary distress among the fugitives was very severe. The Goorkhas, however, marched according to orders in a day or two, and society, freed from the incubus of their presence, recovered its usual tone. During the disturbances at Kussowlee caused by the mutiny of the guard, but after its departure, the police rifled the Treasury. A great part of the plundered money was, however, recovered through the deposition of one of the criminals who turned Queen's evidence. Their Native officer, on hearing of the disclosure of his villainy, committed suicide. No other event of importance took place in this territory. Lord William Hay reports that the Hill Chiefs shewed a good spirit throughout; and his principal trouble was caused by the turbulence of the low population (chiefly Hindoostanees) infesting the large bazars, which required a strong hand to restrain it.

TRANS-SUTLEJ DIVISION.

Events in the Trans-Sutlej Division.

46. It was of the last importance that the peace of this division should be preserved, as it formed the medium through which the supplies and troops from the whole of the Punjab proper had to pass in order to reach Delhi. It was likewise important, as containing the strong forts of Phillour, Kangra, Noorpoor and Brijwara, the sanitarium of Dhurmsala and Dalhousie, and the large Native State of Kupoorthula. This division was also the supply depôt of a large portion of the carriage used in the transport of the troops and stores to Delhi, and Captain Farrington, in his report for his district, mentions the care and labour thus entailed as not the least among his anxieties. I proceed briefly to specify the operations in each district.

Measures adopted at Jullundur.

47. Owing to Major Lake's temporary absence on circuit from the station, Captain Farrington was the only civil officer present at the council which Brigadier Hartley assembled on May 12th. At that council it was determined that Phillour was to be secured instantly against its existing garrison of the

8rd Native Infantry, and an electric telegraph office immediately established there. The telegraph was at work by 10 o'clock the same evening, while 150 men of Her Majesty's 8th Foot relieved the native companies from garrison duty by 3 A. M. of the 13th. Two guns were taken from Phillour to Jullundur and united to the two already there, and the whole placed under a guard of the 8th Queen's Regiment. Two post guns were likewise equipped to render service in any part of the district if required. The tehsel of Jullundur was strengthened to serve as a fort; the men of the Shere Dil Police Battalion were called in from the district; the treasure was placed under a European guard, and all European inhabitants were brought together. The presence of the Raja of Kupoorthula, from whom Captain Farrington had on the very first day solicited a force, tended greatly to keep the suspected Native Infantry regiments in check. The services rendered to the Government by this faithful ally have been made the subject of a separate report. It is therefore sufficient to mention here that his force of 6 guns, 225 horse and 1,100 Infantry was an invaluable assistance to the local authorities in this crisis, and particularly on the night of the mutiny. Under the earnest solicitation of Brigadier Hartley, the treasure was subsequently placed in equal portions under the care of the two native regiments; and owing to the prudent arrangements made by Captain Farrington, the Deputy Commissioner, in forwarding all the several district remittances to Phillour, and in paying away all claims upon Government alternately from the treasure chest in the custody of each regiment, this confidence in the guards did not cause the loss of more than about Rs. 5,000, as the guard of the 36th Native Infantry remained staunch to the last.

Assistance rendered by the Chief of Kapúthala.

Custody of treasure.

48. There had been no lack of evidence to show that a mutinous spirit was abroad in the regiments. Constant fires had occurred in the station, and other signs of a bad feeling had been manifested; but I regret to say that the military authorities disregarded these warnings, placed confidence in their men, neglected an opportunity for disarming them, and

Mutiny of Native troops and action taken.

the outbreak found us unprepared. At 11 p. m. on June 7th a fire broke out in cantonments. When the officers went down to extinguish it they were fired on ; for the whole body of the native troops, with the exception of the Artillery, which opened on the mutineers with grape, and of fragments from each regiment, was in open mutiny. They are supposed to have left the station in two bodies about 1 a. m., one party skirting the Hooshyarpore hills, the larger body making for the Sutlej *via* Phillour. The pursuing force, consisting of a detachment of Her Majesty's 8th Foot, 6 guns and some of the police corps, was not ordered out till 7 a. m., when the hot June sun had already risen and the advantage of a cool night march for them had been lost. Captain Farrington accompanied it with 150 of the Raja of Kupoorthula's men. No rations were sent with the Europeans, nor did any servants accompany them to cook their food. They reached Phugwara, seven miles off, at 11 a. m. Before this time the mutineers were at Phillour, or 17 miles ahead. There they were joined by the 3rd Native Infantry. They seized a boat which had been left on the west side, a small body crossed and brought over more boats, and the whole force crossed leisurely during the day. On the east side they were most gallantly attacked by Mr. G. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana, who worked a gun against them himself, and by Lieutenant Williams of the 4th Sikhs ; but, as they were not supported by the General, who had reached Phillour in the evening and saw and heard the engagement, they could not seriously weaken the mutinous force, which advanced to Loodiana and took possession of the fort. This they evacuated the next morning, but they opened the jail and encouraged the populace to destroy the Church and the Mission premises. At 9 a. m. of the 9th the advance of the Europeans started again in pursuit, crossed the river at 2 in the afternoon and reached Loodiana by sunset, but the General did not arrive till an hour before midnight. At 4 a. m. of the 10th the advance left Loodiana and reached the village of Daylon at 9-30, where they heard that the mutineers were still 10 or 12 miles ahead at Mulair Kotla. By this time the Europeans were exhausted, footsore, and 'dispirited. Their

Operations of
Mr. Ricketts
against muti-
neers at Phil-
laur.

Damage done
at Ludhiāna
by mutineers.

Unsuccessful
pursuit.

officers too saw that it was folly to proceed without supplies or support from the rear, neither of which could be obtained. The pursuit was therefore given up, and the troops returned to Loodiana the same night.

49. The party of the mutineers which went along the Hooshyarpore hills made good its escape before the district officers could hear of its arrival. This event did not, however, seriously affect the district, as the march of the mutineers was too hurried to allow them time for much mischief, and they moved in an orderly manner to give color to the supposition that they were a detachment on Government duty.

50. This mutiny gave rise to an order directing all females to leave Jullundur for Lahore, which was immediately enforced. The 8th Foot shortly afterwards joined Brigadier Nicholson's Movable Column, and assisted in the disarming of the 33rd and 35th Native Infantry, which was effected at Phillour on June 25th. The place of the troops thus withdrawn was supplied by 300 Towana horse sent from Lahore, by a Sikh regiment which Major Lake was requested to raise on the spot, and by extra police which he was authorized to entertain to the number of about 100 horse and 150 foot. The conquest-tenure jagheerdars were also called upon for their quotas of horse, and Captain Farrington enlisted 20 Daoodpootras from Leiah in his troop, thus introducing a foreign element which proved advantageous. In addition to the large number of men so entertained, a considerable number was sent to Delhi to join the Artillery and Guide Corps. Major Lake, however, mainly ascribes the safety not only of this country, but of this division, in this its unprotected state, under Providence, to Raja Rundheer Singh, Aloowalia, and his men. The peace of the district throughout has been excellently preserved, and the 6 per cent. loan fairly subscribed to.

Disarming of
Native troops
at Phillaur.

Value of ser-
vices of Raja
of Kapur-
thala.

51. The first precaution Colonel Abbott adopted in this district was to strengthen the tehseel
Hooshyarpore. and remove into its enclosure 2 guns
from the lines of the native troop of Horse Artillery, where

Events in
Hoshiarpur
and measures
taken.

they were in dangerous proximity to the 33rd Native Infantry. By employing free and convict labor, this task was accomplished by the 15th May. The same day the ladies from the civil station left for Dhurmsala, and a few weeks afterwards the post office was removed from cantonments into the civil lines and a minute examination of all suspicious correspondence commenced. Colonel Abbott also organized a system of nightly patrolling, while, in his own house, he, with the two Assistant Commissioners, Lieutenants Paske and Millar, kept a constant watch. The station was guarded by about 800 men of the Aloowalia, Rajori, Mundee and Towana troops, by new levies, and by part of the Sher Dils. On the 23rd May the prisoners were removed into the Brijwara fort, which was then adapted to answer both as a jail and as a fortress, and garrisoned by police instead of by the usual guard of the 33rd Native Infantry. A conspiracy was discovered on the 12th July amongst the prisoners. The five ringleaders were tried by commission and executed by sunset of the same day, and all resistance thereby anticipated. The only disturbances in this district were caused by the incursion of servants from the large station of Simla, who spread exaggerated reports of the panic at that station, and by the rapid march of the small detachment of the Jullundur mutineers, who walked 130 miles in 54 hours and escaped along the hills before notice had reached the head-quarters of the district. Lieutenant W. Paske was twice detached with parties of horse—once to watch the Roopur mutineers, who were afterwards disarmed at Umballa, and once to pursue the flying portion of the Jullundur force.

Services of
Lieutenant
W. Paske.

Internal ad-
ministration
of district.

52. Regarding the internal administration, Colonel Abbott reports :—

“No cases in dispute fell into arrears in the revenue department : even the appeals were disposed of regularly.

“Treasure has been escorted from tehseels to Hooshiarpore, from Hooshiarpore to Jullundur, Phillour and Umballa, without the slightest excitement.

"The Educational department has been steadily at work. Revenue has been paid. The courts of justice have been open; not a highway robbery has occurred; and for this great tranquillity I trust I am sufficiently thankful to Divine Providence; and the people have expressed their unfeigned thankfulness for such tranquillity by subscribing one lakh of rupees (£ 10,000) to the 6 per cent. loan and by general illumination on the news of the occupation of Delhi.

53. The peculiarities of this district are its mountainous nature, the number of rivers and streams that traverse it, and the number

Kangra.

Events in Kangra and measures adopted.

of petty chieftains and hill forts which are dispersed over its area,—the first two causes combining to make communication difficult and uncertain, and the last rendering it imperative, especially in times of anxiety like that under review, that the District officer should be kept well informed of every event occurring anywhere. Very much of its tranquillity depends on the preservation of the two strong fortresses of Kangra and Noorpore. 'He who holds the fort (of Kangra),' say the country-people, 'holds the hills.' Major Taylor, the Deputy Commissioner, was compelled to entertain a very large number of men to watch the ferries and the *nakahs* or hill passes, and his anxiety was further increased by the manifestation in two instances of an uneasy feeling among the Hill Chiefs. The first was by Raja Pertab Chund of Teera, who seemed inclined to raise troops on his own account. Major Lake with great promptitude removed the Kutoch thanadar of Teera, who was one of his adherents, and substituted a Mahomedan, who has since afforded constant and true information regarding the Raja's movements, and no outbreak took place. There was, however, one petty rising originated by a pretender, of unknown origin, to the extinct title and kingdom of the late Rai Thakur Singh of Kullu. Under the impression that British power was annihilated, this person endeavoured to excite a rising against Gyan Singh, the rightful heir, among the people of Kullu and Seoraj. Major Hay, Assistant Commissioner at Kullu, had, however, been on the watch, and on the first overt act apprehended the *soi-disant* Pertab Singh and executed him with five of his chief men. Sixteen

Uneasy feeling among Hill Chiefs.

Suppression of rebellion in Kulu.

other conspirators were imprisoned by the same commission. A large store of powder and arms found in his fort, most of which seemed to have been long buried there, was destroyed.

Occupation
of the fort
of Kangra
and other
measures
taken at
Dharmasala.

54. A great impression was made upon the people by the energy evinced by Majors Lake and Taylor in occupying the Kangra Fort. This step was taken early on the morning of May 14th, when a party of Captain Younghusband's Sher Dil (or lion-hearted) police were marched into the citadel. This was further defended by a howitzer taken from the fort below. The bulk of the treasure was at the same time sent into the citadel, and the remainder lodged in the newly-fortified police station. Every house in Dhurmsala was guarded by a detail of police or new levies, a part of which was also detached as the jail guard. The post-office was brought under a strict surveillance, the ferries and passes guarded, and all vagrants seized and brought before the magistrates for examination. When information of the mutinies of the native troops at Jhelum and Sealkote reached Kangra, Major Taylor, acting under my instructions, disarmed the left wing of the 4th Native Infantry with the aid of the men of the Police Battalion, and marched 34 miles the same night, with a part of the same body and some Sikh Cavalry, to Noorpore to disarm the right wing of the same regiment stationed at that place. The men had, however, voluntarily surrendered their arms to their Commanding Officer, Major Wilkie, at his simple request, before Major Taylor could arrive.

Voluntary
surrender of
arms by wing
of 4th Native
Infantry at
Nurpur.

55. Regarding this Major Lake very truly observes that it was "one of the most remarkable episodes of this eventful Mutiny, and one which contrasts most favorably with the horrible outrages recorded elsewhere."

"Too much cannot be said in favor of the regiment, which I hope will not be forgotten when rewards are given to the loyal and well-disposed. It is as creditable to the men as it is to Major Wilkie and his officers, both European and native."

LAHORE DIVISION.

56. This is the chief division of the Punjab. In it there lie the two largest commercial cities of this province, of which one is also the capital. The country-side is studded with the seats of the native nobility, who under the Sikh rule coveted grants in land in these districts as being near the metropolis and affording conveniences for their constant attendance at court. The population of the division amounts to one-third of the population of the whole Punjab. It is watered by four of the five rivers that give their name to the Province. Its value as regards the preservation of British rule in India could not be overrated. These several circumstances greatly increased the labors and anxieties of the officers on whom the responsibility of preserving peace in it lay. Nobly have they acquitted themselves, and I shall have occasion to bring forward instances of vigor and cool self-reliance on their part which have nowhere been surpassed. Foremost among them stands the Commissioner, Mr. A. A. Roberts. The details in each district will shew the value of his services and the successful earnestness which marked all he did.

Events in
the Lahore
Division.

Services of
Mr. A. A.
Roberts, the
Commissioner.

57. I have already mentioned the important move which gave us a foothold in North
Lahore. India when the empire seemed well nigh overwhelmed by the flood of mutiny which had burst forth so uncontrollably in the North-Western Provinces, *viz.*, the disarming of the troops at Meean Meer. Our danger on the morning of May 13th was far greater than we had conceived. A plot had been laid for the simultaneous seizure of the fort and the outbreak of the troops in cantonments. To understand the importance of this move it must be borne in mind that the fort commands the city of Lahore; that it contains the treasure and the arsenal; that at Ferozepore, 50 miles distant, there is another arsenal, the largest in this part of India; and had these two fallen, the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab must have been for the time irrevocably lost, the lives of all Europeans in these regions sacrificed, Delhi could not have been taken, and India

Lahore
District.

Frustration
of a plot to
seize the fort
at Lahore.

must have been *ab initio* re-conquered. But He who rules over all things had seen fit to save our country from so great a shock. The designs of the conspirators were frustrated. By 5 A. M. of the 13th three companies of Her Majesty's 81st Foot marched into the fort and relieved the Native Infantry guard; while the ringing of the ramrods, as the remaining companies of that regiment on the parade-ground at Meean Meer obeyed the order to load, sounded the knell of sepoy power in the Punjab. The three regiments of Native Infantry and one of Light Cavalry were cowed by that stirring sound and by the sight of 12 Horse Artillery guns charged with destruction to them should they resist. The Infantry piled arms and marched off with silent and angry astonishment, the Cavalry unbuckled their swords and threw them on the ground; and the capital of the Punjab was saved.

Saving of the
Capital of the
Punjab.

Anxiety on
receipt of
news from
Ferozepore.

58. The next night, May 14th, at 10 P. M., Mr. Roberts, the Commissioner, accompanied by one Military and two Civil officers, brought to my house a paper, in the Persian character, which had just reached him with an injunction of secrecy from the writer. It was a report from a Police Officer stationed on the Sutlej giving a confused account of the attack on the Ferozepore entrenchment that afternoon by the 45th Native Infantry. It gave not any account of the result of the action. We conjectured that my express of the previous day to Brigadier Innes had failed of its design; that the sepoys had gained the arsenal, had crossed the bridge-of-boats, and were in full march on Lahore. In the earnest deliberation which ensued, other circumstances occurred to our minds, which seemed to make our position in Lahore critical to the last degree. A Punjabee police corps, the only one we had to carry on the Civil duties, and which furnished personal guards to all the Civil officers at the station, was reputed to be disaffected. (Happily this turned out to be quite false.) Lieutenant Gulliver, Engineers, volunteered to ride off to cantonments to acquaint the Brigadier with what we had just learnt, and beg him to do what he could to defend himself. Messrs. Egerton, Deputy Commissioner, and Elliott, Assistant Commissioner, went round the station to take note

Measures
taken.

of what might be going on. They returned reporting all quiet. Shortly afterwards, Lieutenant Gulliver also came back, bearing from Brigadier Corbett the joyful news of the repulse of the outbreak and the comparative safety of Ferozepore, the Brigadier having received a despatch direct from Brigadier Innes. There could be no doubt that there had been a plot arranged between the Lahore and Ferozepore brigades; for on that same forenoon (May 14th) I received two hasty notes from Brigadier Corbett saying that all the troops in Meean Meer were preparing to desert bodily. This caused a panic among the residents of Anarkullee, and a rendezvous of all male residents took place at the Central Jail. The guns and Her Majesty's 81st Regiment were, however, so quickly got ready that the natives retired into their lines. Some who did escape were seized by the villagers of the tract called the Manjha, and taken to Mr. Thomas, Assistant Commissioner at Kusoor, the chief town of that part of the Manjha which lies in the Lahore District and on the direct route to Ferozepore. Mr. Thomas sent them in to Lahore. I may here notice the eminent services rendered to the State by this officer. His experience, activity and strong common-sense induced me to place full reliance on him, and I know that to the District officer his aid was invaluable. The stalwart Sikhs who form the population of the Manjha were wholly on our side throughout. Many villages have been almost decimated by the number of recruits who have flocked to form our new regiments in memory of the bygone days when they bravely fought against us under the banners of the Khalsa.

News of repulse of the outbreak at Ferozepore.

Panic at Lahore and measures adopted.

Services of Mr. Thomas, Assistant Commissioner, Kasur.

59. Defensive measures were at once adopted in Anarkullee as follows. The fort was provisioned for 6 months for 4,000 men and every gate blocked up but one. All the men of the various Punjab regiments who happened to be on leave at their homes in this neighbourhood, were called in and collected under the command of the late lamented Captain Travers. They furnished picquets for guard all round the Central Jail and at other places where danger seemed to

Defensive measures adopted in Anarkali.

**Anarkali
Volunteers.**

threaten. A company of volunteers from the European residents of Anarkullee was raised in 36 hours to the number of 130 men, and for some days Anarkullee was guarded only by them, a half company of Soobhan Khan's Police Battalion and a few ordinary police. A rendezvous was appointed, and danger signals arranged. A chain of mounted police was thrown out along the roads leading to cantonments, which for a length of time were patrolled during the night by the junior Civil and Military officers of the station. The usual precautions in regard to ferries, sepoys' letters, &c., were vigorously observed.

**Execution of
two men of the
35th Native
Infantry at
Anarkali.**

60. On the 26th and 27th, the Guide Corps passed through on their famous march to Delhi, and about a week afterwards the Movable Column under Brigadier Neville Chamberlain arrived. On June 9th, two men of the 35th Native Infantry, which was one of the regiments composing the column, were blown from guns on the Anarkullee parade-ground, by sentence of a drum-head Court-martial, for sedition and intended mutiny.

**Petty events
showing the
excited state of
men's minds.**

61. Various petty events occurred shewing the excited state of men's minds. A trooper of the disarmed 10th Irregulars on his way down with his regiment seized a sword, and made a feint of attacking several persons, but gave up his weapon quietly at last. He was punished with five years' imprisonment. A man armed with a sword rushed out from one of the city gates, cut down the sentry, and was eventually shot by a mounted policeman while making for the bridge-of-boats. Many persons fell under suspicion from the discovery of papers which, to say the least, were of very questionable loyalty, and several trials of such parties were held. The enigmatical way in which the papers were sometimes worded, or the care with which the real treason had been concealed, had the effect the criminals desired. No proof could be found, and in several cases it was found needful to release on security men whose characters were by no means immaculate. Those who could not give

security were detained in jail. On the 23rd May, the native newspapers were placed under a strict censorship, which has ever since up to the present time been rigorously enforced, under the control of Mr. Perkins, Assistant Commissioner. On the 23rd and 24th July, restrictions were placed on the sale of lead, sulphur, percussion caps, &c. The Hindoostanee population, including civil officials and domestic servants, had been disarmed on the 29th June; and on the 23rd August a census of all unemployed Hindoostanees was taken with a view to their expulsion. The superintendence of this compulsory exodus and the arrest and deportation of numbers of vagrants formed no small part of the Deputy Commissioner's work. Bi-weekly kafilas were formed of Hindoostanees. They were sent down to Hurreekie ferry under guards of police, with lists signed by a District officer, and duly checked at certain stations. As many as 2,536 Hindoostanees were thus sent home during the siege and in the few weeks immediately succeeding the capture of Delhi.

Censorship of
the Native
Press.

Deportation
of Hindu-
stanis.

62. On the 30th July, the 26th Native Infantry mutinied at Meean Meer, and, murdering Major Spencer, their Commanding Officer, one Non-Commissioned European, and two Native Officers, fled. They escaped during a heavy duststorm, which concealed them from observation and kept us in ignorance of their route. They were destroyed by Mr. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner of Umritsur, on the banks of the Ravee. This event shewed the necessity for some means of tracking any future body of deserters, especially as the loyalty of the remaining regiments was very doubtful. Four strong police posts were established in villages which lie beyond the plain upon which the cantonment is built, and the men were instructed to throw out chains of sentries and to watch narrowly all passers-by. On the 17th September Mr. R. E. Egerton, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, was called suddenly down to the south-west part of his district in order to prevent the taint of the Khurrul insurrection from reaching the Mussulman population of that part of the country. Mr. Perkins, Assistant Commissioner, was also for a few days

Mutiny of the
26th Native
Infantry at
Mián Mīr.

Insurrection
in Gugerā as
it affected the
Lahore Dis-
trict.

Services of
Mr. Berkeley,
Extra Assist-
ant Commis-
sioner.

stationed at a remote police post into the boundaries of which emissaries from the insurgents were known to have come. The appearance with Mr. Egerton of half a regiment of Wale's Horse and other demonstrations deterred the Khurruls of the district from joining their rebellious kinsmen. Mr. Egerton was out on another occasion for three or four weeks in company with the Commissioner, Mr. Roberts, in the Googaira District on similar duty. The civil charge of this important station was confided on these occasions to Mr. R. Berkeley, Extra Assistant Commissioner, who has well fulfilled the trust, and has throughout displayed much vigor.

Measures for
reducing the
inmates of the
Lahore jail.

63. In the two jails at Lahore there were confined, on the 11th May, 2,379 prisoners. It was not unreasonable to suppose that, should the native troops mutiny, they would release all these desperadoes, as they did at Agra and elsewhere. It was also likely that the troops themselves would have to be put in jail. Both these considerations pointed to the propriety of emptying the jails as far as possible. With this view I authorized the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to release, on payment of a fine, or even in some cases unconditionally, all such men as were ill, disabled, or had nearly served out their terms. Obedience to this order reduced the numbers considerably. Instructions were also issued to Judicial officers to punish by fine and flogging, as far as possible, rather than by imprisonment. The jails were fortified, the draw-bridges removed, the guards strengthened, and a supply of blue-lights and rockets sent in to serve as signals in case of attack by night. See Appendix No. VIII.

Events in the
Amritsar Dis-
trict.

64. The city which gives its name to this district is the principal mart in the Punjab. It is commanded by the celebrated fortress of Govindgurh. It is to the Sikh what the Isle of Mona was to the Briton of Julius Caesar's day; what Mecca is to the Mahomedan and Benares to the Hindoo. On Umritsur, as the pivot, might be said to turn the loyalty of the Khalsa. Did it fail us, the Sikhs might be expected to rebel; did it stand firm, their attachment to us was secure.

It was a source of much uneasiness that the stronghold was occupied by a detachment of the 59th Native Infantry, with only 70 European Artillerymen. Captain Lawrence, Captain of Police, and Mr. Roberts, Commissioner, drove over on the 13th May, immediately after the disarming at Meean Meer, to arrange for its safety. On their return to Lahore the following day they represented to Brigadier Corbett the emergent necessity for pushing a body of European foot into it. He instantly complied, and, notwithstanding the alarming events of that day as narrated above, half a company of the 81st Foot was run across the same night in *ekkas*, or native one-horse gigs. It entered Govindgarh peaceably by dawn of the 15th. The 59th still remained in the fort, but, as soon as Europeans were available, the latter took their place. The 59th was disarmed by Brigadier-General Nicholson, Commanding the Movable Column, on the 9th July. As soon as the outbreak occurred, one of the first measures adopted by Mr. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner, was to provision this fortress. It was rapidly and thoroughly effected without exciting any particular notice, and the fort then became one of our trusty bulwarks, which it had not hitherto been. Mr. MacNaghten, Assistant Commissioner, at the same time went out on the Lahore road to raise the country (a part of the Manjha) against any deserters who might come by. Rewards were offered for any sepoy who had deserted; the smothered martial spirit of the people was kindled into a flame; escape for a deserter was hopeless, for every village became to him as a nest of hornets. The temper of the people was one great cause of the achievement which has made the Umritsur District famous in the annals of 1857.

Occupation of
Fort of Govindgarh by
European
troops.

Disarming of
59th Native
Infantry.

Provisioning
of Govind-
garh.

Raising of
the Manjha
against the
sepoys.

65. On the 31st July a large body of disarmed sepoys appeared on the left bank of the Ravee, near Balghat, asking for information as to the fords. The people's most curious attention was aroused. They amused the sepoys for a few hours with various pretences, while runners hastened away to the neighbouring tehseel of Ajnala and even on to Umritsur. Prem Nath, Tehseeldar of Ajnala, quickly brought down every available Policeman he had, and it was found

Destruction of
26th Native
Infantry by
Mr. Cooper.

that these men were the 26th Native Infantry, who had mutinied the previous day at Lahore, and, after committing four murders, had travelled across country, off the main lines of communication, 40 miles in 19 hours. A fight ensued: 150 men fell under the resolution of the villagers and police. By 4 P. M. Mr. Cooper arrived with about 80 horse, accompanied by Sirdar Jodh Singh, Extra Assistant, an old Sikh chieftain. The mutineers had escaped by a ford to an island in midstream. They were captured and executed next morning, 45 having died during the night from fatigue and exhaustion. Our critical position at this time justified the awful punishment of these mutineers, 237 in number. About 42 subsequently captured were sent back to Lahore, and there, by sentence of Court-martial, blown from guns in presence of the whole brigade.

66. Many Sikhs, however, on service with their regiment in the North-Western Provinces, failed their country and their masters. Many were drawn into the vortex of revolt, and after the fall of Delhi tried to steal home. A close search was made for them. When the regiments to which they belonged had murdered their officers the men were executed. In other cases they were punished by different terms of imprisonment. This operation was carried on, more or less, throughout the Punjab, but it is here noticed as many of them had their homes in this district.

67. The usual amount of disaffection was found amongst the Hindoostanees in this district, and the same precautions were adopted as elsewhere in regard to their letters, the stoppage of the ferries, and the expulsion of vagrants and emissaries from Delhi. Mr. Aitchison, Assistant Commissioner, was despatched on two occasions into the interior to guard a river or to give confidence to a sub-division, and Mr. Cooper himself for many weeks remained out on

punishment of
ikh sepoysof
utinous regi-
ents return-
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expedition to Ataree on May 14th to raise the country. Here he was willingly seconded by Diwan Narain Singh, the agent of Sardar Kahn Singh, Atareewala.

68. A sepoy and a native doctor of the 35th Native Infantry were hung at different times for seditious language. The executions produced a marked change in the demeanour of the people, and the moral effect of the presence of General Nicholson's Movable Column, at different periods aggregating about a month, was great.

Execution of
a sepoy and a
native doctor
of the 35th
Native Infan-
try.

69. It might have been expected that the subscription to the 6 per cent. loan from the wealthy cities of Umritsur and Lahore would have been large. The opposite was the case. Their contributions were inappreciable. Men worth half a crore of rupees offered a subscription of Rs. 1,000 and others on the same scale. Their niggard distrust of our Government speaks very unfavourably for their loyalty, and is in strong contrast with the eager co-operation of the rural population.

6 per cent.
loan.

70. One of the first precautions adopted here by the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Naesmyth, was to send his Rs. 7,00,000 of treasure into the fort of Govindgurh at Umritsur. It was put under a guard of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, and run through the 44 miles on the night of the 20th May by relays of *bylees*, or light two-bullock carts. On the 3rd June a feeling of still greater security was created in the station by the dismissal of the detachment of the 59th Native Infantry to join its headquarters at Umritsur. Its place over the treasury was taken by a party of the Police Battalion, from which corps also guards had been furnished to the houses of all European residents until the 59th left. The jail was carefully watched, and interviews between the prisoners and any of their friends forbidden, lest any design to break jail should be formed.

Events in the
Gurdáspur
District.

Precautionary
measures of
the Deputy
Commissioner.

71. There was an extraordinary number of Hindoostanees in this district, mostly employed on the works of the Baree Doab Canal, which has its head-quarters at Madhopoor. This public enterprise has not hitherto attracted natives of the

Number of
Hindustanis
in the Gurdás-
pur District.

Punjab in the proportion that might have been expected. Many of the native clerks, contractors, and workmen are natives of Hindoostan. As such, it was needful to watch them closely, and to resort to espionage that any projected disturbance might be stifled at once. Two Civil officers, Hindoostanees of some rank in the Government service, fell under such serious suspicion that they were removed to other places, and ulterior measures against them were at one time contemplated.

Measures for
guarding the
Ravi.

72. It was impossible to guard the river thoroughly here, as it was frequently fordable, and owing to its proximity to the mountains, and consequent liability to sudden freshets, no dependence could be placed on it as a barrier. However, all stray beams and planks which could be bound up in rafts were cleared away, all the boats but two were withdrawn or scuttled, and on receipt of the news of the Jhelum mutiny on the 7th July these two were also sunk. The river was therefore considered temporarily impassable. Two days after this came tidings of the march of the 46th Native Infantry and wing of the 9th Light Cavalry in mutiny from Sealkote towards Goordaspoor. The news had been also telegraphed to Brigadier-General Nicholson, who was lying at Umritsur with his Movable Column. The signaler was drunk and the message was not delivered, but an express sent by mail-cart reached early in the morning. He was earnestly requested to intercept the mutineers, and, with his characteristic energy, he started the same evening with 6 guns under Captain Bouchier, 600 men of Her Majesty's 52nd Foot, some raw Sikh levies, and a few half-disciplined Sikh horse.

Advance of
Sialkot mu-
tineers and
their annihi-
lation by
Brigadier
Nicholson.

73. To the commercial men of Umritsur and Lahore the absence of a railway is compensated for by the hundreds of native gigs, or *ekkas*, which ply unceasingly between the two cities. On the day I allude to the District officers of both places were ordered to seize every *ekka*, *bylee* and pony that was to be seen, and to despatch them under police guards to General Nicholson's camp at Umritsur on urgent public service. The vehicles, on their arrival there, were promptly

loaded with British soldiers, and the force started at dusk for Goordaspoor, which is at a distance of 44 miles from Umritsur, reaching it at 3 p. m. of the 11th July. It was joined at Battala by Mr. Roberts, Commissioner, and Captain Perkins, Assistant Commissioner of Umritsur. The next day General Nicholson was told that the mutineers had crossed to the left bank of the Ravee by the ford at Trimmoo. He marched and met them drawn up in line near the river. The 9th Light Cavalry charged the Artillery fearlessly on both flanks and cut down some of the gunners; the 46th Native Infantry advanced boldly to take the guns in the face of a storm of ~~thrape~~ which mowed them down by scores, and it was not till the 52nd leaped out on them with the bayonet that they turned and fled. The remnant of the mutinous force took refuge on an island, where they erected a battery for their gun and collected their women and their spoil. At daylight on the 16th July they were attacked in this their last stronghold. Numbers were drowned or shot in the water, many were killed in the flight, and the prisoners were all executed by martial law. On the 18th the column returned to Goordaspoor. Many of the mutineers were brought in by the villagers and executed by Captain Adams, Assistant Commissioner, and Mr. Naesmyth in commission. Most of the party that escaped to Jummoo were made over to us by the Maharaja's officers and tried by Lieutenant McMahon and Captain Adams at Bheekho Chuck.

Surrender and punishment of mutineers who escaped into Jammu territory.

74. During the first week in August a remnant, numbering about 25 men, of the 26th Native Infantry from Lahore found their way into the swamps of this district. They were all killed by a party of the new levy under Messrs. Garbett and Hanna, of the Canal Department, and by a separate little party of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry under Major Jackson, who was seriously wounded.

Destruction of a party of the 26th Native Infantry in the Gurdáspur District.

75. The raising of the levy was an important part of the work of the District officers. It was entrusted to Captain Adams, and the force has been pronounced one of the best bodies of men that have been recently raised in the

Raising of a levy in the Gurdáspur District.

Punjab. On this head Mr. Naesmyth makes the following remarks, which I insert as being generally applicable :—

“ This general enlistment was one of the most popular, as it was among the most effective measures adopted by Government, and contributed in a vast degree to link the popular feeling in this part of the country with the British cause. A mutual interest and sympathy was created to support that cause, which had now become common ; deep and earnest were the aspirations which vibrated in every homestead, and evinced that the military spirit of the nation had been gratified, and afforded an assurance that its valiant sons would not be backward in vindicating the trust bestowed.”

Events in the
Sialkot Dis-
trict.

76. At this station were located, at the time of the Meerut and Delhi outbreak, the following troops :—Colonel Dawes' troop, Horse Artillery ; Captain Bouchier's (European) battery, ditto ditto ; Her Majesty's 52nd Foot ; 9th Light Cavalry 35th Native Infantry ; 46th ditto ditto ; Musketry Dep 27 Europeans and 165 natives.

77. When the Movable Column was formed all these troops were withdrawn, with the exception of the 46th Native Infantry and a wing of the 9th Cavalry. Brigadier Brind, who was in command, remonstrated against being left in such critical times with only Hindoostanee troops. He was requested to remove all cause for alarm by disarming them. He did not see his way clear to do this, and the column marched on. Mr. Monckton, Deputy Commissioner, in conjunction with his Assistants, Messrs. McMahon and Jones, and Syud Qaim Ali, Extra Assistant Commissioner, had carried out the various orders which had reached him from the Commissioner, when on the 9th July the whole civil power was suspended by the simultaneous mutiny of all the native troops. The Cavalry attacked the Brigadier, and a trooper shot him in the back. He died of the wound the next day. Doctor Graham, Superintending Surgeon, was shot by his daughter's side as he drove her in his gig. Doctor Graham, Medical Store-keeper, was killed in his carriage among his children, one of whom was grazed by the ball. Captain Bishop, Brigade Major, was shot in sight of the fort, whither he was fleeing for shelter. The

Mutiny of
Native troops
at Sialkot.
Murder of
officers and
Europeans.

Reverend Mr. Hunter, his wife and infant child were murdered by one of the jail guard, a Hindoostanee. The rest of the Europeans crowded into a small fort belonging to Raja Tej Singh, which he had previously placed at the disposal of the Government officers, and which proved, humanly speaking, the salvation of the European residents. The troops in the meanwhile released from the jail the prisoners, more than 300 in number, plundered the Treasury of stamp-paper and cash, burnt the court-houses and all their valuable records, blew up the magazines, and, after revelling at large till midday, went off with all the officers' carriages and horses, the station gun, and all their spoil, towards Goordaspoor. As evening closed, Dr. Butler and his family, with Captain Saunders and his family, entered the fort. They had been concealed in an out-house all day by a faithful Sikh watchman. Mr. Monckton, who was very ill, was carried in on a *cot* by some villagers. Colonel Farquharson and Captain Caulfield had been offered high pay and residence at a hill station during the hot months if they would consent to command the mutineers ! This was during the day, while they were detained in the quarter-guard of the 46th Native Infantry. They also reached the fort in the evening in safety.

78. Although the mutineers had vanished out of sight, it was by no means certain that they had left the neighbourhood. The fugitives beheld from the ramparts of the fort long lines of rustics pouring in from the villages to pillage and to destroy what was to them useless, but to the imprisoned owners priceless and irreparable. The detachments of the Police Battalion and of the Mounted Police had evidently made common cause with the mutineers ; the lower ranks of the Hindoostanee officials generally had followed in their wake : the only troops there were to guard the fort were a few raw Sikh levies, and they were but poorly armed. Many of them had never fired a musket, but they were loyal, and were the Englishmen's only earthly hope. Lieutenant Montgomerie, of the 9th Light Cavalry, escaped to Goojranwala on horseback, thence on the mail-cart to Lahore, and gave the tidings to Mr. Roberts, who communicated them at the dead of night

Departure of
mutineers to-
wards Gur-
dáspur.

Experiences
of certain offi-
cers.

Plundering of
the station of
Sialkot.

Escape of
Lieutenant
Montgomerie
with news to
Lahore.

to me. We immediately held a council and requested Brigadier Corbett to post guns and Europeans at the bridge-of-boats over the Ravee. An express was sent to Ferozepore to deprive the 10th Cavalry of their horses, and another to Major Taylor at Kangra to disarm the sepoys in that fortress and at Noorpore. This was done with a view of preventing their joining the Sealkote mutineers in case they escaped General Nicholson's column. Brigadier Corbett cheerfully acquiesced, and Lahore then seemed safe from an attack. Early next day Captain (now Colonel) R. C. Lawrence, Commanding Police Battalion, and Captain Cripps, Deputy Commissioner, Goojranwala, were deputed by me to Sealkote as a special commission, to try summarily and summarily to punish all offenders, especially the unfaithful police detachments. They hung the two principal native officers of the foot and mounted police; they hung the Overseer of the jail, and many others. They levied a fine of Rs. 7,000 on the marauders' villages as compensation to those whose property had been so wantonly destroyed, and they required the instant surrender of all property plundered on pain of death. The station was scoured of rebels, and a few days afterwards the refugees came out of the fort into the empty barracks of Her Majesty's 52nd. Lieutenant McMahon, Assistant Commissioner, who during Mr. Monckton's illness and under very difficult circumstances had acted vigorously, went out with 300 men to the frontier of Cashmere. He encamped at Bheekho Chuck and induced Maharaja Golab Sing's officers to give up 141 mutineers, who had sought refuge in that territory; most of them were executed by order of Lieutenant McMahon and Captain Adams, Assistant Commissioner of Goordaspoor, who sat in commission to try them. Some were sent in to Sealkote and capitally punished there. The destruction of the main body of the runaways by General Nicholson is noted in the report on Goordaspoor.

Deputation of
Captains
Lawrence and
Cripps to
Siálkot to
restore order.

Deputation of
Lieutenant
McMahon to
the frontier of
Kashmir.

Surrender
and punish-
ment of muti-
neers who
took refuge in
Kashmír.

Change of
Deputy Com-
missioners at
Siálkot.

79. Mr. Monckton, Deputy Commissioner, was laid aside by illness on the 8th July. Captain Elliott from Goojerat took his place on the 15th, and the gradual recapture of the liberated convicts, recovery of the stolen cash and

stamp-paper and other miscellaneous duties have occupied him and Messrs. McMahon and Jones very fully. About 53,000 rupees worth of stamps have been recovered, and a good deal out of the 41,000 rupees which the mutineers took. The bulk of the treasure had been lodged in the fort before the mutiny.

80. Goojranwala is a little civil station on the high road from Lahore to Peshawur. As in all other places, the Deputy Commissioner was burdened with a body of mutinous soldiers as his Treasury guard. In this case the men were of the 46th Native Infantry; they were quickly got rid of by an order to them to rejoin their corps at Sealkote. This was obeyed. Its operation left Captain Cripps, officiating Deputy Commissioner, with 7 horsemen and 35 foot police to defend 3 European officers, 2,00,000 rupees of Government treasure, and a jail full of convicts. This state of things could not last, especially as the Treasury was an insecure building and could not be held as it possessed no well. The station might be attacked, either by the three native regiments from Sealkote or by the four native regiments from Lahore. It lay between the two places, and a junction of the mutinous brigades might reasonably be expected. To avert danger as far as possible an old tomb and its circumjacent garden were fortified, provisions were thrown in, and the treasure was sent in to Lahore. Recruits were called for from the people, and they eagerly thronged in. During six months about 700 men were raised. From this body large drafts were made into three Punjab regiments; 250 remained on duty at the station; 100 were sent down as policemen to the North-Western Provinces; and even while under training the whole body was used as ferry guards, jail guards and escorts. Early in July the Deputy Commissioner hastened away to Goojerat, 35 miles off, on the news of the Jhelum mutiny. There he mounted his 100 men on camels, and went away, another journey of 35 miles, to the very bank of the Jhelum. He learnt there that the Jhelum mutiny had ended, and on his hasty march back he was informed that a formidable one.

Events in the
Gujranwala
District.

Precautions
taken by the
Deputy Com-
missioner.

had broken out at Sealkote, only 35 miles from his own station. He hurried back to Goojranwala, but found, to his satisfaction, that it had not been threatened, the men having gone a different way.

Precautions
against the
Karrals.

81. In the end of September Captain Cripps was called to traverse the southern part of his district, which abuts on the Bar, as the Khurruls had risen, and might be expected to attack some large towns under his jurisdiction. Again a forced march brought a body of the Sikh levies, under his personal command, to the suspected districts; and the people, if they had any evil intentions, were overawed. Order continued to reign throughout that territory.

Change of
officers.

82. In October Colonel Clarke took charge of the district, and Captain Cripps was transferred to Ferozepore on the appointment of Major Marsden to Googaira. The people of Goojranwala seemed to have been very well affected throughout, and the 6 per cent. loan gained considerable accessions from the moneyed men of the country towns.

JHELM DIVISION.

Events in the
Jhelum Divi-
sion.

Difficulties of
the situation.

83. Mr. Thornton, Commissioner of this division, had to contend with the difficulties created by the proximity of the independent kingdom of Cashmere, by the number of restless tribes whose home is in our own territory, and by the mountainous nature of the country. The chief events of interest are the mutiny of a part of the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum, on the 7th July, and the attack on the sanitarium of Murree by the villagers on the 2nd September.

84. The division was not so strategically important as the Cis-Sutlej States, nor was it politically so valuable as the Peshawur or Lahore Division; but to preserve peace in it and contentment among its inhabitants was imperative, owing to the large number of warlike tribes who find their dwelling in its valleys, hills and plains. This object was happily accomplished by the entertainment in British service of many of their martial spirits, who chafed at inaction, and would probably have fretted us had not a legitimate object been given them whereon to spend their strength; upwards of 1,000 horse

were raised from one tribe alone, the Towanas in the Shahpoor District. Mr. Ouseley, the Deputy Commissioner, describes his relief at their departure as great.

85. The alarm at this station was considerable, as there was no European force to restrain the native battery of Artillery and the two regiments (14th and 39th Native Infantry). The 39th were ordered to march without their magazines towards Shahpoor for orders. Their destination was Dera Ismail Khan, but it was an object to avoid any resistance which might have broken out at Jhelum, by keeping them ignorant of their future station. They were sent down the left bank of the Jhelum, and reached Dera Ismail Khan without giving trouble. The Native Artillery was ordered to Lahore and there afterwards disarmed. The only regiment which remained was the 14th Native Infantry. The Chief Commissioner resolved to disarm it, notwithstanding the Commanding Officer's assurances of its loyalty. Two companies were ordered to Rawul Pindee on pretence of forming a treasure party, but in truth to weaken the regiment. This move left but 500 men at Jhelum. Early on the morning of the 7th July a force of Europeans and guns, which had been sent rapidly down from Rawul Pindee, moved towards the parade-ground of the 14th. It was joined on its way by the Sikhs of the 14th. The sepoys, seeing the advancing column at a distance, began firing on their officers, broke, fled to their lines, and there defended themselves against our force till 1 p. m. By that time they were dislodged, and fled to a neighbouring village. This battle had, however, cost the lives of many of our Europeans. Colonel Ellice, Commanding the detachment of Her Majesty's 24th, was dangerously wounded and Captain Spring was killed. The heat of the July sun told terribly upon the English troops. The three guns (6-pounders) proved useless against mud walls and the fortified guard-room of the 14th, and when after desperate fighting the lines were cleared of mutineers, the troops were too exhausted from heat, toil and want of food to follow up their advantage. At 4 p. m. Colonel Gerrard, who had assumed command after

Events in
the Jhelum
District.
Precautions
taken.

Measures for
reducing the
native garri-
son.

Mutiny of the
14th Native
Infantry.

Our casual-
ties.

Unsuccessful
operations
against the
mutineers.

Flight of
mutineers and
their subse-
quent destruc-
tion.

Colonel Ellice's fall, ordered an attack on the village to which the sepoys had retreated. The street fighting proved disastrous to our men; the guns were brought up too close to the houses, the gunners and horses were mowed down by the fire of the mutineers, ammunition on our side ran short, and a retreat was sounded. Two guns were brought off the field; the third, after a most gallant defence of it by Lieutenant Battye, Assistant Commissioner, in command of 30 police horse, and two or three other ineffectual attempts to rescue it, was captured by the mutineers and used against us. Both sides bivouacked on the field. Early in the morning it was found that the enemy had fled. The forethought displayed by Major Browne, Deputy Commissioner, in removing the magazine of the 14th from their lines before the second action probably contributed much to their speedy flight, as it deprived them of any further supply of ball cartridge. The main body of the fugitives crossed into the Cashmere territory, and were subsequently surrendered by the authorities to our Government. Many stragglers were seized by the Police, some were drowned, and 144 were killed in the fight. Only about 40 men of the whole 500 who opposed us are still at large. The usual precautions were taken in this district to guard against any ill-feeling amongst the people. Ferries were closed, letters opened, vagrants examined, doubtful or unemployed Hindoostanees expelled, &c., &c. A plot which was laid by a Hindoostanee underling to murder the tehseeldar at Chukowal and to seize the treasure was found out and disconcerted. When a part of the 9th Irregular Cavalry mutinied at Meean Wali the Police of Jhelum were aroused to try and cut them off. One man was seized and executed; the rest were disposed of elsewhere.

Levy raised in
the Jhelum
District.

86. A levy which was raised at Jhelum continued to keep the country quiet by giving employment to the spare hands. A telegraph office was set up, and a line of direct postal communication organized with the Deputy Commissioners of all adjoining districts, and with Mr. Hardinge, Assistant Commissioner, who had charge of the sub-division of Pind Dadun Khan.

87. Mr. Thornton, the Commissioner, was at the head-quarters of this district at the commencement of the outbreak. He

Rawul Pindee.

Events in the
Rāwalpindi
District.

states that as soon as the news from the North-Western Provinces got abroad amongst the people some of the well-disposed came and expressed to him their unfeigned sorrow at the prospect of the certain extinction of our rule! They considered the struggle a hopeless one for our nation. Hindoostanee emissaries eagerly fostered this idea amongst the countryfolk, assuring them that the King of Delhi had sent directions to his loyal subjects to send all the English down the Indus without hurting them, and that the deportation of the Hindoostanees from the Punjab, which was going on, was simply a fulfilment by the English of the commands of the same potentate, who had forbidden the English to keep his subjects any longer up here, as he required their services at his capital.

Attitude of
the people.

88. These idle tales found credence among the simple population of the Murree hills. They also had imaginary wrongs; they longed to renew their old intestine feuds, and retaliate on our countrymen also for the wrongs they thought we had done them. Rumours reached the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Cracroft, and the other authorities, during May and June, of an uneasiness amongst some of the neighbouring tribes. It was affirmed that a "dua-i-khair," or solemn compact, had been effected; that the object was an attack upon our power, from what quarter or on what place did not appear. Such information could not be slighted. The Chiefs of several tribes were called to Murree and told that their presence there would be of use to us, as affording a ready means of communication between Government and their several clans should the active services of these be needed. In reality, these men were hostages; but to prevent their thinking so a small allowance of Rs. 8 per mensem was made to them by the authorities. As time wore on this allowance excited the jealousy of other tribes, whose representatives considered themselves neglected by

Attack made
on Murree
and repulse of
the insurgents.

not sharing in it. Other compacts were formed, and other plots hatched, which culminated on the night of the 2nd September, when the station of Murree was attacked by 300 men. The fidelity of one of Lady Lawrence's personal attendants, himself an influential man of one of the tribes which had risen, and the sagacity of the local officers were the means, under God, of saving Murree. Lieutenant Battye, Assistant Commissioner, was informed on the 1st idem by Hakim Khan, the individual above alluded to, that the place was to be attacked that night—he could not say by what force or from what quarter. The ladies, of whom a large number was then in Murree, were immediately concentrated, the police and the detachment of European invalids were called out, the Civil and Military officers held a consultation, and despatched urgent requests for help to Mr. Thornton at Rawul Pindee and Major Becher at Huzara. A cordon of sentries was drawn round the station, composed of Europeans and the police force under Lieutenant Bracken, and strong pickets were posted at three places which were considered the most vulnerable. The enemy came at the dead of night, expecting no foe, looking only for butchery and spoil. They were briskly opposed by Captain Robinson and his party, and soon retired, leaving one corpse on the field. One of our men was wounded: he afterwards died. This skirmish constituted the whole of the fighting, but two bodies of the enemy, of 100 men each, held two neighbouring heights during the whole of the 2nd September, and, as there was no knowing how far the confederacy had spread, the station of Murree could not be weakened by sending men to drive them away. On the evening of the 3rd the Commissioner arrived with a reinforcement from below; supplies of food, which he had providently ordered to be bought in Rawul Pindee and sent up, began to arrive; the country was scoured, rebellious villages were burnt, their cattle harried and their men seized. Twenty-seven men were punished, of whom 15 suffered death. The smoke of the eleven villages which were destroyed was seen afar by a party of Khurruls which was coming on to

Arrival of the Commissioner and measures for the punishment of the rebels.

renew the attack; while the white and unscathed houses of Murree showed plainly that no burning had occurred there. The rebel force slunk off disheartened, and their tribe professed deep loyalty; but it was known to be second in ill-feeling only to the Dhoonds who made the attack.

89. On Mr. Thornton's pressing solicitation, Major Becher had despatched from Abbottabad his company of the Sutte tribe, numbering 40 men; this had joined Mr. Thornton. But on the receipt of more urgent letters Major Becher sent, under the command of Captain Hardinge, accompanied by Captain Davies, nearly the whole of his force, leaving himself only 87 men, of whom all but 12 were recruits. The force was pushed across a most difficult country full of morasses and defiles. The Khurruls laid an ambush to cut it off, but Providence saved it. The road on which the trap was laid became impassable from the rains. The force turned off, and not till it had passed the spot did it learn the greatness of the peril from which it had been delivered. It returned to Huzara by Rawul Pindee, leaving Murree on the 14th.

Despatch of a force from Abbottabad to Murree.

90. After the repulse of the Dhoonds, it was found that the conspiracy affected many more clans and a much wider extent of country than had been suspected. It reached far into Huzara and nearly down to Rawul Pindee, and, excepting the Khurrul insurrection in Mooltan, was by far the most extensive rebellion that has occurred in the Punjab during the year. Treachery was added to violence. Two Hindoostanee native doctors in Government employ, educated at Government institutions, and then practising in Murree, were found guilty of being sharers in the plot. They were both executed. There seems no doubt that the hillmen reckoned much on the support and directions they were to receive from their Hindoostanee friends in the station, and several of the domestic servants were seized and punished for complicity; several also fled from justice, and are yet at large. Two of the ringleaders in the raid are still free through the connivance of their countrymen.

Complicity of Hindoostanis at Murree and their punishment.

Measures
taken to
guard against
danger from
Kashmir and
Pesháwar.

91. On the frontier, beyond the district of Rawul Pindee, are the homes of the wild and disorderly tribes of Sitana and Mungul Thana. They are Mahommedans, keep a fanatic Hindoostanee-Mahommedan army, and are in communication with the Mahommedan Nawabs of the North-Western Provinces and Bengal through this army. They were sources of much anxiety to Captain Cracroft, the Deputy Commissioner. The state of feeling in Cashmere was unknown. The Maharaja had given no intimation, at that early period, of the line of policy he meant to pursue ; there was a large force of Hindoostanee troops in the Peshawur District, one of which, the 55th Native Infantry, had mutinied on the 21st May. To guard against dangers from Cashmere and Peshawur it was found needful to organize a force of upwards of 1,500 Policemen and dak runners ; this force was disposed down the rivers Jhelum and Indus. A Movable Column was composed of detachments from Her Majesty's 24th Foot and Captain Miller's Police Battalion to restrain the men of the country.

Occupation
of Attock by
Mr. Macnabb
and com-
mendation of
his services, as
also those of
Lieutenant
Shortt.

92. The fort of Attock commands a very important ferry of the Indus, and Mr. Macnabb, Assistant Commissioner, was deputed to occupy it, in order to superintend the provisioning of it for troops, which were constantly crossing the river, and to protect the ferry from attack. He performed this duty with great diligence and ability, until he was removed to act as Deputy Commissioner of Jhelum on Major Browne's promotion to the Commissionership of Leiah. Mr. Macnabb was succeeded by Lieutenant Shortt, who was also deputed to follow up the Jhelum mutineers in July, and displayed much vigor in this excursion.

Disarming
of 58th Native
Infantry at
Ráwalpindi.

93. In the district there were two regiments of Irregular cavalry, the 58th Native Infantry, and a wing of the 14th Native Infantry, a regiment of Goorkhas and a native troop of Horse Artillery. This was a brigade powerful enough to give just cause for alarm ; the Chief Commissioner, therefore, who was present at Rawul Pindee, determined to disarm the Native Infantry. This was done on the 7th July, but the men did not lay down their arms for upwards of an hour after they had

been ordered to do so. Even after the disarming, the men of the 14th continued so insolent and insubordinate that they were all confined in the central jail. The Goorkhas remained perfectly staunch throughout, and did excellent service before Delhi.

94. Other operations in this district were the despatch of reinforcements to Murree with Mr. Thornton, and the mission of a party to act against the mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry.

Other operations in the Ráwal-pindi District.

95. This station is the head-quarters of the Customs line in connection with the Salt range.

Events in the Shahpur District.

Shahpoor. Mr. Wright, the Collector of Customs, brought to the assistance of Mr. Ouseley, Deputy Commissioner, a very valuable reinforcement in the shape of 100 of the men of the preventive service, who, being all armed and natives of the Punjab or else Puthans, created a valuable counterpoise to the mutinous company of the 46th Native Infantry, which formed the treasury guard. The transit of the 39th Native Infantry through the district on their way from Jhelum to Dera Ismail Khan caused a panic amongst the people of Shahpoor. Strange rumours began to circulate about these men, valuables were buried, people became unsettled, and the Commanding Officer of the regiment feared to come through Shahpoor while the company of the 46th was there, expressing a hope that Mr. Ouseley had not much treasure under his care. On the evening of the 22nd May a strong guard of police marched into the Treasury with three European officers of the station, and took possession of all the surplus money, amounting to Rs. 2,50,000. Part of this was forthwith sent towards Jhelum and part towards Dera Ismail Khan. Under orders, which were subsequently received, the Jhelum consignment was recalled; but the move which took it in the first instance from the 46th was a most ably-planned one, as the Hindoo-stance troops were at the same time turned out of the treasury fort, which was garrisoned by the Police Battalion, fortified and provisioned, and a well sunk to supply drinking water.

Assistance rendered by Customs staff.

Replacement of the Treasury guard of the 39th Native Infantry by Police and fortification of the place.

Precautions
taken against
the villages of
the Bar.

96. At one time the villages of the Bar were said to be in an unquiet state. Mr. Ouseley posted 10 police horse on the confines of the tract of land so called, and, as no mutiny of the sepoy took place in the district, the wild tribes remained peaceful even when their brethren in the Mooltan Division broke out. I have, in my introductory remarks on this division, adverted to the large number of Towana horse which this district yielded and the effect on the country which the levying of them exercised.

Operations
against the
mutineers of
the 9th
Irregular
Cavalry.

97. The mutiny of a portion of the 9th Irregular Cavalry affected this country so far as that it called out the Deputy Commissioner, two or three of the Customs officers and a number of the Police. The mutineers were pursued by the Police; the soldiery and District officers of five or six districts were on their trail and gave them no rest until Captain Hockin came up with them in the Jhang District and cut them up.

98. A Hindoostanee clerk in the Customs office was detected in an attempt to unite Hindoos and Mahomedans against our Government. He was apprehended, convicted and punished.

Events in
the Gujrat
District.

99. The danger here was, comparatively speaking, a transient one. The chief fear was from the wing of the 35th Native Infantry,

Transfer of a
wing of the
35th Native
Infantry to
Siálkot.

Goojrat, which was known to be mutinous to the core. On the 17th June they were ordered out of the station and directed to join the head-quarters of their regiment at Sealkote. They spent the first night of their march in abusing each other for not having resisted the ejection. The regiment afterwards joined General Nicholson's Movable Column, and was disarmed by him at Phillour on the 25th July. When the Jhelum mutineers broke away a small party of them reached an island in the Jhelum, and were destroyed by a party under Captain Elliott, Officiating Deputy Commissioner. Captain Elliott was accompanied by Mr. Teasdale, a clerk in the district office, who behaved with distinguished gallantry.

Operations
against a
party of
Jhelum muti-
neers.

100. All threatened sedition in this district was, throughout the whole of the period under review, vigorously put down by Captain Mackenzie, the officiating Deputy Commissioner, who took Captain Elliott's place when the latter was appointed to the Sealkote District.

LEIAH DIVISION.

101. This division is situated on the Indus, and forms the western frontier of the Punjab. Its distance from Hindoostan, and consequent separation from all Hindoostanee influence, has kept it very quiet. So little has it been affected that Captain Fendall, Deputy Commissioner of Leiah, observes that whatever he did "savours strongly of doing nothing," but that he acted under the immediate orders of the late Colonel Ross, the Commissioner, and that it proved the wisest policy. The people are not commercial. Their intercourse with the world is very limited. They bear passively every change of rule. The principal work of the officers has been to keep the various clans from devouring each other and to prevent encroachments on the British territory from beyond the border.

Events in the
Leiah Division.

102. Colonel Ross, the Commissioner, died on the 18th August. As his early instructions to his District officers were issued demi-officially, Major Browne, his successor, has not been able to furnish me with the purport of them. I am therefore reduced to the necessity of recounting events directly from the narratives of the Deputy Commissioners.

103. This district remained very tranquil: only one or two slight punishments were inflicted for offences connected with the Mutiny.

Tranquillity
of the Leiah
District.

Much anxiety was caused at one time by the arrival of a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry under Captain Hockin, but it remained firm. When the Khurrul insurrection broke out in September, Captain Hockin marched against the rebels, leaving at Leiah 40 of his men who had fallen under

Operations
against the
mutineers of
the 9th
Irregular
Cavalry.

suspicion. The day before he marched news reached Leiah that the whole of the 9th Irregular Cavalry had mutinied at Meeanwalee. Captain Fendall says:—"I certainly at first thought it was a deep-laid scheme for raising the whole country, that the 9th Irregular Cavalry were to appear before Dera Ismail Khan, be joined by the 39th Native Infantry, come on to Leiah, pick up the wing of the 17th Light Cavalry, go towards Googaira, coalescing with the tribes, and march on to Mooltan (where there were two suspected regiments of Native Infantry). It was feasible, and would have temporarily lost us the lower Punjab." The same gracious Providence, Who everywhere else watched over us, prevented this dreaded junction. The news proved to be an exaggeration. The mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, who, strange to say, were all men of the Cis-Sutlej States, were only 30 in number, and were entirely destroyed in a desperate fight, in which Mr. Thomson, the Extra Assistant of Leiah, was very dangerously wounded. I desire to bring his gallant conduct in this most spirited little battle prominently to notice.

Services of
Mr. Thomson,
Extra Assist-
ant Commis-
sioner.

Events in the
Khangurh
District.

104. Major Browne observes on this district:—"The district of Khangurh entirely escaped any ill-effects beyond the alarm felt by the European community at the proximity of the mutinous regiments at Mooltan and the possibility of invasion of the lower portion by bands of robbers from Bahawulpoor."

Precautions
of the Deputy
Commissioner.

Precautions were, however, necessary. Mr. Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, fortified the jail, the court-house, and the chief and district treasuries, armed all Europeans, and vigilantly guarded all the ferries, which were not closed. He detached Lieutenant Ferris, Assistant Commissioner, to the banks of the Chenab to establish a chain of posts along it. This object was fully accomplished. The villagers themselves served so willingly that a cordon of 104 posts, extending 26 miles, was soon established. At another time a chain of mounted police was thrown across the district, from the Chenab to the Indus, to cut off any stragglers of the 14th Native Infantry that might come down from Jhelum. An

intelligence department was also organized between Khanguh, Dera Ghazee Khan, Mooltan, and Mozuffergurh.

105. Captain Pollock's first step here was to summon
Dera Ghazi Khan. to the protection of Dera Ghazee Khan

Dera Ghazi
Khan Dis-
trict.

Captain Hughes, Commanding 1st Punjab Cavalry at Asnee. In a few hours this officer was on his way with 300 sabres, but, his services being needed elsewhere, Captain Pollock was directed by the Chief Commissioner to raise a levy of 300 horse and 300 foot to guard the outposts and relieve the drilled troops, who were called on service in the field. The people shewed great alacrity in joining these levies. They performed the duties of all but three of the outposts. On them much of the guarding of the Jail and Treasury devolved, and the very entertainment of the men tended greatly to keep the country quiet. One coalition to make a disturbance was discovered to have been solemnly ratified by two tribes in this district. Their leaders were summoned, detained until the end of the year, and then released on security. Individuals among the troops were also punished for using seditious language, &c., but no general breach of the peace occurred. The vigour and energy displayed prevented this.

Precautionary
measures
adopted by
the Deputy
Commissioner.

106. At the two stations of Bunnoo and Dera Ismail
Dera Ismail Khan. Khan, in this district, there were located

Dera Ismail
Khan Dis-
trict.

2 regiments of Punjab Infantry, 2 of Punjab Cavalry, 2 Punjab Batteries, 1 Sikh Infantry Regiment, 1 very weak Police Battalion, and 180 Police horse. Many of these troops were instantly ordered away to Peshawur, Jhelum, &c., and for two days, until the arrival of the 3rd Sikh Infantry from Dera Ismail Khan, the station of Bunnoo was guarded only by a battery of Punjab Artillery and the inhabitants of the country, "an experiment," says Captain Coxe, Deputy Commissioner, "which it might have been dangerous to protract." The rapid march of the troops caused a temporary panic amongst the traders of Bunnoo. Captain Coxe closed the gates and talked the people out of their fears.

Withdrawal
of troops.

Disarming of
the 39th
Native In-
fantry and the
Hindustanis
in the 3rd
Sikhs.

107. A fresh cause of anxiety was caused by the arrival of the suspected 39th Native Infantry from Jhelum. Captain Coxe felt their presence a source of imminent danger until 600 or 700 Mooltanee Horse had been raised and collected at Dera Ismail Khan. The 39th were quietly disarmed on the 14th July without the presence of other troops. Three days before this, Captain Renny, Commanding 3rd Sikh Infantry, informed the Deputy Commissioner of a plot among the Hindoostanees of his regiment, 113 in number, to murder all their officers. These 113 men were disarmed the same evening and were subsequently dismissed the service. The plot could not be brought home to them, though there is little doubt it had been laid. Another conspiracy was reported amongst the 39th Native Infantry at Dera Ismail Khan with the object of seizing the fort. Timely information saved it.

Operations
against the
mutineers of
the 9th
Irregular
Cavalry.

108. When the news of the mutiny of the portion of the 9th Irregular Cavalry reached Captain Coxe, he marched to the Indus with a party of Mooltanee Horse, and, travelling 60 miles in 17 hours, raised all the country to act against them if requisite, and sent Mr. Cowan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, to follow them up. His force co-operating with Captain Hookin's party, was instrumental in effecting their destruction. The frontier tribes were turbulent during this period as is their wont, but the presence of a Movable Column sent by the Chief Commissioner restrained them from ravaging our territory.

MOOLTAN DIVISION.

Events in
the Multán
Division.
Rising of
the nomadic
tribes.

109. A large part of this division is mere waste land, covered with jungle or else with a short grass and stunted bushes. These tracts are inhabited by several nomadic tribes, whose sustenance is from their flocks, whose habits are primitive, and whose character is restless, impatient of control and thievish to a degree. They are Mahommedans, and profess to be descended from a common ancestor who lived some centuries ago. In September these tribes rose in insurrection, attacked several police posts and disarmed the Policemen,

took possession of the road by which all mails from the Punjab were at that time carried to England and to all parts of India south of Delhi, and threatened to inflict a severe blow on our power when it was at its weakest ; for they rose but a few days before the capture of Delhi, when the Punjab was almost without troops. The operations which were carried on against these tribes are fully detailed below, under the report on the Googaira District as the outbreak began there, although it seriously affected every district of the division.

110. At the head-quarters of the division much anxiety was caused to Major Hamilton, Commissioner, and all the other residents, by the presence of two corps of Native Infantry, of whom one, the 69th, was known to be thoroughly bad. The post was an important one, as commanding the only outlet the Punjab at that time possessed for communication with England, Bombay and Calcutta, &c. The troops were providentially disarmed in time, and no outbreak took place.

Danger from
Native troops
at Multán.

111. The station of Mooltan commands the passage down the river from Lahore and the only post road whereby the Punjab could communicate with the rest of the world. At the time of the outbreak it was occupied by the 62nd and 69th Native Infantry, 1st Irregular Cavalry, a Native troop of Horse Artillery, and a company of European Artillerymen. The 69th was strongly suspected. The other native troops were considered staunch, and subsequent events verified the supposition in every case.

Events in the
Multán Dis-
trict.

112. It was necessary to provide a refuge in case of any disturbance. The old fort, which had lain in a ruinous condition since it had been battered and dismantled by the British army in 1849, was put in a position of defence, provisioned, and garrisoned by some men of Captain Tronson's Kuttar Mookhee Police Battalion. As these arrangements occupied some days and the temper of the Native troops could not be trusted from hour to hour, Lieutenant Etheridge, of the Indian Navy, who happened to be at Mooltan with his vessel, was requested to detain the steamer until the fort should have become defensible.

Precautionary
measures
adopted.

With this request Lieutenant Etheridge willingly complied, and the steamer lay off Mooltan until it was no longer requisite to trust to it as an asylum in case of need.

Uneasiness
among Native
troops in the
early part of
May.

113. In the early days of May a crowd of sepoys constantly thronged the Mooltan post-office, eagerly asking "for news," and "whether the mail had arrived," and similar questions, in themselves unusual, and were accompanied by such language and demonstrations as were freely used tending to throw the whole establishment into bodily fear. Family remittances, which the soldiery had hitherto always made through the Government treasury, now ceased to be so made. The payments which the men had made on account of these remittances were boisterously demanded back in cash. The price of gold coin rose rapidly in exchange markets, shewing a large demand for portable wealth. Such symptoms of uneasiness (occurring too before any outbreak in the North-Western Provinces) could not but excite the gravest apprehensions in the minds of all European residents; they could not but lead to the conclusion that the soldiery were bent on some mischief, or, to say the least, that their confidence in our Government was gone, and they would rather trust their money in their own hands than in ours. When news of the outbreak in the North-West Provinces reached Mooltan, what had been inexplicable was at once explained, the mystery was revealed; these actions were seen to be part and parcel of a universal and determined design to subvert our rule.

Confidence of
Colonel Hicks
in Native
troops.

114. Colonel Hicks, Commanding at Mooltan, failed to discover in the conduct of the regiments of Native Infantry anything which could justify him in taking from them their arms. The Chief Commissioner, however, sent peremptory orders that they were to be disarmed, and on the morning of the 10th June the minds of European and native residents were relieved, commerce was re-established, and our authority vindicated by the most successful disarming of the 62nd and 69th Native Infantry by Major C. Chamberlain, Commanding 1st Irregular Cavalry. The peculiar character of this excellent move was that the European troops were but 48

Disarming of
Native troops.

Artillerymen. The other auxiliaries were all natives, and one regiment, the 1st Irregular Cavalry, was composed of Hindoo-stanees. During the whole day the townspeople flocked to the Commissioner, Major Hamilton, expressing their hearty congratulations on the success of the measure and their own relief at the prospect of immunity from rapine and slaughter.

115. On the 19th and two following days of June the left wing, Bombay Fusiliers, came in, and about three weeks afterwards the right wing arrived. The imperious requirements of the service, however, forbade the authorities to keep these troops here, and they as well as the trusty Punjabee troops, who arrived from time to time, were pushed on towards Lahore or Delhi; so that, with the exception of the 1st Irregulars, the company of Artillery and the Police Battalion, Mooltan had absolutely no military standby to resist the two full regiments of Native Infantry which were located there. It was an anxious time. If proof of the ill-will of the 69th be required, it is afforded by the facts that the chief Native Officer of the regiment and 10 men were blown from guns by sentence of Court-martial for sedition and intended mutiny; that just before their execution they boasted of their intent and reviled each other for the cowardice displayed in their own past inaction; that when the regiment was disarmed it was found that the Artillery (native) had laid the guns, in anticipation of a struggle, directly on the 69th, avoiding the 62nd; and that the demeanour of the corps throughout was insolent and rebellious to the last degree.

Despatch of
troops from
Multán to
Lahore and
Delhi.

Disloyalty of
69th Native
Infantry.

116. On the 11th August the Horse Artillery was disarmed as a precautionary measure. On the same date the enrolment of men for the new 11th Punjab Infantry was commenced by transferring to it men from other regiments. The Googaira insurrection broke out little more than a month afterwards. The new men at Mooltan were still undisciplined, and could hardly yet be relied on as a serviceable field force. Most of them were left to guard the station, while Major Chamberlain led out his regiment, the 1st Irregular Cavalry

Disarming of
Native Horse
Artillery at
Multán and
raising of
11th Punjab
Infantry.

(Hindoostanees), with some 200 men of the new levies, against the insurgents.

Desertion of
Hindustanis
in the Customs
preventive
service.

117. Another cause of anxiety at Mooltan had been the conduct of the preventive service on the Sutlej. Very many of the men employed in it were Hindoostanees. They bolted at the first rise in Hindoostan, and went off in numbers to join their kindred by blood and by disposition, who were enjoying a transient glory over the smouldering ruins of Hansi and Hissar. Men to take their place were raised in the district, and no serious damage was done to the Government interest by their defection.

Organization
of a camel
train between
Sind and the
Punjab.

118. Under the orders of the Chief Commissioner a camel train was organized, having one of its depôts at Mooltan. It was designed for the conveyance of private parcels, munitions of war and merchandize between Sind and the Punjab, and proved most useful. The care of it constituted one of the many miscellaneous duties entailed on Major Voyle, Deputy Commissioner. The duty of preserving the safety of part of the road between Lahore and Mooltan, especially during and after the Khurrul insurrection, was another most anxious charge for him. The number of widowed ladies, wounded officers, and other travellers who passed down this way, and who were incapable of protecting themselves, made it very needful that the road should be defended. To this end the Deputy Commissioners of Lahore, Googaira and Mooltan were desired to locate extra police, both horse and foot, at every road police station. The arrangement was vigorously carried out, and after the end of September, when the road was re-opened, every European traveller was provided with a guard. The mail-carts were also defended in their passage; for until routes were opened up through Bahawulpoor and Jhung, the Punjab was, as regarded communication with other localities, hermetically sealed.

Preservation
of the safety
of the road
between
Lahore and
Multán.

Events in the
Jhang Dis-
trict.

119. This is a wild rural district, chiefly in the Bar above described, and tenanted by the wild races of whom mention has just been made. The population is comparatively scanty. The Treasury guard

Jhang.

was a company of the 16th Native Infantry (Grenadiers). It was a mere hindrance; and at the request of Captain Hawes, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, was withdrawn to its head-quarters at Lahore, where it was disarmed. Two parties of mutineers were destroyed in this district,—one numbering 10 men of the 14th Native Infantry; the second, the party of the 9th Irregular Cavalry. The villagers rendered good service in tracking this last detachment; but when, on the 17th September, the Bar tribes rose, the villagers of this district maintained but a doubtful neutrality. Communications between Jhung and Lahore were cut off. For some time great anxiety was felt at Lahore as to what had occurred there. It was known that many of the minor police stations had been rifled, and that the tribes around were all in rebellion. In a few days, however, Captain Hockin's force, 250 of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, was thrown into the disturbed region; it was supported by a party of the Leiah and Goojranwala new levies, while Major Chamberlain, with a force from Mooltan, advanced on Jhung from the south. Mr. McMahon, Extra Assistant Commissioner, was sent out to Kote Kumalia in the Googaira District with a party of police horse; but it had been pillaged before his arrival, and he was soon after recalled by Captain Hawes. Lieutenant Lane, Assistant Commissioner, had command of the Leiah levy; while Captain Hawes joined Major Chamberlain's force and remained with it as civil officer till the defeat of the rebels at Kumalia some time after. After Captain Hawes' return to Jhung, Lieutenant Lane was detached to Shorkote, where he did excellent service in apprehending rebels and seizing their cattle.

120. Lieutenant Elphinstone, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, was saddled with a detachment of the 49th Native Infantry as his Treasury guard. As my demi-official of the 13th May informed him of the disarming of the main body of the regiment at Lahore on the morning of that day, he justly considered it inexpedient any longer to trust such questionable friends with the custody of Government property, of the

Events in
the Gugera
District.

station and its officers. He accordingly took their arms and ordered them to Lahore, where they safely arrived. A guard of the Kuttar Mookhee Police Battalion was posted over the Government offices.

Despatch of
a force to
Fazilka.

121. By direction of the Commissioner, Major Hamilton, Lieutenant Elphinstone had made arrangements for a horse dak to Sirsa and its neighbourhood. On the 26th May he received a few hurried lines from Captain Robertson, Superintendent of Sirsa, informing him of the disasters at Hissar and Hansi. Mr. Oliver, Assistant Superintendent, also wrote begging Lieutenant Elphinstone to guard the Fazilka ferry. Fearing an incursion into the Punjab, Lieutenant Elphinstone promptly despatched, under Lieutenant Pearse, a force of 226 horse and foot police to Fazilka. This little force subsequently did good service in Bhutteana.

Revoking of
licenses for
carrying
fire-arms.

122. Licenses for carrying fire-arms were revoked throughout the Googaira District, and blacksmiths entertained to put in order the arms which were supplied to the new levies. Of these 300 men were raised under the Chief Commissioner's orders without difficulty, besides extra police.

Outbreak
in Gugera
Jail.

123. On the 26th June Lieutenant Elphinstone found a quantity of tobacco and other contraband articles in the jail. The discovery led to the dismissal of the overseer of the jail, as the enquiry which it brought on was the means of shewing that the man had been permitting clandestine visits to the prison by a chief of the name of Ahmed, the Khurrul, who was in detention at the station at the time, under suspicion of treason. This event by itself was unimportant, but subsequent events shewed its relevance to all the disturbances which afterwards took place. On the night of the 26th August the prisoners made a desperate attempt to break loose. The Kuttar Mookhee guard fired on them, and Mr. L. Berkeley, Extra Assistant Commissioner, gallantly opposed the rush of the convicts with a very small number of supporters. The *émeute* was subdued, but not until 51 prisoners had been killed or wounded and a few had managed to escape. Ahmed, Khurrul, had also broken his arrest and was not forthcoming.

Escape of
Ahmed Khan,
Karrai.

On his apprehension he was examined, but as no direct proof of complicity in this affair could be brought against him, he was released on heavy security, along with several other chieftains who had fallen under suspicion.

124. On the night of the 16th September a man came to Lieutenant Elphinstone's house demanding instant admittance on urgent business. He told him that all these Chiefs had left the place and were gone to their homes to raise the whole country in open rebellion according to a preconcerted plan. On enquiry it was found that all the men named were indeed missing. Lieutenant Elphinstone, roused to a sense of his danger, sent off expresses to recall 200 foot and 60 horse whom he had despatched a few days before to Peshawur and Lahore respectively. His orders reached one detachment of each force, and 100 foot and 30 horse returned to his aid. An attack on the station was imminent. The prisoners were removed to the enclosed serae, and the tehseel which commanded this was fortified and garrisoned. Mr. Berkeley, Extra Assistant Commissioner, was sent out to try and catch the prime mover of the plot, Ahmed, Khurrul. On coming up to the bank of the river the rebel called out from the opposite side that he had renounced his allegiance to the British Government, and was acting under the orders of his master, the King of Delhi. The party was out of musket range, but Mr. Berkeley brought down the fanatical moulvee, who accompanied it, with his rifle, and afterwards crossed over and seized all the families and cattle of a large village, named Jhamra, with 20 of the men, and burnt the houses.

Threatened
attack on
Gugera.

Measures
taken by the
Deputy Com-
missioner.

Successful
operations
against
Ahmed Khan,
Karal, by
Mr. Berkeley,
Extra Assist-
ant Commis-
sioner.

125. By this time reinforcements had been thrown out from Mooltan and from Lahore, as well as from Jhung. Lieutenant-Colonel Paton, Assistant Quartermaster-General, reached Googaira, a distance of 83 miles from Lahore, in 73 hours. He commanded the Lahore force, consisting of three Horse Artillery guns, a company of Her Majesty's 81st Regiment, a body of Sobhan Khan's Police Corps, and a detachment from the newly-raised 1st Sikh Cavalry. This detachment of horse made the whole distance in one continuous

Arrival of
reinforce-
ments.

Repulse of
attack on
Gugera.

march with but one brief rest. Lieutenant-Colonel Paton arrived about one hour before the rebels attacked the station in great force. They retired after a few rounds of grape, but pursuit was not successful. Captain Black and Lieutenant the Honorable A. Chichester were sent on detached duty, and fell in the next day with a party under Ahmed himself, who was killed, but not without inflicting serious loss on the troops. The advantage obtained by the death of Ahmed was greatly and mournfully overbalanced by the death in a jungle beyond Koureshah of Mr. Berkeley, who fell deserted by his men and covered with wounds, after cutting down seven of the insurgents with his own hand. He had fallen into a trap, and many of his men also lost their lives. His death inflicted a serious blow on our power by the confidence it gave the enemy. His gallantry at the jail outbreak, and again in this insurrection, had won the admiration of all his superiors, and I deeply regret his loss.

Death of
Ahmed Khan,
Karrai.

Mr. Ber-
keley am-
bushed and
killed.

Further
operations
against the
rebels who
had seized
Harappa and
besieged Ma-
jor Chamber-
lain at Chicha-
watui.

126. On the arrival of Mr. R. E. Egerton, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, with reinforcements, Lieutenant Elphinstone made over charge of the station to him and went in person to meet the rebels. He learnt that the tehseel of Hurrappa had been taken by the insurgents and that Major Crawford Chamberlain, who had moved from Mooltan with a force of the 1st Irregular Cavalry and a few Sikh Infantry, was besieged in the serae of Cheechawutnee. Major Chamberlain was opportunely relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Paton's force, which was accompanied by Lieutenant Elphinstone. Major Chamberlain had been in some peril for two or three days. He was beset by crowds of rebels, the town was unfriendly and commanded the serae, and the country was impracticable. He ascribes his safety in a great degree to the gallantry of Messrs. Page and Taylor, of the Engineer and Postal Departments, who volunteered for service, and with five Sikhs held a small tower, and checked by their unerring fire all attempts at an attack from the town. The next day he was joined by Captain McAndrew and the Police Battalion, and also by the Lahore Light Horse (a newly-raised body of mixed European and Eurasian Cavalry) under

Relief of
Major
Chamberlain.

Gallantry of
Messrs. Page
and Taylor.

Captain Snow, which had been moved down by forced marches to Googaira. He was also joined by a reinforcement from Mooltan consisting of a party of Captain Dennis' regiment of Punjab Infantry and two Horse Artillery guns.

127. A short time afterwards a party of troops under Major Voyle and Captain Tronson moved out from Mooltan. It was afterwards joined by Major Jackson with part of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry from Goordaspoor; while Captain Cureton with a squadron of the same regiment, and Captain Hockin with a party of the 17th Irregulars, acted against the rebels in the Reehna Doab. Major Hamilton, the Commissioner, joined Major Jackson's force as civil officer; Major Marsden, in consequence of his long and intimate acquaintance with the Googaira District, was appointed Deputy Commissioner and remained with Captain Snow, while Lieutenant Elphinstone was deputed to accompany Major Chamberlain.

Further operations against the rebels.

128. From Cheechawutnee Major Chamberlain moved *via* Kote Kumalia to attack the rebels in their stronghold of Jhullee. This is a fastness from which the same tribes had succeeded in baffling the soldiers of the Sikh army. It consists of a belt of the most dense grass jungle about five miles long and three broad, and it is bounded and traversed by a stream which serves as an additional defence. Major Chamberlain reports that even a horse could scarcely force a passage through this grass, which rose above the rider's head, and a vast body of men might have come within 20 yards of his encampment without a man being visible. His operations against them here were therefore unsuccessful, but when the rebels broke away across the Bar to the Sutlej they were briskly followed by his force. In the meantime operations had been carried on elsewhere against them. Captain Snow was severely wounded by a matchlock ball, fired from across the Ravee by an enemy who could only be reached by the rifles of his officers, but not by the fire-arms his men carried. The troops, however, got across the river and the insurgents fled. This campaign was at first a very unsuccessful one on account of paucity of troops. The swampy country was covered with a jungle

Unsuccessful operations against the rebels in the Jalli.

of long grass too stiff to be broken or easily cut, too green to be burnt, too dense for troops, especially Cavalry, to march through, and intersected with rivers and streams. The enemy could rarely be seen, though the beating of their drums¹ could often be heard.

Final defeat
of rebels and
quelling of
insurrection.

129. At last, however, the sounding of this "dhol" led to the final battle which quelled the insurrection. Major Marsden, with the Lahore Light Horse under Captain Balmain (Captain Snow having been severely wounded), the Police Battalion under Captain McAndrew and three Horse Artillery guns, made a march of 34 miles under a hot sun across part of the Bar. Guided by the distant "dhol" and by some shepherds whom he captured on the way, he came upon the enemy's camp in the Bar by surprise, utterly routed and dispersed them, and took their equipage and cattle. A few days after this all three bodies of troops were concentrated; several of the Chiefs surrendered; some had already given themselves up to Mr. Roberts, Commissioner, Lahore Division, who, accompanied by Mr. Egerton, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, had gone slowly down the right bank of the Ravee with a body of Cavalry. The insurrection therefore came to a close. The force broke up on the 4th November, and subsequent operations have been comparatively trifling. Thousands of their cattle have been seized and sold, and the tribes have learnt a lesson they will long remember. The principal clans who rose were the Khurruls under Ahmed, the Katiahs under Mahomed, the Futtianas under Bahawul, and the Wutoos under leaders of less note.

Measures
for recovering
stolen prop-
erty.

130. All the Chiefs who have not been killed are now on heavy security, employed in bringing in the property they plundered from Kote Kamalia, Hurruppa, and other places.

Probable
causes of the
rebellion.

131. There is some difficulty in ascribing this rebellion to any one definite cause. There seems, however, no doubt that the insurgents were fired by the idea of the extinction of our rule which had been given them by the liberated Agra convicts

¹ The drum or "dhol" answers to our bugle, and the modulations of its sounds are used for signals exactly like our Infantry and Cavalry bugle-calls.

who came up to their homes through Sirsa and Bhutteana. These men told their kindred of our emptied treasuries and our vacant jails, our deserted cantonments and our slaughtered countrymen. They were led to believe that the Afghans were masters of Peshawur; that the power of the King of Delhi extended to Umballa; that there were no troops in Lahore or in Mooltan which could be spared to act against them; and that they might indulge their inborn love of plunder without any fear of a check. During the Sikh rule they had often been heavily mulcted, and they had been subject to the payment of a blackmail, and had undergone oppression of various kinds. Spared from these troubles by our beneficent Government, taxed only with a very light assessment, and treated with consideration, they mistook our motives and attributed to weakness what was our strength.

132. They were worked on by their fanatical leaders, the Syuds, to carry on a crusade against the infidels, and with the hope of obtaining eternal salvation by spreading the faith of Islam. Moreover, they trusted that their fastnesses amidst swamps and thick jungle would baffle our soldiers as they had baffled the Sikhs. They have, however, been severely dealt with, and it is to be hoped they will profit by their experience.

PESHAWUR DIVISION.

133. This division, comprising our north-western frontier and inhabited throughout by a turbulent and warlike people, as are also our neighbours beyond the border, was a source of the greatest anxiety throughout the crisis. It is made up of the hills and valleys of the Kohat and Peshawur districts, our most northerly possessions trans-Indus, and the mountainous district of Huzara cis-Indus. Kohat and Huzara were held by portions of the old Punjab Irregular Force, but in the valley of Peshawur a strong garrison of the regular army had always been maintained.

Events in the
Peshawar
Division.

134. In the beginning of May 1857 perfect peace reigned in Huzara and Kohat. Their irritable and bigoted, but simple and manly, races had been tamed by easy revenue and kindly rule into that chronic contentment which is the nearest

State of the
Division and
border at the
time of the
Mutiny.

approach to loyalty that new conquerors can expect. In Peshawur the same ease and prosperity prevailed; but for one crime or another almost every powerful tribe beyond the border was under a blockade¹—the Mullikdeen Afreedees for the assassination of a Police Officer; the Zukka Kheyl Afreedees and the Michnee and Pindalee Mohmunds for a long course of raids and highway robberies; the Kukee Kheyl Afreedees for the murder of a British officer at the mouth of the Khyber Pass; and the people of Totye for harbouring escaped criminals. The people of Punjtar, though not actually under ban, were known to be meditating mischief, and to have called in to their assistance a detachment of Hindoostanee fanatics from Sitana.

135. Thus the valley of Peshawur stood in a ring of repressed hostilities. Beyond that mountain ring lay the kingdom of Cabul, over the disastrous memories of which some treaties of friendship had freshly drawn a veil. Three British officers, Major H. Lumsden, Lieutenant P. Lumsden, and Doctor Bellew, were on a political mission at Candahar—envoys to-day, but possible hostages to-morrow. On the western frontiers of Candahar hovered the skirmishers of the Persian army, which had captured Herat in breach of treaties with the English. Such was the state of our north-west border when the electric telegraph flashed up intelligence of the beginning of the mutiny of the Native Army at Meerut.

Critical
situation at
Pesháwar.
Apprehen-
sions from
Kábul.

136. In the following narrative there is, comparatively speaking, little of importance in respect to the doings in Kohat and Huzara, but the events of Peshawur will be read with a painful interest. This district contained a large native force which, for the most part, proved mutinous to the core, to restrain whom, and to keep in check the fierce spirits within and beyond our border, we had but few Europeans and troops; while it was very probable that on the slightest provocation the Ameer of Cabul might pour an army through the Khyber to overwhelm us when we were hardly in a condition to offer any opposition. How these difficulties

¹ This consists in forbidding an offending tribe to trade with Peshawur and imprisoning any member of it caught in the valley till the tribe submit.

were grappled with and overcome by the able officers, Civil and Military, then in authority at Peshawur; how the disaffected Poorbeas and Hindoostanees were rendered innocuous, and the wild mountaineers of the country enlisted on our side—will be narrated in the following paragraphs.

137. The late lamented Brigadier-General John Nicholson was at the time of the outbreak the Deputy Commissioner of this district. The military forces in the valley, consisting of about 2,800 Europeans and 8,000 native soldiers, of all arms,¹ with 18 field guns and a mountain battery, were commanded by Brigadier Sydney Cotton.

Events in the
Peshawar
District.

138. It was on the night of the 11th May that intelligence arrived by telegraph from Delhi that sepoys from Meerut were burning the houses and killing the Europeans. This intelligence was confirmed on the following morning by a second message from Meerut, stating that the native troops were in open mutiny, and "the European troops under arms defending barracks!" Prompt measures were taken to meet the coming storm. A Movable Column of picked troops was determined on to put down mutiny in the Punjab. Orders were the same day (12th May) issued for the 55th Native Infantry to march from Nowshera and relieve the Guide Corps in charge of the fort of Murdan, and for the Guides, on being relieved, to join Her Majesty's 27th Foot at Nowshera. A rigid examination of sepoy correspondence in the post office began. The 64th Native Infantry, of whom particularly suspicions were entertained, was broken up into three detachments and marched to different outposts as if to meet an expected raid of the Mohmunds, and was thus much crippled for intrigue, whether in its own ranks or with other regiments. Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, was invited over from Kohat to join

Measures
adopted.

Formation of
a Movable
Column, &c.

¹ Her Majesty's 27th, 70th and 87th Regiments; 5th Light Cavalry; 7th, 10th and 18th Irregular Cavalry; Guides; 21st, 24th, 27th, 51st, 55th and 64th Native Infantry; Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment; and details of Horse and Foot Artillery and Mountain Battery.

in a council of war. Early on the following morning news was received of the disarming of the native troops at Lahore.

Assembling
of Council of
war and
measures
determined
upon.

139. The Council of war, composed of General Reed, Commanding the Peshawur Division, Brigadier Sydney Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel Edwardes, and Colonel Nicholson, assembled on the forenoon of the 13th, and the following measures were determined on, all of which received the approval of the Chief Commissioner:—*1st*, the concentration of civil and military power in the Punjab by General Reed (the senior officer) assuming chief command and joining the head-quarters of the Chief Commissioner at Rawul Pindie, leaving Brigadier Cotton in command of Peshawur; *2nd*, the organization of a Movable Column of thoroughly reliable troops to assemble at Jhelum, and thence to take the field and put down mutiny wherever it might appear in the Punjab; *3rd*, the removal of a doubtful sepoy garrison from the fort of Attock and the substitution of a reliable one in that important post; and, *4th*, the levy of 100 Puthans under Futteh Khan, Khuttuck, a tried soldier, to hold the Attock ferry, a vital point in the communication between Peshawur and the Punjab. Brigadier Chamberlain was also deputed to consult further with Sir John Lawrence, and an abstract of the above measures was telegraphed to every station in the Punjab.

March of the
Guides for
Delhi.

140. On the same day (the 13th) the Guide Corps marched from Murdan six hours after it got the order, and was at Attock (30 miles off) next morning, fully equipped for service—"a worthy beginning," writes Colonel Edwardes, "of one of the rapidest marches ever made by soldiers; for, it being necessary to give General Anson every available man to attempt the recovery of Delhi, the Guides were not kept for the Movable Column, but were pushed on to Delhi, a distance of 580 miles, or 50 regular marches, which they accomplished in 21 marches with only 3 intervening halts, and those made by order. After thus marching 27 miles a day for three weeks, Guides reached Delhi on the 9th June, and three hours afterwards engaged the enemy hand-to-hand, every officer being more or less wounded."

141. On the 16th a lithographed circular drawn up by Captain Bartlett, Cantonment Joint Magistrate, in the common character of sepoy correspondence, and in their own provincial dialect, containing an appeal to every loyal feeling and personal interest of the native soldiery, was despatched to many stations of the army, with how little effect is well known. On the same date General Reed and Brigadier Chamberlain joined the Chief Commissioner at Rawul Pindee, and Colonel Edwardes was also summoned to a conference. Before starting he, with the consent of Sir John Lawrence, left orders with Colonel Nicholson to raise a force of 1,000 Mooltanee horse. On the 18th permission was given to increase them to 2,000, for it soon became apparent that, whatever gave rise to the Mutiny, it had settled down into a struggle for empire, and that Delhi must be regained at any cost.

Issue of a circular appealing to the loyalty of the Native Army.

Conference at Ráwalpindi.

142. Dark news kept coming up from the provinces, and a rapid change was observed in the native regiments. Precautions began. The treasure (about 24 lakhs) was removed from the centre of cantonments to the fort outside, where the magazine was, and a European garrison was placed in it. The Brigadier removed his head-quarters to the Residency in the centre of cantonments, which was appointed as the rendezvous for all ladies and children on any alarm by day or night. The troops in garrison were divided into two brigades under the Colonels of the two European regiments, with guns attached to each. European guards were placed in the Artillery lines and a watch was set on every ferry of the Indus.

Precautions at Pesháwar.

143. About this time intelligence was received that the 55th Native Infantry, both at Nowshera and Murdan, and the detachment of 10th Irregular Cavalry at the latter place, were in a state of discontent; a wing of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment was therefore ordered from Rawul Pindee. The native newspaper at Peshawur having published an incendiary report that the Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment had murdered its officers, its Editor (a Persian) was immediately put in prison.

Discontent in the 55th Native Infantry and 10th Irregular Cavalry.

Formation of
Movable
Column.

144. The Movable Column was now organized and placed under the command of Brigadier Chamberlain. Major Becher, Deputy Commissioner of Huzara, contributed to the column one of the two Irregular Infantry regiments stationed in Huzara.

Treasonable
correspond-
ence of
sepoys.

145. On the 21st May Colonel Edwardes returned to Peshawur and found the aspect of affairs gloomy in the extreme. The most rancorous and seditious letters had been intercepted from Mahomedan bigots in Patna and Thanesur to soldiers of the 64th Native Infantry, revelling in the atrocities that had been committed in Hindoostan on the men, women and children of the "Nazarenes," and sending them messages from their own mothers that they should emulate these deeds, and if they fell in the attempt they would at least go to heaven, and their deaths in such a case would be pleasant news at home. These letters also alluded to a long series of correspondence that had been going on through the 64th Native Infantry with the fanatics in Swat and Sitana. Another important letter, which had been despatched by the 51st Native Infantry at Peshawur to the 64th Native Infantry and the Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment at the outposts, had a few days before come to light. It ran as follows:—"This letter is sent from the Peshawur cantonment to the whole Heriot Regiment" (name of the 64th Native Infantry). May it reach the Subadar Bahadur." After some Hindoo apostrophes, it proceeds, "for the rest, this letter is written to convey from the whole camp at Peshawur obeisance and benediction" (from Brahmins to Brahmins) "and salutation and service" (from Mussalman to Mussalman) "to the whole regiments of Heriot and Khelat-i-Ghilzie. Further, the state of affairs here is thus, that on the 22nd day of the month the cartridges will be given to the Doobarun Regiment; so do whatever seems to you proper. Again," (*i. e.*, it is repeated) "the cartridges will have to be bitten on the 22nd instant. Of this you are hereby informed. On reading this letter whatever your opinion is so reply. For considering you as our own, we have let you know beforehand. Therefore do as you think right. This is addressed to you by the

whole regiment. O brothers! the religion of Hindoos and Mahomedans is all one. Therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are at the bidding of the Jemadar, Soobadar-Major, and Havildar-Major; all are discontented with this business, whether small or great. What more need be written? Do as you think best. High and low send their obeisance, benediction, salutation, and service." (Postscript by another hand.) "The above is the state of affairs here. In whatever way you can manage it, come into Peshawur on the 21st instant. Thoroughly understand that point. In fact, eat *there* and drink *here*" (a proverb for letting no delay intervene). Strange to say, this letter was given up by the men of the 64th to their officers! There is very little doubt that the regiment was disaffected, and it is supposed that they acted thus because, being broken up into three detachments, and being unable to act together, and having ascertained that the Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment would not act with them, they thought it better to endeavour to gain a name of loyalty for themselves.

146. Another letter in the Persian character was found on the person of a faquir in a small bag (or housewife, for holding antimony and snuff) which was concealed under his arm-pit. It was as follows:—"My beloved moollah, salaam, salutations to you. After salutation and good wishes, this is the point, that instantly on receiving this, on the 2nd day of the festival of the Eed, you must—yes, must come here; and, if it be easy, bring a few pounds of fruit with you. Now is the time; admit no fear into your heart. Such an opportunity will not again occur. Set out I enjoin you—(signed) Faquir Moollah Naieem." There is no doubt that this was an invitation from Mahomedan conspirators in the garrison to Mahomedan conspirators at the outposts to come in with a few English officers' heads and join in a rising on the 2nd day of the Eed, *i. e.*, the 26th May. Warned by these discoveries and by secret information, Colonel Nicholson endeavoured to raise levies through the chiefs of the district. But the time had passed. It became known that Delhi had fallen into the hands of the mutineers, and men remembered Cabul. Not

Failure of
Colonel
Nicholson to
raise levies.

Assistance
from Kohát.

Mutiny of the
detachments
of the 55th
Native Infantry
at Attock
and Nowshera.

a hundred could be found to join so desperate a cause as ours. In this extremity Colonel Edwardes applied to Kohat for assistance, and Captain Henderson sent 100 levies under Bahadoor Sher Khan, the Bungush Chief, who gathered about 50 more Afreedee volunteers as he came through the Kohat Pass.¹ But the train of mutiny had been already fired. A detachment of the 55th Native Infantry, on duty at the Attock ferry, broke into open revolt and marched off towards Nowshera, being joined on the way by another detachment of the 24th Native Infantry which was escorting commissariat stores to Peshawur, the two bands mustering about 40 or 50 men. Intelligence of this having been sent by a horseman across country to Nowshera, the mutineers were met at the entrance of cantonments by a party of the 10th Irregular Cavalry, disarmed and taken prisoners. But no sooner did the companies of the 55th stationed in Nowshera see their comrades in this plight than they broke out and fired on the sowars, who dispersed. The mutineers (now some 200 strong) then broke open the regimental magazine, and, having supplied themselves with ammunition, rushed to the bridge-of-boats to cross the Cabul river and join the main body of the 55th at Murdan. The bridge had, however, already been broken up by the Executive Engineer, Lieutenant F. S. Taylor ; so the sepoys betook them to the boats ; some were drowned, but the majority got safe to the other bank. The sowars of the 10th Irregular Cavalry did not join the mutineers, but they did not act against them.

Determina-
tion to dis-
arm the
Native troops
at Pesháwar.

147. The news of this revolt did not reach Peshawur until midnight, and it became evident that desperate measures must immediately be resorted to. It was resolved to disarm the Native troops early the following morning, and to call in the aid of the mountaineers, to keep whom in order these very Native troops had been maintained in the valley ! This measure was determined on under the strenuous opposition of

¹ These men guarded the kutcheries and other public buildings at Peshawur. "The incident," Colonel Edwardes truly remarks, "was as great a revolution as the mutiny of the Hindoostanee army."

the Commanding Officers of the condemned corps ; some had " implicit confidence " in their regiments ; others advocated " conciliation " ; while one officer predicted that his men " would attack the guns if called on to give up their muskets." Nevertheless, a parade was ordered at 7 A. M. on the morning of the 22nd, when it was determined to disarm the 5th Light Cavalry and the 24th, 27th and 51st Regiments, Native Infantry. The other Native troops in Peshawur were the 21st Native Infantry (who were spared because it had declined to set a mutinous example, and because one Infantry corps was indispensable for carrying on the duties of the station) and the 7th and 18th Irregular Cavalry ; for at that early stage of the revolt it was hoped that they would be kept quiet by their stake in the service, and it would be easy (after disarming the other regiments) at any time to coerce them. It remained, however, to be seen whether the condemned regiments would submit to be disarmed, and, if they resisted, whether the three excused regiments would not fraternize with them at once, and reduce the struggle to the simple issue of the black and white races.

148. At the appointed hour the troops paraded under arms, the two European regiments (Her Majesty's 70th and 87th) and the Artillery taking up positions at the two ends of the cantonment, within sight of the parades, ready to enforce obedience if necessary, yet not so close as to provoke resistance. The sepoys were completely taken aback ; they were allowed no time to consult ; and, isolated from each other, no regiment was willing to commit itself. The whole laid down their arms ; and it is said that, as the muskets and sabres were hurried into carts, here and there the spurs and swords of English officers fell sympathizingly on the pile.

Carrying out
of the meas-
ure.

149. The result of this measure was at once apparent. As the Civil officers rode to the disarming a very few Chiefs and yeomen of the country attended them, apparently to see which way the tide would turn ; " as we rode back," writes Colonel Edwardes, " friends were as thick as summer flies, and levies began from that moment to come in." As fast as they came in they were enrolled ; and, humanly speaking,

Beneficial
effects and
change in the
attitude of
the people.

to the levying of this militia the preservation of the border at this critical period may be mainly ascribed. Afghans, though fanatical, are yet more avaricious, and gladly brought their arms to our market. A large number of footmen were collected in a short time. Good horses are scarce in that country ; " but the headmen of every village have two or three hacks, and the enlistment of their farm servants on these ribs attached all the hamlets one by one to our cause, and got up quite a hearty feeling." Colonel Edwardes gives a graphic and amusing sketch of these enlistments. " Long before the time," he writes, " crowds of candidates for employment thronged the gateways and overflowed into the garden ; the jockeys of unconquerably vicious horses endeavoured to reduce them to a show of docility by galloping them furiously about till the critical moment of inspection came. At last, sick at heart from the receipt of a bad telegram from the Provinces, but endeavouring to look happy, out I used to go and face some hundreds of the Chiefs and yeomen of the country, all eager to gather from the Commissioner Sahib's countenance how the ' King of Delhi ' was getting on. Then the first horseman would be brought up. The beast perhaps would not move. The rider, the owner, and all the neighbours, would assail him with whips, sticks, stones and Pushtu reproaches that might have moved a rock ; but nothing would do till the attempt was given up, and the brute's head turned the other way, when he went off at a gallop amid roars of laughter from the Puthans, who have the keenest perception of both fun and vice. No. 2 would make a shift to come up, but every man and boy in the crowd could see that he was lame on two or three legs. Then the argument began ; and leg by leg, blemish by blemish, the animal was proved by a multitude of witnesses (who had known him for very many years) to be perfectly sound ! And so the enlistment went on from day to day, affording immense occupation, profit, and amusement to the people, and answering a great many good ends. Now and then an orderly of the Hindoostanee Irregular Cavalry, admirably armed and mounted, would pass the spot and mark his opinion of the ' levies ' by a contemptuous smile. But

nevertheless he told his comrades in the lines that the country-people were all with the English, and that it was of no use to desert or to intrigue."

150. On the night of the disarming, about 250 of the sepoy of the 51st Native Infantry deserted and fled in every direction. They were promptly seized by the people of the district and the Police, and, extraordinary to say, were brought in alive though loaded with money. The ringleader, the Soobadar-Major of the regiment, was hanged before the whole garrison on parade, and was the first mutineer executed at Peshawur.

Flight of some sepoy of the 51st Native Infantry. Their seizure and punishment.

151. Return we now to the Nowshera mutineers. It was soon reported that both the 55th and 10th Irregular Cavalry at Murdan were in a state of disaffection,—the former regiment having threatened to murder their officers and the latter to "roast" Lieutenant Horne, the Civil officer stationed there. As soon, therefore, as the disarming had been accomplished at Peshawur, measures were taken to deal with the disaffected troops at Murdan. Major Vaughan's corps was ordered from Attock to Nowshera to protect the families of Her Majesty's 27th Regiment against any return of the mutineers or any outbreak of the detachment of the 10th Irregulars. At 11 o'clock on the night of the 23rd a force of 300 European Infantry, 250 Irregular Cavalry, Horse Levies and Police, and 8 guns, left Peshawur under command of Colonel Chute, of Her Majesty's 70th, accompanied by Colonel Nicholson as Political Officer, and, after being joined by 200 Punjab Infantry from Nowshera under Major Vaughan, reached Murdan about sunrise of the 25th. But no sooner did this force appear in the distance than the 55th (with the exception of some 120 men) broke from the fort and fled tumultuously towards the Swat hills. A pursuit was made by the whole force, but the mutineers had a long start and the ground favored them. The guns and Infantry were unable to come up with them; the Irregular Cavalry only pretended to act; but Colonel Nicholson (who was 20 hours in the saddle, and under a burning sun must have traversed 70 miles on that day) hurled himself on the fugitives

Determination to disarm the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan.

Flight of 55th Native Infantry. Pursuit and destruction of a number of men. Escape of the rest to Swat.

Suicide of the
Colonel of the
55th Native
Infantry.

with a handful of police sowars and did fearful execution amongst them; 150 dead bodies were numbered on their line of flight; thrice that number must have borne off wounds; 150 were taken prisoners. The people of the border rather favored than opposed them, and about 500 made good their escape into Swat. The ultimate fate of these men will be told in the Huzara section. Colonel Spottiswoode, of the 55th, unable to endure the disgrace of the corps he had so loved and trusted, died by his own hand. It subsequently appeared that there had long been intrigues going on between the 55th and 64th Native Infantry and the 10th Irregular Cavalry and the Hindoostanee fanatics in Swat.

Arrival of
Ajun Khan
on the border
and despatch
of a force
against him.

152. And now another cloud seemed gathering on the frontier. The noted outlaw Ajoon Khan came down to Prangar invited, as it was believed, by our Hindoostanee troops¹ in the fort of Abozye, at the head of the Swat River. Nothing seemed more likely than that he would be joined by the fugitives of the 55th, come down to Abozye, and get the fort betrayed to him by the garrison, when the whole frontier would have been in a flame. But the danger was promptly met. The force under Colonel Chute was strengthened and moved rapidly to cover the threatened outposts. It was seen that, after disarming four regiments and routing another we still had a force in the field standing on the aggressive. Ajoon Khan withdrew into the hills, and our little force encamped on the border until Delhi should be regained. But Delhi was not to be recovered by a *coup de main*, and months of painful anxiety were yet to be endured.

Orders regarding deserters.

Arrival of
Multani
levies.

153. About this time the Commissioner issued a proclamation that any deserter might be killed wherever found in the district and the property on his person appropriated by the captors. About 40 or 50 sepoys were killed in consequence in making for the Indus, and this destroyed all confidence between the soldiery and the people. Now, too, the Mooltanee Puthans from the Derajat began to arrive, and

¹ These were detachments of 64th Native Infantry, Khelat-i-Ghilzies and 10th Irregular Cavalry; but the Ghilzies were not concerned in the conspiracy, and indeed remained staunch throughout.

the aspect of affairs greatly to improve. It may be mentioned, as an instance of the strange things that happened in those days, that a party of 300 of the Mullikdeen Afreedees (who were under embargo, as has been previously mentioned), marched into cantonments, armed to the teeth, and said they had come to fight for us and be forgiven. They formed the nucleus of one of the new Punjab regiments. The several detachments of the 64th at the outposts were one by one disarmed by the column under Colonels Chute and Nicholson, and by other forces sent out from cantonments for the purpose.

Offer of service by the Mullikdin Khel Afridis.

154. Meanwhile General Cotton had not been idle. He had been dealing out stern justice to such of the mutineers as had openly committed themselves; and he now turned his attention to making the most of his reliable material. Volunteers from the Queen's Infantry Regiments were mounted and armed with the horses and weapons taken from the 5th Light Cavalry, under the denomination of the "Peshawur Light Horse." Subsequently a limited number of selected sowars of the 5th Light Cavalry were associated with them. The Sikhs and other Punjabees were picked out of the several Hindoostanee regiments of the line and formed into a separate corps, which subsequently did good service. A battery of 9-pounder guns lying in the magazine was manned by European volunteers from the Queen's Infantry Regiments and horsed by the horses of the 5th Light Cavalry. In like manner the Native troop of Horse Artillery was replaced by European volunteers. A depôt was established for Afghan recruits, which was soon after embodied as the 18th Regiment of Punjab Infantry. Three more irregular Cavalry Regiments were raised. Lastly, amongst the measures of new organization may be mentioned the "Land Transport Train" for the conveyance of the European soldiers with ease and comfort at that inclement season. A number of spare ammunition waggons were fitted up by the Ordnance Commissariat officers so that 16 men could ride in each wagon and their arms be stowed away in the lockers on which they sat. The waggons were to be drawn by relays of commissariat bullocks at regular stages along the road; and it was found that, if

Measures of reorganization adopted by General Cotton.

Organization of a Land Transport Train.

necessary, the train could thus accomplish 40 miles in one night. It proved of invaluable service when the autumnal sickness set in with more than its usual virulence. "The European soldiery viewed this thoughtful effort in their behalf with gratitude. It literally opened a way to them to get out of this fatal valley when prostrated by fever; and, though many fine fellows fell victims to the disease, there is no question that many were rescued from death by being removed to Rawul Pindee in the Land Transport Train."

Affairs in
Swat.

155. In the first year of our rule the border was chiefly disturbed by the hostility of the neighbouring country of Swat. An aged priest, called the Akhoond, had hitherto been the Pope of this country; but, looking at the English career in India as aggressive, he expected us to annex Swat as soon as we had settled at Peshawur. On his suggestion, therefore, the Swatees created one Syud Ukbur their king and agreed to pay him a tithe of their crops to keep up soldiers for their defence. Providentially for us, this Badshah of Swat died on the 11th May, the very day that the first news of the mutiny reached Peshawur; so that Swat was plunged into civil war, and thus prevented from making those aggressions on our territory which might otherwise have been looked for. Syud Mobarik Shah, son of the deceased Syud Ukbur, wished to succeed his father; but the Swatees had grown tired of tithes. Both sides called in their friends and allies to settle the question by arms. It was at this juncture that the 500 fugitive sepoy of the 55th Native Infantry arrived in Swat. They were at once taken into the young king's service, but after fighting one battle demanded pay. The king, not being in funds, borrowed 1,000 rupees from the leader of the sepoys and distributed them amongst the mutineers; but when this supply was exhausted the full extent of their folly and misery seems to have struck the ringleader, for he blew out his own brains. The Akhoond at this time having sided with the popular party, the 55th sepoys were dismissed and the young king expelled from Swat. The peace of our border being thus assured, the column returned to Peshawur with Colonel Nicholson who was, however, shortly after

Arrival of
fugitive
sepoys of the
55th Native
Infantry in
Swat and
their treat-
ment.

removed to the command of the Punjab Movable Column, with the rank of Brigadier-General, in the room of General Chamberlain, appointed Adjutant-General of the Army. Colonel Nicholson's place as Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur was filled by Captain James, then Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who had previously had charge of the district for many years. On the break up of Colonel Chute's Column the fort of Murdan was garrisoned by a part of the 5th Punjab Infantry and the Nowshera cantonment by the 4th Punjab Infantry.

Appointment of Colonel Nicholson to the command of the Movable Column.

156. It was now time to bring the 10th Irregulars to task. Part of this regiment was in Peshawur, part in Nowshera. Both were simultaneously dealt with. On the 26th June their arms, horses and property were taken from them and confiscated, and the whole of the men were hurried down to Attock, where they were dismissed with two rupees each, just enough to carry them to their homes.¹ Shortly after, the disarmed regiments were not only deprived of their extra batta, but put upon subsistence allowance, to their great disgust.

Disarming of 10th Irregular Cavalry.

157. Two of the frontier outposts, Forts Bara and Mackeson, were garrisoned by detachments of the 24th Native Infantry. It became known to the authorities that some of these men had been negotiating with the Afreedees to pilot them through the hills to some ferry on the Indus. They were deprived of their arms and removed to cantonments; the ringleader was blown from a gun; and the outposts were garrisoned by Mooltanees.

Disloyalty of detachments of 24th Native Infantry at Forts Bara and Mackeson.

158. Scarcely had this little affair been disposed of when (on the 9th July) two Afreedees of the Sipah tribe entered the lines of the 18th Irregular Cavalry and presented to the sowars a letter from Mullik Surajoodeen, the head of their tribe, and one of the most powerful men in the Khyber, offering an asylum in the hills to "any black men" (so the Hindoostanees are called by the Afghan tribes), either

Attempt of Afreedis of the Sipah tribe to tamper with the 18th Irregular Cavalry.

¹ On the winding up of the accounts of this corps it was found to be 60,000 rupees in debt, which all the horses, arms, property and arrears of pay did little more than cover.

of the Cavalry or Infantry, who chose to mutiny and come to him. The sowars at once took letter and emissaries to their Commanding Officer. The Sipah chief was called upon to explain; he at once acknowledged the letter, and said "if the black men had come he meant to give them up!"

Attempt to
raise rebellion
in Yusafzai
and prompt
punishment of
the rebels.

159. It has already been related how Syud Mobarik Shah and the mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry were dismissed from Swat and told to seek their fortune elsewhere. The mass of the latter made for Cashmere, and mostly perished by the way. The former, accompanied by the few remaining sepoys, proceeded to the valley of Punjtar, which adjoins the Yoosufzye side of the valley of Peshawur. Here they found a colony of Hindoostanee-Mahomedans of the Wahabee sect, headed by a moulvi named Inayat, who, in return for lands at a place called Mungul Thanna, support the Khan of Punjtar in oppressing his own clan. Either this chief (Mokurub Khan) or the clan used to be constantly calling in our border officers to arbitrate their mutual disputes, and our decisions being generally in favor of the people incurred for us the hatred of the Khan. Now was a good opportunity to vent it. He commenced by sending a party of Hindoostanees and other vagabonds under his cousin, Meer Baz Khan, into our nearest villages, and instigating them to "raise the standard of the Prophet"; or in other words to refuse to pay their revenue. Major Vaughan, then commanding at Murdan, at once marched out (2nd July) and fell on them with about 400 horse and foot and 2 mountain guns, killed Meer Baz Khan, took prisoner a Rohilla leader, hanged him and the headman of the rebels, burnt two of the villages which had revolted, fined others, and thus extinguished this spark of mischief.

Raising of the
standard of
rebellion at
Narinji and
successful
operations
against the
Ghazis.

160. Captain James at once proceeded to the spot, and by his judgment, courage and intelligence the Yoosufzye border was saved at this period from a general rise. "The most disastrous tidings came daily from Hindoostan, and echoed in still more alarming voices among these hills. Special messengers made their way from Delhi and proclaimed the extinction of the "Nazarenes" in the Mogul capital.

Others came from Peshawur and invited the Ghazees to descend and inflame the country. The Ghazees came with the moulvee at their head and planted their standard (embroidered with butchery from the Koran) on the heights of Narinjee. This mountain village was so strongly situated that the police scarcely dared to go near it; and it became a refuge for every evil-doer. Its inhabitants, about 400 in number, welcomed the moulvee with delight. The holy war seemed auspiciously opened with every requisite—a priest, a banner, a fastness, a howling crowd of bigots, and several days' provisions. But on the morning of the 21st July Captain James surprised them with a force of 800 horse and foot and 4 mountain guns, under command of Major Vaughan, and put them to a disastrous flight, which the moulvee headed so precipitately that his mystic banner remained in the hands of the infidels. No less than 50 or 60 of the Ghazees were slain, and the lower village of Narinjee was destroyed." The weather was too hot and the troops too exhausted to destroy Upper Narinjee, to which place the Moulvee shortly returned with a strong reinforcement. It was, however, assailed on the 3rd August by Captain James and Major Vaughan with 1,400 men. "The Ghazees had thrown up some formidable entrenchments, and danced and yelled as they saw a small column advancing in their front. Their shouts were answered by British cheers from a second column under Lieutenant Hoste, which had gained the heights by a bye-path and now appeared above Narinjee. A general fight took place; 30 of the Ghazees died fighting stoutly, and three were taken prisoners, amongst whom was a moulvee from Bareilly, who was summarily hanged. The village was then knocked down by elephants, and its towers blown up by the Engineers. Narinjee was at last destroyed."

161. About this time a general restlessness was observed amongst the Chiefs of the district, as well as amongst the native community. Delhi still held out, and doubts began to be entertained in regard to our ultimate success. The conduct of the moneyed classes in respect to the 6 per cent. loan,

Restlessness
amongst the
Frontier
Chiefs.

Reluctance of
inhabitants to
subscribe to
the 6 per cent.
loan.

Measures
taken by
Colonel
Edwardes.

Amount
raised.

which was opened by order of the Financial Commissioner, may be instanced to show how completely native confidence was destroyed. The chief native gentlemen of the city were summoned by the Commissioner and consulted on this delicate topic. "They looked grave, made many wise remarks on the duty of everybody to help such a paternal Government, affected an entire freedom from the vulgar belief that the English Raj was coming to an end; but it was clearly their opinion not a rupee would be subscribed." However, they undertook to sound the city corporation and to bring up the chief capitalists next day. About two hours after the appointed time," writes Colonel Edwardes, "the city magnates slunk in, each trying to make himself as small as possible, and to sit in any row except the front. That hyperbole of gratitude for the prosperity enjoyed under our shadow; that lavish presentation of trays of fruits and sugar-candy, with which these comfortable men formerly rolled 'into the presence'—what had become of it? Alas, all vanished with our prestige! Behold a Government not only opening a loan, but imperatively needing it! Not a man would lend a farthing if he could help it." Seeing this, Colonel Edwardes commenced business by fining them all round for being late, and asked them what arrangements they proposed. After half an hour's consultation, they said "they thought 15,000 rupees might be raised with a little contrivance in the course of a few months." But the prestige of the Government was to be maintained, and the Commissioner informed the corporation that it was his intention to levy five lakhs towards the loan, the assessment of which he left to themselves, allowing them one day to arrange it. "They at once settled down to the details, but, as every house desired to throw an unfair share on its neighbour, I placed the assessment in the hands of the Government treasurer, Man Mull, who carried it out with a patience, firmness, good nature, and impartiality which I cannot too highly praise." Ultimately four lakhs were subscribed. These securities fell during the crisis so low as 26 per cent. discount, but subsequently rose nearly to par. The loan operated very favourably on public opinion. The people

enjoyed seeing the money-lenders brought to book, and the latter at once became interested in the cause of good order.

162. On the 27th July the reliable force in Peshawur was much weakened by the march of the 4th Punjab Infantry for Delhi; but the new levies had now attained an importance which justified the withdrawal of that regiment. Shortly afterwards most of the tribes in disgrace on the border tendered their submission. Some anxiety was caused by rumours of a rising in the city on the feast of Bukra-Eed (1st August), and of its being the intention of the British Government to make over the territories trans-Indus to the Ameer of Cabul. The fears caused by these reports were, however, allayed and nothing came of them.

Anxiety
caused by
groundless
rumours.

163. A fresh source of anxiety was now produced (15th August) by a red-hot fanatic named Syud Ameer, of the family of the known Koonar Badshahs, who came down into the Khyber to incite the tribes to a holy war. "This man had all his life been a mendicant, wandering in Peshawur, Cabul, Teheran, Constantinople and Mecca, and had just returned from one of these pilgrimages with a few thousand rupees, seed enough for a goodly harvest of devilry on the frontier. He planted his green flag at the village of Gaggree in the Peshawur mouth of the Khyber Pass, and sent a summons to the Kookee Kheyl Mulliks to leave me and join him in a crescentade. There is something delightful in the good conduct of thorough rascals. Who could have expected the Kookee Kheyl to stick to their agreements of yesterday? But they did. They went back and told the Syud to be off. He cursed them well and frightened them a good deal with his Koran, flag, and various incantations; but the most he could get from them was five days' hospitality. He certainly made the most of his time, for his emissaries came to every regiment in Peshawur with invitations to join him * * * * At the end of the five days, when the Syud showed no symptoms of leaving, the Kookee Kheyl pulled up the pickets of his horses and camels, and even irreverently shut up his flag; and the Syud left the Pass in a storm of Arabic."

Unsuccessful
attempt of a
fanatic named
Syud Amir to
tamper with
the Kuki
Khel Maliks.

Search for
arms and
mutiny of the
51st Native
Infantry.

Struggle
with the
18th Punjab
Infantry.

Flight of the
51st Native
Infantry.
Pursuit and
destruction
of the regi-
ment.

Night attack
on the fort of
Michni by
Syad Amir
and the Moh-
mands.

164. But we were not yet done with him. He went to the next tribe under blockade, the Michnee Mohmunds, who received him with open arms; and again incendiary letters and messages were introduced amongst the troops. Great restlessness pervaded the disarmed regiments, and arms were supposed to be finding their way into the lines. General Cotton accordingly (on the 28th August) ordered the sepoys to be moved into tents and the lines of every native regiment to be searched simultaneously. Weapons of every description were found. "Exasperated by the discovery of their plans and by the taunts of the newly-raised Afreedee regiments, who were carrying out the search, the 51st Native Infantry rushed upon the piled arms of the 18th Punjab Infantry, and sent messengers to all the other Hindoostanee regiments to tell them of the rise. For a few minutes a desperate struggle ensued. The 51st Native Infantry had been one of the finest sepoy corps in the service; and they took the new irregulars altogether by surprise. They got possession of several stands of arms, and used them well. * * * But soon the Afreedee soldiers seized their arms, and then began that memorable fusillade which commenced on the parade-ground at Peshawur and ended at Jamrood. General Cotton's arrangements for meeting such emergencies were perfect. Troops, horse and foot, were rapidly under arms, and in pursuit of the mutineers. Every Civil officer turned out with his *posse comitatus* of levies or police, and in a quarter of an hour the whole country was covered with the chase." Out of a total of 871 men, some 60 or 70 are supposed to have reached the hills, 660 having either been killed in the pursuit or subsequently executed by sentence of court-martial. The example had a good effect on the disarmed troops, who from that date underwent a marked change.

165. About a fortnight after this event, Syud Ameer with a body of Mohmunds and 40 or 50 of the escaped 51st sepoys made a night attack on the fort of Michnee. The garrison consisted of a detachment of the Khelat-i-Ghilzies, who had heretofore behaved well, but they were Hindoostanees, and who could rely on them? The Mohmunds opened

on the fort with their juzails, but the 51st deserters, with a far more formidable weapon, appealed to every prejudice in the garrison, and screamed to them to betray the fort if they valued their country or their religion. A company of Afreedee sepoys was hastily thrown into the citadel, but something more was needed. The Mohmunds were in the highest excitement, sending "the fiery cross" to all their neighbours, and evidently determined to strike a blow for the recovery of a fief that they had forfeited some three years before. "We had no troops," writes Colonel Edwardes, "to move out against them. It was a time for yielding with as good a grace as could be assumed. I sent them word that they were just going the wrong way to work, and that, if they wanted to regain their confiscated privileges, they must render some marked service to the Government, instead of adding to the embarrassments of a passing crisis. For instance, let them send the fanatic, Syud Ameer, up to the Court of Cabul and there make him over to the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. If they did that and gave hostages for their good conduct till this war was over, I would gladly ask Government to reinstate them, though not on such favorable terms as formerly. Whatever the errors and shortcomings of Englishmen in the East may be, they are undoubtedly believed. The Mohmunds sent in their hostages to Peshawur, packed the Syud off unceremoniously, and sat down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindoostan."

Reinforce-
ment of the
fort.

Negotiations
with the Moh-
mands and
terms made.

166. The narrative of events at Peshawur during the crisis of 1857 is now ended; but the following statistics may prove interesting. To give a right idea of the way in which the military authorities met the crisis, it may be mentioned that no less than 523 military executions took place for mutiny and desertion, of whom 20 were hanged, 44 blown from guns, and 459 shot by musketry.

Statistics of
military
punishments
inflicted at
Pesháwar.

167. Of Irregular levies raised in Peshawur during the crisis (irrespective of regiments of disciplined Infantry raised by Military officers), there were 1,223 horse and 1,101 foot, or a total of 2,324; and if we take into account the levies of

Statistics of
Irregular
levies raised.

the Derajat and Kohat, which were subsequently sent to Peshawur, the total will be raised to 5,667, of whom 1,807 were sent to Hindoostan for general service, where they have behaved with credit. Perhaps nothing tended more than these levies to keep the frontier quiet. They absorbed all the idlers and adventurers of the Peshawur Valley, and made the campaign against the Hindoostanee mutineers a highly popular service. To use a common phrase of the natives, it put the people into our boat.

Conclusion of
the narrative
of events in
Peshāwar.

168. The following extract from Colonel Edwardes' report may appropriately close the narrative of events in Peshawur during the crisis :—"Anxiety and suspense about Delhi reached its climax on the 14th September, the day fixed for the storm; and when the telegraph at last announced that desperate feat of arms and General Nicholson dangerously wounded, it did not sound like victory. And day by day as gate after gate and quarter after quarter of the rebel city was mastered by that band of heroes, the question still was—*Is Nicholson any better?* On the 20th, Delhi was completely in our possession, and every English heart thanked God for it. There seemed a hope too that Nicholson might live. On the 23rd that hope was extinguished, and with a grief unfeigned, and deep and stern, and worthy of the man, the news was whispered,—*Nicholson is dead!*"

Events in
Hazāra.

169. The troops in Huzara at the commencement of the Mutiny, consisted of the 2nd and 4th Regiments of Sikh Infantry and a mountain train of 6 guns, all concentrated at Abbottabad. Besides these there were available for general duty a police force of 150 horse and 60 foot and 24 *zumburchees*, or gunners attached to camel swivels, under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Major J. Becher. As soon as news of the outbreak was received, three companies of the 2nd Sikhs were detached for the protection of the neighbouring hill station of Murree in the Rawul Pindee district; and on the 19th May the 4th Sikhs marched for Delhi, whereby the

Transfer of
troops from
Abbott-abad.

strength of the Infantry force at Abbottabad was reduced to 341 men.

170. To supply the place of the absent force and to provide for the security and peace of this mountain district, orders were given to raise 150 horse and 500 foot levies from the people of the country, and for Major Becher to assume military command. The levies were enrolled by quotas from the Chiefs and principal Mulliks, and were the representatives of so many clans ; they brought their own arms, and were all accustomed to hill warfare. They were employed partly in guarding the ferries of the Indus and all the principal roads of the district, and were instrumental in seizing many deserters, mutineers and breeders of sedition, who were thus brought to justice.

Levies raised
under Major
Becher.

171. On the 10th June the Kumaon Goorkha Battalion marched into Huzara ; and three days after an opportunity occurred for testing the feeling of the force and for a first example to the country by the blowing from guns of two mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry, who had escaped from Murdan into Huzara. The Court-martial which tried and condemned them was composed wholly of Native officers. The execution took place on parade before all the troops and a large concourse of the country-people ; and the most perfect order prevailed.

Arrival of
Kumaon Bat-
talion and its
loyalty.

172. Three days later the Kumaon Regiment was called away to reinforce the army before Delhi, where this corps earned much distinction for itself.

Departure for
Delhi.

173. Again reduced in military strength, the Deputy Commissioner proceeded to make the best arrangements he could for the security and defence of the district from invasion from without and disturbance within. The fort of Hurreepoor, 22 miles to the rear of the cantonment of Abbottabad, is the chief place of defence in Huzara. It was built by Sirdar Hurree Singh to maintain the first Sikh conquest of the country, and was always their base of operations. This fort, which contained a large magazine, was well stored with provisions and was garrisoned by a force of

Precautionary
measures
adopted by
Major Becher.

police and levies. The detached hill forts and several police stations along the Indus were also provisioned, strengthened and put into repair. The chiefs of the district were summoned by the Deputy Commissioner and assured of the reliance placed in their aid and fidelity, and by daily intercourse and encouragement the mischievous effects of the machinations and lying reports of sedition-mongers were counteracted. The semi-barbarous tribes of Huzara are by feeling and kindred nearly allied to the wild clans beyond the border ; and the action of the latter in the critical posture which affairs had assumed would necessarily be influenced by the position taken up by the former ; it was therefore a point of great importance to secure the people of the district firmly on our side. This was happily done by the judicious measures adopted by Major Becher—a result to which 10 years of kindly rule no doubt contributed.

Operations
against the
remnant of
the mutineers
of the 55th
Native In-
fantry from
Mardán.

174. It has been related in the Peshawur section how the 55th Native Infantry, after mutinying at Hotee Murdan and being pursued by a police force under the late General Nicholson, escaped into Swat, and after a short sojourn in that country were expelled by the Swatees. Rumours reached Major Becher of the desperate resolution of this band of mutineers to proceed across the hills to the territory of the Maharaja of Cashmere, in the forlorn hope of receiving welcome and sympathy from the soldiery of that kingdom. As their route lay either through Huzara or along its border, the chiefs and headmen of the district were warned to be on the alert to oppose their passage.

Arrival of
mutineers in
Allai.

175. On the evening of the 23rd June a letter was sent to Major Becher at Abbottabad by a Mullik of Kounsh enclosing another from a Chief in Ullye in which assistance and a safe passage through Kounsh were asked for 600 Hindoo-stanee soldiers who had fled from the "Feringhees." This intelligence was corroborated by a messenger, who stated that the sepoys had crossed the Indus on rafts and inflated skins, and were then in Ullye. They were armed with muskets or rifles and swords, but had little clothing, and were accom-

panied by confidential messengers of the Akhoond of Swat, who bore letters calling on all good Mussalmans to help the sepoys and denouncing all who did not.

176. Ulye is two days' journey from our extreme possession of Kounsh, which is the jageer of Muhammad Ameen Khan, the head of the Swatees of Huzara; between intervenes the independent territory of Nundyar, occupied also by Swatees, all of one common ancestry; adjoining are several wild and mountainous glens through which are roads practicable for men on foot, though the more direct road is through Kounsh.

177. On learning that the sepoys had crossed the Indus, Major Becher called on Mahomed Ameen Khan and the Khagan and other Chiefs of the neighbourhood to collect their followers and oppose the progress of the mutineers through the passes; and leaving Lieutenant Boulderson, the Assistant Commissioner, in command at Abbottabad, he proceeded on the 24th June with a detachment of the 2nd Sikhs and some police and levies to Dodyal, 25 miles off, where he learnt that the sepoys would attempt the direct route *via* Kounsh. Dodyal is a central position in the plain, and controls all the principal roads and approaches. The intention was to oppose the passage of the mutineers through the gorges by the armed peasantry of the country, and to meet them with the regular troops as they debouched into the open. On the 27th the band of mutineers advanced towards Kounsh; but, seeing the passes occupied by the armed and hostile country people, their courage failed them; they turned back and determined at all hazards to attempt the difficult route near the Indus and through the Kohistan.

Measures
adopted
against the
mutineers.

178. "Little did they know," writes Major Becher, "the country through which they must tread their way, on the narrow ledges of tremendous precipices, by tracks with scarcely footing for the practised peasant, through gorges where a few could prevent a host, and over wastes where seldom was to be found even the hut of the shepherd Goojur. Destruction was before them. At Raeshung, the first

ill-omened day of their advance, a Jemadar shot himself with a musket, vainly urging the direct and easier way, and declaring that it was better to perish in fight than to starve or die miserably among those frightful rocks."

Wanderings
of the muti-
neers, who are
attacked and
suffer severe
losses.

179. On learning the altered route of the mutineers, the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the Syuds of that part of Ulye where they had now arrived, and to the jirga of the Kohistanees, to disabuse them of the report that the British Government wished to touch the religion of its soldiers, urging them to view these men not as martyrs but as rank traitors to their salt; and, bringing to their minds the many favors they had received at our hands, he called upon them to aid us in opposing the passage of the sepoys. These letters had the desired effect. Just beyond the boundary of Ulye the band of mutineers were attacked in rear; while the Goojurs of Kohistan assailed them in front, hurling down huge stones from the rocks above. In this encounter eight sepoys fell; while on the other side a Chief of the district was wounded and a Kohistanee was shot. Enraged at the loss of their countryman, the Kohistanees again opposed the sepoys at the pass of Banda Dewan and slew several more of them. "Every step of the advance now brought new embarrassment; the knapsacks and bayonets and many of the muskets were cast down the rocks, and a large payment in silver could scarcely procure a seer of flour."

180. On the 5th July the mutineers, haggard and hungry, halted on the bank of the Blue River (Neela Nud-dee), a tributary of the Indus; and in the afternoon a party of six men proceeded to a neighbouring village for provisions. These were seized, but two of them escaping gave the alarm to the rest to prepare to resist the new wild force which was hovering over their heads. The Kohistanees and Syuds of Khagan, closing in, fired down upon them from the heights above. The fight lasted until the following morning; several of the sepoys were killed or wounded; many were drowned in the rapid stream, the narrow bridge over which had been secured; while others were made prisoners; till at last

Flight to-
wards Kash-
mir.

with a desperate rush they took possession of the bridge and village, and their further molestation was prevented by a moollah accredited by the Akhoond of Swat. Thence they proceeded, under the protection of this man, to the Laloosur Lake, on the borders of the kingdom of Cashmere, where they were again met by the Syuds and Kohistanees, and their miserable wanderings brought to a close.

Pursuit by
Syads and
Kohistanis.

181. It was a rainy morning. Footsore, weary, and famished, with failing strength and diminished numbers, the hearts of the mutineers despaired as they saw their enemies appear through the mists, with drums beating and pennons flying; and after a faint resistance and the slaughter of a few of their number, they laid down their arms and surrendered; 124 were here made prisoners; and shortly after 43 more, who had made their escape, were seized and sent in by the Cashmere Government. Most of these men were executed in different parts of the district. Since then six sick and miserable wretches, converted to Mahomedanism, have been picked up at different times. A few by changing their religion may have found refuge in Ullye and Swat; a few may have escaped into Chilas, where a life of slavery awaited them; but the great mass of them were either killed in fight, or perished from famine and fatigue, or were executed after their capture.

Surrender and
punishment.

182. Thus was accomplished the retribution of the ill-fated 55th Regiment. From the day of their mutiny at Hotee Murdan until their final overthrow, their progress was marked by disappointment, famine, toil, disaster, and at last by death—a terrible example to other mutinous regiments, and an evidence that there was no refuge for them even far beyond our own border.

Retribution
of 55th Na-
tive Infantry.

183. After this the force returned to cantonments at Abbottabad, and matters remained quiet and undisturbed in Huzara, though the delay in the fall of Delhi operated here, as in other parts of the Punjab, to unsettle the minds of the people and to lead them to regard as possible the downfall of the English power. The effect was a combination of the Khurrul tribe in Huzara and of the Dhoonds of the hills in the

Return of
pursuing
force to
Abbottabad.

Assistance rendered by Hazára in connection with the *émeute* at Murree.

Rawul Pindee district for the purpose of assaulting and sacking the hill station of Murree. A full account of this *émeute* and of the forces contributed by Major Becher for its suppression has already been given in the Rawul Pindee section; and it will only be necessary here to state that there is no doubt that the attack was planned, and the tribes incited thereto, by Hindoostanee-Mahomedans at Murree itself; that, after despatching a second detachment of three companies for the protection of Murree, the force in Huzara was reduced to 27 effective sepoy and 82 recruits of about a month's standing; and that by the exertions of Major Becher most of the ringleaders in this affair were hunted up and brought to punishment.

Events in the Kohát District.

184. This district was presided over during the anxious period of 1857 by Captain B. Henderson. Kohat.

Reinforcements sent to Pesháwar.

The force stationed at Kohat at the commencement of the Mutiny consisted of three regiments of Punjab Infantry and one of Punjab Cavalry, with some Artillery—in all about 3,500 men. This garrison was gradually reduced to about one-fifth of its original strength by the despatch of reinforcements to Peshawur, Attock, and the Movable Column. Thus on the 15th May, or within 24 hours of the receipt of intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi, a complete regiment of Infantry marched to Attock; on the 31st the regiment of Cavalry proceeded to Peshawur, and from time to time smaller detachments were sent to reinforce General Nicholson's column as well as the reliable troops at Peshawur. The places of the absent forces were in some degree filled by levies of the warlike tribes in the district and beyond the border. Captain Henderson further contributed some 1,400 levies (of whom mention has been made in the Peshawur section) as well as a large body of his police to the Peshawur forces.

Unfounded rumours and precautions taken.

185. Much anxiety was caused by a rumour, which reached the Deputy Commissioner on the 22nd May, that the stock of ammunition which had recently been received at Kohat, and some portion of which had been served out to all the troops, was prepared with the mixture of pig's and

bullock's fat, and that it was intended to coerce the men into using it on the 1st June following. No other grievance was spoken of, but all the troops were said to have declared that they would refuse the ammunition. "The traders began to conceal their property, and to carry it to the houses of Syuds and powerful villages; and the common bazar report was that the Cavalry would not take the cartridge, and made no secret of it." Immediate precautions were taken. Strong Infantry picquets were placed over the guns; the treasure was removed into the upper fort of Kohat, which was garrisoned by a company of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, and target practice was discontinued for a time. The excitement gradually subsided; and happily nothing came of it.

186. The progress of events in Hindoostan and the Punjab necessarily reacted on the people of Kohat and created considerable excitement amongst them; nevertheless the peace of the district was preserved in a remarkable degree. There was a slight increase of violent crime; but on the whole the behaviour of the people, everything considered, was excellent. There was but one attempt at a petty raid with about 120 men, which resulted, writes Captain Henderson, "in the helterskelter flight of the would-be assailants, who narrowly escaped destruction." The Toorees beyond the border, as well as a party in Boree, were at one time inclined to give trouble by plundering, but they were peaceably brought to reason, and obliged to give security for good conduct. The Afreedees of the Kohat Pass, before notoriously the most unruly tribe in the district, behaved in an admirable manner, furnishing levies with alacrity and keeping the pass so safe that it was considered by Captain Henderson "the safest portion of the road in the whole country"; and during the seven months of trouble they were not charged with a single crime—not even a petty theft. This satisfactory state of things was mainly due to the wise measures taken by the District and Military authorities to put down revolt and to counteract the evil effect of false and exaggerated rumours by disseminating throughout the district any good tidings that came to hand.

Behaviour of
the people.

Attitude of
the neighbour-
ing tribes.

187. On the outbreak of the rebellion all the neighbouring tribes offered their services to the Government ; but their feeling is described by Captain Henderson as "a strange mixed one, their best wishes at heart being in favor of the King of Delhi, in whom they clearly felt a great interest, though they were inimical to the Poorbeas. It was a constant subject of anxiety," continues Captain Henderson, "to the temper and feelings of the tribes all round, and we have not many real friends amongst them, though so long as we have power they hesitate to break their connection with us ; but they were worked upon to rise against us, day after day, by faquirs and moollahs bearing every imaginable falsehood that could be invented against Government ; but, though the excitement was everywhere intense, and common report was everywhere rife that we were about to make our escape from the country, it was not until the end of August and early in September that any attempt at collecting men with any hostile intent was made, and before any harm was done, or matters had been brought to a head, dissension was happily brought about in their councils, and all angrily separated." The news of the fall of Delhi shortly afterwards completely placed these tribes on our side, and congratulations poured in from every quarter.

Disarming of
a party of the
58th Native
Infantry at
Kohát.

188. Towards the end of May a detachment of three companies of the 58th Native Infantry was sent to Kohat. As these men had been heard once or twice speaking in a manner that evinced bad feeling, they were disarmed on the 8th July without any show of resistance.

189. Throughout the crisis there was not a single military execution at Kohat. Five men in all were fined and imprisoned for seditious language.

Thanks of
Mr. Mont-
gomery to Sir
J. Lawrence
for his
support.

190. The foregoing paragraphs are a history of the events in the Punjab during the latter part of 1857. In conclusion, it only remains for me to mention those officers from whom I have more particularly received valuable aid during the period under review. Foremost stands Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B., Chief Commissioner. I desire to tender

to him my grateful thanks for the hearty support he has always given to any proposal I felt called upon to make, and to express to him my sincerest admiration of the intrepid policy he originated, and so nobly carried out—even to complete success. I only express my own feeling, and that of every officer in the Province, in saying that we have all felt it a high privilege to serve our country under him.

191. Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary, being in charge of the Chief Commissioner's Office at Lahore, the general superintendence of arrangements, connected not only with the raising of new levies, but with the marching of detachments, providing carriage, ammunition, tents, &c., stationing of guards and picquets for the security of the town and civil station, and generally all matters affecting the efficiency and distribution of the Punjab local force and military police, devolved mainly upon him. The Chief Commissioner knows too well, and appreciates too highly, the services rendered by Colonel Macpherson throughout this critical period to require any assurance from me. But I deem it incumbent on me here to record how prominent and important was his share in all that was transacted at the metropolis of the Punjab previous to the Chief Commissioner's arrival.

Acknowledgment of services of officers :—

Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary.

192. With health much impaired, and an office of which the duties had been enormously increased by the course of events, he nevertheless shewed himself equal to every emergency, and took an active part wherever his services could be useful. When Volunteer companies were formed he superintended their organization and drill. The examination of native letters received by the post was chiefly conducted by him; he especially maintained a complete understanding at all times with the Military authorities; and his energy, resolution and judgment inspired general confidence. To myself personally his presence was of the very greatest value.

193. From my coadjutor, Mr. D. F. McLeod, Financial Commissioner, I have ever received cordial help and wise advice. Even when laid aside from active duties by serious

Mr. D. F. McLeod, Financial Commissioner.

sickness, he refused to leave his post at Lahore. His great and varied experience was a source of great confidence to us all throughout, and the policy which led to the separation of trusty from mutinous sepoys in suspected regiments was of his origination.

Services of
Commissioners:—

Lieutenant-
Colonel
Edwardes,
Messrs. A. A.
Roberts and
G. C. Barnes.

194. Among the Commissioners of Divisions, I wish to bring forward prominently the names of Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawur, A. A. Roberts, Esquire, Commissioner of Lahore, and G. C. Barnes, Esquire, Commissioner, Cis-Sutlej States. Each of these gentlemen had most arduous and responsible duties to perform. To Colonel Edwardes was confined the custody of the frontier, to Mr. Roberts the preservation of the capital, to Mr. Barnes the keeping open of the communication between the Punjab and Delhi. One act of irresolution, or one false step on the part of any of these officers, would have plunged the Government into inextricable difficulties; but the conduct of all of them was marked by such consummate prudence and such indomitable courage that their very presence in their several divisions seemed to put down rebellion by the moral force which accompanied all their acts. The other Commissioners, *viz.*, Major Lake, Major Hamilton and Mr. Thornton, had less difficult posts, but performed their parts admirably.

Major Lake,
Major Ham-
ilton and Mr.
Thornton.

Services of
District
Officers:—

Mr. G. H. M.
Ricketts,
Deputy Com-
missioner,
Ludhiana.

195. All the District officers did well, as the foregoing record will shew, but one has so conspicuously distinguished himself that I cannot forbear mentioning his name in this place. I allude to Mr. G. H. M. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana. Mr. Ricketts possesses remarkably the qualities which fit a man for doing his duty in turbulent times. For the physical and moral courage he displayed on the 8th and 9th June I would refer to the observations on his district. My opinions on his measure of fining the refractory city are fully given there, and I consider his country owes him much for his conduct on that occasion.

Services of
Brigadier
Corbett,

196. There is also a Military officer to whom I must likewise express my thanks for his ever ready energy and the unanimity which has characterized him in working with the

Civil authorities. From the 13th May, when Brigadier Corbett willingly took upon himself the vast responsibility of disarming the native regiments under his command, the stroke which saved the Punjab, to the most trivial act in which I have ever had cause to solicit his help, his conduct has been bold, resolute and decisive. It may be said that it is beyond my province to mention this officer's services, but the whole year has been one wherein Civil and Military work has been so strangely intermixed, and the support which Brigadier Corbett has ever afforded me has been so great that I cannot close this report without a passing mention of his name, and I most earnestly trust that his services will be recognized by the Government.

197. But it was not policy, or soldiers, or officers, that saved the Indian Empire to England, and saved England to India. The Lord our God, He it was Who went before us and gave us the victory over our enemies when they had well nigh overwhelmed us. To Him is all the praise due for nerving the hearts of our statesmen and the arms of our soldiers, for keeping peace in this part of our borders, and for finally giving us the mastery against all human probabilities and contrary to all rules of warfare. To Him Who holds all events in His own hand, and has so wondrously overruled all to our success and to His own glory, do I desire, on behalf of myself and all whom I represent, to express my devout and heartfelt thanksgiving.

Success of the
British attrib-
uted to
Divine inter-
position.

R. MONTGOMERY,

Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 72.

73. *List of Appendices to the Judicial Commissioner's Mutiny Report.*

No. I.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's demi-official Circular to Deputy Commissioners, dated 13th May.

No. II.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 53, dated 10th June (and of Secretary to Chief Commissioner's dated 19th May), regarding control over ferries.

No. III.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 60, dated 25th June, directing disarming of Hindoostanees.

No. IV.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 64, dated 9th July, prohibiting passes.

No. V.—Statement of subscriptions to Punjab 6 per cent. loan.

No. VI.—Copy of Financial Commissioner's Circular No. 65, dated 8th July, inviting subscriptions to 6 per cent. loan.

No. VII.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 75, dated 29th July.

No. VIII.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 80, dated 8th August, relative to fortifying jails and other precautions, &c., for their protection.

No. IX.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's demi-official Circular to Commissioners, dated 13th June.

No. X.—Copy of Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 101, dated 12th September.

No. XI.—Return of cost of extra establishments from May to December.

No. XII.—List of Officers employed in the several districts from May to December.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 72.

APPENDIX (I).

74. *Copy of Judicial Commissioner's demi-official Circular to Deputy Commissioners,—dated 13th of May 1857.*

You will have heard, ere this reaches you, of the revolt of the sepoys at Meerut and Delhi, and of all the Europeans at the latter place having been massacred.

General in-
structions to
District
Officers.

The Hindoostanee sepoys generally seemed leagued together, and no dependence can, I believe, be put on any of them; but with our strong European force in the Punjab, our Sikh irregulars and our rural police, I have little fear we can hold our own.

It is of great importance that every due precaution should be taken for the lives of the British residents, and this you will do in communication with the Military officer in command of troops at your station.

The treasure should be cared for and placed in safety, and if possible the bulk of it should be sent to some place where there is a European guard; the mounted police and

burkundazes might form the escort. It is evidently not desirable to trust it to Hindoostanee sepoys.

Your tehseeldars should have orders to communicate to you daily intelligence from every part of your district, and should any ill-feeling shew itself it should be met and checked at once. This may easily be done if taken in time.

I would have you arrange with the Postmaster to stop every native letter addressed to sepoys. They may be collected and kept by you.

Whilst acting vigorously, and being alive to the great importance of this crisis, I would earnestly suggest calmness and quietness; and there should be no signs of alarm or excitement; but be prepared to act and have the best information from every source at your disposal.

Should necessity arise to supply the places of guards sent away, you should entertain extra police, *men of the country*, and the most respectable and trustworthy you can get. But this should be done quietly, and no general proclamation for men can be needed.

Sir John Lawrence being absent from Lahore, and till he arrives, I should wish that every day or two a few lines should be sent to me, informing me of the state of feeling in your district, &c.

I have full reliance on your zeal and *discretion* at this important crisis.

R. MONTGOMERY,
Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 72.

APPENDIX (II).

75. *From the Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab,—Circular No. 53, dated Lahore, 10th June 1857.*

I BEG to draw your attention to the Chief Commissioner's Circular, dated 19th of May last, laying down rules for District officers in maintaining a better control over the boats and ferries upon all the rivers in their jurisdictions,

Instructions
regarding the
control of
ferries.

Instructions
regarding the
control of
ferries.

2. I have now to direct that you will warn your District officers that they will be held personally responsible for carrying out the Chief Commissioner's orders to the letter, and you will satisfy yourself of the sufficiency of the measures adopted by District officers.

3. I request also that a guard, of not less in any instance than one officer and 4 burkundazes, be stationed at each ferry on both banks, with written instructions for their guidance, and with a translation of the Chief Commissioner's Circular.

4. Hitherto it has, I believe, been only customary to have a guard on one side; but each District officer must maintain one; and a very efficient party, and a superior native officer should visit them at least once a day to see that they are on the alert, and that they fully understand their instructions.

5. I think also a number of petty ferries may, for the present, be discontinued, and they should as far as possible be reduced in number. Compensation can be allowed for those temporarily suspended, and the boats, if not required, may be sunk, or so disposed of as not to be in the power of mutineers.

R. MONTGOMERY,
Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (4) TO 72.

76. *From the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab,—Circular No. ——— Judicial, dated Rawul Pindee, 19th May 1857.*

PASSING events demand that District officers should maintain sure control over the boats and ferries upon all rivers in their jurisdiction.

2. The arrangements for securing this object should be adopted :—

1st—To keep open our own communications; and

2ndly—To cut off that of the disaffected and rebellious.

3. District officers must be guided by local circumstances in arranging the details, but the following general points should be observed.

4. Guards to be placed at each ferry of a strength proportioned to the number of boats and the importance of the passage.

5. Fixed instructions to be given to these guards, who should be directed, amongst other matters, to prevent any Poorbeeas, faquirs, or vagrants crossing the rivers without a pass; to keep the boats by night in one place, on the opposite side of the river to that where danger is to be apprehended; and if danger threatens on both sides, to keep the boats, if possible, in mid-stream.

6. The guards should be ordered to throw up a small breastwork in which they might hold their ground against any sudden attack.

7. These precautions are simple, but, unless authoritatively laid down, will in all probability be neglected.

H. R. JAMES,

Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Punjab.

ENCLOSURE (5) TO 72.

APPENDIX (III).

77. *From the Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab,—Circular No. 60 [Judicial (Criminal)], dated 25th June 1857.*

THE population of the Sadr and other bazars at Meean Meer has been disarmed by order of Brigadier Corbett, and Major-General Gowan has this day issued orders that the same shall be done in all cantonments throughout the Punjab.

Disarming of
Hindustanis.

2. The Hindoostanees in the Punjab have never been excluded from the operation of the Arms Act, but it is believed that as regards them the law has not been rigorously enforced. Recent events, especially at Meerut, shew that no exception should be made in their favour.

3. There are many Hindoostanee shop-keepers, amlah, and other residents in the cities and bazars at civil stations who possess arms without a license. Private servants very generally bear arms.

4. I hereby direct, with the concurrence of the Chief

*Private arms belonging to chuprassies and burkundazes are not exempt from the rule. The public arms given by the Government they will of course retain.

†The penalty is for the first offence a fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000, or, in default of payment, imprisonment for 6 months.

For a second offence, a fine not exceeding Rs. 2,000, or in default of payment to simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months, and the confiscation of the house or other place in which the weapon or weapons may be found.

Commissioner, that the arms of the classes above indicated be at once demanded, and that hereafter the law be as vigorously enforced against the Hindoostanees* as against other classes,

and the full penalties† inflicted for contravening it.

5. The disarming at each station should, if possible, be completed in one day ; otherwise arms will be secreted.

6. You will issue such detailed instructions in the matter as may appear to you proper.

7. It will be a convenient plan perhaps to require private servants to deliver up their arms through their masters, and the heavy penalty for retaining them without a license should be explained.

8. There can be no objection to allow one or two confidential servants in each household to retain their arms if a license be taken out. But the number of licenses granted should be limited and only given to those persons recommended by their masters.

9. I request you will furnish me with a return, within 10 days from the receipt of this letter, showing the number and description of arms which have been taken in your division in conformity with these instructions and the number of licenses that have been granted.

R. MONTGOMERY,
Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (6) TO 72.

APPENDIX (IF).

78. *From the Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab,—Circular No. 64 (Judicial, Miscellaneous), dated Lahore, 9th July 1857.*

I HAVE received intimation of passes having been given by an Extra Assistant without due enquiry to travellers, who, it is believed, obtained them under false pretences. I request you will issue orders that no pass is to be given to any person without the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner of the district, and that before any pass is given the strictest enquiry be made.

Restriction
of grant of
passes to
travellers.

2. I have reason to know that Mahomedan fanatics and other persons with evil designs towards our Government pass the ferries from the eastward (in the garb of faquirs) without molestation. You will be so good as to issue orders that will prevent this in future. All doubtful persons should be sent to the Deputy Commissioner before being allowed to proceed.

3. The ferries should be more strictly watched than ever, and measures adopted to ascertain from time to time that orders are obeyed. A mere order is of little use; it must be enforced.

R. MONTGOMERY,
Judicial Commissioner, Punjab.

ENCLOSURE (7)

APPENDIX

79. *Statement showing the amount of Subscriptions to the and the probable amount of Subscriptions to*

| Division. | District. | Amount received up to 31st December 1857 (included in general estimate). | (NOT INCLUDED IN ESTIMATED TO | |
|---------------|--------------------|--|-------------------------------|----------------|
| | | | January 1858. | February 1858. |
| | | Rs. | Rs. | Rs. |
| C. S. STATES. | Umballa . . . | (a) 11,15,485 | ... | ... |
| | Thanesur . . . | 2,44,500 | ... | ... |
| | Loodiana . . . | 2,32,400 | 5,000 | ... |
| | Ferozepore . . . | 1,97,600 | 500 | ... |
| | Simla . . . | (b) 2,06,616 | 1,500 | ... |
| | Total . . . | 19,93,601 | 7,000 | ... |
| T. S. STATES. | Jullundur . . . | (c) 97,020 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| | Hooshyarpoor . . . | 1,00,000 | ... | ... |
| | Kangra . . . | 89,900 | ... | ... |
| | Total . . . | 2,86,920 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| LAHORE | Lahore . . . | (d) 1,71,000 | 22,000 | 21,000 |
| | Umritsur . . . | 2,30,719 | ... | ... |
| | Goordaspoor . . . | 32,700 | ... | ... |
| | Goojranwala . . . | 76,669 | 1,500 | ... |
| | Sealkote . . . | (e) 5,78,300 | ... | ... |
| | Total . . . | 10,89,388 | 23,500 | 21,000 |
| JHELMUM | Jhelum . . . | 40,923 | 45,200 | ... |
| | Rawul Pindee . . . | (f) 22,000 | 100 | 100 |
| | Goojerat . . . | 62,268 | ... | ... |
| | Shahpoor . . . | 6,000 | ... | ... |
| | Total . . . | 1,31,191 | 45,300 | 100 |

TO 72.

(V).

Punjab 6 per cent. Loan, received up to the 31st December 1857, this loan for the succeeding four months.

| GENERAL ESTIMATE). BE RECEIVED IN | | Total to 30th April 1858. | REMARKS. |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|---|
| March 1858. | April 1858. | | |
| Rs. | Rs. | Rs. | |
| ... | ... | 11,15,485 | (a) Loans from Native Chiefs included, amounting to Rs. 8,35,000, also Rs. 5,200 subscribed to Government 5 per cent. loan. |
| ... | ... | 2,44,500 | |
| ... | ... | 2,37,400 | |
| ... | ... | 1,98,100 | |
| ... | ... | 2,08,116 | |
| ... | ... | 20,03,601 | (b) Rs. 48,800, ditto. |
| 1,000 | ... | 1,02,020 | (c) Rs. 3,000, ditto. |
| ... | ... | 1,00,000 | |
| ... | ... | 89,900 | |
| 1,000 | ... | 2,91,920 | |
| 13,000 | 11,000 | 2,38,000 | (d) Rs. 22,500, ditto. |
| ... | ... | 2,30,719 | |
| ... | ... | 32,700 | |
| ... | ... | 78,169 | |
| ... | ... | 5,78,300 | (e) Of this Rs. 5,71,000 is the Jum-moo loan. |
| 13,000 | 11,000 | 11,57,888 | |
| ... | ... | 86,123 | (f) Rs. 1,000 subscribed to Government 5 per cent. loan. |
| 100 | 100 | 22,400 | |
| ... | ... | 62,268 | |
| ... | ... | 6,000 | |
| 100 | 100 | 1,76,791 | |

APPENDIX

79. Statement showing the amount of Subscriptions to the
and the probable amount of Subscriptions to

| Division. | District. | Amount received up to 31st December 1857 (included in general estimate). | (NOT INCLUDED IN ESTIMATED TO | |
|-----------------|----------------------|---|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| | | | January 1858. | February 1858. |
| PESHAWUR | Peshawur | (g) 4,24,000 | Rs. 23,000 | Rs. 23,000 |
| | Kohat | ... | ... | ... |
| | Huzara | ... | ... | ... |
| | Total | 4,24,000 | 23,000 | 23,000 |
| | | | | |
| LEIAH | Leiah | 50,811 | ... | ... |
| | Khangurh | 84,642 | 5,000 | ... |
| | Dera Ismail Khan . . | 34,566 | ... | ... 2,000 |
| | Dera Ghazi Khan . . | ... | ... | ... |
| | Total | 1,70,019 | 5,000 | ... |
| MOOLTAN | Mooltan | 1,00,032 | ... | ... |
| | Jhung | 19,480 | ... | ... |
| | Googaira | (h) 1,04,020 | ... | ... |
| | Total | 2,23,541 | ... | ... |
| | | | | |
| GRAND TOTAL . . | | 43,81,680 | 1,06,700 | 47,000 |

FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE: }
The 19th January 1858.

(V)—concluded.

Punjab 6 per cent. Loan, received up to the 31st December 1857, this loan for the succeeding four months—concluded.

| GENERAL ESTIMATE). BE RECEIVED IN | | Total to 20th April 1858. | REMARKS. |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|---|
| March 1858. | April 1858. | | |
| Rs. | Rs. | Rs. | |
| 23,900 | 23,900 | 5,19,600 | (g) Rs. 6,400 subscribed to Govern- ment 5 per cent. loan. |
| ... | ... | ... | No subscriptions. |
| ... | ... | ... | Ditto. |
| 23,900 | 23,900 | 5,19,600 | |
| ... | ... | 50,811 | |
| ... | ... | 89,642 | |
| ... | ... | 34,566 | |
| ... | ... | ... | No subscriptions. |
| ... | ... | 1,75,019 | |
| ... | ... | 1,60,032 | |
| ... | ... | 19,480 | |
| ... | ... | 1,04,029 | (h) Rs. 2,200 subscribed to Gov- ernment 5 per cent. loan. |
| ... | ... | 2,83,541 | |
| 38,000 | 35,000 | 46,08,360 | Total subscriptions to Government 5 per cent. loan to 31st Decem- ber 1857, Rs. 89,100. |

D. F. McLEOD,

Financial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (S) TO 72.

APPENDIX (VI).

80. *From the Financial Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab, except Cis-Sutlej States,—Circular No. 65 (Revenue), dated Lahore, 8th July 1857.*

Instructions
for the raising
of a loan.

As it is very necessary that steps be taken to guard against the chance of a deficiency of funds during the period which will elapse between the cessation of the rubbee collections and the commencement of those of the khurreef harvest, it has been determined to raise a loan from the moneyed men of the Punjab generally, for a period of one year, at an interest of 6 per cent. per annum.

2. I request, accordingly, that you will adopt immediate measures for having it made known to the community, European and Native, at all stations, that loans in even hundreds of rupees will be received by Deputy Commissioners from all persons willing to invest money, for a period of one year, at the above rate of interest.

3. I enclose, at the same time, a vernacular statement, based, in the main, upon one issued by the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States, setting forth the views and expectations of Government in this matter, of which you can make such use as may appear to you expedient. It is chiefly in the large towns and cities that men of capital are to be found, and the best course probably will be, after intimation of the loan being opened shall have been generally communicated to the public, to make over a copy of this document to the *punches* of every such town or city, and through their instrumentality to determine the amount that it will be suitable for each capitalist to contribute; or to take such other steps in the matter as, in consultation with them, may be determined on.

4. This refers to traders, *sarrafs*, bankers and such classes only as are ordinarily considered to be represented by

the *punches*. Men of superior rank and consideration, whose circumstances may be such as to enable them to contribute without inconvenience, must be communicated with individually, not collectively, but to these, in like manner, it may not be inappropriate to communicate a copy of the accompanying document. In the first instance, however, the communication made to them, as well as to the rest of the community, should be limited to a simple announcement of the terms of the loan, so that the act of subscribing may, in some cases at all events, be spontaneous.

Instructions
for the raising
of a loan.

5. I am unable to suggest how much will be required from each individual or each locality. But with the drain which may be expected, to meet the expenditure of the army, and the wants of the most northerly zillahs of the North-Western Provinces, which have become disorganized, it seems probable that the outlay of the Punjab will not fall short of 50 lakhs of rupees per mensem; and as about three months will have to be provided for, it is certain that a *kror* of rupees, if thus raised, can be turned to good account; and this may serve as some guide to you in determining the scale to be generally adopted in your Division.

D. F. McLEOD,

Financial Commissioner.

English Translation of the Vernacular Memo.

At the present time portions of the Gangetic Doab, Rohilkund and the Delhi provinces have become disorganized owing to the mutiny of Hindoostanee sepoys, and the dawk closed. In some places treasuries have been plundered, and the collections have become interrupted. It is to be expected therefore that assistance will have to be rendered from the Punjab, while the sums heretofore raised by bills are no longer available owing to the stoppage of trade. For these reasons it is certain that the expenditure of the Punjab, during the interval which will elapse between the rubbee and khurreef collections, will considerably exceed its receipts; and

Instructions
for the raising
of a loan.

as cash sent out from England will not reach Lahore by that time, and there will be a still greater demand for it in other quarters, it has become necessary to raise a loan for a limited period.

The rate of interest allowed on the Government loan, which is now open, is 5 per cent. per annum; but as the subscriptions to it in the Punjab have been inconsiderable; and the usual rate of interest amongst capitalists in these parts is 8 annas per cent. per mensem, or Rs. 6 per cent. per annum, the Chief Commissioner has authorized interest to be paid at this rate, for the period of one year, at the close of which the principal will be likewise repaid.

All capitalists are therefore invited to contribute to this loan according to their means, and thus aid the Government in the work of restoring tranquillity and order in those localities where it has been temporarily interrupted. Those engaged in trade are already aware how much loss and injury are resulting from the interruption which it has experienced, owing to the treacherous perfidy of traitors who have set at defiance alike the laws of God and man, and for whom vengeance is assuredly in store; and while they have seen how all have heretofore been protected in the peaceable prosecution of their several occupations, under the British Government, and are now witnesses of the strenuous efforts being made by the Punjab Government to maintain peace within its own boundaries, and extend it beyond them, all must feel that it is their duty to assist in this good work, as far as may be in their power.

The British Government at all times uses the most strenuous efforts to remove every burden from the commerce and trade of the territories under its rule. Taxes on all but a very few articles have been abolished. Stringent and successful measures are adopted for preventing violence and rendering the highways secure; and the cost of these is borne by the Government itself. When, therefore, it becomes necessary for Government temporarily thus to call for the assistance of a loan, all the well-disposed will cheerfully respond to the call,

and those who may show themselves backward will assuredly be considered to have come short of what their duty requires.

ENCLOSURE (9) TO 72.

APPENDIX (VII).

81. *From the Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab,—Circular No. 75, Judicial (Jails), dated Lahore, 29th July 1857.*

It has just been reported to me that the prisoners in one of our jails rose and overpowered their guards and owing to the extreme darkness of the night 18 of them managed to escape. The District officer stated that had he had blue lights, or *mushals*, not one would have got away: 50 of the prisoners were killed and wounded.

Precautionary
measures in
Jails.

2. As a precautionary measure, I request that at least two dozen blue lights be kept at every jail; half may be placed in charge of the guard, and half with the darogah, so as to be available at any moment. A dozen *mushals* should also be kept ready, and two or three seers of oil. Parties should be told off to light these on any alarm being given, and the officers visiting the jail should satisfy themselves, from time to time, that they are kept ready to be used when required.

3. I take this opportunity of stating that in another jail, a few days ago, an attempt at an insurrection was defeated by timely notice being given and five of the ringleaders were hanged. As these risings are often infectious, I would suggest redoubled vigilance at this time.

4. You will be so good as to direct your officers to report in three days from the receipt of this that the instructions have been carried out.

R. MONTGOMERY,

Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (10) TO 72.


APPENDIX (VIII).

82. *From the Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab,—Circular No. 80, Judicial (Jails), dated Lahore, 8th April 1857.*

Fortification
and protection
of jails.

THE Chief Commissioner considers that our district jails require strengthening, to resist an attack from without. The entrance side in all jails is supposed to be sufficiently defended; but the other sides present only dead walls, from which no fire could be directed against parties endeavouring to effect an entrance.

2. He considers that three towers should be erected at



each jail according to the accompanying sketch and in the position noted in the margin.

N. B.—The towers to be placed at about 60 feet from the outer wall. There must be a clear space for the sentries on the ground to see along the wall. Their view must not be intercepted by the towers.

3. These towers are only intended to defend the jail against outside enemies, and are purposely *not* raised so as to admit of a

fire being directed from them to the interior of the jail. The plan is not to be deviated from.

4. The tower is very similar to those in use on the frontier. Access is had to them by means of a rope ladder, which should be drawn up when the guards have ascended. Each tower will hold about eight men, and need not be occupied except in troublous times, or when there is, from any cause, reason to expect an attack. They will always be useful as look-out towers.

5. Some of the jails are of irregular construction, and may not admit of the towers being erected in the position I

have described. Whenever this is the case, you will sanction such modification as you consider best and report the same.

5. I request a return within two months, reporting that these orders have been carried out.

R. MONTGOMERY,

Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (11) TO 72.

APPENDIX (IX).

83. *Copy of a demi-official Circular issued by the Judicial Commissioner on the 13th June 1857, to all Commissioners in the Punjab.*

ALTHOUGH the general spirit of loyalty that prevails throughout the Punjab is undoubted, yet there is no station or large city where there are not bad characters ready to stir up sedition and incite the people against us. I believe there are few bazars in which people are not found to talk openly of the English rule being at an end ; and this being constantly repeated, the inhabitants begin in a measure to believe it ; and their minds become prepared for such a possibility, and in time they may become disloyal.

Punishment
of persons
guilty of
using sedi-
tious langu-
age.

Should any officer in charge of a district assert that such does not prevail in his district, I feel sure that he does not know what is going on, and that he has not good information.

In such a crisis as this the old routine of reports will not do. Officers in charge of districts must take the initiative and search out persons guilty of seditious language. Where a case is proved, execution should immediately follow, and the crime and punishment be proclaimed.

It will sometimes happen that full proof will not be obtainable ; but if our officers believe that seditious language has been spoken the person or persons should at once be closely confined in jail and retained for the present.

It is not desirable that inhabitants of Hindoostan should at this crisis be the principal officers in our large cities and towns, and I would strongly suggest that they be temporarily

removed to some other sphere, and intelligent inhabitants of the country appointed in their room.

Experience of the last few days has proved to me the importance of this.

I shall feel obliged by your communicating the above to your District officers, with any further instructions from yourself that you deem proper.

R. MONTGOMERY,
Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (12) TO 72.

APPENDIX (X).

84. *From the Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to all Commissioners in the Punjab,—Circular No. 101, Judicial (Miscellaneous), dated Lahore, 12th September 1857.*

Limitation of
employment
of Hindu-
stanis.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information and guidance and that of your District officers copies of the papers noted in the margin.

My letter to the address of the Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner, No. 286, dated 17th August, with enclosed memo. showing the proportion of Hindoostanees and Punjabees employed in the Punjab.

The Officiating Secretary's reply, No. 1296, dated 9th September.

2. You will perceive that the Chief Commissioner has sanctioned my proposition to limit the number of Hindoostanees in each department.

3. It will be your duty to see that the rules prescribed are fully carried out, and that a return, in the form attached to my memo., be in future furnished with the annual reports.

4. Any inefficient and untrustworthy men should at once be weeded out, and their places supplied from among the numerous qualified and respectable inhabitants of the country.

5. I understand that, owing to the cessation of the settlement operations, many Punjabees have been thrown out of employment.

R. MONTGOMERY,
Judicial Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (13) TO 72.

APPENDIX (XI).

85. Return showing the number and cost of the extra Establishment employed from the month of May to December, inclusive.

| Division | Districts. | Total number of men employed. | Total cost. | REMARKS. |
|---------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|----------|
| | | | Rs. A. P. | |
| C. S. STATES. | Ferozepore . . . | 1,038 | 5,494 4 6 | |
| | Loodiana . . . | 445 | 1,840 12 0 | |
| | Thanesur . . . | 80 | 504 14 3 | |
| | Umballa . . . | ... | ... | |
| | Simla . . . | 300 | 1,449 14 4 | |
| | Total . | 1,863 | 9,289 13 1 | |
| T. S. STATES. | Jullundur . . . | 1,821 | 16,667 4 3 | |
| | Hooshyarpoor . . . | 1,658 | 7,615 5 7 | |
| | Kangra . . . | 392 | 13,740 13 11 | |
| | Total . | 3,871 | 38,023 7 9 | |
| LAHORE. | Lahore . . . | 3,376 | 15,866 15 6 | |
| | Umritsur . . . | 703 | 3,816 15 5 | |
| | Goordaspoor . . . | 2,520 | 11,641 4 7 | |
| | Sealkote . . . | 1,166 | 5,488 0 0 | |
| | Goojranwala . . . | 2,771 | 13,080 9 4 | |
| | Total . | 10,536 | 59,893 12 10 | |
| JHELUM. | Jhelum . . . | 1,776 | 9,605 12 2 | |
| | Rawul Pindee . . . | 5,868 | 31,204 15 10 | |
| | Shahpoor . . . | 580 | 2,387 0 0 | |
| | Goojerat . . . | 2,454 | 13,478 15 0 | |
| | Total . | 10,678 | 62,676 11 0 | |
| LEIAH. | Leiah . . . | 889 | 3,883 10 8 | |
| | Khangurh . . . | 1,690 | 8,925 8 11 | |
| | Dera Ghazee Khan . . . | 192 | 960 0 0 | |
| | Dera Ismail Khan . . . | 861 | 4,823 0 0 | |
| | Total . | 3,632 | 18,592 3 7 | |
| MOOLTAN. | Mooltan . . . | 2,527 | 14,305 3 11 | |
| | Jhung . . . | 1,222 | 12,765 8 4 | |
| | Googaira . . . | 2,639 | 12,107 1 0 | |
| | Total . | 6,388 | 39,177 13 3 | |
| PESHAWUR. | Peshawur . . . | ... | ... | |
| | Kohat . . . | 464 | 31,268 13 1 | |
| | Huzara . . . | 6,824 | 55,278 0 0 | |
| | Total . | 7,288 | 86,546 13 0 | |
| | GRAND TOTAL . | 44,256 | 3,04,200 10 7 | |

ENCLOSURE (14) TO 72.

APPENDIX (XII).

86. *Statement showing the names of Officers serving in the different districts in the Punjab from May to December 1857.*

Lahore Division.

LAHORE DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. R. E. Egerton.

Assistant Commissioners.

Mr. C. P. Elliott, to June.

Mr. H. E. Perkins, from June.

Mr. F. McNaghten, from August to November.

Mr. R. W. Thomas.

Extra Assistants.

Mr. J. H. Penn and Mr. R. Berkeley.

UMRITSUR DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. F. H. Cooper.

Assistant Commissioners.

Mr. F. McNaghten, from May to July and December.

Lieutenant J. Perkins, from May to September.

Mr. C. U. Aitchison, from June.

Extra Assistants.

Mr. W. E. Blyth and Mr. C. Stephen.

SEALKOTE DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Mr. H. Monckton, from May to July, and from November.

Captain W. R. Elliott, from August to October.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant C. A. McMahon.

Mr. W. B. Jones, from June.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. A. K. Blackall, to June.

GOORDASPOOR DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. J. Naesmyth.

Assistant Commissioner.

Captain R. R. Adams.

GOOJRANWALA DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Captain J. M. Cripps, to October.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Clarke, from November.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant D. K. Presgrave, to June.

Lieutenant C. Hall, from November.

Extra Assistants.

Mr. A. K. Blackall, from July.

Mr. O. Wood, to June.

Jhelum Division.

RAWUL PINDEE DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Lieutenant J. E. Cracroft.

Assistant Commissioners.

Mr. J. W. Macnabb.

Lieutenant G. M. Battye.

Lieutenant J. R. G. G. Shortt, from June.

Lieutenant H. P. Babbage, from October.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. G. D. Westropp.

JHELM DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Major C. Browne, to September.

Mr. J. W. Macnabb, from October.

Assistant Commissioners.

Mr. J. W. Macnabb, to September.

Mr. B. H. Hardinge.

Lieutenant H. D. Battye.

GOOJERAT DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Captain W. R. Elliott, to July.

Lieutenant H. J. McKenzie, from August.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant H. J. McKenzie, to July.

Lieutenant J. R. G. G. Shortt, to May.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. C. R. Crommelin.

SHAHPOOR DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. G. Ouseley.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant J. F. Forster.

Mr. D. C. Macnabb.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. T. C. Owen.

Mooltan Division.

MOOLTAN DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Major F. E. Voyle.

Assistant Commissioners.

Captain J. E. Fraser.

Lieutenant F. J. Millar, from December.

Lieutenant W. G. Davies, from August to September.

JHUNG DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Lieutenant H. J. Hawes.

Assistant Commissioner.

Ensign W. M. Lane.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. W. McMahon.

GOOGAIRA DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Lieutenant N. Elphinstone, to October.

Major F. C. Marsden, from November.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant G. G. Pearse, to September.

Lieutenant N. Elphinstone, from November.

Lieutenant J. Perkins, from October.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. L. Berkeley, to September.

Leiah Division.

LEIAH DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Captain J. Fendall.

Assistant Commissioner.

Lieutenant J. C. Horne.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. G. Thomson.

DERA GHAZEE KHAN DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Captain F. R. Pollock.

Assistant Commissioners.

Captain S. F. Graham, to November.

Lieutenant J. B. Smyly.

Lieutenant A. A. Munro, to September.

Lieutenant W. G. Davies, from October.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Captain H. W. H. Coxe.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant C. C. Minchin.

Lieutenant J. S. Ross.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. L. Cowan.

KHANGURH DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. H. B. Henderson.

Assistant Commissioner.

Lieutenant J. D. Ferris.

Peshawur Division.

PESHAWUR DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Nicholson, to June.

Captain H. R. James, from July.

Assistant Commissioners.

Captain S. F. Graham, from December.

Lieutenant J. C. Horne, to November.

Ensign J. Havelock, from October to November.

Captain R. H. D. Tulloh, from July to November.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. G. E. Wakefield.

HUZARA DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Major J. R. Becher.

Assistant Commissioner.

Lieutenant S. S. Boulderson.

KOHAT DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Captain B. Henderson.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant T. J. H. Keyes.

Ensign J. Havelock, to November.

Cis-Sutlej States.

UMBALLA DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. T. D. Forsyth.

Assistant Commissioners.

Captain G. McAndrew, to August.

Mr. W. C. Plowden.

Lieutenant E. Hill.

Mr. C. P. Elliott, July to November.

Lieutenant D. K. Presgrave, from July to November.

Mr. J. Taylor, from August.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. T. C. Vaughan.

LOODIANA DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Mr. G. H. M. Ricketts, to November.

Mr. C. P. Elliott, from December.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant R. O. T. Nicolls.

Mr. T. H. Thornton.

THANESUR DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Captain W. McNeile.

Assistant Commissioners.

Mr. A. Levien.

Lieutenant J. E. B. Parsons.

FEROZEPORE DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioners.

Mr. H. C. Van Cortlandt, to September.

Major F. C. Marsden, for October.

Captain J. M. Cripps, from November.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant T. W. Mercer, to November.

Mr. R. G. Melvill.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. W. C. Wood.

SIMLA DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Lord Wm. M. Hay.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant P. Maxwell.

Mr. J. Taylor, to July.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. O. Wood.

Trans-Sutlej States.

JULLUNDUR DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Captain O. J. McL. Farrington.

Assistant Commissioner.

Mr. S. S. Hogg.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. G. Knox.

HOOSHYARPOOR DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Lieutenant-Colonel S. A. Abbott.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant W. Paske.

Lieutenant F. J. Millar, to September.

Extra Assistant.

Mr. C. W. Lennox.

KANGRA DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Major R. G. Taylor.

Assistant Commissioners.

Mr. R. F. Saunders.

Major W. E. Hay.

Lieutenant C. Hall, to October.

Settlement Department.

MOOLTAN DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. A. H. Morris.

Assistant Commissioner.

Lieutenant W. G. Davies, to July.

SEALKOTE DISTRICT.

Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. E. A. Prinsep, to July.

JHELUM DISTRICT.

Assistant Commissioner.

Mr. A. Brandreth, to June and from November.

CHAPTER IX.

NARRATIVE OF THE MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB AND COM-
MENTS OF SIR J. LAWRENCE, CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICES OF MR. R. MONTGOMERY
AND MR. H. B. E. FRERE.

87. *From R. TEMPLE, Esquire, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, to G. F. EDMONSTONE, Esquire, Secretary to the Government of India (with the Governor-General),—No. 75-322 (Political), dated Lahore, 25th May 1858.*

I AM directed to submit, for the information of the Supreme Government, a report, prepared under direction of Mr. R. Montgomery, late Judicial Commissioner, of occurrences in the Punjab territories during the critical period of 1857; also a report¹ by Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes on events in Peshawur, a report on events in the Cis-Sutlej States by Mr. G. C. Barnes,² and certain selected district reports marginally noted.³ While forwarding these, I am also to

Narrative of
the Mutiny
in the Punjab
and comments
of Sir J.
Lawrence.

¹ *Vide 63 supra.*

² *Vide 1 supra.*

³ Umballa, by T. D. Forsyth, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner—*vide 4 supra.*

Umritsur, by F. H. Cooper, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner—*vide 28 supra.*

Loodianah, by G. H. M. Ricketts, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner—*vide 11 supra.*

Huzara, by Major J. R. Becher, Deputy Commissioner—*vide 60 supra.*

submit the following narrative and comments on the part of the Chief Commissioner.

2. It will not be necessary, after the detailed reports now rendered, to recapitulate all the events of that awful struggle through which the Punjab passed. It will suffice to glance at them generally, and to note the policy which was adopted to confront the crisis in its various phases.

Troops in Punjab at the time of the outbreak.

3. When the outbreak of May 1857 burst upon Hindoostan, that portion of the Bengal Army which was cantoned in the Punjab territories amounted to about 60,000 soldiers, as follows :—

| | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|--------|
| Hindoostanees, chiefly Regulars | . . . | 35,900 |
| Punjabee (Irregulars) | . . . | 13,430 |
| Europeans | . . . | 10,326 |
| | | <hr/> |
| Total | . . . | 59,656 |

Besides, there were military organized police, amounting to about 9,000. The Hindoostanee troops shown in the above abstract had few Punjabees in their ranks, numbering, perhaps, 2,000; but of the Punjabee troops, full one-fourth were Hindoostanees. Of the European force, one corps, *viz.*, Bombay Fusiliers, did not belong to the Punjab complement, and arrived in detachments, at different times, between the 17th June and the end of July. Out of 12 corps (including one corps of Cavalry), 7 were massed, as it were, at each extremity of the province, namely, either on the Simla Hills, north of Umballa, or in the Peshawur Valley. Thus there were left to hold the country from the Sutlej to the Indus 5 weak European corps, distributed at the stations of Ferozepore, Lahore, Sealkote, Jullundur, and Rawul Pindee.

Recall of European troops from the hills to Ambála.

4. When the *émeute* occurred at Meerut, and Delhi fell into the hands of the mutineers, it was evident that the European troops for the suppression of the Mutiny must be mainly obtained from Meerut itself, or from the hills near Umballa. To Umballa then were the Europeans ordered immediately from the hills by the Commander-in-Chief, General

Anson. Thus the greater part of three Infantry corps and one Cavalry corps were collected. But there were no Artillery-men in sufficient numbers; there was but little ammunition, and no heavy guns were procurable, except from Phillour, on the Sutlej, 80 miles distant, with the river intervening. But the Commander-in-Chief, when arranging to move on Delhi, was further beset with difficulties. The hot winds had set in, rendering the season most adverse. The commissariat and medical authorities were averse to an advance; and the three native corps on the spot were demoralized, were watching events, and were ripe for an outbreak.

Difficulties of
Commander-
in-Chief in
moving on
Delhi.

5. Under these circumstances, the Chief Commissioner conceived that the first step was to disarm these regiments, whom it was equally dangerous either to leave at Umballa or take to Delhi. This course the Chief Commissioner lost no time in urging; but when the Commander-in-Chief took the matter in hand the local Military authorities pointed out that they had pledged themselves not to disarm the sepoys. It was in vain urged *per contra* that the compact had no sooner been made than it was broken by the sepoys themselves. There was not indeed the shadow of a reasonable hope that these men would prove faithful. Indeed, the incendiary fires which had been lighted up night after night in the cantonment of Umballa too surely indicated the discontent which pervaded the minds of these men. Ultimately, one corps, the 4th Light Cavalry, were sent off in various detachments, but many troopers deserted. One corps, the 5th Native Infantry, was left at Umballa, but one-fourth of their number deserted at night, shortly after the departure of the Europeans for Delhi, and the rest made off at different periods afterwards. The third corps, the 60th Native Infantry, accompanied the field force for Delhi as far as Kurnal. Thence they were detached to Rohtuk, 40 miles distant from Delhi, to operate against insurgents in that district; but, shortly after arriving there, they mutinied, fired on their officers, and went off to Delhi. Thus it was that, through mistaken leniency and blind

Reluctance
of Military
authorities at
Ambála to
disarm Native
troops.

confidence in native soldiers, an opportunity was missed whereby, at the outset of the disturbances, a whole brigade might have been successfully dealt with in a vigorous and exemplary manner.

Importance
of advance
on Delhi.

6. The Chief Commissioner presumes that no officer would now deny that an immediate advance upon Delhi was the right course; but at that time such was not the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief's military advisers. His Excellency assured the Chief Commissioner that every officer whom he consulted was averse to this measure. The Chief Commissioner believes now, as he urged then, that if our troops had not advanced from Umballa upon Delhi, the whole population between the Jumna and the Sutlej would have risen, and that the Chiefs of Puttiala, Jheend, and Nabha, who performed such excellent service afterwards, would, even if they had stood by us, have been deserted by their own troops, or else would have been compelled by these troops to join the insurrection. But the advance of our troops towards Delhi, and the victory at Badlee Serai, near that city, on the 8th June, proved to the country that there was vitality in our cause, and power on our side.

Disarming of
the Native
Brigade at
Lahore.

7. It is now proper to turn to the events which occurred in the Punjab itself immediately after the arrival of the news from Delhi. Of these, first, was the disarming of the native brigade at Lahore on the 13th May. The promptitude and success with which that all-important measure was carried out were truly remarkable. The credit belongs solely to the Military and Civil authorities on the spot. Among them, the chief praise is due to Brigadier S. Corbett, who commanded the troops, and to Mr. R. Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner. Had Lahore, with the fort, the munitions of war, and the treasure, fallen into the hands of a mutinous soldiery, the preservation of order in the Punjab generally would have been scarcely possible. The consequences of such a disaster would have been felt everywhere. The actual event was that three Native Infantry regiments and one regiment of regular Cavalry, about 3,000 well-trained native

soldiers, were disarmed by 400 European Infantry and 12 guns with European Artillerymen.

8. The next episode was the outbreak at Ferozepore. On the British side affairs were badly managed. It was fortunate that the European barracks were close to the Arsenal, into which building a company of Europeans were introduced, just before it was assailed by the Native Infantry. But after the Arsenal had been secured, and the mutineers repulsed, they were allowed to return and burn buildings in the cantonment at their pleasure during the whole night of the 14th May. No adequate efforts were made to destroy or even to punish them. Even those who, in their flight from the station towards Delhi, had been seized by the police and the country-people were not brought to trial until reiterated orders to that effect had been issued. But, unfortunately, at Ferozepore, errors did not end here; for when, at a date subsequent to the above occurrences, the 10th Light Cavalry were disarmed, their horses were not taken away. When, however, the taking of the horses was insisted on at last, the troopers had a full opportunity of concocting their plans for an outbreak; for the order about the horses, instead of being kept secret, was formally copied and circulated in the Regimental Order book.

Outbreak at
Ferozepore.

9. Among the earliest measures adopted was the securing of the important forts of Phillour and Govindgurh (Umrithur). On the first news of the outbreak at Delhi, indeed on the 11th May, Sir H. Barnard, Commanding the Umballa or Sirhind Division, warned the Military authorities at Jullundur to arrange for the safety of the Arsenal at Phillour, then defended by Native troops. Upon this, Brigadier Hartley promptly threw a company of European Infantry and some European Artillerymen into the fort. To show the immense importance of this Arsenal, together with that of Ferozepore, it is sufficient to observe that from them were derived the means of taking Delhi. At about the same time some European Infantry were sent from Lahore to hold Govindgurh, in conjunction with some European Artillerymen already there.

Securing of
Forts of Phil-
laur and
Govindgarh.

This place, it must be remembered, was the most central and the most important stronghold in the Punjab.

Council of
War at Peshá-
war.

Movable Col-
umn.

Disaffection
of Native
troops at
Pesháwar.

10. The same eventful days witnessed stirring scenes at Peshawur. In that valley there were at that period three European regiments and a strong body of European Artillery, a force more than a match for the 8,000 Hindoostanee troops in that vicinity. No sooner had the Delhi news become known in Peshawur than Major-General Reed, Commanding that Division, assumed the command of all the troops in the Punjab. At a council of war held immediately by him it was proposed to form a Movable Column composed of the *élite* of the European regiments (one to be taken from Peshawur, the other from Rawul Pindee), with a due proportion of European Artillery and with the Guide Corps, half Cavalry, half Infantry, and other Punjabee troops, and Goorkhas, upon whom it was considered that reliance might be placed. It was intended that this column should assemble at Jhelum, a very critical position, and there remain ready to fall upon and crush mutineers wherever they might break out. Scarcely, however, had the troops marched from Peshawur when it was discovered that the Hindoostanee troops there were utterly untrustworthy. And inasmuch as any considerable and successful mutiny in that valley would certainly have been followed by an invasion from the surrounding hill tribes, the European corps which had started was ordered back, and two regiments of Punjab Infantry were despatched thither in haste.

11. This precaution was indeed as necessary as it was timely. For despite everything, mutinies did break out, and partial insurrection occurred in the valley. But the rising flames were speedily trampled out by the wisdom, decision, and energy of three officers, namely, Brigadier-General S. Cotton, who commanded the division, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner; and our hold on this important position and territory was securely maintained. In the first instance it was resolved to disarm the 5th Light

Cavalry and three of the Native Infantry regiments. This having been most successfully accomplished, a select force moved out against the 55th Native Infantry, which had mutinied at Fort Hotee Murdan, on the Eusufzye frontier. On the approach of this force, the mutineers evacuated the fort and fled towards Swat. Many were killed in the pursuit and many were taken prisoners. The remnant escaped for a time by wandering among the rugged hills beyond Huzara. The miserable, though well-deserved, fate of these fugitives has been graphically described in the report by Major J. R. Becher, the Deputy Commissioner of Huzara. After these events, which turned so evidently in our favor, the Peshawur Valley remained tranquil. Some attempts to excite insurrection were indeed made from time to time; but gradually our position in that quarter became so firm as to enable the Chief Commissioner to withdraw one of the Punjabee corps cantoned there in order that it might reinforce the army before Delhi.

Disarming of
Native troops
at Pesháwar.

Mutiny at
Mardán.

Flight of
mutineers
and their
destruction.

12. Before proceeding to measures and events connected with the interior of the Punjab, it will be proper to mention the troops from the Punjab territories, including Cis-Sutlej States, which formed a part of the army before Delhi. Of the 12 European corps (11 Infantry and one Cavalry), the 9th Lancers, the greater portions of Her Majesty's 75th, the 1st and 2nd European Bengal Fusiliers, and about 200 European Artillerymen, formed the greater portion of the European force that first marched upon Delhi, the remainder of the force coming from Meerut. In the first instance also a second class siege train was despatched from Phillour. Afterwards two wings of European corps followed. Then a considerable native force was despatched from the Punjab also. First the Guide Corps, Cavalry and Infantry, after a memorable march of 580 miles, at an average speed of 28 miles a day, arrived before Delhi early in June. Then the 4th Sikhs were sent from Huzara, and the 1st Punjab Infantry from Bunnoo, the 1st Punjab Cavalry and two squadrons of the 2nd and 5th. All these troops joined the camp before the end of July. It will be seen presently that subsequently two more Punjabee

Despatch of
reinforce-
ments to
Delhi.

corps were despatched to reinforce the army, together with European troops equal to two battalions ; so that 5 out of the 11 regiments of Punjabee Infantry, and two out of five-and-a-half regiments of Punjabee Cavalry took part in the final struggle at Delhi, and shared the honors and perils of that terrible conflict. One newly-raised Punjabee corps was sent to Meerut to release European troops there for service at Delhi. But besides the above there was further aid furnished from the Punjab. Artillerymen being greatly wanted in the camp, the Artillerymen of the old Sikh army who were then out of employ were enlisted in the British service, to the number of about 300 men, and despatched to Delhi. To the same destination was sent a strong corps of Muzhubees (low caste) Sikhs, numbering 1,200 men, to serve as Pioneers. A body of Cavalry was raised to form the nucleus of Hodson's Horse. A second siege train of first class calibre, which will be alluded to hereafter, was forwarded from Ferozepore under escort of a Belooch battalion. A number of Engineer officers were sent down to Delhi from the Punjab Department of Public Works ; it is well known what excellent service they rendered and how nobly they behaved. Among them Major A. Taylor was eminently distinguished. Lastly, the contingents of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs were important auxiliaries to the force before Delhi, by guarding the communications in its rear. The Jheend force of 800 men went in advance of our force and facilitated its movements, guarded the Grand Trunk Road from the camp to Kurnal, and held the boat-bridge at that point of the Jumna which commanded the communication between our camp and Meerut. From Kurnal to Loodiana the road was held by the Puttiala troops, 5,000 strong. The lesser force furnished by the Nabha State of 800 men escorted the siege train from Phillour, and numerous convoys of stores and ammunition. Then the Jummoo Contingent, 2,200 strong, was despatched to aid in the operations before Delhi. An irregular force under General Van Cortlandt, of about 1,000 men, was sent across the Sutlej to reconquer and occupy the districts of the Delhi territory to the rear of our besieging army. A military trans-

Aid rendered
by the Jind,
Patiala and
Jammu
forces and
the Irregular
force under
General Van
Cortlandt.

port train of 30 waggons per diem was organized, under the excellent management of Captain D. Briggs, to carry men and *matériel* for the army. A waggon train was established from Mooltan to Ferozepore and Lahore, and a camel train from Kurrachee to Mooltan. Thus land transport was effectually secured from the seat of war at Delhi to the seaboard of Kurrachee, a distance of 1,400 miles. As our officers could obtain but little carriage from the Cis-Sutlej States, and none at all from Delhi territory, the means of conveyance were obtained from the Punjab, and the number of elephants, camels, bullocks, and country carts collected for this purpose were enormous. Besides quantities of miscellaneous stores, the greater portion of the treasure for the Delhi force was despatched from the Punjab treasuries. In general terms it may be said that the Punjab territories contributed for the operations at or near Delhi six battalions of European Infantry, a considerable force of European Artillery, one regiment of European Cavalry, seven battalions of Punjab Infantry, a body of Sikh Artillerymen, a corps of Sappers and Miners,—Punjabee,—three regiments of Punjabee Cavalry, two siege trains, and auxiliary native contingents of 8,000 men.

Military transport train.

Transport for the army supplied by the Punjab.

13. I am now to advert to those measures which were adopted in the Punjab to preserve tranquillity. The preceding paragraph has shown what heavy duties had to be discharged for the support of the army before Delhi. But besides that, there were some 36,000 Hindoostanee mutinous troops to be overawed if possible, and, if not possible, then to be overpowered. Then a long and difficult frontier, open to attack on many points, was to be guarded; and, lastly, any disposition to insurrection which might exist among the people had to be repressed.

Measures adopted for the tranquillity of the Punjab.

14. The efficiency of the Punjabee force was among the very first matters to engage attention. When the crisis came on in May, nearly one-fourth of this force was on furlough. A double period of furlough had been granted to the Infantry soldiers, as no such leave had been enjoyed during the previous

Recall of men from furlough.

Qualities of
the Punjab
force and
names of the
Commandant
and officers.

year. But now circulars were at once issued to recall the furlough men. Many men rejoined during the first fortnight ; but some, whose homes were more distant, could not return so quickly. The men kept, however, continually dropping in, footsore and travel-worn. They were all, however, in excellent spirits, eagerly asking what route their regiments were marching by, and how they could most quickly rejoin their standards. The Chief Commissioner believes that no body of native troops have ever been seen in India superior, if indeed equal, to the Punjab force. The present war has most amply shown how they can march, how they can fight, how they can endure. They have regarded neither the burning sun nor the drenching rain. Under every trial they have done their duty nobly. The fact is that these troops had been gradually inured to danger, to war, and to fatigue, by active and unremitting service for the last nine years along a rugged and mountainous frontier of 800 miles. Their splendid condition has proved that constant service in the field and hard work are consistent with thorough efficiency and with the maintenance of the best spirit. On hearing of the revolt the men expressed an ardent desire to be led against the mutineers. The force has also been peculiarly fortunate in the number of able and zealous officers attached to it. In Brigadier-General Neville Chamberlain, its Commander, it possesses one of the most able and experienced officers of the Bengal Army. He has seen more service than perhaps any other officer in India of his age. Every Infantry corps and several of the Cavalry corps have been excellently commanded. Such officers as Lieutenant-Colonel Coke ; Majors Lumsden, Wilde, Daly, Probyn, and Rothney ; Captains Renny, Henderson, and Hughes ; Lieutenants William Lumsden, C. Nicholson, J. Watson, Younghusband, and Kennedy, would do credit to any army in the world.

Composition
of the Punjab
Force.

15. The force is composed for the most part either of Sikhs or of Mahomedans of the country and the border ; but, as already stated, it has many Hindoostanees and a few hundred Afghans and Goorkhas. The Hindoostanees were

to be found in numbers in all the Cavalry regiments except the Guides. During the crisis these men were a source of deep anxiety. In those corps which remained on the frontier, however, not one case of overt misconduct occurred; some of them were suspected and summarily discharged. But most of them behaved well. Of those corps which marched to Delhi, in the 4th Sikhs the Hindoostanees were suspected, disarmed, and ordered back to the Punjab. None of these men, however, deserted, but obeyed orders, and returned to Huzara, and since the fall of Delhi have received back their arms. In the 1st Punjab Infantry, which is mainly a Puthan regiment, few Hindoostanees were to be found. In the 2nd and 4th Regiments the Hindoostanees were deprived of their arms and retained at Lahore. In the autumn, when the insurrection broke out in the Gogaira district (which will be noticed hereafter), and troops were much needed, these men offered to proceed against the enemy. This offer was accepted; they were armed, and sent down to the scene of the insurrection, where they behaved well. From the Punjab Cavalry which proceeded to Delhi many desertions took place, and ultimately it was found necessary to send the 1st Regiment, excepting one squadron, away to Saharunpore. But that squadron remained to do excellent service under Lieutenant J. Watson, and formed afterwards a portion of that force which relieved Lucknow. Of the 2nd and 5th Cavalry Corps, two squadrons under the command of Lieutenants Nicholson, Probyn, and Younghusband, marched down towards Delhi with the 1st Punjab Infantry. Two days before these troops were to arrive in the British camp three of the Cavalry native officers, who were Hindoostanees, came to Mahomed Jafir, the senior Subadar of the Infantry, who was a Puthan of the Punjab frontier, and proposed that they should murder all the European officers and join the mutineers in Delhi. Mahomed Jafir, in the first instance, refused to listen to such a proposal, and indeed treated it with contempt. But on its being presently renewed by them, he said he would think over the matter. But that very night he communicated the intelligence to Lieutenant-Colonel Coke, the Commanding Officer,

who, instead of making a single march the next morning, took the troops by a double march straight into camp. That same evening Mahomed Jafir told his story in open durbar before Brigadier-General Chamberlain and other officers, and pointed out the three traitors, who were at once secured, tried, convicted, and hanged. The Guide Infantry, the 4th Sikhs, the 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry, after fighting gallantly on many occasions during the siege of Delhi, finally took a prominent part in the storming of the city; and the three last-named corps have again distinguished themselves both at Lucknow and in Rohilkund.

Doubts as to whether the Punjab force would remain staunch.

16. Such generally were the characteristics of this remarkable force. When the mutinies broke out among the Hindoostanees, the question was how far the contagion had spread, or would spread, among the Punjabees. This question was at that moment most difficult to decide. There was much indeed to hope, but there was something to fear. If, on the one hand, many Punjabee troops immediately evinced the best spirit, yet, on the other hand, it was to be remembered that there were some Sikhs in nearly every Hindoostanee regiment. Now, either these men had never informed the European officers of the mischief that was brewing, or, if they had informed, they could not have been believed. In the first instance, then, it seemed expedient to pause, to inquire, to ascertain if possible whether a widely extended conspiracy existed in the Native Army throughout all ranks and all races, or whether the treason was confined to a comparatively limited circle of Hindoostanees or others. At one time it seemed probable that there was a general conspiracy among all classes; an uprising of the black man against the white. Such incidents as the misconduct of the Nusseeree Battalion near Simla showed that some infection had touched even the Goorkhas, the class least likely to be influenced. Early in June, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, when passing through Umritsur to join the army before Delhi, was warned by one of the most intelligent, trusty, and experienced of the Sikh Chiefs that the disaffection might spread so far and

wide that the British authorities would have to gather the European troops together and struggle for existence.

17. By the 17th of May, however, it became apparent that the Punjab did not sympathize with the movement in Hindoostan, and that a good spirit prevailed in the Punjabee troops. It was therefore at once resolved to augment them. There were 18 battalions of Punjab Infantry and organized police. For each of them four additional companies were ordered to be raised; so that these extra numbers might form a nucleus for such new regiments as it might be necessary to raise. A few days afterwards the Sikhs were ordered to be excerpted from the Hindoostanee regiments and formed into separate battalions. As already mentioned, all the furlough men were recalled. On the 24th of May the Chief Commissioner received a telegram from the Governor-General conveying approval of what had been done, and intimating that all measures which might be necessary for the public safety would be upheld. In this manner eighteen new regiments of Infantry were raised in the Punjab, of which five were completed in May and June; in August, eight; in October, two; and in subsequent months, three. Besides these there were raised irregular levies in the different districts, aggregating 7,000 horse and the same number of foot. These troops of various kind were raised to supply the place of the Punjab regiments gone to Delhi, to overawe the Hindoostanee troops by serving as a counterpoise, and to quell disaffection wherever it might arise. There was no difficulty in obtaining volunteers in any part of the country. For the foot levies eligible recruits were forthcoming in abundance. For the Cavalry the main difficulty consisted in the procuring of horses, but still the animals were obtained in greater numbers than might perhaps have been anticipated. Many excellent men were enlisted on or near the border, especially the Puthan horsemen who had served under Colonel Edwardes during the Second Punjab War, and upon whose fidelity much confidence was placed. These troops of all arms consisted of men from the various tribes and races of the Punjab and the adjacent countries. The foot soldiers

Staunchness
of Punjab
troops and
decision to
augment the
force.

were chiefly Sikhs, Punjabee Mahomedans, border Puthans, and hillmen from the Jummoo and Kangra districts. The mounted levies were mostly Mahomedans from the country between the Jhelum and the Indus, and the frontier, that is, Puthans, Belooches, Gukkurs, and races of Hindoo lineage long converted to Mahomedanism. But, although the raising of so large a body of troops was necessitated by the imminence of the crisis, yet from first to last it was the Chief Commissioner's policy to enlist no more men than might be absolutely necessary to preserve the peace and to supply the drain for Hindoostan. The Chief Commissioner felt the expediency of preventing as far as possible the Punjabees from seeing that the physical force in the country was on their side, or from feeling that they were the right arm of the British power. The aggregate of the Punjab forces, old and new, stands as follows in round numbers :—

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------|
| Old force | . | . | . | . | . | . | 24,815 |
| New force | . | . | . | . | . | . | 34,000 |
| Total | | | | | | | 58,815 |

Details of
races from
which the
Punjab troops
are drawn.

These troops are not, however, mostly Sikhs, nor do they belong to one or two prevailing castes or tribes, but are drawn from a variety of races (though chiefly comprised within Punjab limits), differing in religion, birthplace, habits, and dialects, as will be seen from the following abstract, which does not include the military police :—

| Christians. | Sikhs. | Mahomedans. | Hillmen. | Hindoos, mixed. | Hindoo- stanees. |
|-------------|--------|-------------|----------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 16 | 13,344 | 24,027 | 2,203 | 5,336 | 2,430 |

Under the head of Mahomedans many tribes are embraced having little in common except religion. Many of these are as utterly alien to the Sikhs as to the Hindoostanees, and have proved during the Second Punjab War and on previous

occasions that they could be depended on to fight against the Sikhs.

18. After the military arrangements, one of the first precautionary measures was the strengthening of the ordinary police and the occupying of all the ferries and principal passages of the Punjab rivers. It was felt that these great streams, which, traversing the country north and south, severed the Punjab from Hindoostan, afforded peculiar facilities for preventing ingress and egress. So a strict embargo was placed upon all suspicious travellers who could not give a proper account of themselves, and especially upon faqueers and other mendicants of a *quasi*-religious character.

Strengthening
of Police and
guarding of
ferries.

19. So difficult did it soon become for seditious characters to pass unchallenged through the country that the public post was unavoidably resorted to by the disaffected for treasonable communications. But a strict surveillance was instituted over all postal despatches. Native letters were opened and examined by responsible British officers. In this way many important and interesting documents came to light, which, though cautiously and even enigmatically worded, yet served to indicate clearly the tendency of native opinion.

Scrutiny of
postal corre-
spondence.

20. Another matter of urgent consequence was the protection of the large quantities of treasure in the various districts. The local officers at outlying stations were accordingly ordered to collect their treasure and to send the bulk of it to stations where European guards could be obtained, and on no account was any considerable sum to be retained anywhere, except at places where European troops were cantoned. Bullion was as much as possible to be kept inside fortifications; a small portion only being sent outside, so as to suffice for daily expenditure. These orders were generally executed with promptness and efficiency, and the result was satisfactory. From first to last the loss of treasure in these territories did not amount to a lakh of rupees, or 10,000 £; and much even of this might have been saved if the orders had in every case been strictly carried out.

Protection of
treasure.

Adoption of stringent measures for the punishment of offenders during the rebellion.

21. Whenever the condition of a district might be critical, or disturbance threatened, stringent measures were adopted in the criminal department. It was felt that in such cases the punishment must be exemplarily prompt and severe to the last degree. Authority was given that any two Civil officers sitting in commission should summarily try persons charged with offences directed against the State, or endangering the public safety, and should execute capital sentences without further reference. In many localities, exposed to evil influences, the speedy justice done these offenders had a repressive and deterring effect. But the Chief Commissioner was among the foremost in urging severity upon all offenders of whatever class while the State was menaced with danger, and while the strongest measures were necessary to turn in our favor the balance already borne down by the weight of opposing circumstances. There was no room then for mercy; the public safety was then a paramount consideration. In those terrible days he was obliged to telegraph injunctions for the extermination of the mutineers by the various means at our disposal,—by slaying them in fight, by raising the people against them, by offering rewards for their seizure, by driving them on to destruction in the swollen rivers, in the hills and jungles. At that juncture these measures were as necessary as they were just, when the awful crimes which these mutineers had either perpetrated or meditated, and the dangers they had brought upon the Empire, are considered. But at a time of success and victory, when once more we can breathe freely, when we are relieved from the pressure of imminent peril, the Chief Commissioner has deemed it his duty to advocate a merciful and considerate discrimination. We must, indeed, pursue to the last the leaders of treason and the actual perpetrators of hideous crime. There can be no forgiveness for them on this side the grave. But having, by judicious inquiry, separated those whose guilt is secondary, whose offences, though legally punishable with death, are yet free from the blacker hues—for these we must, in the Chief Commissioner's opinion, mitigate punishment, extend mercy, and even offer amnesty. Even if it were morally right to be inexorable towards every class of

Subsequent treatment.

offenders, it certainly will not be practicable. Even the might of British power could hardly effect this; we could not well afford to assign the number of European troops which would be requisite to conduct a guerilla warfare over a wide tract of territory and an indefinite space of time. In important classes of cases we may now proffer pardon with a good grace, without any risk of clemency being mistaken for irresolution, and thereby we may relieve our overburdened resources from a task devoid of advantage and arduous of performance. If punitive operations are too long protracted, the popular mind continues in that ferment which renders complete pacification of the distracted districts impossible. We cannot war with large sections of the population. We must remember that they are our people; our erring, guilty subjects, but our subjects still. By force of arms have we recently asserted our right to rule over them, and we must now show towards them the magnanimity of rulers. Lastly, we should not forget that, if grievously sinned against, we may have to some extent sinned also; that we have to answer for our own shortcomings and defaults, whereby we placed sore temptation before a people who have no true religion, no true morality to sustain them; that while but too many have done that which can never be palliated or condoned, numbers have been guilty in various lesser degrees. There is a Judge over both them and us. Inasmuch as we have been preserved from impending destruction by His mercy alone, we should be merciful to others, reflecting that if He were to be extreme to mark what we have done, and still do amiss, we should forfeit that protection from on High which alone maintains us in India.

22. The high amount of the charges arising from the levy of extra troops, from the miscellaneous war expenses, from the supplying of the army before Delhi with cash, rendered it probable that financial pressure would be felt. A public loan was therefore opened, bearing 6 per cent. interest and repayable within one year. The Chiefs, independent and feudatory, evinced their loyalty by subscribing liberally. The mercantile class, though some of them contributed largely, as a body withheld their money, thereby disappointing

6 per cent.
loan.

expectations which might have been fairly formed on account of their known wealth and prosperity. The novelty of the requisition may have been one reason why they hesitated to embark their capital in British securities. But it must be confessed that their tardiness and unwillingness in this matter indicated their opinion regarding the character of the contest in which we were engaged. Ultimately however, upwards of 42 lakhs of rupees, or 420,000 £ sterling, were raised.

Deportation of
non-military
Hindustanis
from the
Punjab.

23. The traitorous symptoms evinced, and the intrigues set on foot by the non-military Hindoostanees in the Punjab territories, rendered it necessary to remove large numbers of them. These people were employed to a considerable extent among the police and other subordinate civil establishments; and as camp followers they swarmed in every cantonment and in the adjacent cities. Most of the lower class of employés were discharged, and numbers of the camp followers deported out of the province. Such measures, though severe, were at that juncture necessitated by the conduct of these people. But when the present troubles shall have passed away entirely, it may not in future be politic to exclude altogether the foreign Hindoostanee element from the Punjab administration.

Aid from feudatory
Chiefs.

24. Wherever feudatory Chiefs existed, they were called upon to furnish police contingents to assist in securing the public safety. To this call they responded with laudable alacrity, and their men proved most useful. The Rajah of Kupoorthulla, several of the Simla Hill Chiefs, the lesser Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, and others, distinguished themselves in this respect.

Opening of the
public service
to all classes,
including
Native
Christians.

25. Lastly, it may be mentioned that later in the year a circular was issued to the effect that the avenues of public employ were to be opened to men irrespective of their caste, tribe, sect, or creed, and that in this respect every fair and reasonable opportunity was to be afforded to Native Christians. At such a time it was deemed right that a Christian and civilized administration should declare the principle by which it was actuated in this matter.

26. The next event of importance which happened after those already recorded was the Jullundur mutiny. On the 7th June, at that station, two native corps of Infantry and one of Cavalry mutinied, and marched for Phillour, where they were joined by the 3rd Native Infantry. The whole body then crossing the Sutlej did some damage to Loodiana, and then went on to Delhi. The event, though not so calamitous as it might have been, was yet very unfortunate, for it caused an effective addition to the mutineer army at Delhi and gave much encouragement to the revolt. The affair occurred in this wise. The native brigade at Jullundur had for some time shown unmistakable signs of disaffection. Many incendiary fires had broken out in the cantonment. The conduct of some of the sepoys had been insolent and defiant. The Chief Commissioner had himself been warned by natives on the spot that an outbreak might be anticipated at any moment. The local Civil authorities were of the same opinion. The Chief Commissioner had more than once urged that these troops should be disarmed. General Reed had actually ordered the measure. For its execution, Her Majesty's 8th Regiment was present and one troop of European Artillery, and at one time a Punjab Infantry corps passing through was available as an auxiliary. But the local military authorities decided otherwise. The treasure which was sent in from the Civil treasury, and which should have been placed under the custody of the European troops, was divided and placed in charge of the two Native Infantry regiments, "in order to give them confidence." When these two corps did break out, they might have been successfully attacked, broken, and dispersed before they left cantonments, but they were permitted to escape. Even then, had they been followed up with vigor, they would certainly have never been able to cross the Sutlej as a military body. But they were not pursued for some hours, and then our troops moved slower than they did. Such a pursuit was obviously worse than useless. At the passage of the Sutlej the mutineers were opposed with great spirit by Mr. G. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana. He attacked them with some Nabha levies and three companies of the 4th Sikhs under

Mutiny at
Jullundur and
escape of
troops.

Futile pur-
suit.

Operations of
Mr. Ricketts
at the Sutlej.

Crossing of the river by the mutineers and their subsequent proceedings.

Lieutenant Williams. He had two half-manned guns of the Nabha Chief, one of which became useless by the horses running off with the limber. The other gun he worked himself until the ammunition, consisting of a few rounds, was expended. Lieutenant Williams was badly wounded and some of his Sikhs were killed. The mutineers effected their passage with the loss of about 40 men. Arriving at Loodiana they did but little damage, as they saw that a portion of the European troops from Jullundur had by this time crossed the river in pursuit. This pursuit, however, was soon abandoned. Then the mutineers, instead of taking the Grand Trunk Road, went straight across country for Delhi, avoiding all places where they might meet European troops. A panic seems to have seized them, and they marched night and day. This turn of the affair was most providential for us; for it were hard to estimate the damage they might have inflicted had they taken the Grand Trunk Road. In that case neither the cantonments nor any single military or civil post between Loodiana and Delhi could have been preserved from them. They would have intercepted our communications and created an alarm which it is scarcely possible to exaggerate; and at that time it would have been impracticable to detach against them a portion of the Delhi force. In fact, there is no mode of accounting for the folly and fatuity of the mutineers on this occasion, except by recognising in the event the hand of a Higher Power.

Composition of the Movable Column and the objects for which it was maintained.

27. It will now be proper to make further reference to the Movable Column already mentioned. That column had been greatly reduced in force by the recall of one of its European regiments to strengthen Peshawur, and by the onward advance of the Guides, the 4th Sikhs and the Kumaon Battalion to join the army before Delhi. Brigadier-General Chamberlain had moved with the column to Wuzeerabad, on the left bank of the Chenab. Here it was arranged that the column should be augmented by troops from Sealkote, namely, Her Majesty's 52nd, the European Artillery, the 35th Native Infantry, and half the 9th Light Cavalry. At Sealkote, there were thus left the 46th Native Infantry, and the remaining wing of the 9th Light Cavalry. It was necessary to take the

European force from Sealkote to join the column. The Native troops at Sealkote had behaved well since the commencement of the crisis. The Brigadier Commanding and the officers expressed entire confidence in the men. But still it was not thought safe to leave the whole brigade at the station alone, without Europeans. When, therefore, the European force was unavoidably withdrawn, a large portion of the Native troops accompanied them, so that only a comparatively small number were left at the station. It had more than once been contemplated to disarm every sepoy regiment in the Punjab. But the Chief Commissioner found that this could not in all cases be successfully carried out. He indeed knew but too well that every one of these corps was rotten to the core. Many of them still, however, preserved the appearance of fidelity, and avoided the least overt manifestation that might justify extreme measures. There was a hope that if Delhi were to fall speedily, a reaction of loyalty among these regiments would set in. But the chief difficulty was this, that in many places the disarming could not be carried through in such force as to prevent the men from escaping by flight; and it was of great consequence that the numbers of the Delhi mutineers should not be swelled by the accession of such fugitives. Under these circumstances it was arranged that the Movable Column should range about within a certain circle, ready to sweep down upon any station on the first alarm. But, notwithstanding this precaution, the Chief Commissioner kept the policy of disarming constantly in view; and it will now be seen that necessity soon arose for carrying out that policy in other cases besides those already recounted.

28. Early in July, the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum showed symptoms of uneasiness. Whereupon the detachment of Punjabee Military Police at that station was strengthened, some mounted levies were sent there to overawe the sepoys, and two companies of the 14th Native Infantry itself were ordered on special duty to Rawal Pindee, so as to separate and weaken the regiment. Matters growing worse; it became necessary to act at once, though action was difficult. There

Mutiny of
the troops at
Jhelum and
the action
taken.

were no Europeans whatever at Jhelum. The only available European troops were 500 Infantry and six guns with European Artillerymen at Rawul Pindee, 75 miles off. But at that station there was the 58th Native Infantry and the two companies of the 14th. Jhelum, however, was an important place, situated on the right bank of the river of that name, and commanding the Grand Trunk Road between Lahore and Peshawur. A successful disturbance there would have cut the Punjab into halves. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, resolved with the scanty European force at Rawul Pindee to disarm the sepoys both at that station and Jhelum. About half the Rawul Pindee force, that is, 280 Europeans of all arms, were sent to Jhelum to disarm the main body of the 14th Native Infantry. The sepoys, however, resisted desperately, and were with great difficulty overpowered. After a regular fight during the day, they fled in the night. Four hundred of them were killed in the fight and pursuit, or seized and executed. About 200 escaped into the neighbouring Jummoo territory, but were subsequently given up by the Maharajah Golab Singh. These men, however, having received from the officers of the Maharajah a promise that their lives should be spared, that promise was kept by the British officers, and they were transported beyond the seas. At Rawul Pindee, the 58th Native Infantry and the remainder of the 14th quietly surrendered their arms, excepting a few men who endeavoured to escape and were intercepted.

Disarming of
Native troops
at Multán.

29. Immediately upon hearing of the outbreak at Jullundur, the Chief Commissioner deemed it absolutely necessary to disarm the two Native Infantry regiments at Mooltan, one of which (the 69th) had, in particular, evinced a bad spirit. There were at that time some 60 European Artillerymen in the Fort. There was no European Infantry, but a regiment had been ordered thither by the Supreme Government, which was coming up the Indus by detachments. The first of these detachments was expected to arrive in about 10 days. *Time*, however, in respect to disarming these two Native Infantry corps was of the last importance. If they should hear of the Jullundur mutiny,

they might rise. If we were to lose Mooltan, all the Southern Punjab would be lost with it; and the only line of communication then open, namely, that to Bombay, would be closed. Besides the 60 Gunners, there were the 1st Irregular Cavalry, all Hindoostanees; the 1st Punjab Cavalry, partly Punjabees and partly Hindoostanees; the 2nd Punjab Infantry, nearly all Hindoostanees; a few men of the local Police Battalion, and a Hindoostanee troop of Horse Artillery, with six guns. These troops aggregated about 1,200 available men; from their composition they could hardly be implicitly relied upon, and it was doubtful whether the 1st Irregular Cavalry would prove staunch. The Chief Commissioner, however, decided that, even with these doubtful means, an attempt must be made to disarm the Native Infantry corps before the news of the Jullundur outbreak should reach Mooltan; the Chief Commissioner accordingly telegraphed his suggestions to that effect to General Gowan, at Lahore, and begged that the task might be entrusted to Major Crawford Chamberlain, commanding the 1st Irregulars. The General was good enough to comply with this request, and invested Major Chamberlain with the command of all the irregular troops at Mooltan for this purpose. The disarming was effected in a masterly manner, and the conduct of the Irregulars was quite satisfactory. Too much credit cannot well be given to Major Chamberlain for his coolness, resolution, and good management on this trying occasion. So delicate was the task, that the Chief Commissioner believes that if it had devolved on the Officer Commanding at Mooltan, or upon any officer at the station other than Major Chamberlain, there would have been a failure. As the result of failure would have been calamitous, so the result of success was most favourable. Indeed the disarming at Mooltan was a turning point in the Punjab crisis, second only in importance to the disarmings at Lahore and Peshawur. Shortly afterwards, on the 17th June, the first detachment of the Bombay European Fusiliers arrived at Mooltan, and the second quickly followed. The two detachments mustered

320 men. This aid secured the place, and enabled the Chief Commissioner to move the 1st Punjab Cavalry and the 2nd Punjab Infantry towards Delhi.

Despatch of
further rein-
forcements to
Delhi.

30. By this time repeated calls had been made from Delhi for further reinforcements of Europeans troops, and it was urged that Brigadier-General Chamberlain's Movable Column should march down to Delhi. To this measure the Chief Commissioner was obliged to demur. But he agreed that General Chamberlain should go, provided that Lieutenant-Colonel J. Nicholson were appointed to command the column in his stead. But by way of reinforcement a wing of Her Majesty's 8th was despatched from Jullundur for Delhi, and a wing of Her Majesty's 61st from Ferozepore, and it was promised that the remaining wings of these two corps should follow as soon as the whole of the Bombay European Fusiliers should arrive. Some European Artillerymen were also despatched. It was at this period that the Gunners of the old Sikh army, many of them covered with the scars of former service against us, were enlisted to serve against the mutineers at Delhi. To the same destination were now despatched the Muzhubees corps of Sappers and Miners (already alluded to in para. 12) who had been collected from the works of the Baree Doab Canal, and other places, and who now rendered excellent assistance in the operations before Delhi. The Judicial Commissioner, Mr. R. Montgomery, also had raised five troops of Sikh Cavalry, that formed the nucleus of Hodson's Horse at Delhi, which afterwards became so well known.

Further dis-
arming of
Native troops.

31. The Chief Commissioner then, by electric telegraph, informed Brigadier-General Nicholson, Commanding the Movable Column, of the events at Jhelum and Rawul Pindee. General Nicholson was then in the Jullundur Doab. On hearing the news, he quietly disarmed the 33rd and 35th Native Infantry, and a wing of the 9th Light Cavalry. The 59th he had recently disarmed at Umritsur. Instructions were also sent to disarm the 4th Native Infantry, one wing of which was at Noorpoor and the other at Kote

Kangra. The wing at Kangra was disarmed by Major Reynell Taylor and Captain Younghusband by means of about an equal number of the local Police Battalion; and the Kangra fortress has since been held by a detachment of European troops. The wing at Noorpoor (of which, however, some two-fifths were Punjabees) surrendered their arms at the order of Major Wilkie, their Commanding Officer.

32. By these measures in the Jhelum division and in the Trans-Sutlej States, some six regiments of Native Infantry and a wing of Light Cavalry were rendered innocuous; and the disarming policy proved quite successful. No armed Native Infantry now remained in the Punjab, except the 39th at Dera Ismael Khan on the frontier, who quietly surrendered their arms, two corps at Peshawur, who were perfectly overawed and were doing well, and one Native Infantry corps, and a wing of Cavalry at Sealkote, who broke out into mutiny, as will now be described.

Strength of
Native troops
left in Pun-
jab.

33. Hearing of the disarming at Jhelum and elsewhere, the Sealkote sepoy immediately broke out. The Infantry contented themselves with sending their officers away, but the Cavalry waylaid the officers, and murdered every European they could meet; the Brigadier, four other officers, two Medical officers, a Missionary Clergyman and his family, were slain. Many others would doubtless have fallen victims had not the old fort at Sealkote, belonging to the Raja Tej Singh, in which were located a body of our newly-raised levies, afforded a safe refuge for the European officers and ladies. On this occasion the military police misbehaved, the only instance of misconduct on the part of the Punjab Police during the crisis. The detachment of the local battalion and the horsemen were, indeed, much too weak to oppose the mutineers with any success; but they might have defended themselves in the Jail. The Native officers, however, joined the insurgents, and the men remained passive. The mutineers remained in the station during the day, pillaged all the moveable property, collected all the carriage available, emptied the treasury, burned the public offices, released

Mutiny at
Siálkot.

Departure
of mutineers
after plun-
dering the
station.

Trial and
conviction of
offenders at
Sialkot.

the prisoners from Jail, blew up the magazines, and then, taking with them the only gun in the place, an iron 12-pounder, and all their spoil, marched for the Ravee, about 50 miles distant. On their departure the villagers from the neighbourhood entered the deserted station to plunder, but were expelled by the levies from the fort. Captain Lawrence and another officer were sent up from Lahore to form a special commission. They tried, convicted, and executed the two chief Native officers of the military police, the chief Native officer of the Jail, and some dozen of the villagers who were the ring-leaders in the plunder. Some 40 or 50 more of the country-people were flogged or imprisoned, and order was restored.

Annihilation
of Sialkot
mutineers by
Brigadier-
General
Nicholson
near Gurdás-
pur.

34. From the course which the Sealkote mutineers took it seems probable that they intended to proceed to Goordaspore, to induce the 2nd Regiment of Irregular Cavalry stationed there to rise; then crossing the Ravee to gain over the 16th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry at Hooshyarpore, and the disarmed men of the 4th and the 33rd, and to move across the Sutlej towards Delhi. They doubtless knew well that along this line of country there was no European force to oppose them, except the Movable Column, and that lay many miles to the south, so that they might hope to out-march it. But Brigadier-General Nicholson with the column was at Umritsur. He received news of the Sealkote mutiny early on the day after its occurrence. He had collected a large number of light country carts, so as to be able to march rapidly in the event of such an outbreak as this occurring. He instantly marched to meet the mutineers with 600 men of Her Majesty's 52nd and nine guns and two troops of newly-raised Sikh Horse. He placed the Europeans on the country carts, and, despite the burning sun, he made a distance of 40 miles that very day, arriving at Goordaspore in the evening. Early the next morning he heard that the mutineers had crossed the Ravee, and were advancing on the station of Goordaspore. At this moment his position was critical. By advancing against the mutineers he would have to leave the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, doubtful friends, at

Goordaspore. These men might at the proper moment make a diversion to the rear of the Movable Column in favor of the mutineers. But Nicholson was not a soldier to hesitate. He advanced out of Goordaspore at once, some six miles towards the Ravee. The mutineers had no idea of the proximity of the column; and when they saw it drawn up to bar the road, they mistook the British Infantry, in their dusky-coloured uniforms, for the Umritsur Police Battalion. Under this erroneous impression the mutineers advanced with courage to the attack, soon, however, to discover their mistake. They were driven back in confusion. Many were killed, and more still were drowned in the river, which had risen since they had crossed. Many fled in various directions, and the remainder took refuge in a large island, where they were subsequently attacked and destroyed. The fugitives were seized and shot. Some escaped into the Jummoo territory, and were, for the most part, given up to meet a similar fate.

35. It is now time to mention certain operations, set on foot from the Punjab, for the recovery and pacification of certain parts of the Delhi territory. When Delhi fell, emissaries from the King and the mutineers were despatched to Hurrianah to stir up the Light Infantry Battalion quartered at Hissar, Hansee, and Sirsa. These evil messengers were but too successful; the Hurrianah Light Infantry rose, and the Mahomedan population of those parts followed their example. The country is sandy, sterile, bleak in parts, and jungly. The season was inclement, and our officers had but scanty means of escaping from their awful position. Many of the Europeans at these stations were murdered; but many also, aided by some of the country people, saved their lives by flight, enduring great hardship. Thus, the revolt spread to the Ferozepore frontier and to the bank of the Sutlej. There was fear that, unless we should repel the enemy from our threshold, the mischief would spread across the Sutlej and into the Ferozepore district. Therefore, a force composed chiefly of new levies, two companies of the Mooltan Police Battalion and a troop of

Despatch of a force under General Van Cortlandt to re-conquer Hariana, and its success.

mounted police, were hurriedly collected and placed under General Van Cortlandt, who had belonged formerly to the Sikh army and had served with Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes in the second Punjab campaign and was at this time Deputy Commissioner of Googaira. With this force General Van Cortlandt started to re-conquer Hurrianah. After crossing the Sutlej he received some assistance from the Maharajahs of Puttiala and Bikaner. After beating the rebels on several occasions, he ultimately re-occupied these districts. Indeed, it is well known how successful General Van Cortlandt was, and how by his prudence, temper, and good management he justified the trust that had been reposed on him.

Mutiny of
26th Native
Infantry at
Mian Mir.

Flight of
men and their
destruction by
Mr. F. H.
Cooper.

36. After the action with the Sealkote mutineers, matters remained tolerably quiet in the Punjab for a short time. The violence of the mutiny had burnt itself out. Many mutineers had been destroyed, though some escaped to Delhi. The remainder had been mostly disarmed. But soon the disarmed brigade at Lahore began to heave with a mutinous impulse. Before it could be ascertained what kind of mischief was brewing, one of the regiments, the 26th Native Infantry, suddenly rose, murdered their Commanding Officer, Major Spencer, the Sergeant-Major and two Native officers, and decamped. Hearing that the men were bent on evil, Major Spencer had gone to their lines to pacify and restrain them. There he fell a victim of generous, though misplaced, confidence in sepoys with whom he had served, and for whom he had labored and cared, for 30 years. The regiment then fled, but through some misapprehension were not pursued until it was too late. They did not make for the Beas or Sutlej, to go to Delhi, probably because they knew that the ferries were guarded. But they went northwards, and attempted to cross the Ravee, and so escape into the Jummoo territories. But the country-people and the police got news of their flight, and collected to attack them near the river. Many were killed, and the remainder were forced to take refuge on an island. Here they were seized by Mr. F. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner of Umritsur, and put to death the following morning.

37. The other disarmed troops at Lahore, two Infantry regiments and one Cavalry, were then marched out of their lines and encamped in front of the European barracks and within range of the guns.

Guarding
of disarmed
troops at
Lahore.

38. By this time, that is, the commencement of August, war and sickness had sadly thinned the ranks of our gallant soldiers before Delhi. On the one hand, while the numbers of the mutineers had been swollen by large reinforcements from Neemuch, Bareilly, Jhansee, and Mhow, on the other hand the succours despatched from the Punjab barely enabled our army to maintain its position on the ridge before Delhi. By August it became clear that assistance from below was hopeless. Therefore General Wilson wrote to the Chief Commissioner that unless he should be largely reinforced from the Punjab, he would not be able to hold his own position, much less to assault the town. It then became a serious question as to what was the proper policy to pursue. The Chief Commissioner had to consider whether the field force before Delhi should be reinforced at all hazards, or whether further assistance should be withheld and an effort made to hold the Punjab with our remaining means. There were then in the Punjab nearly seven corps of European Infantry; five were regiments previously in the province; one, the Bombay Fusiliers, had recently arrived, and the seventh consisted of 250 men of Her Majesty's 8th and a wing of Her Majesty's 61st. Of these, three were in the Peshawur Valley, but so prostrated by sickness that they could not muster much more than 1,000 bayonets. One regiment held Lahore; one held Mooltan and Ferozepore; one furnished the detachments to hold Rawul Pindee, Umritsur, and Jullundur. There remained one corps composing the Movable Column. There were from 800 to 1,000 European Artillerymen. The sick and ineffective at Peshawur being deducted, there were at that juncture not more than 4,700 effective Europeans. Many of the new Punjab regiments had been organized, disciplined, and fairly drilled. Such were the available means. But with these not only was the Punjab to be held, but there were also some 18,000 Hindoostanee troops to watch and guard; and of

Appeal of
General
Wilson at
Delhi for
more troops.

these nearly 6,000 were armed. This large body of suspected and dangerous men was a sad incumbrance, and shackled every movement.

Determination
of Sir J.
Lawrence to
help General
Wilson.

39. The decision of the question as to whether the army before Delhi should be reinforced or not rested with the Chief Commissioner. After full reflection, he resolved that, come what might, our comrades before Delhi should not be abandoned. He felt that the advance on Delhi had, in the first instance, been made mainly upon his urgent solicitations. He saw that, if the army before Delhi were now to fall back, it would probably be deserted by all the native troops that were with it. Such an example would probably be followed by all the Punjabee troops in the Punjab itself, and then the whole province would certainly rise. In that extremity, the only chance for the British of preserving even existence would have been to collect the European troops into one solid mass. But even at this period (the early part of August) things had gone so far that very possibly it would be found that the time for such concentration had gone by. And even if it could be effected, still there was much doubt whether the combined mass of British would be strong enough to hold its own, encumbered as it would be by large numbers of women and children, and distracted by the discordant counsels which so surely follow disaster.

Detail of rein-
forcements
despatched to
Delhi.

40. On every view of the question, therefore, it seemed to be the true policy to reinforce to the utmost the army before Delhi. Accordingly, Brigadier-General Nicholson, with Her Majesty's 52nd, the remaining wing of the 61st, two troops of European Horse Artillery, the 2nd Punjab Rifles, and some Mooltanee Horse, marched for Delhi. The Movable Column in the Punjab from that time consisted of between 200 and 300 men of Her Majesty's 24th, 200 men of the 3rd and 6th Punjab Rifles, and two companies of military police, with some mounted levies. These remained in the Punjab of course. The reinforcements above mentioned, which had marched for Delhi, were shortly followed by the remainder of Her Majesty's 8th and the 4th Punjab Rifles. One of the newly-raised Punjab regiments was also despatched to

Meerut, to enable the Military authorities there to spare a further detachment of the 60th Rifles and some European Artillerymen for service before Delhi. Lastly, there issued from the Ferozepore Arsenal a first-class siege train, consisting of 18 heavy guns, of various calibres, with suitable stores of ammunition, the whole drawn by 16 elephants and 548 country waggons. The utmost credit is due to Captain Lewis, the Commissary of Ordnance, for his exertions in the preparation of this train. It was escorted by a wing of the Belooch Battalion from Sindh, which had been sent up to render aid in the Punjab. At the same time the Jummoo contingent, furnished by the Maharajah Runbheer Singh, consisting of 2,000 Infantry, 200 Cavalry, and 6 guns, under the political charge of Lieutenant-Colonel R. Lawrence, was despatched to Delhi.

41. Such were the last reinforcements which the Punjab was able to send to Delhi. To send them, every nerve had been strained to the utmost; the last available soldier had gone; and it only remained to await the result with a humble trust in Providence. It is foreign to this narrative to recount what glorious successes were actually attained; how General Nicholson dealt the first deadly blow to the strength of the mutineers, by defeating their force at Nujjufgurh; and how nobly he led that final assault in which he perished. When Delhi fell the knell of the great rebellion was sounded. It spread no farther anywhere. As the mutineers dispersed in flight, the country was restored to peace. Here and there those rebels who had committed themselves beyond the hope of pardon maintained a brief and ineffective struggle. The Chiefs who had joined in the revolt surrendered their strongholds and gave themselves up. By the time that the insurgent Joudpoor Legion arrived at Narnoud, on the frontier of the Delhi territory, they found that the country-people were not on the side of the mutineers and that there was a strong force ready to attack them.

42. By the time that Delhi fell, the tension upon the military resources of the Punjab had reached the utmost bearable pitch. After the departure of the final reinforcements for

Tension on
the Military
resources of
the Punjab.

Delhi, there remained hardly more than 4,000 Europeans in the province of all arms ; and the effectives must have been even less than this number. The spectacle of our weakness must have had its effect upon the native population, and the consequences manifested themselves in two *émeutes*, which occurred about this time.

Rising in the
hills near
Murree.

43. In the hills near Murree and in Lower Huzara a conspiracy was discovered just in time to prevent its being carried out. The people of that country, who are all Mahomedans, were doubtless ripe for an outbreak. The success of the mutineers at Delhi, and the hopes thereby inspired of restoring Mahomedan power, had offered irresistible temptation. Early in September one of the petty Chiefs of Huzara told the Chief Commissioner's informant, an English lady, that unless Delhi fell within a week there would be a general insurrection in Huzara. Besides the general hope of revived power for the Mahomedans, there was the lust of plunder to incite the mountaineers to attempt the sack of Murree.

Insurrection
in Gugera
and its sup-
pression.

44. The next *émeute* was in the Googaira district, south of Lahore, between the Ravee and the Sutlej. On the very evening of the memorable 14th of September (the assault of Delhi) a Mahomedan official of the postal department arrived at Lahore from Googaira, came before the Chief Commissioner, and reported, with a somewhat malicious twinkle of the eye, that all the wild and predatory tribes inhabiting the jungly country between Lahore and Mooltan had risen. In reply to a question, he further informed the Chief Commissioner that the numbers of the insurgents amounted to exactly 125,000 men. Such information was somewhat bewildering ; nevertheless, within three hours one company of European Infantry (the most that could be spared), three guns, with European Artillerymen, and 200 Sikh Cavalry, started from Lahore for the seat of the insurrection. The insurgents were, of course, contemptible as soldiers, but they were a hardy, brave, and athletic race, of pastoral habits. They had but few arms, and those few had been either seized from isolated police posts or had been imported from the adjacent independ-

ent State of Bhawulpore. Their real strength lay in the character of the impervious jungles which they inhabited, and which may be described as vast waving sheets of high grass and low stunted trees. The insurrection was put down in about 20 days, with but small loss of life on our side. Some difficulty was, however, experienced in effecting this; and some 1,500 troops, of various kinds, had to be collected together for the purpose. For some little time the direct line of communication with Bombay was interrupted and a temporary postal line, down the right bank of the Sutlej, had to be opened.

45. Since that time peace and order have reigned in these territories. But it will be proper to consider very briefly what were the probable causes why the Punjab people and army resisted so long the general tendency to mutiny and rebellion; why, at the last, partial outbreaks began to occur; and why a general insurrection could no longer have been staved off, if Delhi had not fallen.

Restoration of
tranquillity.

46. In the first place, as previously remarked, the Punjabee troops had been well trained and disciplined. They had found incessant work to do. They had never been pampered or spoilt. They had never imbibed the notion that soldiers should not be generally useful on service. They had never learned that anything except drill and manœuvring would be detrimental to their military efficiency. They were commanded by excellent officers whom they regarded and respected. All the above considerations tended to bind them to our interests. On the other hand, the Punjabees despised and disliked the Hindoostanee soldiery. The Hindoostanees were boastful and vainglorious in their bearing towards the Punjabee troops, and occasionally had been oppressive in their conduct towards the people. It was the European Infantry and Artillery, and not the Hindoostanees, that had broken the flower of the Sikh chivalry in two successive campaigns in 1846 and 1848; and the Punjabees longed to prove their superiority as soldiers against the Hindoostanees. Again, the Sikhs cherished an especial dislike against the

Consideration
of the reasons
for the loyalty
of the Punjab
troops and
Chiefs.

Mahomedans of Hindoostan. They entertained an hereditary hatred against the City of Delhi, where Togh Bahadoor, one of their famous warrior priests, was cruelly put to death, and where the limbs of the martyr were exposed at the gates. The Punjabees of all classes, Sikhs or Mahomedans, are fond of plunder, and the wealth of Delhi had been long notorious to all. The hope of sharing in such spoil turned the thoughts of many towards our service during the crisis. Then the whole people had been accustomed to regard our power as irresistible, and our prestige when the war broke out was mighty in their eyes. They saw that at least we held their country in considerable force, and that we were able to deal vigorously and severely with our mutinous Hindoostanees. They, perhaps, did not consider whether we were or were not equally strong elsewhere. At all events, they may have been inclined to draw their conclusions from what passed before their immediate view. Then we began to engage the services of the more adventurous and excitable spirits all over the country on a popular expedition. Thus, the very class most likely to profit by disturbance, and to turn against us for the want of something better to do, were enlisted in our cause. And the idea got possession of their minds that (to use their own expression) the bread which the Hindoostanees had rejected would fall to the lot of Punjabees. Many a man who sighed in retirement for the good old days of war and excitement, and who would have been ready to start up against us on the first sound of tumult, marched joyously off for Delhi, to earn abroad the living he could not get at home and to share in the spoils of Hindoostan. Again, the Chief Commissioner believes it may be truly said that the people had, on the whole, been well and kindly governed. They had no grievances to complain of, while they had solid and appreciable advantages to be thankful for. Though fanatical in some respects, they are less sensitive and suspicious in respect to caste and religion, less enslaved to prejudice than the Hindoostanees. Their minds had not been poisoned by malicious stories regarding the intentions of the British. The mass of the people had never been so prosperous,

so easy in circumstances, as under British rule. Agriculture, commerce, material wealth of all kinds, were increasing. The middle and lower classes were thriving and multiplying. In no parts was improvement more marked than in hill tracts like Huzara, and in the wild jungly tracts towards the south. In all parts there were numbers who could remember the evils which war and insecurity inflict. And for some time there were few or none who conceived that the cause of the mutineers could ever prosper. But it is never to be forgotten that the people were without arms. Even in a few years the general disarming had produced a change in the national habits. The rougher and sturdier classes felt that they were unprepared for strife, and that they were destitute of one principal means of resistance. Then, fortunately, the class of men who once had been leaders in strife, and round whom the disaffected might rally, were scarcely to be found in the Punjab. State prisoners and dangerous characters had always been kept at a distance from their native province. This circumstance, without doubt, proved most opportune. The Chiefs who remained, either with feudal possessions or with independent powers, were on our side to a man. In the days before our rule they had witnessed the effects of military anarchy, and knew that they themselves would be the first prey of an insurgent soldiery flushed with victory over their lawful rulers. No respectable man wished to see the revival of a military domination such as that with which the country was threatened should the mutiny succeed. Those Chiefs who had troops perceived in the events of Hindoostan an example of what would next happen to themselves. And the aged Maharajah of Jummoo and Cashmere trembled lest the scenes which he remembered at Lahore should be re-enacted in his old age by his own army.

47. On the whole, it must be said, in fairness, that the Punjab people behaved creditably, and deserve well of the British Government. There was no marked or extraordinary increase of violent crime; of lesser offences there was a positive decrease upon former years. In almost all districts the civil courts were open throughout the period of trouble,

Creditable behaviour of the people of the Punjab.

and there was no falling-off in the amount of judicial business during the year. The land revenue was paid up to the last rupee; in the excise taxes there was actually an increase. Even the attendance of pupils at the Government schools did not materially diminish, and the public dispensaries were resorted to much as usual. All these points indicate that the people preserved an even mind; that they never mistrusted our intentions; that they were slow to doubt our power. Many of the Chiefs rendered that degree of assistance which should claim the gratitude of Englishmen. The independent tribes on the frontier seemed either not to comprehend how really embarrassed we were or else to be intent on plunder rather than conquest. They showed, in many instances, that their disposition towards us was bad, and were frequently meditating serious irruption on various points; yet they did not make any systematic attempt to break through that cordon of British power which, through the vast length of the frontier, has so long acted as a barrier against evil. The Afghans were in a position to cause us extreme embarrassment. But the friendly attitude of the Ameer's Government was doubtless in part the result of the treaty of 1855, and of the closer relations which had subsisted since 1856, so greatly to His Highness's advantage. Such, so far as secondary human causes go, were apparently the reasons why the Punjabees remained true to the British during this most critical period. In enumerating these we must never forget to look up to the first Great Cause, namely, the Divine mercy towards us.

Assistance rendered by the Chiefs.

Friendly attitude of the Amir of Kábul.

Tension during the operations against Delhi.

48. But the aspect of things, at first so encouraging, began gradually to be darkened over. When, week after week and month after month passed away, and the rebellion was not put down, the Punjabees then began to think that the British power could hardly recover from the repeated shocks it was sustaining. The accumulating odds against us seemed insuperable. When detachment after detachment of Europeans went out of the Punjab and none came in; when the successes of the mutineers re-echoed through the land; when cantonment after cantonment in Hindoostan was

destroyed and deserted by its soldiery, who rushed to Delhi ; when incendiary letters arrived, figuratively indicating the position of the British in India, and saying that "many of the finest trees in the garden have fallen," that "white wheat had become very scarce, and country produce very abundant," that "hats were hardly to be seen, while turbans were plentiful"—then the Punjabees began to feel how utterly isolated we were and how desperate was our cause. Their minds passed from confidence to doubt, then to mistrust, and then to disaffection. This last symptom had begun to set in when Delhi fell. To the last, however, the Punjabee troops before Delhi behaved most gallantly. Though many and great were the temptations held out, still there were no desertions. But they began to feel and even to show their consciousness of power. The Chief Commissioner believes that there is a limit beyond which mercenary troops will not remain faithful to their salt. No doubt the better they are treated, the more highly they are disciplined, physically and morally, in the true sense of the term, the longer can they be relied on. But when the hope of success has departed from their breasts ; when on all sides they are surrounded by enemies, who with the one hand present certain destruction as the penalty of fidelity, and with the other hand offer a share in the fruits of victory as the reward of desertion—then it were vain to expect that such troops will ever fight for us to the death. Individually they are willing enough to stake their lives for that which is worth the risk. No men care less for safety, provided that they see a fair chance of eventual success. But when once that chance shall vanish, then every mercenary native soldier thinks how he shall best shift for himself. Who shall say how nearly this fatal turn was approached during the late crisis? Again, the Mahomedans of the Punjab, although after having been a vanquished and oppressed race under the Sikhs, they had lived easily and prosperously under British rule, are yet imbued with fanaticism, impatient of control, and prone to change. The temper of these people in Peshawur and Kohat is especially wayward and fitful.

The Mahomedans, after a time, began to think that the day of our rule was drawing towards its close, and that the time had come when they should strike for power and for plunder. As regards the Sikhs, one decade only had passed since they were the dominant power in the Punjab. They are a highly military race. Their prejudices are comparatively few. But their religion constitutes a strong bond of union; though depressed by political disaster, it has still vitality and a power of expansion through the admission of new converts. It might revive in a moment through any change of circumstances, and spread far and wide. Again, the memory of the Khalsa or Sikh commonwealth may sleep, but is not yet dead. A spirit of nationality and military ambition still survive in the minds and hearts of thousands among the Sikhs. It were vain to suppose that thoughts of future triumphs and future independence did not cross the imaginations of these people; that aspirations of restoring the Khalsa were not excited during the summer of 1857. The premonitory symptoms of danger broke out in August and September in two points widely distant from each other, and in the very districts which, perhaps, of all others, had most benefited by our rule. In Huzara and Googaira the *émeutes* already related arose from no grievance or special cause whatever. They merely sprang from the popular belief that British power was mortally stricken, and they afforded examples of what would soon have happened universally if Delhi had not fallen.

Acknowledgment of the services of officers.

49. It now only remains to record how ably, how zealously, how effectively, the Chief Commissioner has been aided by the various classes of officers who served in conjunction with him and under his orders, in his efforts to discharge the difficult duties which fell to his lot.

Major-General Sir S. Cotton.

50. From the Military authorities in the Punjab the Chief Commissioner has received much support. They freely and considerately received his advice and listened to his suggestions. The Chief Commissioner's gratitude is especially due to Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton for the able

management of the Peshawur Division, and to Brigadier S. Corbett for the promptitude displayed in the disarming of the Native troops at Lahore; and to Major Crawford Chamberlain for the excellent arrangements whereby he disarmed the two Native Infantry regiments at Mooltan.

Services of—
Brigadier
Corbett.
Major C.
Chamberlain.

51. The Chief Commissioner desires that the obligations be recorded which he deeply feels to be owing to Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, the Commandant of the Punjab Force. To that officer's zeal, ability, and high standard of military excellence the present character of these troops is much indebted. Immediately after the Mutiny broke out he was placed in command of the Movable Column. His experience and his counsels were of great value to the Chief Commissioner during the first days of the crisis. He was subsequently appointed Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, and he was severely wounded before Delhi.

Brigadier
Neville Cham-
berlain.

52. Brigadier-General John Nicholson is now beyond human praise and human reward; but so long as British rule shall endure in India his fame can never perish. He seems especially to have been raised up for this juncture. He crowned a bright, though brief, career by dying of the wound he received in the moment of victory at Delhi. The Chief Commissioner does not hesitate to affirm that without John Nicholson, Delhi could not have fallen.

The late Brig-
adier-Gener-
al John
Nicholson.

53. Among the Civil and Military officers in administrative employment, the Chief Commissioner's first acknowledgments are due to Mr. Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab. No one perhaps ever had a more single-minded, active, and determined coadjutor than the Chief Commissioner has possessed in that officer. In the midst of this crisis all persons felt assured when Robert Montgomery was among them. His coolness in danger and his fertility of resource were invaluable.

Mr. R. Mont-
gomery.

54. The Chief Commissioner is also much indebted to Mr. D. F. McLeod, the Financial Commissioner, for much valuable advice during this period. There is probably no

Mr. D. F.
McLeod.

Services of— officer who understands the native character better than Mr. McLeod.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes.

55. Among the divisional and local officers, the post of difficulty and honor was held by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawur. Allusion has already been made to the admirable manner in which he discharged his duties. His report on the events which occurred at Peshawur, and in which he played so brilliant a part, is full of deep interest. Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, was officiating as the Chief Commissioner's Secretary when the mutiny broke out. Shortly afterwards, he voluntarily relinquished the advantages of that post and returned to Peshawur to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson to assume command of the Movable Column. As Officiating Secretary, and subsequently as Deputy Commissioner, he performed good service. On several occasions he conducted very successful expeditions in the field. Major J. R. Becher, as Deputy Commissioner of Huzara, held a very difficult charge, to which he proved himself fully equal. He displayed much resolution, tact, and judgment. Captain Henderson preserved the peace of the difficult district of Kohat, and his arrangements throughout this trying time gave much satisfaction.

Captain H. R. James.

Major J. R. Becher.

Captain Henderson.

56. The point next to Peshawur in difficulty was the division of the Cis-Sutlej States. There the population was armed; many classes were tainted with the bad spirit so prevalent in Hindoostan. Through that territory passed the main line of communication between the Punjab and Delhi. Throughout the tract were scattered Sikh Chiefs, great and small, some independent, some feudatory. The Chief Commissioner's acknowledgments are especially due to the Commissioner, Mr. G. C. Barnes, for the good management whereby he kept the Sikh Chiefs firm to their allegiance, and secured their active co-operation, and for the manner in which he preserved order and facilitated the passage of troops and *matériel*. Mr. G. H. M. Ricketts distinguished himself by the vigour with which he controlled the disaffected city of

Mr. G. C. Barnes.

Mr. G. Ricketts.

Loodiana, and the spirited manner in which he opposed the passage of the rebels at the Sutlej. Both Mr. Barnes and Mr. Ricketts received the thanks of General Wilson after the capture of Delhi. Mr. T. D. Forsyth, at Umballa, and Major Marsden, at Ferozepore, also signalized themselves by the discharge of multifarious and pressing duties in districts of peculiar difficulty.

Services of—

Mr. T. D.
Forsyth.
Major Mars-
den.

57. The next division in respect to difficulty was that of Lahore, containing as it does the political and religious capitals, namely, the cities of Lahore and Umritsur. Mr. A. A. Roberts, the Commissioner, evinced considerable prudence, temper, and activity, and rendered much assistance to Brigadier-General Nicholson in the operations against the Sealkote mutineers. Mr. F. Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner of Umritsur, distinguished himself in the capture of the mutineers of the 26th Native Infantry.

Mr. A. A.
Roberts.

Mr. F.
Cooper.

58. The Chief Commissioner's Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Macpherson, rendered valuable assistance throughout the crisis. The labors of Colonel Macpherson in the organization of the new regiments and in the multifarious duties which devolved on him were incessant. His counsel as an experienced soldier was most useful. Since the outbreak of the Mutiny there have, from first to last, been raised and organized 18 new regiments of Infantry, 6 of Cavalry, besides many thousands of levies—horse and foot. On the 1st May 1858, just one year after the Mutiny, the new force numbered upwards of 34,000, which, with the previous numbers (20,000), make up an aggregate of 54,000 men. The details of this large force passed through Colonel Macpherson's hands.

Lieutenant-
Colonel J. D.
Macpherson.

59. The services of Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Lawrence also demand notice. At the commencement of the crisis he was Captain of Police of the Lahore division. He was the first officer to discover the intended outbreak of the sepoys at Lahore. He was the sole European officer in charge of 2,700 organized military police, on whose fidelity so much

Lieutenant-
Colonel R. C.
Lawrence.

Services of— depended. During the months of May, June, and July he raised and organized 2,000 additional levies for service at Delhi, consisting of horse, foot, Artillerymen, and pioneers. He formed one of the commission deputed to Sealkote after the mutiny there. Lastly, at the request of the Maharaja, he was appointed to command the Jummoo contingent at Delhi, and afterwards he was placed in charge of the Jhujjur territory.

60. The Chief Commissioner also desires that certain officers should be mentioned who rendered important aid in the conveyance of men and *matériel* for the siege of Delhi. The camel train from Kurrachee to Mooltan was organized most efficiently by Mr. H. B. E. Frere, the Commissioner of Sindh, and Major G. W. Hamilton, Commissioner of Mooltan. Major Hamilton also deserves much credit in respect to the waggon train from Mooltan to Lahore, whereby nearly all the reinforcements of European troops have been brought up the country. In the management of the waggon train from Loodiana to Delhi, Captain Briggs rendered most important service, and merits very high commendation. The exertions of Captain Lewis, the Commissary of Ordnance, in the preparation and despatch of the great siege train from Ferozepore, were most valuable. Lieutenant Dobbin also gave much satisfaction in respect to the despatch of the siege train from Phillour.

Major G. W.
Hamilton.

Captain
Briggs.

Captain
Lewis.

Lieutenant
Dobbin.

61. The Chief Commissioner could not allow this notice of the officers who have distinguished themselves to be closed without mention being made of the great obligations under which he lies to Mr. H. B. E. Frere, the Commissioner of Sindh. From first to last, from the first commencement of the mutiny to the final triumph, that officer has rendered assistance to the Punjab administration just as if he had been one of its own Commissioners. It was owing to his indefatigable exertions that the 1st Bombay Fusiliers arrived at Mooltan so soon as they did. He despatched the 1st and then the 2nd Belooch battalion from Sindh to succour the Punjab. The Chief Commissioner believes that probably

Mr. H. B. E.
Frere.

there is no Civil officer in India who, for eminent exertions, deserves better of his Government than Mr. H. B. E. Frere.

62. I am now to add that, in causing this narrative to be recorded, Sir John Lawrence has not been actuated by any motive of self-laudation. Throughout the crisis he could not but feel that human means and human precautions were utterly impotent; that everything which was done or could be done to surmount such dangers and difficulties was as nothing, and that trust could be placed in Divine Providence alone. On the present occasion his sole objects are to submit to the Supreme Government a faithful account of what actually happened, and to bring to the notice of his superiors, and of his countrymen at large, the noble conduct and sterling merits of the officers who served under his orders, or in conjunction with him, during the critical and perilous period of 1857. The Chief Commissioner well knows that no functionary has ever been better served than he has, or owes more to his officers than he does. The Punjab officials of all grades had great difficulties to meet, and met them resolutely. They had to maintain the civil administration without interruption, despite many troubles and hindrances; to perform multifarious business connected with the raising, the supplying and transporting of troops, and all this they did, discharging their duty right well from first to last.

Objects of
this narrative.

63. Lastly, Sir John Lawrence desires to join with Mr. Montgomery in the expression of devout thankfulness to Almighty God. To Him alone is due the praise for our success, and for our very safety. His mercy vouchsafed a happy issue to our measures and confounded the devices of our enemies. Human aid could avail us nothing in that crisis. And it is owing to an over-ruling Providence, and to that alone, that a single Englishman was left alive in the Punjab.

Conclusion.

88. *From R. TEMPLE, Esquire, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, to R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Lucknow,—No. 324, dated 25th May 1858.*

Acknowledgment of the services of Mr. R. Montgomery.

I AM directed to transmit extract copy of paragraph 53 of letter No. 75—322 of the 25th current, reporting to the Supreme Government the events which occurred in the Punjab during the crisis of 1857.

2. From this you will see how many and great are the obligations which the Chief Commissioner considers that he owes to you for your hearty and most valued co-operation during that trying period.

3. But, further, Sir John Lawrence desires that this opportunity may be taken of recording the grateful sense he entertains of the services you have rendered to the Punjab administration. He has observed with high satisfaction that, as Commissioner of Lahore, as member of the late Board, as Judicial Commissioner successively, you have stamped upon many public departments the character of your own vigour and efficiency. He has to thank you warmly for the constant and cheerful aid you have afforded him as a colleague during the last nine years. He cannot but deeply regret your departure from the Punjab; still that regret is mitigated by the reflection that those qualities of yours which were long so conspicuous here have been transferred to a higher sphere of usefulness.

89. *From R. TEMPLE, Esquire, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay,—No. 323, dated 25th May 1858.*

I AM directed to transmit, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council, extract copy of paragraph 61 of letter No. 75—322 of the 25th current,

reporting to the Supreme Government the events which occurred in the Punjab during the crisis of 1857, in order that, if His Lordship in Council should see fit, the extract may be communicated to the Commissioner of Sindh as an acknowledgement on the part of the Chief Commissioner of the important aid afforded by Mr. Frere to the Punjab administration during that trying period.

Acknowledgment of aid rendered by Mr. Frere, Commissioner in Sindh

2. Sir John Lawrence would also desire to avail himself of this opportunity of tendering the expression of his thankful acknowledgments to the Bombay Government for the support and assistance it rendered to the Punjab at a time of unexampled danger and difficulty.

and of assistance received from the Bombay Government.

90. *From H. L. ANDERSON, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Bombay, to R. TEMPLE, Esquire, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, Lahore,—No. 2242, dated 14th June 1858.*

I AM directed by the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th May last, No. 323, and to state, for the information of the Chief Commissioner in the Punjab, that it will be a most grateful duty to this Government to forward the extract from your letter to the address of the Supreme Government, to Mr. Frere, the Commissioner in Sindh.

2. I am further desired to inform you that the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council has received the intimation conveyed in the second paragraph of your letter with the most sincere gratification.

3. A copy of your letter and of its enclosure will be forwarded for the information of the Home authorities.

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